Results for 'epiphenomenal qualia'

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  1. I: The Knowledge Argument for Qualia.Epiphenomenal Qualia - 2006 - In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 102.
  2. B. The Knowledge Argument.Epiphenomenal Qualia - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 273.
     
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  3. Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
  4.  96
    Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
    Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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  5. Not so Epiphenomenal Qualia.Fredrik Stjernberg - 1996 - Spinning Ideas.
    Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism has caused an extensive debate. In this paper, I sketch and examine a new argument against Jackson's view, an argument which appears to retain more of physicalism than other replies to Jackson. this argument draws strength from a causal theory of knowledge, and hold that there is no knowledge of epiphenomenal qualia, hence that Jackson's main conclusions from the thought experiment are incorrect. There are still problems with this argument, however, so the (...)
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  6. Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  7.  64
    Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal?Daniel Lim & Wang Hao - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.
    Frank Jackson (1982) famously argued, with his so-called Knowledge Argument (KA), that qualia are non-physical. Moreover, he argued that qualia are epiphenomenal. Some have objected that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA. One way of developing this objection, following Neil Campbell (2003; 2012), is to argue that epiphenomenalism is at odds with the kind of behavioral evidence that makes the soundness of KA plausible. We argue that Campbell’s claim that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness (...)
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  8. "Epiphenomenal" Qualia?Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Little, Brown. pp. 127-136.
  9.  13
    Mental Fictionalism and Epiphenomenal Qualia.Gábor Bács - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):297-308.
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  10.  75
    Why Qualia Are Not Epiphenomenal.Hans Muller - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):85–90.
    In this article, I give an original objection to Frank Jackson's argument for the conclusion that the subjective, felt properties of experience are causally inert. I show that the very act of asserting the existence of these properties undermines the claim that they are epiphenomenal. If this objection goes through, it is fatal to the argument in question.
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  11. Mad Qualia.Umut Baysan - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):467-485.
    This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an (...) property. One conclusion is that it is not obvious if qualia epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false—or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, physicalism, and non-physicalist property dualism are further explored. (shrink)
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  12.  73
    Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.
    In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect. I begin by offering four arguments that such non-introspectible conscious experiences are possible. Next, I offer two arguments for thinking that we actually have such experiences. According to the first argument, it is unlikely that evolution would have furnished us with a faculty of introspection that worked flawlessly. According to the second argument, there (...)
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  13. Dennett on Qualia and Consciousness: A Critique.Bredo Johnsen - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):47-82.
    IntroductionIt is at least a bit embarrassing, perhaps even scandalous, that debate should still rage over the sheer existence of qualia, but they continue to find able defenders after decades of being attacked as relics of ghostly substances, epiphenomenal non-entities, nomological danglers and the like; the intensity of the current confrontation is captured vividly by Daniel Dennett:What are qualia, exactly? This obstreperous query is dismissed by one author by invoking Louis Armstrong's legendary reply when asked what jazz (...)
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  14. Re-Acquaintance with Qualia.John C. Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):353 – 378.
    Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on 'Epiphenomenal qualia '[Jackson 1982 that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray. Eventually, Jackson did publish a diagnosis (...)
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  15.  38
    The Causal Efficacy of Qualia.Mark Bradley - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
    Qualia are the elements of phenomenal consciousness -- the raw feels which constitute what it is like to be in a conscious mental state. Some claim that qualia are epiphenomenal properties -- mere by-products of brain function which are causally inert. Though this is an implausible theory, it is difficult to show that it is false. Here I present an ad hominem argument -- the argument from coincidence -- which shows that epiphenomenalism about qualia is explanatorily (...)
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  16.  4
    Dennett on Qualia and Consciousness: A Critique.Bredo Johnsen - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):47-81.
    IntroductionIt is at least a bit embarrassing, perhaps even scandalous, that debate should still rage over the sheer existence of qualia, but they continue to find able defenders after decades of being attacked as relics of ghostly substances, epiphenomenal non-entities, nomological danglers and the like; the intensity of the current confrontation is captured vividly by Daniel Dennett:What are qualia, exactly? This obstreperous query is dismissed by one author by invoking Louis Armstrong's legendary reply when asked what jazz (...)
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  17. An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument.Neil Campbell - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):261-266.
    I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeed in showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given the structure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim that qualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tension is that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they have causal efficacy, while (...)
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  18. More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism.Hans Muller - 2008 - Philosophia 37 (1):109-112.
    I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far (...)
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    Novel Colours.Evan Thompson - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):321-349.
