Results for 'foundationalism'

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  1. Foundationalism and arbitrariness.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24.
    Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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  2. Divine Foundationalism.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (10):e12524.
    Divine Foundationalism is the thesis that God is the source of all things (apart from God hirself). I clarify and defend the thesis, before I consider the main arguments for and against it.
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  3. Foundationalism with infinite regresses of probabilistic support.William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3899-3917.
    There is a long-standing debate in epistemology on the structure of justification. Some recent work in formal epistemology promises to shed some new light on that debate. I have in mind here some recent work by David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, hereafter “A&P”, on infinite regresses of probabilistic support. A&P show that there are probability distributions defined over an infinite set of propositions {\ such that \ is probabilistically supported by \ for all i and \ has a high probability. (...)
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  4. Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma (...)
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  5.  67
    Foundationalism and neuroscience; silence and language.Machiel Keestra & Stephen Cowley - 2009 - Language Sciences 31:531-552.
    Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language, perception and action. Since it also shows many functions to be highly distributed, interconnected and dependent on mechanisms at different levels of processing, it challenges concepts that are traditionally used to describe these functions. The question is how to accommodate these concepts to the recent evidence. A recent proposal, made in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) by Bennett and Hacker, is that concepts play a (...)
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  6. Metaphysical Foundationalism and Theoretical Unification.Andrew Brenner - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1661-1681.
    Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, (...)
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  7. Do Psychological Defeaters Undermine Foundationalism in Moral Epistemology? - a Critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument against Ethical Intuitionism.Philipp Https://Orcidorg Schwind - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):941-952.
    Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would (...)
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  8. Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism.Ali Hasan - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:391-410.
    In Justification without Awareness (2006), Michael Bergmann presents a dilemma for internalism from which he claims there is “no escape”: The awareness allegedly required for justification is either strong awareness, which involves conceiving of some justification-contributor as relevant to the truth of a belief, or weak awareness, which does not. Bergmann argues that the former leads to an infinite regress of justifiers, while the latter conflicts with the “clearest and most compelling” motivation for endorsing internalism, namely, that for a belief (...)
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  9. Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem?Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies In Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 73-94.
    This chapter has two goals: to motivate the foundationalist solution to the regress problem and to defend it against arguments from Sellars, BonJour and Klein. Both the motivation and the defence of foundationalism raise larger questions about the relationship between foundationalism and access internalism. I argue that foundationalism is not in conflict with access internalism, despite influential arguments to the contrary, and that access internalism in fact supplies a theoretical motivation for foundationalism. I conclude that (...) and access internalism form a coherent and well-motivated package. (shrink)
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  10. Memory foundationalism and the problem of unforgotten carelessness.Robert Schroer - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85.
    According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember (...)
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  11.  53
    Metaphysical foundationalism, heterarchical structure, and Huayan interdependence.Nicholaos Jones - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-23.
    Standard views about metaphysical structure presume that if metaphysical structure is hierarchical, any priority ordering of individuals is rigid or situationally invariant. This paper challenges this presumption. The challenge derives from an effort to interpret the kind of metaphysical structure implicit in writings central to the Huayan tradition of Chinese Buddhism. The Huayan tradition views reality as a realm of thoroughgoing interdependence. Close attention to primary sources indicates that this view does not fit comfortably in any of the metaphysical structures (...)
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  12. Metaphysical Foundationalism: Consensus and Controversy.Thomas Oberle - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):97-110.
    There has been an explosion of interest in the metaphysics of fundamentality in recent decades. The consensus view, called metaphysical foundationalism, maintains that there is something absolutely fundamental in reality upon which everything else depends. However, a number of thinkers have chal- lenged the arguments in favor of foundationalism and have proposed competing non-foundationalist ontologies. This paper provides a systematic and critical introduction to metaphysical foundationalism in the current literature and argues that its relation to ontological dependence (...)
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  13. Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists.John Turri - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283.
    Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
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  14.  34
    Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation.Anil Gupta - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):177-202.
    A foundationalist account of our empirical thinking divides propositions we accept into two classes, basic and derivative, and sees the warrant of derivative propositions as accruing to them through their derivation from basic propositions. Such an account needs to answer two questions: which propositions are basic, and whence do basic propositions acquire their warrant? A natural and ancient answer to these questions is that basic propositions are observational and that these propositions gain their warrant from perceptions. I critically examine this (...)
