Multiple-conclusion Hilbert-style systems allow us to finitely axiomatize every logic defined by a finite matrix. Having obtained such axiomatizations for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene and Bochvar–Kleene logics, we modify them by replacing the multiple-conclusion rules with carefully selected single-conclusion ones. In this way we manage to introduce the first finite Hilbert-style single-conclusion axiomatizations for these logics.

We derive a Mal'cev condition for congruence meet-semidistributivity and then use it to prove two theorems. $\mathbf{Theorem A:}$ if a variety in a finite language is congruence meet-semidistributive and residually less than some finite cardinal, then it is finitely based. $\mathbf{Theorem B:}$ there is an algorithm which, given $m < \omega$ and a finite algebra in a finite language, determines whether the variety generated by the algebra is congruence meet-semidistributive and residually less than m.

Renowned scholar Robert Adams explores the relation between religion and ethics through a comprehensive philosophical account of a theistically-based framework for ethics. Adams' framework begins with the good rather than the right, and with excellence rather than usefulness. He argues that loving the excellent, of which adoring God is a clear example, is the most fundamental aspect of a life well lived. Developing his original and detailed theory, Adams contends that devotion, the sacred, grace, martyrdom, worship, vocation, faith, and other (...) concepts drawn from religious ethics have been sorely overlooked in moral philosophy and can enrich the texture of ethical thought. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that de Finetti provided compelling reasons for rejecting countable additivity. It is ironical therefore that the main argument advanced by Bayesians against following his recommendation is based on the consistency criterion, coherence, he himself developed. I will show that this argument is mistaken. Nevertheless, there remain some counter-intuitive consequences of rejecting countable additivity, and one in particular has all the appearances of a full-blown paradox. I will end by arguing that in fact it is no (...) paradox, and that what it shows is that conditionalisation, often claimed to be integral to the Bayesian canon, has to be rejected as a general rule in a finitely additive environment. (shrink)

This book is a rich collection of philosophical essays radically interrogating key notions and preoccupations of the phenomenological tradition. While using Heidegger’s Being and Time as its permanent point of reference and dispute, this collection also confronts other important philosophers, such as Kant, Nietzsche, and Derrida. The projects of these pivotal thinkers of finitude are relentlessly pushed to their extreme, with respect both to their unexpected horizons and to their as yet unexplored analytical potential. A Finite Thinking shows that, paradoxically, (...) where the thought of finitude comes into its own it frees itself, not only to reaffirm a certain transformed and transformative presence, but also for a non-religious reconsideration and reaffirmation of certain theologemes, as well as of the body, heart, and love. This book shows the literary dimension of philosophical discourse, providing important enabling ideas for scholars of literature, cultural theory, and philosophy. (shrink)

Edith Stein's (1891-1942) pivotal philosophical study of being. Includes two appendixes: "Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of Existence" and "The Interior Castle".

We use finite model theory to prove:Let m ≥ 2. Then: If there exists k such that NP ⊆ σmTIME ∩ ΠmTIME, then for every r there exists kr such that PNP[nr] ⊆ σmTIME ∩ ΠmTIME; If there exists a superpolynomial time-constructible function f such that NTIME ⊆ Σpm ∪ Πpm, then additionally PNP[nr] ⊈ Σpm ∪ Πpm.This strengthens a result by Mocas [M96] that for any r, PNP[nr] ⊈ NEXP.In addition, we use FM-truth definitions to give a simple sufficient (...) condition for the σ11 arity hierarchy to be strict over finite models. (shrink)

Our investigation is concerned with the finite model property with respect to admissible rules. We establish general sufficient conditions for absence of fmp w. r. t. admissibility which are applicable to modal logics containing K4: Theorem 3.1 says that no logic λ containing K4 with the co-cover property and of width > 2 has fmp w. r. t. admissibility. Surprisingly many, if not to say all, important modal logics of width > 2 are within the scope of this theorem–K4 itself, (...) S4, GL, K4.1, K4.2, S4.1, S4.2, GL.2, etc. Thus the situation is completely opposite to the case of the ordinary fmp–the absolute majority of important logics have fmp, but not with respect to admissibility. As regards logics of width ≤ 2, there exists a zone for fmp w. r. t. admissibility. It is shown that all modal logics A of width ≤ 2 extending S4 which are not sub-logics of three special tabular logics have fmp w.r.t. admissibility. (shrink)

Adams offers a theistically-based framework for ethics, based upon the idea of a transcendent, infinite good, which is God, and its relation to the many finite examples of good in our experience. His account shows how philosophically unfashionable religious concepts can enrich ethical thought. "...one of the two most important books in moral philosophy of the last quarter century, the other being After Virtue."--Theology Today.

The ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is typically associated with a punishing conception of responsibility rather than freedom. In this chapter, our aim is to explore Levinas’s often overlooked theory of freedom. Specifically, we compare Levinas’s account of freedom to the Kantian (and Fichtean) idea of freedom as autonomy and the Hegelian idea of freedom as relational. Based on these comparisons, we suggest that Levinas offers a distinctive conception of freedom—“finite freedom.” In contrast to Kantian autonomy, finite freedom constitutively involves (...) standing in certain social relations with others. And in contrast to Hegelian relational freedom, the social relations involved in finite freedom are not defined by mutual recognition, but by feelings of separation and even antagonism. Along the way, we promote a reading Levinas’s Totality and Infinity as a Hegel-style story of Bildung (development), and show how, on Levinas’s view, freedom can develop or mature in the life of the individual. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory is a ZFU-like axiomatic set theory, which deals with two kinds of ur-elements: M-atoms, objects like the atoms of ZFU, and m-atoms, items for which the usual identity relation is not defined. One of the motivations to advance such a theory is to deal properly with collections of items like particles in non-relativistic quantum mechanics when these are understood as being non-individuals in the sense that they may be indistinguishable although identity does not apply to them. According to (...) some authors, this is the best way to understand quantum objects. The fact that identity is not defined for m-atoms raises a technical difficulty: it seems impossible to follow the usual procedures to define the cardinal of collections involving these items. In this paper we propose a definition of finite cardinals in quasi-set theory which works for collections involving m-atoms. (shrink)

We use the apparatus of the canonical formulas introduced by Zakharyaschev [10] to prove that all finitely axiomatizable normal modal logics containing K4.3 are decidable, though possibly not characterized by classes of finite frames. Our method is purely frame-theoretic. Roughly, given a normal logic L above K4.3, we enumerate effectively a class of frames with respect to which L is complete, show how to check effectively whether a frame in the class validates a given formula, and then apply a Harropstyle (...) argument to establish the decidability of L, provided of course that it has finitely many axioms. (shrink)

Formal learning theory constitutes an attempt to describe and explain the phenomenon of learning, in particular of language acquisition. The considerations in this domain are also applicable in philosophy of science, where it can be interpreted as a description of the process of scientific inquiry. The theory focuses on various properties of the process of hypothesis change over time. Treating conjectures as informational states, we link the process of conjecture-change to epistemic update. We reconstruct and analyze the temporal aspect of (...) learning in the context of dynamic and temporal logics of epistemic change. We first introduce the basic formal notions of learning theory and basic epistemic logic. We provide a translation of the components of learning scenarios into the domain of epistemic logic. Then, we propose a characterization of finite identifiability in an epistemic temporal language. In the end we discuss consequences and possible extensions of our work. (shrink)

The variety of Heyting algebras has two well-behaved locally finite reducts, the variety of bounded distributive lattices and the variety of implicative semilattices. The variety of bounded distributive lattices is generated by the →-free reducts of Heyting algebras, while the variety of implicative semilattices is generated by the ∨-free reducts. Each of these reducts gives rise to canonical formulas that generalize Jankov formulas and provide an axiomatization of all superintuitionistic logics. The ∨-free reducts of Heyting algebras give rise to the (...) -canonical formulas that we studied in an earlier work. Here we introduce the -canonical formulas, which are obtained from the study of the →-free reducts of Heyting algebras. We prove that every si-logic is axiomatizable by -canonical formulas. We also discuss the similarities and differences between these two kinds of canonical formulas. One of the main ingredients of these formulas is a designated subset D of pairs of elements of a finite subdirectly irreducible Heyting algebra A. When D=A2, we show that the -canonical formula of A is equivalent to the Jankov formula of A. On the other hand, when D=∅, the -canonical formulas produce a new class of si-logics we term stable si-logics. We prove that there are continuum many stable si-logics and that all stable si-logics have the finite model property. We also compare stable si-logics to splitting and subframe si-logics. (shrink)

