Results for 'epistemology of disagreement'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
  1. Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Arsenault & Zachary C. Irving - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):185-194.
    We present a family of counter-examples to David Christensen's Independence Criterion, which is central to the epistemology of disagreement. Roughly, independence requires that, when you assess whether to revise your credence in P upon discovering that someone disagrees with you, you shouldn't rely on the reasoning that lead you to your initial credence in P. To do so would beg the question against your interlocutor. Our counter-examples involve questions where, in the course of your reasoning, you almost fall (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  64
    Epistemology of Disagreement, Bias, and Political Deliberation: The Problems for a Conciliatory Democracy.Jay Carlson - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    In this paper, I will discuss the relevance of epistemology of disagreement to political disagreement. The two major positions in the epistemology of disagreement literature are the steadfast and the conciliationist approaches: while the conciliationist says that disagreement with one’s epistemic equals should compel one to epistemically “split the difference” with those peers, the steadfast approach claims that one can maintain one’s antecedent position even in the face of such peer disagreement. Martin Ebeling (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  31
    The Epistemology of Group Disagreement: An Introduction.Fernandfo Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. London: Routledge.
    This is an introduction to the volume The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, forthcoming), (eds.) F. Broncano-Berrocal and J.A. Carter.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Calibrated Probabilities and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Barry Lam - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1079-1098.
    This paper assesses the comparative reliability of two belief-revision rules relevant to the epistemology of disagreement, the Equal Weight and Stay the Course rules. I use two measures of reliability for probabilistic belief-revision rules, calibration and Brier Scoring, to give a precise account of epistemic peerhood and epistemic reliability. On the calibration measure of reliability, epistemic peerhood is easy to come by, and employing the Equal Weight rule generally renders you less reliable than Staying the Course. On the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5. Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   136 citations  
  6. The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
    This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7. Relativism, Faultlessness, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Micah Dugas - 2018 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (2):137-150.
    Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in relativism. Proponents have defended various accounts that seek to model the truth-conditions of certain propositions along the lines of standard possible world semantics. The central challenge for such views has been to explain what advantage they have over contextualist theories with regard to the possibility of disagreement. I will press this worry against Max Kölbel’s account of faultless disagreement. My case will proceed along two distinct but connected lines. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  26
    Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps ‘epistemic peers’ who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  9.  96
    The Epistemology of Disagreement.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - In Gerry Dunne (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy.
    Short introduction to the epistemology of disagreement.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.
    In disagreements about trivial matters, it often seems appropriate for disputing parties to adopt a ‘middle ground’ view about the disputed matter. But in disputes about more substantial controversies (e.g. in ethics, religion, or politics) this sort of doxastic conduct can seem viciously acquiescent. How should we distinguish between the two kinds of cases, and thereby account for our divergent intuitions about how we ought to respond to them? One possibility is to say that ceding ground in a trivial dispute (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  11. Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
  12. An Arrovian Impossibility Theorem for the Epistemology of Disagreement.Nicholaos Jones - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):97-115.
    According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  83
    A Note on the Epistemology of Disagreement and Politics.Thomas Mulligan - 2016 - Political Theory 44 (5):657-663.
    Martin Ebeling argues that a popular theory in the epistemology of disagreement--conciliationism--supports an egalitarian approach to politics. This view is mistaken for two reasons. First, even if political parties have the epistemic value that Ebeling claims, voters should not regard each other as epistemic peers--which conciliationism requires that they do. The American electorate is strikingly heterogeneous in both its knowledgeability and its rationality, and so the necessary epistemic parity relation does not hold. Second, for technical reasons, the beliefs (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  43
    Moral Virtue and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Christopher W. Gowans - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):39-57.
    The paper is a defense of the thesis that there are situations in which morally virtuous persons who are epistemic peers may disagree about what to do without either person being rationally required to change his or her judgment (a version of the Steadfast position in the epistemology of disagreement debate). The argument is based in part on similarities between decisions of virtuous agents and other practical decisions such as a baseball manager’s decision to change pitchers during a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy. They develop our understanding of epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful engagement with others' beliefs.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  16. Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.
    Consider two people who disagree about some important claim (e.g. the future moral and political consequences of current U.S. economic policy are X). They each believe the other person is in possession of relevant evidence, is roughly equally competent to evaluate that evidence, etc. From the epistemic point of view, how should such recognized disagreement affect their doxastic attitude toward the original claim? Recent research on the epistemology of disagreement has converged upon three general ways of answering (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  17.  6
    Peer Idealization and Internal Examples in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Tim Kenyon - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (1):69-79.
