Results for 'entailment thesis'

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  1. Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
    Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their (...)
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  2. Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):957-982.
    In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as (...)
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  3.  49
    Do We Need a New Theory of Truthmaking? Some Comments on Disjunction Thesis, Conjunction Thesis, Entailment Principle and Explanation.Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Wojciech Wciórka & Piotr Wilkin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):591-604.
    In the paper we discuss criticisms against David Armstrong’s general theory of truthmaking by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Peter Schulte and Benjamin Schnieder, and conclude that Armstrong’s theory survives these criticisms. Special attention is given to the problems concerning Entailment Principle, Conjunction Thesis, Disjunction Thesis and to the notion of explanation.
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    Why Margolis Hasn’T Defeated the Entailment Thesis.D. S. Mannison - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):553-559.
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    Why Margolis Hasn't Defeated the Entailment Thesis.D. S. Mannison - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):553 - 559.
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  6. Belief Through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also (...)
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  7. God Knows (but Does God Believe?).Dylan Murray, Justin Sytsma & Jonathan Livengood - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):83-107.
    The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the (...)
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  8.  96
    How to Be a Type-C Physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.
    This paper advances a version of physicalism which reconciles the “a priori entailment thesis” (APET) with the analytic independence of our phenomenal and physical vocabularies. The APET is the claim that, if physicalism is true, the complete truths of physics imply every other truth a priori. If so, “cosmic hermeneutics” is possible: a demon having only complete knowledge of physics could deduce every truth about the world. Analytic independence is a popular physicalist explanation for the apparent “epistemic gaps” (...)
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  9.  59
    The Bifurcated Conception of Perceptual Knowledge: A New Solution to the Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Kegan Shaw - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    Epistemological disjunctivism says that one can know that p on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p. The basis problem for disjunctivism says that that can’t be since seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p. In defense of their view disjunctivists have rejected the idea that seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p (the SwK thesis). That manoeuvre is familiar. In this (...)
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  10. Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.
    This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
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  11. Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
    In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a priori entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I (...)
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  12. In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.
    We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we provide evidence that the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology could be a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
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  13.  22
    Space, Supervenence and Entailment.Sophie Gibb - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (2):171-184.
    Le Poidevin has recently presented an argument that gives rise to a serious problem for relationist theories of space. It appeals to the simple geometrical fact that if A, B and C are three points lying in a straight line, then AB and BC together entail AC. He suggests that an ontological relationship of supervenience must be appealed to to explain this entailment. Given this thesis of supervenience, relationism is implausible. I argue that the problem that Le Poidevin (...)
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  14.  49
    Entailment.Jonathan Bennett - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):197-236.
    Following Moore, I use ‘P entails Q’ as a convenient shorthand for ‘Q can be deduced logically from P’, ‘From P, Q follows logically’, ‘There is a logically valid argument with P as sole premise and Q as conclusion’, and the like.1 Apart from a minor point to be raised in Section XVI, distinctions within this cluster do not matter for present purposes. An analysis of the concept of entailment is answerable to careful, educated uses of expressions such as (...)
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  15. Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.
    Symposium contribution on Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book he develops this thesis within the two-dimensional framework and also proposes a formal argument for it. I argue that the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.
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  16. The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):427-443.
    This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both (...)
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  17. Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is (...)
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  18. Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):190-222.
    According to a view I’ll call Epistemic Normativism, knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues against EN in two stages and defends a positive non-normativist alternative. After clarifying the target in §1, I consider in §2 some arguments for EN from the premise that knowledge entails justification. I first raise some worries about inferring constitution from entailment. I then rehearse the reasons why some epistemologists reject the (...) Thesis and argue that a non-normativist picture provides the best explanation of all the intuitions surrounding this thesis, favorable and unfavorable. On this picture, human knowledge is a structured non-normative complex that has as one of its parts a justification-making property, analogous in role to good-making properties like pleasurableness. After giving three arguments against EN in §3 and answering an objection in §4, I turn in §5 to further develop the positive view sketched in §2. In §6, I take stock and conclude. (shrink)
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  19.  1
    Possibility. [REVIEW]Michael Jubien - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):184-186.