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  15. Anti-foundationalism and the vienna circle's revolution in philosophy.Thomas E. Uebel - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):415-440.
    The tendency to attribute foundationalist ambitions to the Vienna Circle has long obscured our view of its attempted revolution in philosophy. The present paper makes the case for a consistently epistemologically anti-foundationalist interpretation of all three of the Circle's main protagonists: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. Corresponding to the intellectual fault lines within the Circle, two ways of going about the radical reorientation of the pursuit of philosophy will then be distinguished and the contemporary potential of Carnap's and Neurath's project explored.
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  16.  28
    On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism.Tom Rockmore - 2004 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In ancient times, the main approaches to metaphysical realism were intuitive. In modern times, foundationalism has replaced intuition as the main strategy to make out metaphysical realist claims to know. In On Foundationalism, Rockmore argues that foundationalism fails in all its known variants.
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  17.  9
    The Foundationalism in Irrealism, and the Immorality.John F. Post - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:1-14.
    The foundationalism in irrealism is structural foundationalism, according to which reason giving must terminate with some affair beyond the reach of noncircular inferential justification or critique. Even relativist irrealists are structural foundationalists. But structural foundationalism is only as good as the regress argument for it, which presupposes that the relevant forms of inferential justification are all transitive. Since they are not, structural foundationalism fails. So too does the “God’s-eye-view” or look-see argument against realism, to the effect (...)
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  18.  14
    Anti-foundationalism in Rawls and Dworkin.Sophie Papaefthmiou - 2020 - Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosphie 106 (1):29-43.
    This paper compares and contrasts the epistemologies of Rawls and Dworkin, both usually presented as either Kantian or pragmatist. It considers in particular the main pragmatist theses underlying their work, namely anti-metaphysics, anti-skepticism, fallibilism and objectivity as conditioned by practice, as well as their account of truth. It then examines an approach which takes Rawls’ epistemology as “anti-foundationalist” and argues that, to the extent that this qualification is connected to deliberative democracy, it should not be accepted without reservation as an (...)
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  19. Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism.Henry Jackman - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41.
    Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands (...)
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  20. Foundationalism and practical reason.Joseph Heath - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):451-474.
    In this paper, I argue that Humean theories of moral motivation appear preferable to Kantian approaches only if one assumes a broadly foundationalist conception of rational justification. Like foundationalist approaches to justification generally, Humean psychology aims to counter the regress-of-justification argument by positing a set of ultimate regress-stoppers-in this case, unmotivated desires. If the need for regress-stoppers of this type in the realm of practical deliberation is accepted, desires do indeed appear to be the most likely candidate. But if this (...)
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  21.  62
    Foundationalism and epistemic rationality.John Heil - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (2):179 - 188.
    Some foundationalists have argued that epistemic warrant may be in some measure determined by features of a doxastic agent's circumstances that are not necessarily accessible to the agent. 'externalist' views of this sort have been attacked recently by laurence bonjour on the grounds that they are at odds with the ordinary notion of "epistemic rationality". I suggest that this need not be so and argue that bonjour fails to provide convincing reasons for the rejection of externalist forms of foundationalism.
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  22.  98
    Foundationalism, circular justification, and the levels gambit.James A. Keller - 1986 - Synthese 68 (2):205 - 212.
    In Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit, David Shatz argued that foundationalists must countenance a circular mediate justification of perceptual beliefs which the foundationalist holds are already immediately justified. Because the circularity of coherentist accounts of the justification of beliefs is a major basis of foundationalist criticism of coherentism, Shatz's claim is a serious challenge to foundationalism. In this paper, using a moderate foundationalism with a reliabilist conception of justification, I give an account of immediately and mediately (...)
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  23.  15
    Modal Foundationalism in Brandom´s Interpretation of Hegel.Mert Yirmibe? - 2023 - Studia Hegeliana 9:65-74.
    Brandom’s reading of Hegel’s metaphysics offers an excitingly rich interpretation within the context of contemporary modal metaphysics. Brandom reads Hegel’s determinate negation in the way that the concepts of material incompatibility and material consequence relations operate. Brandom recognizes incompatibility as a modal concept and places it as a primitive in the foundation of Hegel’s metaphysics. This paper examines of Brandom’s modal foundationalist claim in comparison to how Hegel conceives of modality in his Logic. Upon this examination, the paper suggests that (...)