    The epistemology of disagreement has developed around a highly idealized notion of epistemic peers. The analysis of examples in the literature has somewhat entrenched this idealization, when using cases of extant philosophical disputes between named interlocutors. These examples make it hard to emphasize the ordinary ways in which discussants, as disciplinary colleagues, may be wrong. Overlooking these possibilities is probably made easier by widespread attitudes in philosophy about the importance of genius or raw intelligence in doing philosophy. The (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. My Way or Her Way: A Conundrum in Bayesian Epistemology of Disagreement.Tomoji Shogenji - manuscript
    The proportional weight view in epistemology of disagreement generalizes the equal weight view and proposes that we assign to judgments of different people weights that are proportional to their epistemic qualifications. It is shown that if the resulting degrees of confidence are to constitute a probability function, they must be the weighted arithmetic means of individual degrees of confidence, while if the resulting degrees of confidence are to obey the Bayesian rule of conditionalization, they must be the weighted (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19.  69
    A Patchwork Epistemology of Disagreement?Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1873-1885.
    The epistemology of disagreement standardly divides conciliationist views from steadfast views. But both sorts of views are subject to counterexample—indeed, both sorts of views are subject to the same counterexample. After presenting this counterexample, I explore how the epistemology of disagreement should be reconceptualized in light of it.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  7
    Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Epistemologists who have studied disagreement have started to devote attention to the notion of epistemic standing. One feature of epistemic standing they have not drawn attention to is a distinction between what I call “broad” and “narrow” epistemic standing. Someone who is, say, your broad epistemic peer with respect to some topic is someone who is generally as familiar with and good at handling the evidence as you are. But someone who is your narrow epistemic peer with respect to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  94
    The Self-Undermining Objection to the Epistemology of Disagreement.Shawn Graves - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (1):93-106.
    Disagreements about, within, and between religions are widespread. It’s no surprise, then, that there’s an enormous philosophical literature on religious diversity. But in recent years, philosophers working in mainstream epistemology have done a lot of work on disagreement in general. This work has focused in particular upon the epistemology of peer disagreement, i.e., disagreements between parties who are justifiably believed to be epistemic equals regarding the matter at hand. In this paper, I intend to defend a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22.  30
    Conflicting Higher and Lower Order Evidences in the Epistemology of Disagreement About Religion.James Kraft - 2010 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (1):65-89.
    This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one’s belief when one discovers an epistemic peer with conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23.  72
    Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.
    In this article, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this principle, we should exercise moral caution, at least when we can. More formally, the principle claims that if you should believe or suspend judgment that doing an action is a serious moral wrong, while knowing that not doing that action is not morally wrong, then you should not do that action. After motivating this principle, I argue that it has significant application in applied ethics. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24.  91
    With All Due Respect: The Macro-Epistemology of Disagreement.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    In this paper, I develop a new kind of conciliatory answer to the problem of peer disagreement. Instead of trying to guide an agent’s updating behaviour in any particular disagreement, I establish constraints on an agent’s expected behaviour and argue that, in the long run, she should tend to be conciliatory toward her peers. I first claim that this macro-approach affords us new conceptual insight on the problem of peer disagreement and provides an important angle complementary to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  25. The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Disagreement is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and philosophers have dutifully attended to it. One important question related to disagreement is epistemological: How does a rational person change her beliefs (if at all) in light of disagreement from others? The typical methodology for answering this question is to endorse a steadfast or conciliatory disagreement norm (and not both) on a priori grounds and selected intuitive cases. In this paper, I argue that this methodology is misguided. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  16
    The Epistemology of Religious Disagreement.Chad Bogosian & Paul Copan - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):207-214.
    Our introduction to the special topics forum provides a brief explanation of terms central to the general epistemology of disagreement literature that has developed over the past fifteen years. We then provide an overview of each contributor’s paper with an eye toward how each one relates to and extends the discussion about the epistemology of disagreement. Papers are arranged in an effort to draw readers into the discussion as follows: applying different general theories about disagreement (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. A Neo-Pyrrhonian Approach to the Epistemology of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. pp. 66-89.
    This paper approaches the current epistemological debate on peer disagreement from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, thus adopting a form of skepticism which is more radical than those discussed in the literature. It makes use of argumentative strategies found in ancient Pyrrhonism both to show that such a debate rests on problematic assumptions and to block some maneuvers intended to offer an efficacious way of settling a considerable number of peer disputes. The essay takes issue with three views held in the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28.  24
    David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, Eds. , The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays . Reviewed By.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (1):4-6.