    Possibility aims to stake out and defend a novel position in the metaphysics of modality: the Entailment Thesis, that modality is to be analysed via entailments between properties and relations. ‘Necessarily, all horses are mammals’, for instance, is analysed as ‘The property of being a horse entails the property of being a mammal’. Possible worlds play no part of the analysis; Jubien insists they are theoretically valueless.Although ET forms its core, much of the book concerns other matters. Jubien (...)
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  20. A Place for Dogs and Trees?Thomas W. Polger - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Rosenberg does not provide arguments for some crucial premises in his argument against physicalism. In particular, he gives no independent argument to show that physicalists must accept the entry-by-entailment thesis. The arguments provided establish weaker premises than those that are needed. As a consequence, Rosenberg.
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  21.  87
    Charity Implies Meta-Charity.Roy Sorensen - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):290 - 315.
    The principle of charity says that all agents are rational. The principle of meta-charity says that all agents believe all agents are rational. My thesis is that the arguments which are used to support charity also support meta-charity. Meta-charity implies meta-meta-charity. By recursion, the principle of charity implies that it is common knowledge. But there appears to be intelligent, well-informed disagreement with the principle of charity. So if the entailment thesis holds, opponents of the principle of charity (...)
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    Knowledge Requires Belief – and It Doesn’T? On Belief as Such and Belief Necessary for Knowledge.Peter Baumann - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Does knowledge entail belief? This paper argues that the answer depends on how one interprets ‘belief’. There are two different notions of belief: belief as such and belief for knowledge. They often differ in their degrees of conviction such that one but not both might be present in a particular case. The core of the paper is dedicated to a defense of this overlooked distinction. The beginning of the paper presents the distinction. It then presents two cases which are supposed (...)
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    Positive Truthmakers for Negative Truths: A Solution to Molnar’s Problem.Jonas Waechter - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):579-592.
    The present paper addresses Molnar’s problem :72–86, 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called, is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible (...)
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    Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    In his very influential book, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I show that his argument can be refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth (...)
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  25. Ontological Physicalism and Property Pluralism: Why They Are Incompatible.Robert Francescotti - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):349-362.
    To earn the title “ontological physicalist,” one must endorse an entailment thesis of the following sort: the physical properties that are had, together with the causal laws, determine which higher-level properties are had. I argue that if this thesis is to capture all that is essential to physicalist intuitions, the relevant set of causal laws must be restricted to purely physical laws. But then it follows that higher-level properties are physical properties. The conclusion is that one cannot (...)
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  26.  6
    I—Lucifer’s Logic Lesson: How to Lie with Arguments.Roy Sorensen - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):105-126.
    My thesis is that you can lie with ‘ P therefore Q ’ without P or Q being lies. For you can lie by virtue of not believing that P supports Q. My thesis is reconciled with the principle that all lies are assertions through H. P. Grice’s account of conventional implicatures. These semantic cousins of conversational implicatures are secondary assertions that clarify the speaker’s attitude toward his primary assertions. The meaning of ‘therefore’ commits the speaker to an (...)
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  27. Defining "Physicalism".Robert Francescotti - 1998 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):51-64.
    To earn the title “ontological physicalist,” one must endorse an entailment thesis of the following sort: the physical properties that are had, together with the causal laws, determine which higher-level properties are had. I argue that if this thesis is to capture all that is essential to physicalist intuitions, the relevant set of causal laws must be restricted to purely physical laws. But then it follows that higher-level properties are physical properties. The conclusion is that one cannot (...)
     
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  28.  2
    The Interpretation of Partitioned Frame Semantics.Colin R. Caret - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    The advocate of modal logic or relevant logic has traditionally argued that her preferred system offers the best regimentation of the theory of entailment. Essential to the projects of modal and relevant logic is the importation of non-truth-functional expressive resources into the object language on which the logic is defined. The most elegant technique for giving the semantics of such languages is that of frame semantics, a variation on which features the device of partitioned frames that divide 'points of (...)
