Results for 'expected utility'

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  1.  60
    Recursive Expected Utility and the Separation of Attitudes Towards Risk and Ambiguity: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW]Sujoy Chakravarty & Jaideep Roy - 2008 - Theory and Decision 66 (3):199-228.
    We use the multiple price list method and a recursive expected utility theory of smooth ambiguity to separate out attitude towards risk from that towards ambiguity. Based on this separation, we investigate if there are differences in agent behaviour under uncertainty over gain amounts vis-a-vis uncertainty over loss amounts. On an aggregate level, we find that (i) subjects are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, displaying a “reflection effect” and (ii) they are ambiguity neutral over (...)
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  2. Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility.Peter J. Hammond - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (1):25-78.
    Behaviour norms are considered for decision trees which allow both objective probabilities and uncertain states of the world with unknown probabilities. Terminal nodes have consequences in a given domain. Behaviour is required to be consistent in subtrees. Consequentialist behaviour, by definition, reveals a consequence choice function independent of the structure of the decision tree. It implies that behaviour reveals a revealed preference ordering satisfying both the independence axiom and a novel form of sure-thing principle. Continuous consequentialist behaviour must be (...) utility maximizing. Other plausible assumptions then imply additive utilities, subjective probabilities, and Bayes' rule. (shrink)
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  3.  82
    Expected Utility and Risk.Paul Weirich - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):419-442.
    The rule to maximize expected utility is intended for decisions where options involve risk. In those decisions the decision maker's attitude toward risk is important, and the rule ought to take it into account. Allais's and Ellsberg's paradoxes, however, suggest that the rule ignores attitudes toward risk. This suggestion is supported by recent psychological studies of decisions. These studies present a great variety of cases where apparently rational people violate the rule because of aversion or attraction to risk. (...)
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  4.  75
    Subjective Expected Utility: A Review of Normative Theories. [REVIEW]Peter C. Fishburn - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (2):139-199.
  5. On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.
    The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees (...)
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  6.  7
    An Expected Utility Theory for State-Dependent Preferences.Edi Karni & David Schmeidler - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):467-478.
    This note is a generalization and improved interpretation of the main result of Karni and Schmeidler. A decision-maker is supposed to possess a preference relation on acts and another preference relation on state-prize lotteries, both of which are assumed to satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms. In addition, the two preference relations restricted to a state of nature are assumed to agree. We show that these axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence of subjective expected utility over acts (...)
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  7. Risk, Rationality and Expected Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.
    There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (...)
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  8. Utilitarianism with and Without Expected Utility.David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola & Joaquin Teruji Thomas - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 87:77-113.
    We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons are encoded in a single ‘individual preorder’. The theorems give axioms that uniquely determine a social preorder in terms of this individual preorder. The social preorders described by these theorems have features that may be considered characteristic of Harsanyi-style utilitarianism, such as indifference to ex ante and ex post equality. However, the theorems are (...)
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  9. Expected Utility Without Utility.E. Castagnoli & M. Li Calzi - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):281-301.
  10. Expected Utility, Contributory Causation, and Vegetarianism.Gaverick Matheny - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (3):293–297.
  11.  97
    Expected Utility Theory Under Non-Classical Uncertainty.V. I. Danilov & A. Lambert-Mogiliansky - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):25-47.
    In this article, Savage’s theory of decision-making under uncertainty is extended from a classical environment into a non-classical one. The Boolean lattice of events is replaced by an arbitrary ortho-complemented poset. We formulate the corresponding axioms and provide representation theorems for qualitative measures and expected utility. Then, we discuss the issue of beliefs updating and investigate a transition probability model. An application to a simple game context is proposed.
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  12. Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences.Burak Can, Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (2):123-144.
    We consider the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. The extension axioms we consider generate orderings over sets according to their expected utilities induced by some assignment of utilities over alternatives and probability distributions over sets. The model we propose gives a general and unified exposition of expected utility consistent extensions whilst it allows to emphasize various subtleties, the effects of which seem to be underestimated – particularly in the literature (...)
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  13. Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 1998 - In John Davis, Wade Hands & Uskali Maki (eds.), Handbook of Economic Methodology. Edward Elgar. pp. 342-350.
    The paper summarizes expected utility theory, both in its original von Neumann-Morgenstern version and its later developments, and discusses the normative claims to rationality made by this theory.
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  14.  24
    Lexicographic Expected Utility Without Completeness.D. Borie - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):167-176.
    Standard theories of expected utility require that preferences are complete, and/or Archimedean. We present in this paper a theory of decision under uncertainty for both incomplete and non-Archimedean preferences. Without continuity assumptions, incomplete preferences on a lottery space reduce to an order-extension problem. It is well known that incomplete preferences can be extended to complete preferences in the full generality, but this result does not necessarily hold for incomplete preferences which satisfy the independence axiom, since it may obviously (...)
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  15. How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility.Bradley Monton - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibilities.