  29.  10
    Do Minds Change? Calkins's Self-Psychology and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Kyle Bromhall - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1):117-124.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Knowledge and the Poison Oracle: Relativism and the Epistemology of Cross-Cultural Disagreement.Thomas Bennigson - 1993 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The contemporary consensus in analytic philosophy concerning cultural relativism is: it is impossible to formulate relativism coherently, diversity does not provide good reason for accepting relativist conclusions anyway, and if relativism is false, or incoherent, then cross-cultural disagreement, however intractable, raises no important epistemological challenge. I challenge every aspect of this consensus in the light of contemporary theories of reference and knowledge, focussing on various traditional cultures' supernatural explanations of illness. ;I defend the coherence of relativism against standard objections, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Upon discovering that certain beliefs we hold are contingent on arbitrary features of our background, we often feel uneasy. I defend the proposal that if such cases of contingency anxiety involve defeaters, this is because of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I note two hurdles to our accepting this Disagreement Hypothesis. Firstly, some cases of contingency anxiety apparently involve no disagreement. Secondly, the proposal may seem to make our awareness of the influence of arbitrary background factors irrelevant (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32.  81
    The Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Palgrave.
    Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Perception, Evidence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Thomas D. Senor - manuscript
    In this paper I argue for a version of the Total Evidence view according to which the rational response to disagreement depends upon one's total evidence. I argue that perceptual evidence of a certain kind is significantly weightier than many other types of evidence, including testimonial. Furthermore, what is generally called "The Uniqueness Thesis" is actually a conflation of two distinct principles that I dub "Evidential Uniqueness" and "Rationality Uniqueness." The former principle is likely true but the latter almost (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. The Epistemology of Disagreement.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  35. 'Partial Defeaters' and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372.
    Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is (fully) defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  36.  77
    Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Juan Comesana - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):237-252.
    What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the degree of trust (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Introduction: The Epistemology of Disagreement.David Christensen - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):231-232.
    One of the most salient features of forming beliefs in a social context is that people end up disagreeing with one another. This is not just an obvious fact about belief-formation; it raises interesting normative questions, especially when people become aware of the opinions of others. How should my beliefs be affected by the knowledge that others hold contrary beliefs? In some cases, the answer seems easy. If I have reason to think that my friend is much better informed than (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Epistemology of Disagreement and the Moral Non-Conformist.Benjamin Sherman - manuscript
    When people disagree about what is moral, we face an epistemological challenge—when the answer to a moral question is not obvious, how do we determine who is right? What if, under the circumstances, we do not have the means to show one party or the other is right? In recent years, a number of epistemologists have turned their attention to the general epistemic problem of how to respond reasonably to disagreement, and we can look to their work for guidance. (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  18
    Rowe’s Friendly Atheism and the Epistemology of Religious Disagreement.Chad Bogosian - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):227-239.
    In this paper, I engage William Rowe’s “Friendly Atheism” to illuminate the discussion of religious disagreement. I argue that his view gives way to an epistemic principle about how two “intellectual peers” might remain steadfast in what they believe their total available evidence supports and thereby reasonably disagree about their religious beliefs. I consider a key objection from Uniqueness thesis proponents and show how there are additional epistemic considerations to help fix the proposed problem.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  8
    David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, Eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. [REVIEW]Eugen Huzum - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (4):467-468.
  41.  38
    The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays by Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer : Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Pp. Viii + 272, £40.00. [REVIEW]Andrew Rotondo - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):413-414.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. The Epistemology of Religious Disagreement: A Better Understanding.James Kraft - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  43.  7
    Recognition and Epistemic Injustice in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (3):363-377.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44.  9
    The Role of Idealized Cases in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):251-270.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays By David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey.Tomas Bogardus & Anna Brinkerhoff - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):339-342.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  13
    Review of The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. [REVIEW]Derek McAllister - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):303-306.
  47. Concepts, Conceptions and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Stephen Pethick & S. T. Kirchin - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
  48.  20
    The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays Christensen David and Lackey Jennifer, Eds. Oxford University Press, 2013; V + 272 Pp. £40.00. [REVIEW]Anastasia Panagopoulos - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (2):363-364.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
    To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  27
    The Epistemology of Real-World Religious Disagreement Without Peers.Bryan Frances - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):289-297.
    When you learn that a large body of highly intelligent, fair-minded, reasonable, and relatively unbiased thinkers disagree with you, does that give you good reason to think you’re wrong? Should you think, “Wait a minute. Maybe I’ve missed something here”? Should you at least drastically reduce your confidence? There is a general epistemological problem here regarding controversial beliefs, one that has nothing especially to do with religious belief. I argue that applying this discussion to religion transforms the problem in unexpected (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000