One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of freewillskepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with freewillskepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled (...) out by the skeptical view per se face significant independent moral objections. Yet despite these concerns, I maintain that freewillskepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular preventive detention, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s, taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health -quarantine model—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own. (shrink)
An apparently increasing number of philosophers take freewillskepticism to pose a serious challenge to some of our practices. This must seem odd to many—why should anyone think that freewillskepticism is relevant for our practices, when nobody seems to think that other canonical forms of philosophical skepticism are relevant for our practices? Part of the explanation may be epistemic, but here I focus on a metaethical explanation. Freewill (...)skepticism is special because it is compatible with ‘basic moral reasons’—moral reasons acknowledged by all mainstream ethicists—and other minds and induction skepticism are not. One example is our reason not to intentionally harm others. Practical seriousness about other minds and induction skepticism undermines this reason, but practical seriousness about freewillskepticism only undermines a potential overrider of this reason, that is, the reason of retribution. (shrink)
Freewillskepticism maintains that what we do, and the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense—the sense that would make us truly deserving of praise and blame. In recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers have advanced and defended versions of freewillskepticism, including Derk Pereboom (2001, 2014), Galen Strawson (2010), (...) Neil Levy (2011), Bruce Waller (2011, 2015), and myself (Caruso 2012, 2013, forthcoming). Critics, however, often complain that adopting such views would have dire consequences for ourselves, society, morality, meaning, and the law. They fear, for instance, that relinquishing belief in freewill and basic desert moral responsibility would leave us unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior, increase anti-social conduct, and undermine meaning in life. -/- In response, freewill skeptics argue that life without freewill and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe (see, e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014; Waller 2011, 2015; Caruso 2016, forthcoming). According to optimistic skeptics, prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be threatened. And although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, incapacitation and rehabilitation programs would still be justified (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014; Levy 2012; Caruso 2016; Pereboom and Caruso, forthcoming). In this paper, I attempt to extend this general optimism about the practical implications of freewillskepticism to the question of creativity. -/- In Section I, I spell out the question of creativity and explain why it’s relevant to the problem of freewill. In Section II, I identify three different conceptions of creativity and explain the practical concerns critics have with freewillskepticism. In Section III, I distinguish between three different conceptions of moral responsibility and argue that at least two of them are consistent with freewillskepticism. I further contend that forward-looking accounts of moral responsibility, which are perfectly consistent with freewillskepticism, can justify calling agents to account for immoral behavior as well as providing encouragement for creative activities since these are important for moral and creative formation and development. I conclude in Section IV by arguing that relinquishing belief in freewill and basic desert would not mean the death of creativity or our sense of achievement since important and realistic conceptions of both remain in place. (shrink)
In contemporary freewill theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have freewill, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. Freewill theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this (...) dramatic. Giving up the belief that we are morally responsible undermines many, and perhaps most, of the desert claims we are pretheoretically inclined to accept. But it does not undermine desert claims based on the sheer fact of personhood. Even in the absence of belief in moral responsibility, personhood-based desert claims require us to respect persons and their rights. So personhood-based desert claims can provide a substantial role for desert in freewill skeptics' ethical theories. (shrink)
'Freewillskepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the freewill - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic freewill skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing (...) that life without freewill and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. This collection addresses the practical implications of freewillskepticism for law and society. It contains eleven original essays that provide alternatives to retributive punishment, explore what changes are needed for the criminal justice system, and ask whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the real-world implications of freewillskepticism. (shrink)
In contemporary freewill theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have freewill, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. (Freewill is understood here as whatever satisfies the control condition of moral responsibility.) Freewill theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But (...) the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief that we are morally responsible undermines many, and perhaps most, of the desert claims we are pretheoretically inclined to accept. But it does not undermine desert claims based on the sheer fact of personhood. Even in the absence of belief in moral responsibility, personhood-based desert claims require us to respect persons and their rights. So personhood-based desert claims can provide a substantial role for desert in freewill skeptics' ethical theories. (shrink)