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  24.  45
    The Foundationalism in Irrealism, and the Immorality.John F. Post - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:1-14.
    The foundationalism in irrealism is structural foundationalism, according to which reason giving must terminate with some affair beyond the reach of noncircular inferential justification or critique. Even relativist irrealists are structural foundationalists. But structural foundationalism is only as good as the regress argument for it, which presupposes that the relevant forms of inferential justification are all transitive. Since they are not, structural foundationalism fails. So too does the “God’s-eye-view” or look-see argument against realism, to the effect (...)
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  25. Foundationalism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum. pp. 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There (...)
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  26. Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support.Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  27. Causal foundationalism, physical causation, and difference-making.Luke Glynn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1017-1037.
    An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical (...)
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  28.  64
    Foundationalism and the External World.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):229-249.
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  29. Foundationalism and the external world.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:229-249.
    Outlines a tenable version of a traditional foundationalist account\nof empirical justification and its implications for the justification\nof beliefs about physical or material objects. Presupposing the acceptability\nof other beliefs about physical objects; Concept of a basic belief;\nMetabeliefs about one's own occurrent beliefs; Beliefs about sensory\nexperience.
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  30.  48
    Foundationalism.Richard Fumerton - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.
    Foundationalism is a view about the structure of knowledge and justification. The heart of the thesis is the claim that if there is any knowledge or justified belief at all, then there is a kind of knowledge and justified belief that does not require inference from something else known or justifiably believed. This Element begins by exploring abstract arguments for foundationalism and against proposed alternatives. It then explores disagreements among foundationalists about how to understand foundational knowledge and justified (...)
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  31.  42
    Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):75-98.
    I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this (...)
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  32.  71
    Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support.Lydia McGrew & Timothy McGrew - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):55-77.
    The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositions involved in mutual support relations (...)
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  33. A Myth resurgent: classical foundationalism and the new Sellarsian critique.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4155-4169.
    One important strand of Sellars’s attack on classical foundationalism from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is his thesis about the priority of is-talk over looks-talk. This thesis has been criticized extensively in recent years, and classical foundationalism has found several contemporary defenders. I revisit Sellars’s thesis and argue that is-talk is epistemically prior to looks-talk in a way that undermines classical foundationalism. The classical foundationalist claims that epistemic foundations are constituted by the agent’s set of looks-judgments. (...)
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  34. Faith After Foundationalism.D. Z. Phillips - 1988 - New York: Routledge.
    Foundationalism is the view that philosophical propositions are of two kinds, those which need supporting evidence, and those which in themselves provide the evidence which renders them irrefutable. This book, originally published 1988, describes the battle between foundationalism, which places belief in God in the first category, and various other approaches to the problem of faith – ‘Reformed Epistemology’, hermeneutics; and sociological analysis. In the concluding section of the book, an examination of concept formation in religious belief is (...)
     
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  35.  46
    Anti-foundationalism, Hendrik Hart and the Nature and Function of Religious Belief.William Sweet - 1993 - Philosophy and Theology 8 (2):167-191.
    ln a number of recent essays, Hendrik Hart has elaborated an account of the nature and function of religious belief that, he believes, is post-modern in inspiration and anti-foundationalist in character. ln this paper, I reconstruct what I take to be Hart’s central claims. While Hart does remind us of some important aspects of the nature of religious belief---aspects often overlooked by many critics---l suggest that there are several problems in the account he provides, that there are tensions between his (...)
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  36.  79
    Psychological Foundationalism.Robert Audi - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):592-610.
    Epistemological foundationalism is best conceived as a thesis about the structure of a body of knowledge. Although its major proponents have been non-skeptics, the thesis may be construed as neutral with respect to skepticism. A modest version of epistemological foundationalism so construed might be formulated as the view that necessarily, if one has any knowledge, one has some direct knowledge, i.e., knowledge not based on other knowledge or beliefs one has, and any further knowledge one has is at (...)
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  37.  77
    Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Pragmatism.Joseph Margolis - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):119 - 127.
    This article formulates the grounds on which a pragmatist theory of knowledge may be favored against skepticism and foundationalism without requiring the refutation of skepticism. It explores in considerable detail some of the central positions bearing on the issue, Including views of g e moore, Bertrand russell, Roderick chisholm, Keith lehrer, Leonard nelson. It also provides a fresh characterization of pragmatism and shows the bearing of theories of truth on the justification of knowledge claims.
