Results for 'foreknowledge'

472 found
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  1.  15
    Actes du XI• Congres International d'Archeologie Chretienne, Lyon, Vienne, Grenoble, Geneve Et Aoste (21-28 Septembre 1986),(Studi di Antichita Cristiana XLI; Collection de I'Ecole Fran~ Aise de Rome 123), Voi. I. [REVIEW]Jochen Brunow, Schreiben fur den Film, Carsten Colpe, Das Siegel der Propheten, William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge & Human Freedom - 1991 - Bijdragen, Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie En Theologie 52 (2):235.
  2. Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    We typically think we have free will. But how could we have free will, if for anything we do, it was already true in the distant past that we would do that thing? Or how could we have free will, if God already knows in advance all the details of our lives? Such issues raise the specter of "fatalism". This book collects sixteen previously published articles on fatalism, truths about the future, and the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human (...)
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  3.  35
    Co o przyszłości Petera Van Inwagena wiedzą Istota Wszechwiedząca i on sam? Krytyka argumentu za sprzecznością przedwiedzy Boga i ludzkiego wolnego działania / What do Peter Van Inwagen and the omniscient being know about Peter Van Inwagen's future? Criticism of the argument for the contradiction of God's foreknowledge and human free action,.Marek A. Pepliński - 2019 - Przegląd Religioznawczy 272 (2):87-101.
    The article analyzes and criticizes the assumptions of Peter Van Inwagen’s argument for the alleged contradiction of the foreknowledge of God and human freedom. The argument is based on the sine qua non condition of human freedom defined as access to possible worlds containing such a continuation of the present in which the agent implements a different action than will be realized de facto in the future. The condition also contains that in every possible continuation of the present state (...)
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  4. Divine Foreknowledge, Rational Determinism, and the Value of Freedom.Andrea Guardo - manuscript
    After having given in the Essay a definition of freedom which straightforwardly entails its compatibility with – among other things – God's foreknowledge, Locke surprisingly writes in a 1693 letter to Molyneux that he does not see how human liberty can coexist with divine prescience. I argue that the confession to Molyneux can be made consistent with the Essay's definition by embracing the view that the problem Locke had in mind when he drafted it was not a problem concerning (...)
     
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  5. ‘All is Foreseen, and Freedom of Choice is Granted’: A Scotistic Examination of God's Freedom, Divine Foreknowledge and the Arbitrary Use of Power.Liran Shia Gordon - 2019 - Heythrop Journal 60 (5):711-726.
    Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of whom supports (...)
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  6.  64
    The Truth About Foreknowledge.Patrick Todd & John Martin Fischer - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (3):286-301.
    In this paper we critically evaluate Trenton Merricks’s recent attempt to provide a “new” way of defending compatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human freedom. We take issue with Merricks’s claim that his approach is fundamentally different from Ockhamism. We also seek to highlight the implausibility of Merricks’s rejection of the assumption of the fixity of the past, and we also develop a critique of the Merricks’s crucial notion of “dependence.”.
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  7. Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past.John Martin Fischer - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.
    I seek to clarify the notion of the fixity of the past appropriate to Pike’s regimentation of the argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. Also, I discuss Alvin Plantinga’s famous example of Paul and the Ant Colony in light of Pike’s argument.
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  8. Infallible Divine Foreknowledge Cannot Uniquely Threaten Human Freedom, but its Mechanics Might.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):73-94.
    It is not uncommon to think that the existence of exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge uniquely threatens the existence of human freedom. This paper shows that this cannot be so. For, to uniquely threaten human freedom, infallible divine foreknowledge would have to make an essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. And infallible divine foreknowledge cannot do this. There remains, however, an important question about the compatibility of freedom and (...). It is a question not about the existence of foreknowledge, but about its mechanics. (shrink)
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  9. In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):5-28.
    In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this (...)
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  10. Against Limited Foreknowledge.Patrick Todd - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):523-538.
    Theological fatalists contend that if God knows everything, then no human action is free, and that since God does know everything, no human action is free. One reply to such arguments that has become popular recently— a way favored by William Hasker and Peter van Inwagen—agrees that if God knows everything, no human action is free. The distinctive response of these philosophers is simply to say that therefore God does not know everything. On this view, what the fatalist arguments in (...)
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  11.  32
    Contra Tooley: Divine Foreknowledge is Possible.Elijah Hess - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (2):165-172.
    Michael Tooley’s latest argument against the possibility of divine foreknowledge trades on the idea that, whichever theory of time is true, the ontology of the future—or lack thereof—gives rise to special problems for God’s prescience. I argue that Tooley’s reasoning is predicated on two mischaracterizations and conclude that, on at least some theories of time, the possibility of divine foreknowledge appears secure.
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  12. Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?Justin Mooney - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):131-148.
    John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.
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  13. Leibniz on Determinism and Divine Foreknowledge.Endre Begby - 2005 - Studia Leibnitiana 37 (1):83-98.