This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse which can be endorsed by freewill skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about freewill, but we can preserve some important ones which can do valuable work for freewill skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws (...) on a modified Rawlsian original position in which we assume we are just as likely to be among the punished when the veil of ignorance is raised as we are to be among those protected by the institution of punishment. The justification of remorse presented here is care-based, and draws on the value of sympathizing with people we have wronged, which has a Kantian ground in the duty to take others’ ends as our own. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to provide a justification of punishment which can be endorsed by freewill skeptics, and which can also be defended against the "using persons as mere means" objection. Freewill skeptics must reject retributivism, that is, the view that punishment is just because criminals deserve to suffer based on their actions. Retributivists often claim that theirs is the only justification on which punishment is constrained by desert, and suppose that non-retributive (...) justifications must therefore endorse treating the people punished as mere means to social ends. Retributivists typically presuppose a monolithic conception of desert: they assume that action-based desert is the only kind of desert. But there are also personhood-based desert claims, that is, desert claims which depend not on facts about our actions, but instead on the more abstract fact that we are persons. Since personhood-based desert claims do not depend on facts about our actions, they do not depend on moral responsibility, so freewill skeptics can appeal to them just as well as retributivists. What people deserve based on the mere fact of their personhood is to be treated as they would rationally consent to be treated if all they had in view was the mere fact of their personhood. We can work out the implications of this view for punishment by developing a hypothetical consent justification in which we select principles of punishment in the Rawlsian original position, so long as we are careful not to smuggle in the retributivist assumption that it is under our control whether we end up as criminals or as law-abiding citizens once we raise the veil of ignorance. (shrink)
Offered here is a review of Gregg D. Caruso’s edited volume, Exploring the Illusion of Freewill and Moral Responsibility [1]. Assembled here are essays by nearly all the major contributors to the philosophical freewill debate on the denial and skeptical side. The volume tells us where the field currently is and also gives us a sense of how the freewill debate is actually advancing toward greater understanding. Perhaps we can even discern (...) some glimmer of hope for a resolution or a degree of consensus that could, in the near future, underlie or give rise to practical engagements to bring about significant social transformations and innovations toward a more humane society. (shrink)
: What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack freewill on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain freewill, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the supposition of causal determination there would be robust ways in which we could shape, control, and cause our actions. But (...) I deny that on this supposition we would have the control in action required for us to basically deserve to be blamed, praised, punished or rewarded. In this response, I argue that this is the core issue that divides compatibilists and incompatiblists about freewill and causal determination, and that the incompatibilist position is the right one to accept. Keywords: Sam Harris; Daniel Dennett; FreeWillSkepticism; Compatibilism; Incompatibilism Risposta a Daniel Dennet sullo scetticismo circa il libero arbitrio Riassunto: Qual è la posta in gioco nel dibattito che vede contrapporsi chi – come Sam Harris e me – sostiene che non avremmo libertà di volere sulla scorta dell’ipotesi per cui siamo agenti causalmente determinati e chi, al contrario – come Daniel Dennett – difende l’idea che possa darsi un libero volere? Concordo con Dennett circa il fatto che, anche nell’ipotesi della determinazione causale, resterebbe lo spazio per sostenere che per vari e importanti aspetti saremmo comunque noi a modellare, controllare e causare le nostre azioni. E tuttavia rifiuto che su questa base avremmo il controllo in azioni richieste per meritare di essere biasimati, lodati, puniti o premiati. A mio avviso questo è l’elemento cardine che divide i compatibilisti dagli incompatibilisti all’interno del dibattito sul libero arbitro e sulla determinazione causale e ritengo che la posizione corretta sia quella incompatibista. Parole chiave: Sam Harris; Daniel Dennett; Scetticismo verso il libero arbitrio; Compatibilismo; Incompatibilismo. (shrink)
This paper features Derk Pereboom’s replies to commentaries by Victor Tadros and Saul Smilansky on his non-retributive, incapacitation-focused proposal for treatment of dangerous criminals; by Michael McKenna on his manipulation argument against compatibilism about basic desert and causal determination; and by Alfred R. Mele on his disappearing agent argument against event-causal libertarianism.
This book is a multi-faceted exploration and critique of the human condition as it is presently manifested. It addresses science and philosophy, explores the underlying nature of reality, the state of our society and culture, the influence of the mainstream media, the nature of freewill and a number of other topics. Each of these examinations contributes an angle to an emerging idea gestalt that challenges present mainstream views and behaviors and offers a sane alternative. The book is (...) organized as a series of short and self-contained essays, most of which can be read in under one hour. (shrink)
In this paper I criticize libertarianism and skepticism about freewill. The criticism of libertarianism takes some steps towards filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail, the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say "take some steps" because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason (...) to believe that extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic compatibility. The argument against skepticism about freewill tries to show (1) perhaps the most prominent form of skeptical argument against the existence of freewill does not work, and (2) there is a good general argument against skepticism about freewill. (shrink)
This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as freewill—at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in freewill can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness.
