Results for 'epistemic aims'

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  1. Goldman and Siegel on the Epistemic Aims of Education.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy of Education.
    Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegel’s position intuitively more plausible than Goldman’s, we also find Siegel’s defence of it wanting. (...)
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  2. The Dynamics of Scientific Concepts: The Relevance of Epistemic Aims and Values.Ingo Brigandt - 2012 - In Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 75–103.
    The philosophy of science that grew out of logical positivism construed scientific knowledge in terms of set of interconnected beliefs about the world, such as theories and observation statements. Nowadays science is also conceived of as a dynamic process based on the various practices of individual scientists and the institutional settings of science. Two features particularly influence the dynamics of scientific knowledge: epistemic standards and aims (e.g., assumptions about what issues are currently in need of scientific study and (...)
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  3.  39
    Pierre Duhem’s Epistemic Aims and the Intellectual Virtue of Humility: A Reply to Ivanova.Ian James Kidd - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):185-189.
    David Stump has recently argued that Pierre Duhem can be interpreted as a virtue epistemologist. Stump’s claims have been challenged by Milena Ivanova on the grounds that Duhem’s ‘epistemic aims’ are more modest than those of virtue epistemologists. I challenge Ivanova’s criticism of Stump by arguing that she not distinguish between ‘reliabilist’ and ‘responsibilist’ virtue epistemologies. Once this distinction is drawn, Duhem clearly emerges as a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ in a way that complements Ivanova’s positive proposal that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ (...)
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  4. Pictorial Art and Epistemic Aims.Jochen Briesen - 2014 - In Harald Klinke (ed.), Art Theory as Visual Epistemology. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 11-28.
    The question whether art is of any epistemic value is an old question in the philosophy of art. Whereas many contemporary artists, art-critics, and art-historians answer this question affirmatively, many contemporary philosophers remain skeptical. If art is of epistemic significance, they maintain, then it has to contribute to our quest of achieving our most basic epistemic aim, namely knowledge.Unfortunately, recent and widely accepted analyses of knowledge make it very hard to see how art might significantly contribute to (...)
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  5.  44
    The Epistemic Aims of Education.Emily Robertson - 2009 - In Harvey Siegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Oxford University Press. pp. 11--34.
  6.  84
    Epistemic Aims and Values in W.V. Quine's Naturalized Epistemology.Javier Rodriguez Alcazar - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:309-318.
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    Challenging the Dominant Ideological Paradigm: Can Community Engagement Contribute to the Central Epistemic Aims of Philosophy?Sharli Anne Paphitis & Lindsay Kelland - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):419-432.
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    Developing Epistemic Aims and Supports for Engaging Students in Scientific Practices.Gregory Kelly - 2018 - Science & Education 27 (3-4):245-246.
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  9. Aims of Education. The Epistemic Aims of Education.Emily Robertson - 2009 - In Harvey Siegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Oxford University Press.
     
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  10. Strategic Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic and Social Aims.Ingo Brigandt & Esther Rosario - 2020 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-124.
    Examining previous discussions on how to construe the concepts of gender and race, we advocate what we call strategic conceptual engineering. This is the employment of a (possibly novel) concept for specific epistemic or social aims, concomitant with the openness to use a different concept (e.g., of race) for other purposes. We illustrate this approach by sketching three distinct concepts of gender and arguing that all of them are needed, as they answer to different social aims. The (...)
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  11.  57
    Cele teologii naturalnej i filozoficznej a preferowane wartości poznawcze / Aims of Natural and Philosophical Theology and the Preferred Epistemic Values.Marek A. Pepliński - 2004 - Przegląd Religioznawczy 212 (2):3-11.
    In philosophical literature terms: „natural theology” (or „rational theology”) and „philosophical theology” are used as exchangeable. The author argues that natural and philosophical theology are different philosophical disciplines. It is possible to point out a philosophic theology, different from natural theology, the former aims are not only supposed to show that God exists but to unifícate, interpret and explain (understand) religious faith and her tasks are not primary apologetic. The author considers that the aims of the latter discipline (...)
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  12.  88
    Epistemic Injustice in Research Evaluation: A Cultural Analysis of the Humanities and Physics in Estonia.Endla Lõhkivi, Katrin Velbaum & Jaana Eigi - 2012 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):108-132.
