Results for 'expected utility'

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  1. Allan Gibbard and William L. Harper.of Expected Utility - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 125.
     
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  2. Doris ol1n.Expected Utility - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 1--385.
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  3. Oskar Morgenstern.Some Reflections On Utility - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 175.
  4. Richard M. Cyert and Morris H. Degroot.Adaptive Utility - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 21--223.
  5. Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes.Philippe Mongin & Jean Baccelli - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):695-713.
    In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, (...)
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  6. Expected Utility in 3D.Jean Baccelli - 2022 - In Thomas Augustin, Fabio Cozman & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Teddy Seidenfeld. pp. 187-206.
    Consider a subjective expected utility preference relation. It is usually held that the representations which this relation admits differ only in one respect, namely, the possible scales for the measurement of utility. In this paper, I discuss the fact that there are, metaphorically speaking, two additional dimensions along which infinitely many more admissible representations can be found. The first additional dimension is that of state-dependence. The second—and, in this context, much lesser-known—additional dimension is that of act-dependence. The (...)
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  7.  11
    Expected Utility and Rationality.John Broome - 2017 - In Weighing Goods. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 90–120.
    This chapter concerns with rational preferences in the face of uncertainty. The goodness of uncertain prospects is best understood in terms of rational preferences. The chapter discusses some necessary spadework. Its particular purpose is to defend some parts of expected utility theory as an account of rational preferences. It explains the general idea of expected utility theory, and particularly how it is founded on axioms. The principal axiom is also explained. It is often called the 'sure‐thing (...)
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  8. The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility. Freidman, M. & L. Savage - 1952 - Journal of Political Economy 60:463--474.
     