The immediate aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features of an alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to sources of resistance to the compatibilist program based on considerations of fate and luck. The approach taken relies on distinguishing carefully between issues of skepticism and pessimism as they arise in this context. A compatibilism that is properly responsive to concerns about fate and luck is committed to what I describe as freewill pessimism, which (...) is to be distinguished from freewillskepticism. Freewillskepticism is the view that our vulnerability to conditions of fate and luck serve to discredit our view of ourselves as free and responsible agents. Freewill pessimism rejects freewill scepticism, since the basis of its pessimism rests with the assumption that we are free and responsible agents who are, nevertheless, subject to fate and luck in this aspect of our lives. According to freewill pessimism, all the major parties and positions in the freewill debate, including that of skepticism, are modes of evasion and distortion regarding our human predicament in respect of agency and moral life. (shrink)
My topic is recent scientific skepticism about freewill. A leading argument for such skepticism features the proposition—defended by Daniel Wegner (2002, 2008) and Benjamin Libet (1985, 2004) among others that conscious intentions (and their physical correlates) never play a role in producing corresponding overt actions. This chapter examines alleged scientific evidence for the truth of this proposition.
What is freewill? Why is it important? Can the same act be both free and determined? Is freewill necessary for moral responsibility? Does anyone have freewill, and if not, how is creativity possible and how can anyone be praised or blamed for anything? These are just some of the questions considered by Joseph Keim Campbell in this lively and accessible introduction to the concept of freewill. Using a (...) range of engaging examples the book introduces the problems, arguments, and theories surrounding freewill. Beginning with a discussion of fatalism and causal determinism, the book goes on to focus on the metaphysics of moral responsibility, freewillskepticism, and skepticism about moral responsibility. Campbell shows that no matter how we look at it, freewill is problematic. Thankfully there are a plethora of solutions on offer and the best of these are considered in full in the final chapter on contemporary theories of freewill. This includes a rigorous account of libertarianism, compatabilism, and naturalism. _Free Will_ is the ideal introduction to the topic and will be a valuable resource for scholars and students seeking to understand the importance and relevance of the concept for contemporary philosophy. (shrink)
This paper is about an asymmetry in the justification of praising and blaming behaviour which freewill theorists should acknowledge even if they do not follow Wolf and Nelkin in holding that praise and blame have different control conditions. That is, even if praise and blame have the same control condition, we must have stronger reasons for believing that it is satisfied to treat someone as blameworthy than we require to treat someone as praiseworthy. Blaming behaviour which involves (...) serious harm can only be justified if the claim that the target of blame acted freely cannot be reasonably doubted. But harmless praise can be justified so long as the claim that the candidate for praise did not act freely can be reasonably doubted. Anyone who thinks a debate about whether someone acted freely is truth-conducive has to acknowledge that reasonable doubt is possible in both these cases. (shrink)
The Metaphysics of FreeWill provides a through statement of the major grounds for skepticism about the reality of freewill and moral responsibility. The author identifies and explains the sort of control that is associated with personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with causal determinism. In so doing, out view of ourselves as morally responsible agents is protected against the disturbing changes posed by science and religion.
This paper considers the analogies and disanalogies between a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about freewill and a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about the external world. In the case of freewill, I offer the ancient Lazy Argument and an argument of my own, which I call the Agency Argument, as examples of the relevant genre; and in the case of the external world, I consider Moore’s alleged proof (...) of an external world. I draw attention to analogies and disanalogies between the arguments offered in each case in order to suggest that although the Agency Argument shares with its Moorean relative the unfortunate property of being dialectically ineffective against some of those it is mainly hoping to convince, it will not be dialectically ineffective against all of them. It is also argued that the Agency Argument is less vulnerable than Moore’s proof to worries about its justificatory structure. (shrink)
This book explores the philosophical and scientific arguments for freewillskepticism and their implications. Skepticism about freewill and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of freewill and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of (...)freewill and moral responsibility play in our lives—in understanding ourselves, society, and the law—it is important that we explore what is behind this new wave of skepticism. It is also important that we explore the potential consequences of skepticism for ourselves and society. This edited collection of new essays brings together an internationally recognized line-up of contributors, most of whom hold skeptical positions of some sort, to display and explore the leading arguments for freewillskepticism and to debate their implications. It includes original contributions by Derk Pereboom, Galen Strawson, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Neil Levy, Saul Smilansky, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Benjamin Vilhauer, Susan Blackmore, Manuel Vargas, Shaun Nichols, John-Dylan Haynes and Michael Pauen, Thomas Clark, Mark Hallett, Susan Pockett, and Maureen Sie. (shrink)
