Results for 'epistemic internalism'

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  1. Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):753-772.
    Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are _in principle_ incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the _prima facie_ appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition _nor_ the extended mind theses are in (...)
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  2. Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory.B. J. C. Madison - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.
    Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such (...)
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  3. Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):231-244.
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited (...)
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  4. On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
    In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which (...)
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  5. Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
    The internalism /externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label (...)
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  6. Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing (...)
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  7.  96
    Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma.Colin Ruloff - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):129-151.
    Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version (...)
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  8. An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  9. Gibbons on Epistemic Internalism.Andrew Moon - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):143-151.
    John Gibbons (2006) has argued against epistemic internalism on the basis of thought experiments. I argue that Gibbons’s thought experiments fail to support his argument.
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  10.  52
    Epistemic Internalism and Perceptual Content: How a Fear of Demons Leads to an Error Theory of Perception.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2153-2170.
    Despite the fact that many of our beliefs are justified by perceptual experience, there is relatively little exploration of the connections between epistemic justification and perceptual content. This is unfortunate since it seems likely that some views of justification will require particular views of content, and the package of the two might be quite a bit less attractive than either view considered alone. I will argue that this is the case for epistemic internalism. In particular, epistemic (...)
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  11.  53
    Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  12.  84
    Doxastic Planning and Epistemic Internalism.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2571-2591.
    In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role (...)
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  13. Epistemic Internalism: An Explanation and Defense.B. J. C. Madison - 2008 - Dissertation, University College London
    What does it take for a positive epistemic status to obtain? I argue throughout my thesis that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Instead, if for example a belief is justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. A fundamental topic in epistemology is the question of what sorts of factors can be relevant to determining the positive epistemic status of belief. Epistemic Internalism holds that these (...)
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  14. Methodological Naturalism and Epistemic Internalism.Gregory Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):315-328.
    Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer (...)
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  15.  48
    Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism.René Woudenberg & Ronald Meester - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):221-231.
    This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress (...)
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  16. Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues.Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within (...)
  17.  2
    Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility.Leandro de Brasi - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):113-140.
    ABSTRACT In contemporary epistemology, there are a number of particular internalism/externalism debates. My concern here is with the internalism/externalism controversy about some specific positive epistemic status required for knowledge which is normally understood in terms of epistemic responsibility. I argue that, given our pervasive epistemic interdependence, such particular debate needs to be reformulated in anti-individualistic terms if it is to be an interesting one.
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  18.  4
    Brett Coppenger and Michael Bergmann, Eds., Intellectual Assurance, Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Reviewed By.Mason Sharon - 2017 - Philosophy in Review 37 (2):56-58.
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  19. Plantinga on Epistemic Internalism.Ernest Sosa - 1996 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 73-87.
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  20.  32
    Epistemic Internalism's Dilemma.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 1990 - American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (3):245-251.
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  21.  43
    Evaluational Internalism, Epistemic Virtues, and the Significance of Trying.Reza Lahroodi - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:1-20.
    While there is general agreement about the list of epistemic virtues, there has been much controversy over what it is to be an epistemic virtue. Three competing theories have been offered: evaluational externalism, evaluational internalism, and mixed theories. A major problem with internalism, the focus of this paper, is that it disconnects the value of epistemic virtue from actual success in the real world (the Disconnection Problem). Relying on a novel thesis about the relation of (...)
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  22. Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress.José L. Zalabardo - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34 - 58.
    I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to (...)
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    Evaluational Internalism, Epistemic Virtues, and the Significance of Trying.Reza Lahroodi - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:1-20.
    While there is general agreement about the list of epistemic virtues, there has been much controversy over what it is to be an epistemic virtue. Three competing theories have been offered: evaluational externalism, evaluational internalism, and mixed theories. A major problem with internalism, the focus of this paper, is that it disconnects the value of epistemic virtue from actual success in the real world. Relying on a novel thesis about the relation of “trying” and “exercise (...)
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  24.  46
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
    Epistemic Justification illuminates in a deep way some core issues in contemporary epistemology. Its two authors disagree sharply about the nature of epistemic justification: both are foundationalists but whereas BonJour is a staunch defender of a traditional version of internalist foundationalism, Sosa argues for an externalist virtue reliabilism. In spite of their differences they speak the same language and employ the same rigorous standards for philosophical interchange. They most assuredly do not talk past each other. In part because (...)
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  25.  40
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
    Epistemic Justification illuminates in a deep way some core issues in contemporary epistemology. Its two authors disagree sharply about the nature of epistemic justification: both are foundationalists but whereas BonJour is a staunch defender of a traditional version of internalist foundationalism, Sosa argues for an externalist virtue reliabilism. In spite of their differences they speak the same language and employ the same rigorous standards for philosophical interchange. They most assuredly do not talk past each other. In part because (...)
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  26.  15
    Internalist Evidentialism and Epistemic Virtue: Re-Reply to Axtell.Trent Dougherty - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):281-289.
    In this brief re-reply to Axtell, I reply to key criticisms of my previous reply and flesh out a bit my notions of the relationship between internalist evidentialism and epistemic virtue and epistemic value.
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  27.  69
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):319-322.
  28.  43
    Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 231--248.
  29.  63
    Mentalism is Not Epistemic Ur-Internalism.Evan Butts - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by (...)
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  30. Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux.B. J. C. Madison - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):741-755.
    In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons (...)
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  31.  71
    Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification.George Pappas - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  32. The Epistemic Role of Testimony: Internalist and Externalist Perspectives.Richard Fumerton - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Clarendon Press.
     