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  38.  16
    Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2017 - In William James Abraham & Frederick D. Aquino (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 253-73.
    Foundationalism, a theory about the structure of epistemic justification, is often criticized for excesses that are unnecessary additions to it. But when correctly understood, its main tenets (featuring most prominently the claim that there can be properly basic beliefs) are virtually undeniable. The best way to get at the heart of foundationalism is to focus not on Descartes but on Aristotle and his famous regress argument. Section I unpacks that foundationalist argument. Section II addresses some objections to (...). Section III considers how foundationalism bears on topics in the epistemology of theology—topics such as Reformed epistemology, natural theology, Biblical criticism, and post-foundationalism. (shrink)
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  39.  29
    Foundationalism and the Justification of Religious Belief.Julie Gowen - 1983 - Religious Studies 19 (3):393 - 406.
    Alvin Plantinga, in some essays recently published and presented, defends the rationality of a belief in the existence of God on the grounds that it is foundationally justified. Though this belief does not appear to be justified were we to adopt what Plantinga calls classical foundationalism, there are other, less restrictive versions of foundationalism. Plantinga urges that we recognize that a belief in the existence of God can be warranted within one of these frameworks.
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  40. Non-foundationalist epistemology: Holism, coherence, and tenability.Catherine Elgin - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 156--67.
     
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  41.  9
    Anti-foundationalism and Practical Reasoning: Conversations Between Hermeneutics and Analysis.Evan Simpson - 1987 - Academic Printing &.
    The editor's introduction to the volume explores the thesis of a convergence between analytic and hermeneutic philosophy on the absence of grounds for knowledge and practice. The nature of philosophy without foundations is discussed, along with the conservative tendencies and utopian tensions of "anti-foundationalism.".
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  42.  6
    Faith After Foundationalism.D. Z. Phillips - 1988 - New York: Routledge.
    Foundationalism is the view that philosophical propositions are of two kinds, those which need supporting evidence, and those which in themselves provide the evidence which renders them irrefutable. This book, originally published 1988, describes the battle between foundationalism, which places belief in God in the first category, and various other approaches to the problem of faith – ‘Reformed Epistemology’, hermeneutics; and sociological analysis. In the concluding section of the book, an examination of concept formation in religious belief is (...)
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  43.  79
    The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 117-144.
    My aim in this paper is to explore the dispute between foundationalism and coherentism and attempt a resolution. I will begin by considering the origin of the issue in the famous epistemic regress problem. Next I will explore the central foundationalist idea and the most central objections that have been raised against foundationalist views. This will lead to a consideration of the main contours of the coherentist alternative, and eventually to a discussion of objections to coherentism – including several (...)
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  44.  24
    Foundationalism, the Given, and C. I. Lewis.Paul K. Moser & Paul K. Mosser - 1988 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2):189 - 204.
  45. Has foundationalism been refuted?William P. Alston - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (5):295.
    It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be (...)
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  46.  28
    No Experience Necessary? Foundationalism and the Retreat from Culture in Environmental Ethics.Ben A. Minteer - 1998 - Environmental Values 7 (3):333-348.
    Many of the leading contributors to the field of environmental ethics demonstrate a preference for foundationalist approaches in their theoretical justifications of environmentalism. In this paper, I criticise this tendency as it figures in the work of Holmes Rolston III, J. Baird Callicott, and Eric Katz. I illustrate how these writers' desire for philosophical absolutes leads them to reject the moral resources present within human culture; a move that carries with it a number of troubling philosophical and political problems. I (...)
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  47.  73
    Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions.Dirk Franken - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-26.
    In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object’s physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments – the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions – which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards (...)
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  48.  21
    Toward a new foundationalism: from Carnap to Kripke, and from Husserl to Sallis.Bernard Freydberg - 2021 - Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press.
    This book addresses the breach within contemporary philosophy with a newly conceived foundationalism. It shows that dramatic discord has arisen between its two dominant branches. The Anglo-American branch generally takes its departure from logic and from natural science, while the Continental branch generally takes its departure from art and from the great traditional questions. However, they share this common negative feature: each side denies the view that philosophy issues from a central foundation. The book gives brief distillations of six (...)
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  49. Foundationalism, coherentism, and the levels gambit.David Shatz - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
    A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.In this paper (...)
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  50. Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief.Thomas D. Senor - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):453 - 476.
    In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for (...)
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