Alexander Pruss and I have proposed an analysis of omnipotence which makes no use of the problematic terms 'power' and 'ability'. However, this raises an obvious worry: if our analysis is not related to the notion of power, then how can it count as an analysis of omnipotence, the property of being all-powerful, at all? In this paper, I show how omnipotence can be understood as the possession of infinite power (general, universal, or unlimited power) rather than the possession of (...) particular powers. I then argue that the ordinary notions of particular powers or abilities can be understood as applying vague limitations to the notion of infinite power. The vagueness of these limitations is the source of the well-known difficulties in the analysis of ability. (shrink)

The logic Kf of the modalities of finite, devised to capture the notion of 'there exists a finite number of accessible worlds such that . . . is true', was introduced and axiomatized by Fattorosi. In this paper we enrich the logical framework of Kf: we give consistency properties and a tableau system (which yields the decidability) explicitly designed for Kf, and we introduce a shorter and more natural axiomatization. Moreover, we show the strong and suggestive relationship between Kf and (...) the much older logic of the physical modalities of Burks. (shrink)

We provide a canonical construction of conformal covers for finite hypergraphs and present two immediate applications to the finite model theory of relational structures. In the setting of relational structures, conformal covers serve to construct guarded bisimilar companion structures that avoid all incidental Gaifman cliques-thus serving as a partial analogue in finite model theory for the usually infinite guarded unravellings. In hypergraph theoretic terms, we show that every finite hypergraph admits a bisimilar cover by a finite conformal hypergraph. In terms (...) of relational structures, we show that every finite relational structure admits a guarded bisimilar cover by a finite structure whose Gaifman cliques are guarded. One of our applications answers an open question about a clique constrained strengthening of the extension property for partial automorphisms (EPPA) of Hrushovski, Herwig and Lascar. A second application provides an alternative proof of the finite model property (FMP) for the clique guarded fragment of first-order logic CGF, by reducing (finite) satisfiability in CGF to (finite) satisfiability in the guarded fragment, GF. (shrink)

Neo-Fregeanism contends that knowledge of arithmetic may be acquired by second-order logical reflection upon Hume's principle. Heck argues that Hume's principle doesn't inform ordinary arithmetical reasoning and so knowledge derived from it cannot be genuinely arithmetical. To suppose otherwise, Heck claims, is to fail to comprehend the magnitude of Cantor's conceptual contribution to mathematics. Heck recommends that finite Hume's principle be employed instead to generate arithmetical knowledge. But a better understanding of Cantor's contribution is achieved if it is supposed that (...) Hume's principle really does inform arithmetical practice. More generally, Heck's arguments misconceive the epistemological character of neo-Fregeanism. (shrink)

This paper proves the finite axiomatizability of transitive modal logics of finite depth and finite width w.r.t. proper-successor-equivalence. The frame condition of the latter requires, in a rooted transitive frame, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points with different sets of proper successors. The result generalizes Rybakov’s result of the finite axiomatizability of extensions of$\mathbf {S4}$of finite depth and finite width.

We explore a network architecture introduced by Elman (1988) for predicting successive elements of a sequence. The network uses the pattern of activation over a set of hidden units from time-step 25-1, together with element t, to predict element t + 1. When the network is trained with strings from a particular finite-state grammar, it can learn to be a perfect finite-state recognizer for the grammar. When the network has a minimal number of hidden units, patterns on the hidden units (...) come to correspond to the nodes of the grammar, although this correspondence is not necessary for the network to act as a perfect finite-state recognizer. We explore the conditions under which the network can carry information about distant sequential contingencies across intervening elements. Such information is maintained with relative ease if it is.. (shrink)

We give a proof of the finite model property of some fragments of commutative and noncommutative linear logic: the Lambek calculus, BCI, BCK and their enrichments, MALL and Cyclic MALL. We essentially simplify the method used in [4] for proving fmp of BCI and the Lambek ca culus and in [5] for proving fmp of MALL. Our construction of finite models also differs from that used in Lafont [8] in his proof of fmp of MALL.