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  16.  14
    Expected Utility Theory on Mixture Spaces Without the Completeness Axiom.David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola & Joaquin Teruji Thomas - 2021 - arXiv:2102.06898 [Econ.TH].
    A mixture preorder is a preorder on a mixture space (such as a convex set) that is compatible with the mixing operation. In decision theoretic terms, it satisfies the central expected utility axiom of strong independence. We consider when a mixture preorder has a multi-representation that consists of real-valued, mixture-preserving functions. If it does, it must satisfy the mixture continuity axiom of Herstein and Milnor (1953). Mixture continuity is sufficient for a mixture-preserving multi-representation when the dimension of the (...)
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  17. Why High-Risk, Non-Expected-Utility-Maximising Gambles Can Be Rational and Beneficial: The Case of HIV Cure Studies.Lara Buchak - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics (2):1-6.
    Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk–benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation not to (...)
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  18.  17
    Rationality, Expected Utility Theory and the Precautionary Principle.Andreas Christiansen - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1):3-20.
    ABSTRACTA common objection to the precautionary principle is that it is irrational. I argue that this objection goes beyond the often-discussed claim that the principle is incoherent. Instead, I argue, expected utility theory is the source of several more sophisticated irrationality charges against the precautionary principle. I then defend the principle from these objections by arguing that the relevant features of the precautionary principle are part of plausible normative theories, and that the precautionary principle does not diverge more (...)
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  19. Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes.Philippe Mongin & Jean Baccelli - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):695-713.
    In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, (...)
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  20.  36
    Expected Utilities and Rational Actions and Choices.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1983 - Theoria 49 (3):159-183.
  21. Maximizing Expected Utility and the Rule of Long Run Success.Antonio Camacho - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 203--222.
  22. Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2009 - In Anastasios Brenner and Jean Gayon (ed.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 303-357.
    This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow (...)
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  23.  49
    Expected Utility From Additive Utility on Semigroups.Juan C. Candeal, Juan R. de Miguel & Esteban Induráin - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (1):87-94.
    In the present paper we study the framework of additive utility theory, obtaining new results derived from a concurrence of algebraic and topological techniques. Such techniques lean on the concept of a connected topological totally ordered semigroup. We achieve a general result concerning the existence of continuous and additive utility functions on completely preordered sets endowed with a binary operation ``+'', not necessarily being commutative or associative. In the final part of the paper we get some applications to (...)
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  24. The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason.Jean Hampton - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):195.
    Expected-utility theory has been a popular and influential theory in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. While its original developers, von Neumann and Morgenstern, presented it as a purely predictive theory useful to the practitioners of economic science, many subsequent theorists, particularly those outside of economics, have come to endorse EU theory as providing us with a representation of reason. But precisely in what sense does EU theory portray reason? And does it do so successfully? There are two (...)
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  25. Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
  26.  80
    Facts, Norms and Expected Utility Functions.Sophie Jallais, Pierre-Charles Pradier & David Teira - 2008 - History of the Human Sciences 21 (2):45-62.
    In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven (...)
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  27.  13
    Subjectively Expected Utility Theory and Subjects' Probability Estimates: Use of Measurement-Free Techniques.Thomas S. Wallsten - 1971 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 88 (1):31.
  28. A Conditional Expected Utility Model for Myopic Decision Makers.Leigh Tesfatsion - 1980 - Theory and Decision 12 (2):185-206.
    An expected utility model of individual choice is formulated which allows the decision maker to specify his available actions in the form of controls (partial contingency plans) and to simultaneously choose goals and controls in end-mean pairs. It is shown that the Savage expected utility model, the Marschak- Radner team model, the Bayesian statistical decision model, and the standard optimal control model can be viewed as special cases of this goal-control expected utility model.
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  29. Expected Utility Theory.Simon Grant & Timothy Van Zandt - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
     
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  30. The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility. Freidman, M. & L. Savage - 1952 - Journal of Political Economy 60:463--474.
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  31.  45
    Subjective Expected Utility Theory Revisited: A Reductio Ad Absurdum Paradox.Paul J. H. Schoemaker - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (1):1-21.
  32. Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility. [REVIEW]Hans Lottenbach - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48.
    In recent attempts at deriving morality from rationality expected utility theory has played a major role. In the most prominent such attempt, Gauthier'sMorals by Agreement, a mode of maximizing utility calledconstrained maximization is defended. I want to show that constrained maximization or any similar proposal cannot be coherently supported by expected utility theory. First, I point to an important implication of that theory. Second, I discuss the question of what the place of constrained maximization in (...)
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  33.  28
    Choquet Expected Utility with Affine Capacities.Pascal Toquebeuf - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):177-187.
    This paper studies decisions under ambiguity when attention is paid to extreme outcomes. In a purely subjective framework, we propose an axiomatic characterization of affine capacities, which are Choquet capacities consisting in an affine transformation of a subjective probability. Our main axiom restricts the well-known Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle to a change in a common intermediate outcome. The representation result is then an affine combination of the expected utility of the valued act and its maximal and minimal utilities.