    This paper explores the issue of epistemic injustice in research evaluation. Through an analysis of the disciplinary cultures of physics and humanities, we attempt to identify some aims and values specific to the disciplinary areas. We suggest that credibility is at stake when the cultural values and goals of a discipline contradict those presupposed by official evaluation standards. Disciplines that are better aligned with the epistemic assumptions of evaluation standards appear to produce more "scientific" findings. To restore (...)
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  13.  22
    Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.
    Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the ‘dialectical tier’ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson’s dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a (...)
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  14. An Unfinished Debate: What Are the Aims of Religion and Science?Mikael Stenmark - 1997 - Zygon 32 (4):491-514.
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  15. Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304.
    In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be (...)
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  16. Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.
    Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. I argue that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provide normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist (...)
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  17. Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle.Jochen Briesen - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 277-306.
    Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ETHICAL consequentialism spell out what is MORALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of EPISTEMIC consequentialism spell out what is EPISTEMICALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting (...)
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  18. Passing the Epistemic Buck.Anne Meylan & Davide Fassio - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Daniel Whiting & Jonathan Way (eds.), Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain. Oxford, Royaume-Uni: pp. 46-66.
    While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific (...)
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  19. A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.
    The typical epistemology course begins with a discussion of the distinction between justification and knowledge and ends without any discussion of the distinction between justification and excuse. This is unfortunate. If we had a better understanding of the justification-excuse distinction, we would have a better understanding of the intuitions that shape the internalism-externalism debate. My aims in this paper are these. First, I will explain how the kinds of excuses that should interest epistemologists exculpate. Second, I will explain why (...)
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  20. Epistemic Democracy Without Truth: The Deweyan Approach.Michael Fuerstein - forthcoming - Raisons Politiques.
    In this essay I situate John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to democratic epistemology in relation to contemporary “epistemic democracy.” Like epistemic democrats, Dewey characterizes democracy as a form of social inquiry. But whereas epistemic democrats suggest that democracy aims to “track the truth,” Dewey rejects the notion of “tracking” or “corresponding” to truth in political and other domains. For Dewey, the measure of successful decision-making is not some fixed independent standard of truth or correctness but, instead, our (...)
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  21. Epistemic Trust in Science.Torsten Wilholt - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):233-253.
    Epistemic trust is crucial for science. This article aims to identify the kinds of assumptions that are involved in epistemic trust as it is required for the successful operation of science as a collective epistemic enterprise. The relevant kind of reliance should involve working from the assumption that the epistemic endeavors of others are appropriately geared towards the truth, but the exact content of this assumption is more difficult to analyze than it might appear. The (...)
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  22.  34
    Varieties of Epistemic Instrumentalism.Daniel Buckley - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    There exists a family of views concerning the foundations of epistemic normativity that all travel under the heading “epistemic instrumentalism”. These views are unified by their attempt to explain epistemic normativity in terms of instrumental normativity. Very roughly, they all say that we have reason to respond to truth-related considerations when forming and maintaining doxastic attitudes since regulating our doxastic attitudes in this way helps us satisfy our aims, interests, or goals. Thus, according to epistemic (...)
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  23. The Diverse Aims of Science.Angela Potochnik - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:71-80.
    There is increasing attention to the centrality of idealization in science. One common view is that models and other idealized representations are important to science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be an intermediary step between idealized representation and the traditional aims of science, including truth, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative interpretation of the relationship between idealized representation and the aims of science. In my view, continuing, (...)
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  24.  48
    Expert Deference About the Epistemic and Its Metaepistemological Significance.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):524-538.
    This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one’s judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed (...)
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  25. Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when (...)
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  26. Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
    For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism (...)
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  27. Epistemic Relativism. A Constructive Critique.Markus Seidel - 2014 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Are our beliefs justified only relatively to a specific culture or society? Is it possible to give reasons for the superiority of our scientific, epistemic methods? Markus Seidel sets out to answer these questions in his critique of epistemic relativism. Focusing on the work of the most prominent, explicitly relativist position in the sociology of scientific knowledge – so-called 'Edinburgh relativism' or the 'Strong Programme' –, he scrutinizes the key arguments for epistemic relativism from a philosophical perspective: (...)
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  28.  1
    Beyond Knowing That: A New Generation of Epistemic Logics.Yanjing Wang - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Springer. pp. 499-533.