    Nach Michael J. Murrays Aufsatz „Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom" ist Leibniz nicht als Kompatibilist zu verstehen. Die göttliche Vorhersehung beruhe nicht darauf, dass menschliche Handlungen mechanischen Gesetzen von Ursache und Wirkung (causa efficiens) gehorchen, sondern auf den für diese Handlungen spezifischen geistigen Gesetzen (causa finalis, moralische Gesetze, etc.). In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass Murray die Tragweite des Grundsatzes vom hinreichenden Grund in Leibniz' Philosophie nicht richtig versteht. Des Weiteren zeige ich, dass die (...)
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  14. On the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.Jason Wyckoff - 2010 - Sophia 49 (3):333-41.
    I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t 1 what an agent S will do at t 2 , is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom (...)
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  15.  93
    The Mystery of Foreknowledge.David J. Anderson & Joshua L. Watson - 2010 - Philo 13 (2):136-150.
    Many have attempted to respond to arguments for the incompatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge by claiming that God’s beliefs about the future are explained by what the world is like at that future time. We argue that this response adequately advances the discussion only if the theist is able to articulate a model of foreknowledge that is both clearly possible and compatible with freedom. We investigate various models the theist might articulate and argue that all of these (...)
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  16.  75
    Future Freedom and the Fixity of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism. [REVIEW]Benjamin H. Arbour - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):189-207.
    Unlike versions of open theism that appeal to the alethic openness of the future, defenders of limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT) affirm that some propositions concerning future contingents are presently true. Thus, there exist truths that are unknown to God, so God is not omniscient simpliciter. LFOT requires modal definitions of divine omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable. Defenders of LFOT have yet to provide an adequate response to Richard Purtill’s argument that fatalism (...)
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  17.  44
    Prophets Against Ockhamism. Or: Why the Hard Fact/Soft Fact Distinction is Irrelevant to the Problem of Foreknowledge.Raphael van Riel - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):119-135.
    In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a (...)
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  18.  48
    Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma.Tina Talsma - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.
    The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David (...)
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  19. Foreknowledge and Free Will.Norman M. Swartz - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free (...)
     
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  20.  50
    On Molinism and Manipulation: Does Molinism Answer the Problems About Providence, Foreknowledge and Free Will?R. I. Anderson - unknown
    Molinism attempts to resolve the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human libertarian freedom by the inclusion of the divine will into the solution. Moreover, middle knowledge is providentially useful under the Molinist model because of the way God uses it. This speaks of an integral link between the divine will and intellect that works in such a way as to provide a foreknowledge solution and, allegedly, the best view of providence. Nevertheless, there have been several anti-Molinist arguments by (...)
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  21.  57
    Foreknowledge, Freedom, and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):321-339.
    : A vital presupposition of an influential argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free action is that free action requires alternative possibilities. A recent, noteworthy challenge to this presupposition invokes a “Divine Frankfurt‐type example”: God's foreknowledge of one's future actions prevents one from doing otherwise without having any responsibility‐undermining effect on one's actions. First, I explain why features of God's omniscience cast doubt on this Frankfurtian response. Second, even if this appraisal is mistaken, I argue (...)
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  22.  32
    Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, "The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge". [REVIEW]Bruce R. Reichenbach - 1993 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1):133.
    Review of Zagzebski's book, which develops a defense of the position that freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge. After critiquing previous attempts at reconciliation, including Boethius, Ockham, and Molina, she develops her own view that the relation between God's knowledge and human existence must accord with human models of knowing.
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  23.  36
    Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.
    Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim (...)
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  24.  11
    Molinism, Question-Begging, and Foreknowledge of Indeterminates.John D. Laing - 2018 - Perichoresis 16 (2):55-75.
    John Martin Fischer’s charge that Molinism does not offer a unique answer to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom can be seen as a criticism of middle knowledge for begging the question of FF -compatibilism. In this paper, I seek to answer this criticism in two ways. First, I demonstrate that most of the chief arguments against middle knowledge are guilty of begging the question of FF-incompatibilism and conclude that the simple charge of begging the question cannot (...)
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  25.  12
    Supervaluationism and the Timeless Solution to the Foreknowledge Problem.Pablo Cobreros - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (1):61-75.
    If God knew I were going to write this paper, was I able to refrain from writing it this morning? One possible response to this question is that God's knowledge does not take place in time and therefore He does not properly fore-know. According to this response, God knows absolutely everything, it's just that He knows everything outside of time. The so-called timeless solution was one of the influential responses to the foreknowledge problem in classical Christian Theology. This solution, (...)
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  26.  14
    The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.Timothy O'Connor - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):139.
    Review of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.
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  27.  33
    Divine Foreknowledge and Providence in the Commentaries of Boethius and Aquinas on the De Interpretatione 9 by Aristotle.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2020 - Biblica Et Patristica Thoruniensia 13:151-173.
    Boethius represents one of the most important milestones in Christian reflection about fate and providence, especially considering that he takes into account Proclus’ contributions to these questions. For this reason, The Consolation of philosophy is considered a crucial work for the development of this topic. However, Boethius also exposes his ideas in his commentary on the book that constitutes one of the oldest and most relevant texts on the problem of future contingents, namely Aristotle’s De interpretatione. Although St. Thomas refers (...)