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  34.  73
    Rationality, Group Choice and Expected Utility.Reed Richter - 1985 - Synthese 63 (2):203 - 232.
    This paper proposes a view uniformly extending expected utility calculations to both individual and group choice contexts. Three related cases illustrate the problems inherent in applying expected utility to group choices. However, these problems do not essentially depend upon the tact that more than one agent is involved. I devise a modified strategy allowing the application of expected utility calculations to these otherwise problematic cases. One case, however, apparently leads to contradiction. But recognizing the (...)
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  35. Hyperreal Expected Utilities and Pascal's Wager.Frederik Herzberg - 2011 - Logique Et Analyse 54 (213):69-108.
     
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  36.  95
    A Critique of Expected Utility Theory: Descriptive and Normative Considerations.Amos Tversky - 1975 - Erkenntnis 9 (2):163 - 173.
  37.  24
    Wild Fish and Expected Utility.Bob Fischer - 2017 - Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 8 (1):1-6.
    Its difficult to process the number of fish killed annually by the fishing industry. Nevertheless, governments are encouraging people to eat even more fishsee, e.g., the USDA dietary guidelinesand although animal advocates certainly dont concur with this advice, they generally havent prioritized fish in their lobbying efforts. Given the influence of utilitarianism on animal advocacy, the odds are good that this is motivated by an expected utility calculation. For those concerned about fish, is there any way to defend (...)
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  38.  25
    Expected Utility with Ambiguous Probabilities and 'Irrational' Parameters.GÜnter Franke - 1978 - Theory and Decision 9 (3):267.
  39. Conditionalization and Expected Utility.Peter M. Brown - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):415-419.
  40.  30
    Expected Utility, Ordering, and Context Freedom.Piers Rawling - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):79.
    The context-free weak ordering principle is viewed by many as a cornerstone of rational choice theory. McClennen, for example, claims that this principle is one of a pair on which '[t]he theory of rational choice and preference, as it has been developed in the past few decades by economists and decision theorists, rests', and Sen characterizes a version of context freedom as ‘a very basic requirement of rational choice’. But this principle is certainly not uncontroversial: there are examples of principle (...)
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  41. Extensions of Expected Utility Theory and Some Limitations of Pairwise Comparisons.Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
    We contrast three decision rules that extend Expected Utility to contexts where a convex set of probabilities is used to depict uncertainty: Γ-Maximin, Maximality, and E-admissibility. The rules extend Expected Utility theory as they require that an option is inadmissible if there is another that carries greater expected utility for each probability in a (closed) convex set. If the convex set is a singleton, then each rule agrees with maximizing expected utility. We (...)
     
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  42.  25
    Dynamic Consistency of Expected Utility Under Non-Classical Uncertainty.V. I. Danilov, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky & V. Vergopoulos - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (4):645-670.
    Quantum cognition in decision making is a recent and rapidly growing field. In this paper, we develop an expected utility theory in a context of non-classical uncertainty. We replace the classical state space with a Hilbert space which allows introducing the concept of quantum lottery. Within that framework, we formulate axioms on preferences over quantum lotteries to establish a representation theorem. We show that demanding the consistency of choice behavior conditional on new information is equivalent to the von (...)
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  43.  27
    Security Level, Potential Level, Expected Utility: A Three-Criteria Decision Model Under Risk.MichÈle Cohen - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (2):101.
  44.  35
    Maximizing Expected Utility is a Survival Criterion.Paul Snow - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (2):143-154.
  45.  26
    Expected Utility with Perturbed Lotteries.Gilbert W. Bassett - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (1):79-96.
  46. Utilitarianism and Expected Utility.John Broome - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (8):405-422.
  47.  31
    Expected Utility for Decision Making with Subjective Models.Salvatore Modica - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (2):157-168.
  48.  26
    A Test of Generalized Expected Utility Theory.Barry Sopher & Gary Gigliotti - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (1):75-106.
  49. Actual Utility, The Objection From Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility.Fred Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):49-79.
    Utilitarians are attracted to the idea that an act is morally right iff it leads to the best outcome. But critics have pointed out that in many cases we cannot determine which of our alternatives in fact would lead to the best outcome. So we can’t use the classic principle to determine what we should do. It’s not “practical”; it’s not “action-guiding”. Some take this to be a serious objection to utilitarianism, since they think a moral theory ought to be (...)
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  50.  80
    Cost-Benefit Versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules.Alex C. Michalos - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970 (1):375-402.
    A rule for the acceptance of scientific hypotheses called 'the principle of cost-benefit dominance' is shown to be more effective and efficient than the well-known principle of the maximization of expected utility. Harvey 's defense of his theory of the circulation of blood in animals is examined as a historical paradigm case of a successful defense of a scientific hypothesis and as an implicit application of the cost-benefit dominance rule advocated here. Finally, various concepts of 'dominance' are considered (...)
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