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  29. Talk About Stuffs & Things: The Logic of Mass and Count Nouns.Kathrin Koslicki - 1995 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    My thesis examines the mass/count distinction; that is, to illustrate, the distinction between the role of "hair" in "There is hair in my soup" and "There is a hair in my soup". In "hair" has a mass-occurrence; in a count-occurrence. These two kinds of noun-occurrences, I argue, can be marked off from each other largely on syntactic grounds. Along the semantic dimension, I suggest that, in order to account for the intuitive distinction between nouns in their mass-occurrences and their (...)
     
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  30. Reason-Giving Statements.Helen Lauer - 1987 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    It is commonplace to observe that explanations of human behavior diverge from explanations of other sorts, though it is far from commonplace to articulate exactly what this divergence amounts to. One very obvious and rather marvelous fact about explanations in the human sciences is that the subject matter talks and sometimes literally explains itself. This dissertation is an essay about what sort of difference language participation makes to explaining what language participants do. ;Currently, action theorists are recruiting insights from philosophy (...)
     
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  31.  45
    Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2012 - Dissertation, Sussex
    This thesis introduces the Problem of Consciousness as an antinomy between Physicalism and Primitivism about the phenomenal. I argue that Primitivism is implausible, but is supported by two conceptual gaps. The ‘–tivity gap’ holds that physical states are objective and phenomenal states are subjective, and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ holds that physical properties are extrinsic and phenomenal qualities are intrinsic, and that there is no entailment from the (...)
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  32. Well Founding Grounding Grounding.Gabriel Oak Rabin & Brian Rabern - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (4):349-379.
    Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead (...)
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    Is 'the Monstrous Thesis' Truly Cartesian?Rodrigo González - 2017 - Discusiones Filosóficas 18 (30):15-33.
    According to Kemp Smith, Descartes believed that animals were devoid of feelings and sensations. This is the so-called ‘monstrous thesis,’ which I explore here in light of two Cartesian approaches to animals. Firstly, I examine their original treatment in function of Descartes’ early metaphysical approach, i.e., all natural phenomena are to be elucidated in terms of mental scrutiny. As pain would only exist in the understanding, and animals have neither understanding nor souls, Descartes held that they did not suffer. (...)
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  34. The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
    The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists find them unconvincing. Last, we present some purported counterexamples that have been raised against Uniqueness (...)
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  35. Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.
    In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft (...)
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  36.  10
    Virtue, Profit, and the Separation Thesis: An Aristotelian View. [REVIEW]Edwin M. Hartman - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 99 (1):5 - 17.
    If social scientists take natural science as a model, they may err in their predictions and may offer facile ethical views. Maclntyre assails them for this, but he is unduly pessimistic about business, and in rejecting the separation thesis he raises some difficulties about naturalism.Aristotle's views of the good life and of the close relationship between internal and external goods provide a corrective to Maclntyre, and in fact suggest how virtues can support social capital and thus prevail within and (...)
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  37. The Fall of “Adams' Thesis”?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):145-161.
    The so-called ‘Adams’ Thesis’ is often understood as the claim that the assertibility of an indicative conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability—schematically: $${({\rm AT})}\qquad\qquad\quad As(A\rightarrow B)=P({B|A}),{\rm provided}\quad P(A)\neq 0.$$ The Thesis is taken by many to be a touchstone of any theorizing about indicative conditionals. Yet it is unclear exactly what the Thesis is . I suggest some precise statements of it. I then rebut a number of arguments that have been given in its favor. Finally, I (...)
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  38. Stalnaker’s Thesis in Context.Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):131-163.
    In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The (...) is formalised rigorously and two models are provided that demonstrate that the new thesis is indeed tenable within a standard possible world semantics based on selection functions. Unlike the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics the selection functions cannot be understood in terms of similarity. A probabilistic account of selection is defended in its place. -/- I end the paper by suggesting that this approach overcomes some of the objections often leveled at accounts of indicatives based on the notion of similarity. (shrink)
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  39.  79
    The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside–Outside’ Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW]Ciano Aydin - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):73-94.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. (...)
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  40.  93
    Hypercomputation and the Physical Church‐Turing Thesis.Paolo Cotogno - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):181-223.