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  9. Expected utility without utility.E. Castagnoli & M. Li Calzi - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):281-301.
  10. Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences.Burak Can, Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (2):123-144.
    We consider the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. The extension axioms we consider generate orderings over sets according to their expected utilities induced by some assignment of utilities over alternatives and probability distributions over sets. The model we propose gives a general and unified exposition of expected utility consistent extensions whilst it allows to emphasize various subtleties, the effects of which seem to be underestimated – particularly in the literature (...)
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  11.  33
    Lexicographic expected utility without completeness.D. Borie - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):167-176.
    Standard theories of expected utility require that preferences are complete, and/or Archimedean. We present in this paper a theory of decision under uncertainty for both incomplete and non-Archimedean preferences. Without continuity assumptions, incomplete preferences on a lottery space reduce to an order-extension problem. It is well known that incomplete preferences can be extended to complete preferences in the full generality, but this result does not necessarily hold for incomplete preferences which satisfy the independence axiom, since it may obviously (...)
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  12. Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 1998 - In John Davis, Wade Hands & Uskali Maki (eds.), Handbook of Economic Methodology. Edward Elgar. pp. 342-350.
    The paper summarizes expected utility theory, both in its original von Neumann-Morgenstern version and its later developments, and discusses the normative claims to rationality made by this theory.
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  13. Maximizing expected utility and the rule of long run success.Antonio Camacho - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 203--222.
  14.  56
    Expected utility from additive utility on semigroups.Juan C. Candeal, Juan R. de Miguel & Esteban Induráin - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (1):87-94.
    In the present paper we study the framework of additive utility theory, obtaining new results derived from a concurrence of algebraic and topological techniques. Such techniques lean on the concept of a connected topological totally ordered semigroup. We achieve a general result concerning the existence of continuous and additive utility functions on completely preordered sets endowed with a binary operation ``+'', not necessarily being commutative or associative. In the final part of the paper we get some applications to (...)
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  15. Expected utility theory under non-classical uncertainty.V. I. Danilov & A. Lambert-Mogiliansky - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):25-47.
    In this article, Savage’s theory of decision-making under uncertainty is extended from a classical environment into a non-classical one. The Boolean lattice of events is replaced by an arbitrary ortho-complemented poset. We formulate the corresponding axioms and provide representation theorems for qualitative measures and expected utility. Then, we discuss the issue of beliefs updating and investigate a transition probability model. An application to a simple game context is proposed.
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  16. Expected utility, contributory causation, and vegetarianism.Gaverick Matheny - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (3):293–297.
    Several authors have argued that act–utilitarianism cannot provide an adequate critique of buying meat because a single meat purchase will not actually cause more farm animals to be raised or slaughtered. Thus, regardless of whether or not the production of meat is inhumane to animals, someone who buys meat is doing nothing wrong. This argument fails to show that meat purchases are morally permissible, however, because it assumes that act–utilitarians would use actual utility in their decision to buy or (...)
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  17. Expected utility and risk.Paul Weirich - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):419-442.
    The rule to maximize expected utility is intended for decisions where options involve risk. In those decisions the decision maker's attitude toward risk is important, and the rule ought to take it into account. Allais's and Ellsberg's paradoxes, however, suggest that the rule ignores attitudes toward risk. This suggestion is supported by recent psychological studies of decisions. These studies present a great variety of cases where apparently rational people violate the rule because of aversion or attraction to risk. (...)
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  18.  19
    An expected utility theory for state-dependent preferences.Edi Karni & David Schmeidler - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):467-478.
    This note is a generalization and improved interpretation of the main result of Karni and Schmeidler. A decision-maker is supposed to possess a preference relation on acts and another preference relation on state-prize lotteries, both of which are assumed to satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms. In addition, the two preference relations restricted to a state of nature are assumed to agree. We show that these axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence of subjective expected utility over acts (...)
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  19. Why high-risk, non-expected-utility-maximising gambles can be rational and beneficial: the case of HIV cure studies.Lara Buchak - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics (2):1-6.
    Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk–benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation not to (...)
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  20.  45
    Expected utility theory on mixture spaces without the completeness axiom.David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola & Joaquin Teruji Thomas - 2021 - arXiv:2102.06898 [Econ.TH].
    A mixture preorder is a preorder on a mixture space (such as a convex set) that is compatible with the mixing operation. In decision theoretic terms, it satisfies the central expected utility axiom of strong independence. We consider when a mixture preorder has a multi-representation that consists of real-valued, mixture-preserving functions. If it does, it must satisfy the mixture continuity axiom of Herstein and Milnor (1953). Mixture continuity is sufficient for a mixture-preserving multi-representation when the dimension of the (...)
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  21. Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility.Peter J. Hammond - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (1):25-78.
    Behaviour norms are considered for decision trees which allow both objective probabilities and uncertain states of the world with unknown probabilities. Terminal nodes have consequences in a given domain. Behaviour is required to be consistent in subtrees. Consequentialist behaviour, by definition, reveals a consequence choice function independent of the structure of the decision tree. It implies that behaviour reveals a revealed preference ordering satisfying both the independence axiom and a novel form of sure-thing principle. Continuous consequentialist behaviour must be (...) utility maximizing. Other plausible assumptions then imply additive utilities, subjective probabilities, and Bayes' rule. (shrink)
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  22. On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.
    The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees (...)
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  23. Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing.WooJin Chung & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-40.
    We introduce an expected-value theory of linguistic modality that makes reference to expected utility and a likelihood-based confirmation measure for deontics and epistemics, respectively. The account is a probabilistic semantics for deontics and epistemics, yet it proposes that deontics and epistemics share a common core modal semantics, as in traditional possible-worlds analysis of modality. We argue that this account is not only theoretically advantageous, but also has far-reaching empirical consequences. In particular, we predict modal versions of reasoning (...)
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  24.  20
    Subjectively expected utility theory and subjects' probability estimates: Use of measurement-free techniques.Thomas S. Wallsten - 1971 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 88 (1):31.
  25. Risk, rationality and expected utility theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.
    There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (...)
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  26.  29
    Arrovian Aggregation of Generalised Expected-Utility Preferences: (Im)possibility Results by Means of Model Theory.Frederik Herzberg - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (5):947-967.
    Cerreia-Vioglio et al. :341–375, 2011) have proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preference orderings. This paper investigates the problem of Arrovian aggregation of such preferences—and proves dictatorial impossibility results for both finite and infinite populations. Applications for the special case of aggregating expected-utility preferences are given. A novel proof methodology for special aggregation problems, based on model theory, is employed.
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  27. Utilitarianism with and without expected utility.David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola & Joaquin Teruji Thomas - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 87:77-113.
    We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons are encoded in a single ‘individual preorder’. The theorems give axioms that uniquely determine a social preorder in terms of this individual preorder. The social preorders described by these theorems have features that may be considered characteristic of Harsanyi-style utilitarianism, such as indifference to ex ante and ex post equality. However, the theorems are (...)
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  28.  48
    Expected utilities and rational actions and choices.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1983 - Theoria 49 (3):159-183.
  29.  60
    Subjective expected utility theory revisited: A reductio ad absurdum paradox.Paul J. H. Schoemaker - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (1):1-21.
  30. How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility.Bradley Monton - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibilities.
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  31.  66
    Recursive expected utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: an experimental study. [REVIEW]Sujoy Chakravarty & Jaideep Roy - 2008 - Theory and Decision 66 (3):199-228.
    We use the multiple price list method and a recursive expected utility theory of smooth ambiguity to separate out attitude towards risk from that towards ambiguity. Based on this separation, we investigate if there are differences in agent behaviour under uncertainty over gain amounts vis-a-vis uncertainty over loss amounts. On an aggregate level, we find that (i) subjects are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, displaying a “reflection effect” and (ii) they are ambiguity neutral over (...)
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  32.  45
    Choquet expected utility with affine capacities.Pascal Toquebeuf - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):177-187.
    This paper studies decisions under ambiguity when attention is paid to extreme outcomes. In a purely subjective framework, we propose an axiomatic characterization of affine capacities, which are Choquet capacities consisting in an affine transformation of a subjective probability. Our main axiom restricts the well-known Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle to a change in a common intermediate outcome. The representation result is then an affine combination of the expected utility of the valued act and its maximal and minimal utilities.
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  33.  39
    Rationality, Expected Utility Theory and the Precautionary Principle.Andreas Christiansen - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1):3-20.
    A common objection to the precautionary principle is that it is irrational. I argue that this objection goes beyond the often-discussed claim that the principle is incoherent. Instead, I argue, exp...
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  34.  3
    Expected utility, independence, and continuity.Kemal Ozbek - forthcoming - Theory and Decision:1-22.
    In this paper, we provide two novel expected utility theorems by suitably adjusting the independence and continuity axioms. Our first theorem characterizes expected utility preferences using weak versions of the independence axiom (with varying mixture weights) and a new weak continuity axiom. Our second theorem characterizes these preferences using weaker versions of the independence axiom (with mixture weights fixed at 1/2) and a strong topological continuity axiom. We provide useful examples to illustrate the tightness of these (...)
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  35. Facts, norms and expected utility functions.Sophie Jallais, Pierre-Charles Pradier & David Teira - 2008 - History of the Human Sciences 21 (2):45-62.
    In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven (...)
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  36.  29
    Expected utility with perturbed lotteries.Gilbert W. Bassett - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (1):79-96.
  37. A conditional expected utility model for myopic decision makers.Leigh Tesfatsion - 1980 - Theory and Decision 12 (2):185-206.
    An expected utility model of individual choice is formulated which allows the decision maker to specify his available actions in the form of controls (partial contingency plans) and to simultaneously choose goals and controls in end-mean pairs. It is shown that the Savage expected utility model, the Marschak- Radner team model, the Bayesian statistical decision model, and the standard optimal control model can be viewed as special cases of this goal-control expected utility model.
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  38. Wanting is not expected utility.Tomasz Zyglewicz - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, I criticize Ethan Jerzak’s view that ‘want’ has only one sense, the mixed expected utility sense. First, I show that his appeals to ‘really’-locutions fail to explain away the counterintuitive predictions of his view. Second, I present a class of cases, which I call “principled indifference” cases, that pose difficulties for any expected utility lexical entry for ‘want’. I argue that in order to account for these cases, one needs to concede that ‘want’ (...)
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  39.  83
    Rationality, group choice and expected utility.Reed Richter - 1985 - Synthese 63 (2):203 - 232.
    This paper proposes a view uniformly extending expected utility calculations to both individual and group choice contexts. Three related cases illustrate the problems inherent in applying expected utility to group choices. However, these problems do not essentially depend upon the tact that more than one agent is involved. I devise a modified strategy allowing the application of expected utility calculations to these otherwise problematic cases. One case, however, apparently leads to contradiction. But recognizing the (...)
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  40. Expected Utility Theory.Simon Grant & Timothy Van Zandt - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
     