    Epistemic logic has become a major field of philosophical logic ever since the groundbreaking work by Hintikka [58]. Despite its various successful applications in theoretical computer science, AI, and game theory, the technical development of the field has been mainly focusing on the propositional part, i.e., the propositional modal logics of “knowing that”. However, knowledge is expressed in everyday life by using various other locutions such as “knowing whether”, “knowing what”, “knowing how” and so on (knowing-wh hereafter). Such knowledge (...)
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  29. Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically.Dingmar van Eck - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):5-22.
    In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings. Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. (...)
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  30. A Note on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.Timothy Williamson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):129-140.
    The paper explains how Gettier’s conclusion can be reached on general theoretical grounds within the framework of epistemic logic, without reliance on thought experiments. It extends the argument to permissive conceptions of justification that invalidate principles of multi-premise closure and require neighbourhood semantics rather than semantics of a more standard type. The paper concludes by recommending a robust methodology that aims at convergence in results between thought experimentation and more formal methods. It also warns against conjunctive definitions as (...)
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  31. Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.
    Many of us care about the existence of ethical facts because such facts appear crucial to making sense of our practical lives. On one tempting line of thought, this idea does more than raise the metaethical stakes: it can also play a central role in justifying our belief in those facts. In recent work, David Enoch has developed this tempting thought into a formidable new proposal in moral epistemology, that aims to explain how the deliberative indispensability of ethical facts (...)
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  32.  35
    The Interrogative Model of Inquiry Meets Dynamic Epistemic Logics.Yacin Hamami - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1609-1642.
    The Interrogative Model of Inquiry and Dynamic Epistemic Logics are two central paradigms in formal epistemology. This paper is motivated by the observation of a significant complementarity between them: on the one hand, the IMI provides a framework for investigating inquiry represented as an idealized game between an Inquirer and Nature, along with an account of the interaction between questions and inferences in information-seeking processes, but is lacking a formulation in the multi-agent case; on the other hand, DELs model (...)
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  33.  5
    The Epistemology of Democracy: The Epistemic Virtues of Democracy.Snježana Prijić Samaržija - 2020 - Filozofija I Društvo 31 (1):56-70.
    The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature (...)
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  34.  4
    The Epistemology of Democracy: The Epistemic Virtues of Democracy.Snježana Prijić-Samaržija - 2020 - Filozofija I Društvo 31 (1):56-70.
    The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature (...)
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  35.  20
    Judgment and the Aims of Education.Randall Curren - 2014 - Social Philosophy and Policy 31 (1):36-59.
    The aim of this paper is to revive a tradition of educational thought that identifies good judgment as the highest aim of education. It identifies sharply opposed manifestations of this tradition in the works of Aristotle and Locke, and uses these as points of departure in defending and exploring the tradition. The defense rests on the claims that the basic aim of educational institutions should be to enable people to live well and that good judgment is essential to living well. (...)
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  36. Democracy and Scientific Expertise: Illusions of Political and Epistemic Inclusion.J. D. Trout - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1267-1291.
    Realizing the ideal of democracy requires political inclusion for citizens. A legitimate democracy must give citizens the opportunity to express their attitudes about the relative attractions of different policies, and access to political mechanisms through which they can be counted and heard. Actual governance often aims not at accurate belief, but at nonepistemic factors like achieving and maintaining institutional stability, creating the feeling of government legitimacy among citizens, or managing access to influence on policy decision-making. I examine the traditional (...)
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  37.  33
    Trade-Offs Between Epistemic and Moral Values in Evidence-Based Policy.Donal Khosrowi - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy (1):49-78.
    Proponents of evidence-based policy (EBP) call for public policy to be informed by high-quality evidence from randomized controlled trials. This methodological preference aims to promote several epistemic values, e.g. rigor, unbiasedness, precision, and the ability to obtain causal conclusions. I argue that there is a trade-off between these epistemic values and several non-epistemic, moral and political values. This is because the evidence afforded by preferred EBP methods is differentially useful for pursuing different moral and political values. (...)
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  38.  88
    The Epistemic Costs of Compromise in Bioethics.Katrien Devolder & Thomas Douglas - 2018 - Bioethics 32 (2):111-118.
    Bioethicists sometimes defend compromise positions, particularly when they enter debates on applied topics that have traditionally been highly polarised, such as those regarding abortion, euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. However, defending compromise positions is often regarded with a degree of disdain. Many are intuitively attracted to the view that it is almost always problematic to defend compromise positions, in the sense that we have a significant moral reason not to do so. In this paper, we consider whether this common (...)
