Results for 'epistemic rationality'

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  1. Religious Disagreements and Epistemic Rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.
    Richard Feldman has argued that in cases of religious disagreement between epistemic peers who have shared all relevant evidence, epistemic rationality requires suspense of judgment. I argue that Feldman’s postulation of completely shared evidence is unrealistic for the kinds of disputes he is considering, since different starting points will typically produce different assessments of what the evidence is and how it should be weighed. Feldman argues that there cannot be equally reasonable starting points, but his extension of (...)
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  2.  55
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.
  3. On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2014 - Dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers
  4.  28
    Epistemic Rationality.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):608-630.
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  5. Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, and I attempt to delineate their respective roles in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. My primary concern is with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality: the view that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive or epistemic goals. After sketching the relevance of the instrumentalist conception to (...)
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  6. A Pluralistic Account of Epistemic Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.
    In this essay, I aim to motivate and defend a pluralistic view of epistemic rationality. At the core of the view is the notion that epistemic rationality is essentially a species of practical rationality put in the service of various epistemic goals. I begin by sketching some closely related views that have appeared in the literature. I then present my preferred version of the view and sketch some of its benefits. Thomas Kelly has raised (...)
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  7. Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
    This paper addresses the question of whether gathering additional evidence is always rationally required, both from the point of view of instrumental rationality and of epistemic rationality. It is shown that in certain situations, it is not instrumentally rational to look for more evidence before making a decision. These are situations in which the risk of “misleading” evidence – a concept that has both instrumental and epistemic senses – is not offset by the gains from the (...)
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  8.  65
    Grounded Rationality: Descriptivism in Epistemic Context.Shira Elqayam - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):39-49.
    Normativism, the approach that judges human rationality by comparison against normative standards, has recently come under intensive criticism as unsuitable for psychological enquiry, and it has been suggested that it should be replaced with a descriptivist paradigm. My goal in this paper is to outline and defend a meta-theoretical framework of such a paradigm, grounded rationality, based on the related principles of descriptivism and (moderate) epistemic relativism. Bounded rationality takes into account universal biological and cognitive limitations (...)
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  9. Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality.Stacey Goguen - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-237.
    Though stereotype threat is most well-known for its ability to hinder performance, it actually has a wide range of effects. For instance, it can also cause stress, anxiety, and doubt. These additional effects are as important and as central to the phenomenon as its effects on performance are. As a result, stereotype threat has more far-reaching implications than many philosophers have realized. In particular, the phenomenon has a number of unexplored “epistemic effects.” These are effects on our epistemic (...)
     