    A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be simulated by Turing Machines (‘Thesis P’). In this formulation the Thesis appears to be an empirical hypothesis, subject to physical falsification. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (‘hypercomputation’): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. The conclusions are that these models reduce to supertasks, i.e. infinite computation, and that even supertasks are no solution for recursive incomputability. This yields (...)
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  41. A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
    Mary learns all the physical facts that one can learn by watching lectures on black-on-white television. According to Jackson, Mary learns new facts when she leaves the room and has color experiences, and that this undermines physicalism. Physicalists have responded by denying the new facts thesis; they argue, she acquires abilities, acquaintance knowledge, or new guises. I argue that the NFT is more plausible than any of the proposed alternatives. I also argue that the NFT does not undermine physicalism (...)
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  42. Truthmaking Without Necessitation.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):11-28.
    I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a "Duplication Principle", according to which a suitable entity T is a truthmaker for a proposition P just in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart of T entails the truth of P, where the counterpart relation is cashed out in terms of qualitative duplication. My account captures an intuitive notion of truthmakers as "things the way they are", validates two appealing principles about (...)
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  43.  97
    Physical Hypercomputation and the Church–Turing Thesis.Oron Shagrir & Itamar Pitowsky - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (1):87-101.
    We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a function that is not Turing computable. Finally, we argue that the existence of the device does not refute the Church–Turing thesis, but nevertheless may be a counterexample to Gandy's (...)
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  44. Role of the Frame Problem in Fodor's Modularity Thesis.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 1996 - In Ken Ford & Zenon Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited.
    It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected.
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  45. The Church-Turing ‘Thesis’ as a Special Corollary of Gödel’s Completeness Theorem.Saul A. Kripke - 2013 - In B. J. Copeland, C. Posy & O. Shagrir (eds.), Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond. MIT Press.
    Traditionally, many writers, following Kleene (1952), thought of the Church-Turing thesis as unprovable by its nature but having various strong arguments in its favor, including Turing’s analysis of human computation. More recently, the beauty, power, and obvious fundamental importance of this analysis, what Turing (1936) calls “argument I,” has led some writers to give an almost exclusive emphasis on this argument as the unique justification for the Church-Turing thesis. In this chapter I advocate an alternative justification, essentially presupposed (...)
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  46. Evil and Moral Detachment: Further Reflections on The Mirror Thesis.Alfred Archer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):201-218.
    A commonly accepted claim by philosophers investigating the nature of evil is that the evil person is, in some way, the mirror image of the moral saint. In this paper I will defend a new version of this thesis. I will argue that both the moral saint and the morally evil person are characterized by a lack of conflict between moral and non-moral concerns. However, while the saint achieves this unity through a reconciliation of the two, the evil person (...)
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  47. A Priori Entailment and Conceptual Analysis: Making Room for Type-C Physicalism.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111.
    One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual analysis (...)
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  48. Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.
    In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.
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    On the Decidability of Implicational Ticket Entailment.Katalin Bimbó & J. Michael Dunn - 2013 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 78 (1):214-236.
    The implicational fragment of the logic of relevant implication, $R_\to$ is known to be decidable. We show that the implicational fragment of the logic of ticket entailment, $T_\to$ is decidable. Our proof is based on the consecution calculus that we introduced specifically to solve this 50-year old open problem. We reduce the decidability problem of $T_\to$ to the decidability problem of $R_\to$. The decidability of $T_\to$ is equivalent to the decidability of the inhabitation problem of implicational types by combinators (...)
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  50. Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics.Charles R. Pigden - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.
    My first paper on the Is/Ought issue. The young Arthur Prior endorsed the Autonomy of Ethics, in the form of Hume’s No-Ought-From-Is (NOFI) but the later Prior developed a seemingly devastating counter-argument. I defend Prior's earlier logical thesis (albeit in a modified form) against his later self. However it is important to distinguish between three versions of the Autonomy of Ethics: Ontological, Semantic and Ontological. Ontological Autonomy is the thesis that moral judgments, to be true, must answer to (...)
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