It is sometimes said that Augustine discovered the faculty of the will, and as a result inaugurated philosophy’s fascination with issues related to freewill. While philosophers prior to Augustine clearly discussed related issues of, for example, voluntariness and agency, one finds in Augustine a focus on a faculty distinct from reason which is necessary for praise and blame that one would be hard-pressed to find in earlier thinkers. Augustine addressed the importance of freewill (...) in many of his works; But he never seems to question whether or not humans have freewill. That is, the following question is one that Augustine never seems to raise because he thought the answer was an obvious yes: -/- The Existence Question: Do humans have freewill?ii -/- In recent years, the Existence Question has come to be at the forefront of many of the debates concerning freewill as an increasing number of scholars are skeptical about the existence of freewill. My aim in this chapter is not so much to answer the Existence Question, but to provide a framework for understanding how the question should be answered. I also provide a taxonomical overview of aspects of the contemporary literature in order to show how one’s answer to the Existence Question depends on other issues pertaining to the nature of freewill. (shrink)
The Limits of FreeWill presents influential articles by Paul Russell concerning freewill and moral responsibility. The problems arising in this field of philosophy, which are deeply rooted in the history of the subject, are also intimately related to a wide range of other fields, such as law and criminology, moral psychology, theology, and, more recently, neuroscience. These articles were written and published over a period of three decades, although most have appeared in the past (...) decade. Among the topics covered: the challenge of skepticism; moral sentiment and moral capacity; necessity and the metaphysics of causation; practical reason; freewill and art; fatalism and the limits of agency; moral luck, and our metaphysical attitudes of optimism and pessimism. (shrink)
Freewillskepticism is the view that people never truly deserve to be praised, blamed, or punished for what they do. One challenge freewill skeptics face is to explain how criminality could be dealt with given their skepticism. This paper critically examines the prospects of implementing legal changes concerning crime and punishment derived from the freewill skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso. One central aspect of the changes (...) their views require is a concern for reducing the severity of current forms of punishment. The paper considers two strategies for pursuing such a reduction. By taking into account evidence from the psychology of belief in freewill and desire to punish, it is argued that a strategy aiming at a reduction of people’s natural desire to punish criminals can be successful if capable of providing alternatives to current forms of punishment satisfying three properties: they must be less harmful than current forms of punishment, more effective in preventing crime, and incompatible with current forms of punishment. (shrink)
Some thinkers argue that our best scientific theories about the world prove that freewill is an illusion. Others disagree. The concept of freewill is profoundly important to our self-understanding, our interpersonal relationships, and our moral and legal practices. If it turns out that no one is ever free and morally responsible, what would that mean for society, morality, meaning, and the law? Just Deserts brings together two philosophers – Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg (...) D. Caruso – to debate their respective views on freewill, moral responsibility, and legal punishment. In three extended conversations, Dennett and Caruso present their arguments for and against the existence of freewill and debate their implications. Dennett argues that the kind of freewill required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism – for him, self-control is key; we are not responsible for becoming responsible, but are responsible for staying responsible, for keeping would-be puppeteers at bay. Caruso takes the opposite view, arguing that who we are and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control, and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the sense that would make us truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. These two leading thinkers introduce the concepts central to the debate about freewill and moral responsibility by way of an entertaining, rigorous and sometimes heated philosophical dialogue. What emerges is a clear account of the latest thinking on freewill, and what is at stake for our moral and legal practices. (shrink)
This chapter outlines six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it’s unclear that agents possess the kind of freewill and moral responsibility needed to justify it. It then sketches a novel non-retributive alternative called the public health-quarantine model. The core idea of the model is that the right to harm in self-defense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required for adequate protection. The model also (...) draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. It is argued that not only does the public health-quarantine model offer a stark contrast to retributivism, it also provides a more humane, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior, one that is superior to both retributivism and other leading non-retributive alternatives. (shrink)
In this essay, I argue that if we assume with freewill skeptics that people lack moral responsibility, or at least a central form of it, we may still maintain that people are ‘basically’ deserving of certain treatment in response to their behavior. I characterize basic-desert justifications for treatment negatively, as justifications that do not depend on consequentialist, contractualist, or relational considerations. Appealing to attributionist accounts of responsibility as well as the symbolic value of protest, I identify protest (...) as a response that may be basically deserved even in the absence of freewill, on the grounds that it is a fitting response to the intrinsic features of agents and their actions. The position defended is not a standard form of semi-compatibilism as it allows that some responses to behavior—such as punishment—that would be basically deserved were people free are not basically deserved in the absence of freewill. (shrink)
What is freewill? Why is it important? Can the same act be both free and determined? Is freewill necessary for moral responsibility? Does anyone have freewill, and if not, how is creativity possible and how can anyone be praised or blamed for anything? These are just some of the questions considered by Joseph Keim Campbell in this lively and accessible introduction to the concept of freewill. Using a (...) range of engaging examples the book introduces the problems, arguments, and theories surrounding freewill. Beginning with a discussion of fatalism and causal determinism, the book goes on to focus on the metaphysics of moral responsibility, freewillskepticism, and skepticism about moral responsibility. Campbell shows that no matter how we look at it, freewill is problematic. Thankfully there are a plethora of solutions on offer and the best of these are considered in full in the final chapter on contemporary theories of freewill. This includes a rigorous account of libertarianism, compatabilism, and naturalism. _Free Will_ is the ideal introduction to the topic and will be a valuable resource for scholars and students seeking to understand the importance and relevance of the concept for contemporary philosophy. (shrink)