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  10.  20
    Extended Rationality: Some Queries About Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism.Giorgio Volpe - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):258-271.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 258 - 271 This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s _Extended Rationality_ is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism.
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  11.  32
    Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity.Patrick Bondy - 2018 - Routledge.
    The aim of this book is to answer two important questions about the issue of normativity in epistemology: Why are epistemic reasons evidential, and what makes epistemic reasons and rationality normative? Bondy's argument proceeds on the assumption that epistemic rationality goes hand in hand with basing beliefs on good evidence. The opening chapters defend a mental-state ontology of reasons, a deflationary account of how kinds of reasons are distinguished, and a deliberative guidance constraint on normative (...)
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  12. The Dynamic Foundations of Epistemic Rationality.Barry Lam - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Classical theories of epistemic rationality take an agent\\textquoteright{}s individual beliefs to be the only things that are rational or irrational. For them, rationality is wholly static. Recent work in epistemology take sets of individual beliefs and also changes of belief over time to be rational or irrational. For these theories, rationality is both static and dynamic. However, for both groups, static rationality is fundamental. In my dissertation, I argue to the contrary that, in fact, all (...)
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  13.  53
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Lorraine Code - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):829-831.
    Richard Foley's theory of epistemic rationality specifies what a cognitive agent should believe, whose epistemic goal is now to believe truths and not to believe falsehoods. As the emphasis upon 'now' demonstrates, this is a synchronic, not a diachronic, theory. Foley acknowledges the importance of long-term intellectual goals in human lives--particularly in their practical aspect, and in scientific practice. But such goals are beyond the scope of a purely epistemic theory of rationality.
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  14. A New Argument Against the Instrumental Conception of Epistemic Rationality.Barry Lam - unknown
    According to the Instrumental Conception of Epistemic Rationality believing rationally is believing in such a way so as to best satisfy one’s cognitive goals. I provide a novel argument against the Instrumental Conception on the basis of an unnoticed phenomenon I call “rational preemption.” You can now revise your plans and actions rationally in order to preempt or prevent foreseeable future irrationality. However, you cannot now revise your beliefs rationally in order to preempt or prevent foreseeable future irrationality. (...)
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  15.  51
    Foundationalism and Epistemic Rationality.John Heil - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (2):179 - 188.
    Some foundationalists have argued that epistemic warrant may be in some measure determined by features of a doxastic agent's circumstances that are not necessarily accessible to the agent. 'externalist' views of this sort have been attacked recently by laurence bonjour on the grounds that they are at odds with the ordinary notion of "epistemic rationality". I suggest that this need not be so and argue that bonjour fails to provide convincing reasons for the rejection of externalist forms (...)
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  16.  23
    Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” The Rationality of Scientific Discovery: Abductive Reasoning and Epistemic Mediators. [REVIEW]Lorenzo Magnani - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (2):213-228.
    Philosophers have usually offered a number of ways of describing hypotheses generation, but all aim at demonstrating that the activity of generating hypotheses is paradoxical, illusory or obscure, and then not analysable. Those descriptions are often so far from Peircian pragmatic prescription and so abstract to result completely unknowable and obscure. The “computational turn” gives us a new way to understand creative processes in a strictly pragmatic sense. In fact, by exploiting artificial intelligence and cognitive science tools, computational philosophy allows (...)
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  17.  10
    Epistemic Rationality, Epistemic Motivation, and Interpretive Charity.David K. Henderson - 1996 - ProtoSociology 8:4-29.
    On what has become the received view of the principle of charity, it is a fundamental methodological constraint on interpretation that we find peoples’ intentional states patterned in ways that are characterized by norms of rationality. This recommended use of normative principles of rationality to inform intentional description is epistemically unmotivated. To say that the received view lacks epistemic motivation is to say that to interpret as it recommends would be epistemically irresponsible ans, in important respects irrational. (...)
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  18.  65
    Socially Naturalized Norms of Epistemic Rationality: Aggregation and Deliberation.Alison Wylie - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):43-48.
    In response to those who see rational deliberation as a source of epistemic norms and a model for well-functioning scientific inquiry, Solomon cites evidence that aggregative techniques often yield better results; deliberative processes are vulnerable to biasing mechanisms that impoverish the epistemic resources on which group judgments are based. I argue that aggregative techniques are similarly vulnerable and illustrate this in terms of the impact of gender schemas on both individual and collective judgment. A consistently externalist and socially (...)
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  19.  75
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Harvard University Press.
  20. Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons, and Rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.
    It is standard, both in the philosophical literature and in ordinary parlance, to assume that one can fall short of responding to all one’s moral reasons without being irrational. Yet when we turn to epistemic reasons, the situation could not be more different. Most epistemologists take it as axiomatic that for a belief to be rational is for it to be well-supported by epistemic reasons. We find ourselves with a striking asymmetry, then, between the moral and epistemic (...)
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  21. The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation.Ingo Brigandt - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):19-40.
    The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept’s inferential role and reference can be accounted for as being (...)
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  22. Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly's "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique".Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456–464.
    Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
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  23. A Proper de Jure Objection to the Epistemic Rationality of Religious Belief: TODD R. LONG.Todd R. Long - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (3):375-394.
    I answer Alvin Plantinga's challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection' concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justification for believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic justification in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. I defend philosophical interest in the SEO against objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga's criteria for a proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, (...)
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  24.  87
    Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly’s “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”.Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456-464.
    Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
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  25. Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality.Rolla Giovanni - 2016 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 39 (3):5-28.
    Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement (...)
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  26. Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality: A Defense of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.
    A defense of imprecise credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes).
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  27. Coherence and Epistemic Rationality.Susan Vineberg - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 45:256-261.
    This paper addresses the question of whether probabilistic coherence is a requirement of rationality. The concept of probabilistic coherence is examined and compared with the familiar notion of consistency for simple beliefs. Several reasons are given for thinking rationality does not require coherence. Finally, it is argued that incoherence does not necessarily involve fallacious reasoning.
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  28. Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality[REVIEW]Stewart Cohen - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):447-455.
  29. On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):326-330.
  30.  49
    How Does Epistemic Rationality Constrain Practical Rationality?Andy Mueller - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (2):139-155.
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  31. Doing What Comes Naturally: Zagzebski on Rationality and Epistemic Self-Trust.Elizabeth Fricker - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):151-166.
    I offer an account of what trust is, and of what epistemic self-trust consists in. I identify five distinct arguments extracted from Chapter 2 of Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority for the rationality and epistemic legitimacy of epistemic self-trust. I take issue with the general account of human rational self-regulation on which one of her arguments rests. Zagzebski maintains that this consists in restoring harmony in the psyche by eliminating conflict and so ending. I argue that (...) rationality is distinct from psychic mechanisms aimed at eliminating dissonance, and these two sometimes pull in opposed directions. (shrink)
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  32.  53
    On Richard Foley's Theory of Epistemic RationalityThe Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Marshall Swain & Richard Foley - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):159.
  33.  79
    Proper Function Justification and Epistemic Rationality.Todd R. Long - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):189-195.
  34.  48
    Foley's Theory of Epistemic Rationality.William P. Alston - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):135.
  35.  9
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality[REVIEW]Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Noûs 24 (1):185-188.
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  36.  48
    Epistemic Rationality and Scientific Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (2):233 – 250.
  37.  50
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.David B. Annis - 1990 - International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):103-104.
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  38. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, by Richard Foley.James G. Edwards - 2001 - Disputatio.
     