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  33.  45
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. VirtuesLaurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa Great Debates in Philosophy Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003, 240 Pp., $26.95 Paper. [REVIEW]Christopher Lepock - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):811-813.
  34.  12
    An “Internalist” Conception of Epistemic Virtue.James A. Montmarquet - 2000 - In Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 135--148.
  35.  51
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Christopher Lepock - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):811-813.
  36.  19
    Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification.Gregory Stoutenburg - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Nevertheless, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I conclude with some remarks about the dialectical position we infallibilists find ourselves in with respect to arguing for our preferred view and some considerations regarding how infallibilists should develop (...)
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  37.  60
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Trent Dougherty - 2006 - Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):142-143.
  38.  58
    An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem.Rosalind S. Simson - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):179-208.
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  39.  44
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Marina Bakalova - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):363-368.
  40. Do the Externalism and the Internalism in the Debate Over Epistemic Justification Have Indeed the Same Subject?Piotr Szalek - 2008 - Acta Philosophica: Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia 17 (1):145-164.
     
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  41.  8
    Henry Pietersma on Husserl: Transcendentalism and Internalism, Epistemic Fulfillment and History.Jay Lampert - 2005 - Symposium 9 (1):89-97.
  42. Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Marina Bakalova - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:363-368.
     
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  43. Reliability and Two Kinds of Epistemic Justification.Clarke Murray - 1987 - In Newton Garver Peter H. Hare (ed.), Naturalism and Rationality. Buffalo: Prometheus Press. pp. 159-170.
    In this paper, I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic justification: one is objective and the other, subjective. Internalists are interested in the subjective variety of justification. Externalists are interested in the objective notion of justification. A paper by Stewart Cohen fails to distinguish these two varieties of epistemic justification and, as a result, criticizes externalists for failing to address the internalist, subjective notion of epistemic justification. But, since that notion is not the one that (...)
     
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  44. Internalism V.S. Externalism in the Epistemology of Memory.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 283-295.
    This chapter first surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. -/- The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.
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  45. The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 98-124.
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism provides (...)
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  46. Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - forthcoming - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
    In our thought, we employ rules of inference and belief-forming methods more generally. For instance, we (plausibly) employ deductive rules such as Modus Ponens, ampliative rules such as Inference to the Best Explanation, and perceptual methods that tell us to believe what perceptually appears to be the case. What explains our entitlement to employ these rules and methods? This chapter considers the motivations for broadly internalist answers to this question. It considers three such motivations—one based on simple cases, one based (...)
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  47.  69
    Conceptual Evaluation: Epistemic.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - forthcoming - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in (...)
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  48. Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):285-304.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states (...)
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  49. Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):174-185.
    Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, (...)
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  50. Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape.John M. DePoe - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.
    Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification (...)
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