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  41. Hyperreal Expected Utilities and Pascal's Wager.Frederik Herzberg - 2011 - Logique Et Analyse 54 (213):69-108.
     
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  42.  47
    Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility.Brad Armendt - 1988 - In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-24.
    Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.
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  43.  33
    Dynamic consistency of expected utility under non-classical uncertainty.V. I. Danilov, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky & V. Vergopoulos - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (4):645-670.
    Quantum cognition in decision making is a recent and rapidly growing field. In this paper, we develop an expected utility theory in a context of non-classical uncertainty. We replace the classical state space with a Hilbert space which allows introducing the concept of quantum lottery. Within that framework, we formulate axioms on preferences over quantum lotteries to establish a representation theorem. We show that demanding the consistency of choice behavior conditional on new information is equivalent to the von (...)
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  44. Utilitarianism and expected utility.John Broome - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (8):405-422.
  45. Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2009 - In Anastasios Brenner and Jean Gayon (ed.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 303-357.
    This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow (...)
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  46. The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason.Jean Hampton - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):195.
    Expected-utility theory has been a popular and influential theory in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. While its original developers, von Neumann and Morgenstern, presented it as a purely predictive theory useful to the practitioners of economic science, many subsequent theorists, particularly those outside of economics, have come to endorse EU theory as providing us with a representation of reason. But precisely in what sense does EU theory portray reason? And does it do so successfully? There are two (...)
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  47. Subjective expected utility: A review of normative theories. [REVIEW]Peter C. Fishburn - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (2):139-199.
  48.  28
    Expected Utility with Ambiguous Probabilities and 'Irrational' Parameters.GÜnter Franke - 1978 - Theory and Decision 9 (3):267.
  49.  51
    Expected Utility, Ordering, and Context Freedom.Piers Rawling - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):79.
    The context-free weak ordering principle is viewed by many as a cornerstone of rational choice theory. McClennen, for example, claims that this principle is one of a pair on which '[t]he theory of rational choice and preference, as it has been developed in the past few decades by economists and decision theorists, rests', and Sen characterizes a version of context freedom as ‘a very basic requirement of rational choice’. But this principle is certainly not uncontroversial: there are examples of principle (...)
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  50.  37
    Maximizing expected utility is a survival criterion.Paul Snow - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (2):143-154.
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