This essay begins by dividing the traditional problem of freewill and determinism into a “correlation” problem and an “explanation” problem. I then focus on the explanation problem, and argue that a standard form of abductive (i.e. inference to the best-explanation) reasoning may be useful in solving it. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the abductive approach, I apply it to three standard accounts of freewill. While each account implies the same solution to the correlation problem, (...) each implies a unique solution to the explanation problem. For example, all libertarian-friendly accounts of freewill imply that it is impossible to act freely when determinism is true. However, only a narrow subset of libertarians have the theoretical resources to defend the incompatibilist claim that deterministic laws (qua being deterministic) undermine freewill, while other libertarians must reject this incompatibilist view. -/- [Version: Nov. 12, 2018]. (shrink)
This introductory chapter discusses the philosophical and scientific arguments for freewillskepticism and their implications--including the debate between Saul Smilansky's "illusionism," Thomas Nadelhoffer's "disillusionism," Shaun Nichols' "anti-revolution," and the "optimistic skepticism" of Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, Tamler Sommers, and others.
_ Source: _Page Count 27 This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of freewill and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by freewill skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the _core assumption_: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of (...) criticisms based on the core assumption. Strawson’s critiques of incompatibilism and freewillskepticism are not intended to provide rational justifications for either compatibilism or the claim that some persons have freewill. Hence, the charge that Strawson’s “arguments” are faulty is misplaced. The core assumption resting behind such critiques is mistaken. (shrink)
This collection provides a selection of the most essential contributions to the contemporary freewill debate. Among the issues discussed and debated are skepticism and naturalism, alternate possibilities, the consequence argument, libertarian metaphysics, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, neuroscience and freewill, and experimental philosophy.
In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of freewill. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about freewill and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free (...) class='Hi'>will? If so, what role or function must it play? Are agents morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are carried out automatically or without conscious control or guidance? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that are the result of implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings of which they are unaware? What about the actions of somnambulists or cases of extreme sleepwalking where consciousness is largely absent? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and freewill is imperative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against freewill. For example, do compatibilist reasons- responsive and deep self accounts require consciousness? If so, are they threatened by recent developments in the behavior, cognitive, and neurosciences? What about libertarian accounts of freewill? What powers, if any, do they impart to consciousness and are they consistent with our best scientific theories about the world? In this survey piece, I will outline and assess several distinct views on the relationship between consciousness and freewill. (shrink)
Exploring the Illusion of FreeWill and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for freewillskepticism and their implications.
In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a (...)freewill denier. That would at least be an unintended consequence, and it might be regarded as a virtual reductio. Versions of the objection could likely be made against a number of other accounts of freewill, but I will limit my focus to Kane and Fischer. Along the way, by way of response to some possible objections to my argument, I make some comments about epistemic closure principles. (shrink)
This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed “scientific epiphenomenalism” about conscious intentions – the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodily motions – and links this thesis to skepticism about freewill and moral responsibility. One line of argument is based on Benjamin Libet’s neuroscientific work on freewill. The other is based on a mixed bag of findings presented by social (...) psychologist Daniel Wegner. It is argued that both lines of argument are unsuccessful. (shrink)
Many think that love would be a casualty of freewillskepticism. I disagree. I argue that love would be largely unaffected if we came to deny freewill, not simply because we cannot shake the attitude, but because love is not chosen, nor do we want it to be. Here, I am not alone; others have reached similar conclusions. But a few important distinctions have been overlooked. Even if hard incompatibilism is true, not all (...) love is equal. Although we have only minimal control over love, it can be more or less authentic. I develop my position by considering the fictional trope of love potions and the implications of a futuristic psychotropic, Lovezac—Viagra for the heart. But I am not as optimistic as some. Even though freewillskepticism would not jeopardize love-the-feeling, there are reasons to think that loving relationships might not be immune. (shrink)
A key source of support for the view that challenging people’s beliefs about freewill may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that freewill is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, (...) N = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and freewill beliefs and (2) freewill beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating freewill beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests. (shrink)
