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Profile: Julian Fink (Universität Bayreuth)
  1. A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'.Julian Fink - 2014 - Erkenntnis (4):909-941.
    The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree (...)
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  2.  81
    The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by (...)
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  3. The Function of Normative Process-Requirements.Julian Fink - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):115-136.
    This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree (...)
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  4.  90
    The Ladder of Rationality.Julian Fink - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):787-791.
    This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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  5.  57
    Erratum To: The Ladder of Rationality.Julian Fink - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):793.
    This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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  6. Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
    Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, (...)
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  7. Is the Right Prior to the Good?Julian Fink - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):143-149.
    One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situa- tions, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action's rightness. This indicates that (...)
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  8.  22
    The Realm of Reason. [REVIEW]Julian Fink - 2005 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 8.
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  9. What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?Julian Fink - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.
    This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the (...)
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  10.  89
    New Perspectives on Nazi Law.Carolyn Benson & Julian Fink - 2012 - Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought 3 (2):341-346.
    It is beyond doubt that the legal system established by the Nazi government in Germany between 1933-1945 represented a gross departure from the rule of law: the Nazis eradicated legal security and certainty; allowed for judicial and state arbitrariness; blocked epistemic access to what the law requires; issued unpredictable legal requirements; and so on. This introduction outlines the distorted nature of the Nazi legal system and looks at the main factors that contributed to this grave divergence.
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  11.  38
    Are There Process-Requirements of Rationality?Julian Fink - 2011 - Organon F 18 (4):475-488.
    Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evalu- ates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction- based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based definition of state- and pro- cess-requirements. However, a (...)
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  12.  46
    Legal Oughts, Normative Transmission, and the Nazi Use of Analogy.Carolyn Benson & Julian Fink - 2012 - Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought 3 (2):445-463.
    In 1935, the Nazi government introduced what came to be known as the abrogation of the pro- hibition of analogy. This measure, a feature of the new penal law, required judges to stray from the letter of the written law and to consider instead whether an action was worthy of pun- ishment according to the ‘sound perception of the people’ and the ‘underlying principle’ of existing criminal statutes. In discussions of Nazi law, an almost unanimous conclusion is that a system (...)
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  13. Normative Lessons for the Scope Debate of Rational Requirements.Julian Fink - 2016 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):99-106.
    A significant part of the debate concerning the nature of rational requirements centers on disambiguating ordinary articulations of conditional requirements of rationality. Particular focus has been put on the question of whether conditional requirements of rationality take a wide or a narrow logical scope. However, this paper shows that this focus is misguided and harmful to the debate. I argue that concentrating on syntactic scope renders us more likely to arrive at incorrect formulations of rational requirements and to overlook questions (...)
     
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  14.  35
    Are All Actions Movements of the Agent's Body?Julian Fink - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):52-64.
    Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading 'movements', in 'all actions are bodily movements', transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to contradict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.
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  15.  6
    Editorial.Julian Fink - 2013 - Organon F 20 (4):422-424.
    Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, instrumental incoherence was for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements, the innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject to. This led to a paradigmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and normativity. While there now exists considerable doubt that rational requirements are normative, it (...)
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  16.  5
    Vorwort.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink - 2014 - In Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.), Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten. Suhrkamp. pp. 9-13.
    Wie war es möglich? Diese mit Blick auf den Nationalsozialismus und die Zeit von 1933 bis 1945 unausweichliche Frage stellt sich für jede Generation aufs Neue – und auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen. Im Gegensatz zur detaillierten historischen Aufarbeitung der NS-Zeit ist die philosophisch-theoretische Analyse der normativen Grundlagen des NS Systems ein bislang vernachlässigtes Gebietder Forschung. Die hier edierte Sammlung von Originaltextenführender Juristen, Rechtstheoretiker und Rechtsphilosophen, die dem nationalsozialistischen Regime loyal gegenüberstanden und an der rechtlichen Um- und Neugestaltung mitarbeiteten, will diese Lücke (...)
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  17. Are There Process-Requirements of Rationality?Julian Fink - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):475-487.
    Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evaluates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction-based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based definition of state- and process-requirements. However, a content-based definition entails (...)
     
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  18. Do We Have Reasons to Do as We Believe We Ought to Do?Julian Fink - 2009 - In M. Silar & F. S. Augier (eds.), Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity. Ziur Navarra. pp. 65-79.
    Suppose you believe you ought to A. Would a failure of yours to A imply that you are not entirely as you ought to be? Ought you to A if you believe you to ought to A? This paper argues for a qualified version of this claim. It is qualified in two ways. First, I assume that this can be so only if ‘if you believe you ought to A’ appears within the scope of ‘you ought’. That is, you ought (...)
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  19.  14
    Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.) - 2014 - Suhrkamp.
    Auf welchen normativen Grundlagen beruhte das NS-System? Mit welcher Rechtfertigung konnte der Führerwille dort zu einer Quelle des Rechts werden? Wie war es gemäß der NS-Strafgesetzgebung möglich, Handlungen zu bestrafen, die gegen kein geschriebenes Gesetz verstießen? Die in diesem Band versammelten und kommentierten Originaltexte geben Einblick in das Denken von Rechtstheoretikern, die mit dem Nationalsozialismus sympathisierten, und belegen deren Versuch, autoritäre und dem Rechtsstaat widersprechende Rechtsprinzipien zu legitimieren. Dabei zeigt sich ein überraschender und bis jetzt von der rechts- und moralphilosophischen (...)
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