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  28.  53
    Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence.Ryan Wasserman - forthcoming - Noûs.
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  29. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.
    The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued (...)
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  30.  72
    Jumalan ennaltatietäminen ja luotujen vapaus molinismin mukaan (in Finnish) [God's Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom according to Molinism].Ari Maunu - 2014 - Ajatus 71:143-172.
  31. The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Bloomsbury Academic.
  32.  92
    Foreknowledge Without Determinism.Nathan Rockwood - 2019 - Sophia 58 (2):103-113.
    A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I challenge in this paper. My aim is to develop an interpretation of God’s essential omniscience according to which God can be wrong even though God never is wrong. If this (...)
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  33. Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge.Christopher Menzel - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:475-507.
    Suppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. (...)
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  34. The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account. [REVIEW]T. Ryan Byerly - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):251-255.
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  35. Foreknowledge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (3):269-293.
    Most arguments against God’s existence aim to show that it is incompatible with various apparent features of the world, such as the existence of evil or of human free will. In response, theists have sought to show that God’s existence is compatible with these features of the world. However, the fact that the proposition that God exists is necessary if possible introduces some underappreciated difficulties for these arguments.
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  36.  79
    Fischer on Freedom and Foreknowledge.Nelson Pike - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (October):599-614.
  37. Molina on Foreknowledge and Transfer of Necessities.Christoph Jäger - 2011 - In Christian Tapp and Edmund Runggaldier (ed.), God, eternity, and time. Ashgate. pp. 81-96.
  38.  20
    T. Ryan Byerly,The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account[REVIEW]Elijah Hess - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):251-255.
  39.  18
    Foreknowledge as a Factor Affecting Perceptual Defense and Alertness.O. W. Lacy, Natalie Lewinger & John F. Adamson - 1953 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 45 (3):169.
  40.  78
    Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention.Taylor W. Cyr & Andrew Law - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear (...)
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  41. Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
    Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the (...)
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  42. Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence: A New Argument for Incompatibilism About Foreknowledge and Freedom.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):619-639.
    The most promising way of responding to arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (in one way or another) invokes a claim about the order of explanation: God knew (or believed) that you would perform a given action because you would, in fact, perform it, and not the other way around. Once we see this result, many suppose, we'll see that divine foreknowledge ultimately poses no threat to human freedom. This essay argues that matters are (...)
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  43.  72
    Foreknowledge and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.
    The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” (Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks” (Philosophical Review 120 [2011]: 97–115), John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd raise a number of (...)
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  44. The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge.Michael Rota - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):165 - 186.
    In this paper I defend the eternity solution to the problem of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. After motivating the problem, I sketch the basic contours of the eternity solution. I then consider several objections which contend that the eternity solution falsely implies that we have various powers (e.g., to change God’s beliefs, or to affect the past) which, according to the objector, we do not in fact have.
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  45.  82
    The Pauper’s Problem: Chance, Foreknowledge and Causal Decision Theory.Adam Bales - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1497-1516.
    In a letter to Wlodek Rabinowicz, David Lewis introduced a decision scenario that he described as “much more problematic for decision theory than the Newcomb Problems”. This scenario, which involves an agent with foreknowledge of the outcome of some chance process, has received little subsequent attention. However, in one of the small number of discussions of such cases, Huw Price's Causation, Chance and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence it has been argued that cases of this sort pose serious (...)
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  46.  34
    Prediction or Prophecy? The Boundaries of Economic Foreknowledge and Their Socio-Political Consequences.Gregor Betz - 2006 - DUV.
    Gregor Betz explores the following questions: Where are the limits of economics, in particular the limits of economic foreknowledge? Are macroeconomic forecasts credible predictions or mere prophecies and what would this imply for the way economic policy decisions are taken? Is rational economic decision making possible without forecasting at all?
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  47. Foreknowledge and Free Will.Alex Blum - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):55-57.
    We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.
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  48. The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 1991 - Oup Usa.
    This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; (...)
     
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  49. Time, Truth, Actuality, and Causation: On the Impossibility of Divine Foreknowledge.Michael Tooley - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):143 - 163.
    In this essay, my goal is, first, to describe the most important contemporary philosophical approaches to the nature of time, and then, secondly, to discuss the ways in which those different accounts bear upon the question of the possibility of divine foreknowledge. I shall argue that different accounts of the nature of time give rise to different objections to the idea of divine foreknowledge, but that, in addition, there is a general argument for the impossibility of divine (...) that is independent of one’s account of the nature of time. (shrink)
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  50. Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action.Carlson Erik - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):71-89.
    In Section 1, I rehearse some arguments for the claim that morality should be ``action-guiding'', and try to state the conditions under which a moral theory is in fact action-guiding. I conclude that only agents who are cognitively and conatively ``ideal'' are in general able to use a moral theory as a guide to action. In Sections 2 and 3, I discuss whether moral ``actualism'' implies that morality cannot be action-guiding even for ideal agents. If actualism is true, an ideal (...)
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