    Could there be genuinely novel colours — that is, visual qualities having a hue that bears a resemblance relation to red, green, yellow, and blue, yet is neither reddish, nor greenish, nor yellowish, nor blueish?1 And if there could be such colours, what would it be like to see them? How would the colours look? In his article,"Epiphenomenal Qualia,"2 Frank Jackson presents a philosophical thought experiment that raises these questions . Jackson asks us to imagine a perceiver named (...)
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  20. The Knowledge Argument.Brie Gertler - 2005 - In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan.
    The definitive statement of the Knowledge Argument was formulated by Frank Jackson, in a paper entitled “Epiphenomenal Qualia” that appeared in The Philosophical Quarterly in 1982. Arguments in the same spirit had appeared earlier (Broad 1925, Robinson 1982), but Jackson’s argument is most often compared with Thomas Nagel’s argument in “What is it Like to be a Bat?” (1974). Jackson, however, takes pains to distinguish his argument from Nagel’s. This entry will follow standard practice in focusing on Jackson’s (...)
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  21. The Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 1999 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    Frank Jackson first presented the Knowledge Argument in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" 1982). The KA is an argument against physicalism, the doctrine that everything is physical. The general thrust of the KA is that physicalism errs by misconstruing or denying the existence of the subjective features of experience. Physicalists have given numerous responses, and the debate continues about whether the KA ultimately succeeds in refuting any or all forms of physicalism. Jackson himself has recently.
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  22. Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):429-457.
    Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia’. First, they are irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset (...)
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  23. Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness.Robert James M. Boyles - 2012 - In Proceedings of the DLSU Congress 2012. pp. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, (...)
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  24. Growing Evidence That Perceptual Qualia Are Neuroelectrical Not Computational.Mostyn W. Jones - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):89-116.
    Computational neuroscience attributes coloured areas and other perceptual qualia to calculations that are realizable in multiple cellular forms. This faces serious issues in explaining how the various qualia arise and how they bind to form overall perceptions. Qualia may instead be neuroelectrical. Growing evidence indicates that perceptions correlate with neuroelectrical activity spotted by locally activated EEGs, the different qualia correlate with the different electrochemistries of unique detector cells, a unified neural-electromagnetic field binds this activity to form (...)
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  25. Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  26. Agency, Qualia and Life: Connecting Mind and Body Biologically.David Longinotti - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Cham: Springer. pp. 43-56.
    Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency, mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which (...)
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  27.  94
    Epiphenomenal Properties.Umut Baysan - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):419-431.
    What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterisation of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such (...)
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  28. Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 309--328.
    It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the (...)
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  29. Four Meta-Methods for the Study of Qualia.Lok-Chi Chan & Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):145-167.
    In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ employed in scientific and philosophical research of qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of qualia that we immediately observe through introspection ; the argument-centred meta-method is interested in (...)
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  30. Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
    endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint the difference between (...)
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  31. Qualia and Introspection.Michael Beaton - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.
    The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue (...)
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  32. Two Types of Qualia Theory.Pär Sundström - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.
    This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.
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  33.  87
    Meta-Illusionism and Qualia Quietism.Pete Mandik - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):140-148.
    Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as Frankish, in holding their view, (...)
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  34. Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars.Hilan Bensusan & Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory (...)
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  35. Sensazioni o proprietà sensibili? Lo statuto ontologico dei qualia in fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2015 - In Roberta Lanfredini (ed.), Architettura della conoscenza e ontologia. Mimesis. pp. 157-187.
    In this paper, I address the issue of the ontological status of qualitative properties. I discuss the prevalent approaches to the problem of qualia in philosophy of mind, in relation to the various attempts at naturalizing the mind and the various theories of perception. I compare these views with Husserl's phenomenology, highlighting the phenomenological distinction between phenomenal contents of mental states and sensory properties of the perceived objects. I present some open issues of this view, in order to show (...)
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  36. Is Qualia Meaning or Understanding?Cosmin Visan - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 5 (8):729-745.
    By arguing that qualia is meaning or understanding, a new framework for understanding consciousness is developed. In this way, the meaning of yellow and red are uncovered. The suggested solutions are that yellow means “source of light” and red means “important”. Also, in the process of arguing that qualia is meaning, remarkable similarities in the structure of qualia are uncovered. In this way, a reason for why very hot and very cold water feel the same, is given. (...)
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    Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.
    It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – (...)
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  38.  9
    Qualia Ain't Out Here Either.Christopher Searle - 2020 - Think 19 (54):31-35.