Recently Lafont [6] showed the finite model property for the multiplicative additive fragment of linear logic (MALL) and for affine logic (LLW), i.e., linear logic with weakening. In this paper, we shall prove the finite model property for intuitionistic versions of those, i.e. intuitionistic MALL (which we call IMALL), and intuitionistic LLW (which we call ILLW). In addition, we shall show the finite model property for contractive linear logic (LLC), i.e., linear logic with contraction, and for its intuitionistic version (ILLC). (...) The finite model property for related substructural logics also follow by our method. In particular, we shall show that the property holds for all of FL and GL - -systems except FL c and GL - c of Ono [11], that will settle the open problems stated in Ono [12]. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that certain stimulus-response learning models which are adequate to represent finite automata (acceptors) are not adequate to represent noninitial state input-output automata (transducers). This circumstance suggests the question whether or not the behavior of animals if satisfactorily modelled by automata is predictive. It is argued in partial answer that there are automata which can be explained in the sense that their transition and output functions can be described (roughly, Hempel-type covering law explanation) while their (...) behaviors are in principle not predictable short of possession of their complete histories or of information concerning present internal states by indirect observation. (shrink)

We generalize the result of non-finite axiomatizability of totally categorical first-order theories from elementary model theory to homogeneous model theory. In particular, we lift the theory of envelopes to homogeneous model theory and develope theory of imaginaries in the case of ω-stable homogeneous classes of finite U-rank.

We define a property for varieties V, the f.r.p. . If it applies to a finitely based V then V is strongly finitely based in the sense of [14], see Theorem 2. Moreover, we obtain finite axiomatizability results for certain propositional logics associated with V, in its generality comparable to well-known finite base results from equational logic. Theorem 3 states that each variety generated by a 2-element algebra has the f.r.p. Essentially this implies finite axiomatizability of a 2-valued logic in (...) any finite language. (shrink)

We write and for the cardinalities of the set of finite subsets and the set of permutations with finitely many non‐fixed points, respectively, of a set which is of cardinality. In this paper, we investigate relationships between and for an infinite cardinal in the absence of the Axiom of Choice. We give conditions that make and comparable as well as give related consistency results.

The typical rules for truth-trees for first-order logic without functions can fail to generate finite branches for formulas that have finite models–the rule set fails to have the finite tree property. In 1984 Boolos showed that a new rule set proposed by Burgess does have this property. In this paper we address a similar problem with the typical rule set for first-order logic with identity and functions, proposing a new rule set that does have the finite tree property.

Trying to overcome Dugundji’s result on uncharacterisability of modal logics by finite logical matrices, Kearns and Ivlev proposed, independently, a characterisation of some modal systems by means of four-valued multivalued truth-functions , as an alternative to Kripke semantics. This constitutes an antecedent of the non-deterministic matrices introduced by Avron and Lev . In this paper we propose a reconstruction of Kearns’s and Ivlev’s results in a uniform way, obtaining an extension to another modal systems. The first part of the paper (...) is devoted to four-valued Nmatrices, including Kearns’s and Ivlev’s. Besides proving with full details Kearns’s results for T, S4 and S5, we also obtain a characterisation of the system B by four-valued Nmatrices with level valuations. Concerning Ivlev’s results, two new modal systems are introduced and char.. (shrink)

It is proved that the variety of relevant disjunction lattices has the finite embeddability property. It follows that Avron's relevance logic RMImin has a strong form of the finite model property, so it has a solvable deducibility problem. This strengthens Avron's result that RMImin is decidable.

Let ℱ be the class of complete, finitely axiomatizable ω-categorical theories. It is not known whether there are simple theories in ℱ. We prove three results of the form: if T∈ ℱ has a sufficently well-behaved definable set J, then T is not simple. All of our arguments assume that the definable set J satisfies the Mazoyer hypothesis, which controls how an element of J can be algebraic over a subset of the model. For every known example in ℱ, there (...) is a definable set satisfying the Mazoyer hypothesis. (shrink)

Tense logics in the bimodal propositional language are investigated with respect to the Finite Model Property. In order to prove positive results techniques from investigations of modal logics above K4 are extended to tense logic. General negative results show the limits of the transfer.