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  39. Foley, R., "The Theory of Epistemic Rationality". [REVIEW]E. Fricker - 1989 - Mind 98:457.
     
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  40.  7
    The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.James Somerville - 1988 - Philosophical Books 29 (4):220-222.
  41. A Study on the Foundations of Theories of Epistemic Rationality.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2016 - Dissertation,
     
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  42. Review of The Theory of Epistemic Rationality[REVIEW]James Edwards - 2001 - Disputatio 1 (11):34-51.
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  43.  19
    Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation,
  44.  15
    Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality.Giovanni Rolla - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (3):5-28.
    Based on Pritchard's distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness. This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I (...)
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  45.  36
    Rationalizing Epistemic Bounded Rationality.Konrad Grabiszewski - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (4):629-637.
    The standard model of knowledge, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}, consists of state space, Ω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\varOmega $$\end{document}, and possibility correspondence, P\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$P$$\end{document}. Usually, it is assumed that P\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$P$$\end{document} satisfies all knowledge axioms. Violating at least one of these axioms is defined as epistemic bounded rationality. If this happens, a (...)
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  46. Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea in On Certainty that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address major problems in epistemology, such as the nature of perceptual justifications, external world skepticism, epistemic relativism, the epistemic status of basic logical laws, of the Principle (...)
     
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  47.  8
    Rationality in the Selection Task: Epistemic Utility Versus Uncertainty Reduction.Jonathan Evans & David E. Over - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):356-363.
    M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by Oaksford (...)
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  48.  89
    Rationality and Epistemic Paradox.Frederick Kroon - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):377 - 408.
    This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.
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  49.  2
    Rationality in Context: On Inequality and the Epistemic Problems of Maximizing Expected Utility.Simon Scheller, Johannes Marx & Dominik Klein - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):209-232.
    The emergence of economic inequality has often been linked to individual differences in mental or physical capacities. By means of an agent-based simulation this paper shows that neither of these is a necessary condition. Rather, inequality can arise from iterated interactions of fully rational agents. This bears consequences for our understanding of both inequality and rationality. In a setting of iterated bargaining games, we claim that expected utility maximizing agents perform suboptimally in comparison with other strategies. The reason for (...)
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  50. Analogues of the Liar Paradox in Systems of Epistemic Logic Representing Meta-Mathematical Reasoning and Strategic Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games.Robert Charles Koons - 1987 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    The ancient puzzle of the Liar was shown by Tarski to be a genuine paradox or antinomy. I show, analogously, that certain puzzles of contemporary game theory are genuinely paradoxical, i.e., certain very plausible principles of rationality, which are in fact presupposed by game theorists, are inconsistent as naively formulated. ;I use Godel theory to construct three versions of this new paradox, in which the role of 'true' in the Liar paradox is played, respectively, by 'provable', 'self-evident', and 'justifiable'. (...)
     
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