    What follows is a short thought experiment that aims to show, reductio ad absurdum, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. Those wishing to rebut the argument presented here will need to demonstrate why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection of functionally isolated components are necessary to the instantiation of qualia.
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  39. Qualia and the Senses.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    How should we characterize the nature of perceptual experience? Some theorists claim that colour experiences, to take an example of perceptual experiences, have both intentional properties and properties called 'colour qualia', namely, mental qualitative properties which are what it is like to be conscious of colour. Since proponents of colour qualia hold that these mental properties cannot be explained in terms of causal relations, this position is in opposition to a functionalist characterization of colour experience.
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  40. Beyond Musical Qualia: Reflecting on the Concept of Experience.Andrea Schiavio & Dylan van der Schyff - 2016 - Psychomusicology 26 (4):366-378.
    In this paper, we take a critical look at the notion of musical qualia. Although different conceptions of qualia are often used by theorists to describe musical experience, there is little consensus as to just what this entails. Broadly speaking, some argue that qualia are best understood as pregiven attributes of the musical environment, whereas others insist that they are products of information processing confined within the boundaries of the skull. We critically examine these positions and consider (...)
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  41. Qualia, Space, and Control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
    According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a (...)
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  42. The Reality of Qualia.Gary Hatfield - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):133--168.
    This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism on epistemological, metaphysical, and 'ordinary' grounds. I distinguish my representative realism from sense-data theories and from recent 'representational' or 'intentional' theories, and I argue that there is no good reason to adopt a physicalist stance that denies the reality of (...)
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  43. Musical Qualia, Context, Time and Emotion.J. Goguen - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):117-147.
    Nearly all listeners consider the subjective aspects of music, such as its emotional tone, to have primary importance. But contemporary philosophers often downplay, ignore, or even deny such aspects of experience. Moreover, traditional philosophies of music try to decontextualize it. Using music as an example, this paper explores the structure of qualitative experience, demonstrating that it is multi-layer emergent, non-compositional, enacted, and situation dependent, among other non-Cartesian properties. Our explanations draw on recent work in cognitive science, including blending, image schemas, (...)
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  44. Let's Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument.B. van Heuveln, Eric Dietrich & M. Oshima - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249.
    David Chalmers' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even stronger, (...)
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  45. The Extra Qualia Problem: Synaesthesia and Representationism.A. Wager - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):263-281.
    Representationism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Synaesthesia is a condition in which the phenomenal character of the experience produced in a subject by stimulation of one sensory modality contains elements characteristic of a second, unstimulated sensory modality. After reviewing some of the recent psychological literature on synaesthesia and one of the leading versions of representationism, I argue that cases of synaesthesia, as instances of what I call the extra qualia (...)
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  46. Naturalizing Phenomenology? Dretske on Qualia.Ronald McIntyre - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford University Press. pp. 429--439.
    First, I briefly characterize Dretske’s particular naturalization project, emphasizing his naturalistic reconstruction of the notion of representation. Second, I note some apparent similarities between his notion of representation and Husserl’s notion of intentionality, but I find even more important differences. Whereas Husserl takes intentionality to be an intrinsic, phenomenological feature of thought and experience, Dretske advocates an “externalist” account of mental representation. Third, I consider Dretske’s treatment of qualia, because he takes it to show that his representational account of (...)
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  47. Will Science and Consciousness Ever Meat? Complexity, Symmetry and Qualia.Roger Vergauwen - 2010 - Symmetry 2 (3):1250-1269.
    Within recent discussions in the Philosophy of Mind, the nature of conscious phenomenal states or qualia (also called ‘raw feels’ or the feel of ‘what it is like to be’) has been an important focus of interest. Proponents of Mind-Body Type-Identity theories have claimed that mental states can be reduced to neurophysiological states of the brain. Others have denied that such a reduction is possible; for them, there remains an explanatory gap. In this paper, functionalist, physicalist, epiphenomenalist, and biological (...)
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  48. In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Volker Gadenne - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
    Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
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  49. The Logic of Qualia.Drew McDermott - manuscript
    Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that is, to include the formulas of (...)
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  50. The Case for Qualia[REVIEW]Stephen Robbins - 2010 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (1-2):141-156.
    This is a review of "The Case for Qualia" (Ed., Edmund Wright). The review is in three parts. In Part 1, I briefly lay out the general metaphysic in which the debate on qualia has been unfolding. I term it the classical or spatial metaphysic. In Part 2, we traverse the essays and relate them – the problems with which they grapple, the pitfalls they encounter – to this classic metaphysic. In Part 3, I will briefly sketch out (...)
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