In this paper we deepen Mundici's analysis on reducibility of the decision problem from infinite-valued ukasiewicz logic to a suitable m-valued ukasiewicz logic m , where m only depends on the length of the formulas to be proved. Using geometrical arguments we find a better upper bound for the least integer m such that a formula is valid in if and only if it is also valid in m. We also reduce the notion of logical consequence in to the same (...) notion in a suitable finite set of finite-valued ukasiewicz logics. Finally, we define an analytic and internal sequent calculus for infinite-valued ukasiewicz logic. (shrink)

It is proved that in a suitable intuitionistic, locally classical, version of the theory ZFC deprived of the axiom of infinity, the requirement that every set be finite is equivalent to the assertion that every ordinal is a natural number. Moreover, the theory obtained with the addition of these finiteness assumptions is equivalent to a theory of hereditarily finite sets, developed by Previale in "Induction and foundation in the theory of hereditarily finite sets." This solves some problems stated there. (...) The analysis is undertaken using for each of these results a limited fragment of the relevant theory. (shrink)

We introduce insertion domains that support the placement of new, higher, vertices into finite trees. We prove that every nonincreasing insertion domain has an element with simple structural properties in the style of classical Ramsey theory. This result is proved using standard large cardinal axioms that go well beyond the usual axioms for mathematics. We also establish that this result cannot be proved without these large cardinal axioms. We also introduce insertion rules that specify the placement of new, higher, vertices (...) into finite trees. We prove that every insertion rule greedily generates a tree with these same structural properties; and every decreasing insertion rule generates (or admits) a tree with these same structural properties. It is also necessary and sufficient to use the same large cardinals (in the precise sense of Corollary D.25). The results suggest new areas of research in discrete mathematics called "Ramsey tree theory" and "greedy Ramsey theory" which demonstrably require more than the usual axioms for mathematics. (shrink)

We exhibit a finite lattice without critical triple that cannot be embedded into the enumerable Turing degrees. Our method promises to lead to a full characterization of the finite lattices embeddable into the enumerable Turing degrees.

William James advocated a form of finite theism, motivated by epistemological and moral concerns with scholastic theism and pantheism. In this article, I elaborate James’s case for finite theism and his strategy for dealing with these concerns, which I dub the problems of suffering. I contend that James is at the very least implicitly aware that the problem of suffering is not so much one generic problem but a family of related problems. I argue that one of James’s great contributions (...) to philosophical theism is his advocacy for the view that adequate theistic philosophizing is not so much about cracking this family of problems, but finding a version of the problem to embrace. (shrink)

In many classes of structures, each computable structure has computable dimension 1 or $\omega$. Nevertheless, Goncharov showed that for each $n < \omega$, there exists a computable structure with computable dimension $n$. In this paper we show that, under one natural definition of relativized computable dimension, no computable structure has finite relativized computable dimension greater than 1.

This paper investigates the question of how we manage to single out the natural number structure as the intended interpretation of our arithmetical language. Horsten submits that the reference of our arithmetical vocabulary is determined by our knowledge of some principles of arithmetic on the one hand, and by our computational abilities on the other. We argue against such a view and we submit an alternative answer. We single out the structure of natural numbers through our intuition of the absolute (...) notion of finiteness. (shrink)

We prove the finite model property (fmp) for BCI and BCI with additive conjunction, which answers some open questions in Meyer and Ono [11]. We also obtain similar results for some restricted versions of these systems in the style of the Lambek calculus [10, 3]. The key tool is the method of barriers which was earlier introduced by the author to prove fmp for the product-free Lambek calculus [2] and the commutative product-free Lambek calculus [4].

Working in the language of first-order arithmetic we consider models of the base theory P - . Suppose M is a model of P - and let M satisfy induction for σ 1 -formulas. First it is shown that the Friedberg-Muchnik finite injury argument can be performed inside M, and then, using a blocking method for the requirements, we prove that the Sacks splitting construction can be done in M. So, the "amount" of induction needed to perform the known finite (...) injury priority arguments is Σ 1 -induction. (shrink)

The logics considered here are the propositional Linear Logic and propositional Intuitionistic Linear Logic extended by a knotted structural rule: γ, xn → y / γ, xm → y. It is proved that the class of algebraic models for such a logic has the finite embeddability property, meaning that every finite partial subalgebra of an algebra in the class can be embedded into a finite full algebra in the class. It follows that each such logic has the finite model property (...) with respect to its algebraic semantics and hence that the logic is decidable. (shrink)