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  39.  57
    Extending Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Joshua Sack - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):241 - 257.
    This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) (...)
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  40. Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45-70.
    In previous work, I defend the following disparity between moral and epistemic facts: whereas moral facts are irreducibly normative, epistemic facts – facts such as that some subject is epistemically justified in believing something – are reducible to facts from some other domain (such as facts about probabilities). This moral-epistemic disparity is significant because it undercuts an important kind of argument for robust moral realism. My defense of epistemic reductionism and of the moral-epistemic disparity has (...)
     
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  41. Epistemic Disagreements: A Solution for Contextualists.Giovanni Mion - 2013 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 6 (1):15-23.
    My paper aims to account for the possibility of disagreements concerning what we know; for clearly, people disagree about what they know. More precisely, my goal is to explain how a contextualist theory of knowledge attributions can explain the existence of disagreement among speakers. My working hypothesis is that genuine epistemic disagreement is possible only under the assumption that the meaning of the word “knowledge” is governed by contexts that are objective, in the sense that the content of (...)
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  42.  40
    Compositional Verification of Multi-Agent Systems in Temporal Multi-Epistemic Logic.Joeri Engelfriet, Catholijn M. Jonker & Jan Treur - 2002 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (2):195-225.
    Compositional verification aims at managing the complexity of theverification process by exploiting compositionality of the systemarchitecture. In this paper we explore the use of a temporal epistemiclogic to formalize the process of verification of compositionalmulti-agent systems. The specification of a system, its properties andtheir proofs are of a compositional nature, and are formalized within acompositional temporal logic: Temporal Multi-Epistemic Logic. It isshown that compositional proofs are valid under certain conditions.Moreover, the possibility of incorporating default persistence ofinformation in a (...)
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  43.  26
    'According To' Phrases and Epistemic Modals.Brett Sherman - 2018 - Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 36 (2):627-636.
    I provide an objection to an argument targeting the claim that epistemic modality concerns what is possible or necessary given what is known. The argument centers around uses of epistemic modals that co-occur with adjuncts of the form 'according to X', those in which the content of some reported information is at issue. I argue that such contexts do not license us to reach the sort of conclusion that the argument aims to reach.
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  44.  30
    Epistemic Theories of Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Procedural Legitimacy of Fundamental Rights.Yann Allard-Tremblay - 2012 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of (...)
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  45. The Epistemic Value of Understanding.Henk W. de Regt - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):585-597.
    This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of (...)
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  46.  74
    Weighing Aims in Doxastic Deliberation.C. J. Atkinson - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, I defend teleological theories of belief against the exclusivity objection. I argue that despite the exclusive influence of truth in doxastic deliberation, multiple epistemic aims interact when we consider what to believe. This is apparent when we focus on the processes involved in specific instances (or concrete cases) of doxastic deliberation, such that the propositions under consideration are specified. First, I out- line a general schema for weighing aims. Second, I discuss recent attempts to (...)
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  47. Keep the chickens cooped: the epistemic inadequacy of free range metaphysics.Amanda Bryant - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):1867-1887.
    This paper aims to better motivate the naturalization of metaphysics by identifying and criticizing a class of theories I call ’free range metaphysics’. I argue that free range metaphysics is epistemically inadequate because the constraints on its content—consistency, simplicity, intuitive plausibility, and explanatory power—are insufficiently robust and justificatory. However, since free range metaphysics yields clarity-conducive techniques, incubates science, and produces conceptual and formal tools useful for scientifically engaged philosophy, I do not recommend its discontinuation. I do recommend, however, ending (...)
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  48. The Epistemic Benefits of Religious Disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
    Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who are committed to religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be (...)
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  49. Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification.Matthew Skene - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.
    Abstract I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for (...)
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  50. The Epistemic Function of Contempt and Laughter in Nietzsche.Mark Alfano - 2018 - In Michelle Mason (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Contempt. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Interpreters have noticed that Nietzsche, in addition to sometimes being uproariously funny, reflects more on laughter and having a sense of humor than almost any other philosopher. Several scholars have further noticed that Nietzschean laughter sometimes seems to have an epistemic function. In this chapter, I assume that Nietzsche is a pluralist about the functions of humor and laughter, and seek to establish the uses he finds for them. I offer an interpretation according to which he tactically uses humor (...)
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