Results for 'i-desire'

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  1.  80
    The Problem of Satisfaction Conditions and the Dispensability of I-Desire.Fiora Salis - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):105-118.
    The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires - what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie's argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine (...)
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  2.  6
    “I Desire Sanctity”: Sanctity and Separateness Among Jewish Religious Zionists in Israel/Palestine.Nehemia Akiva Stern - 2015 - Anthropology of Consciousness 26 (2):156-169.
    This article expands on anthropological understandings of affect and emotion to include certain theological and religious concepts that structure and give meaning to the daily lives of religious nationalists in areas of ethnic and political conflict. In doing so, it will ethnographically explore the relationship between theological notions of sanctity and the way those notions manifest themselves in the context of contemporary Jewish religious Zionism in both Israel and the Occupied West Bank. I will argue that analyzing mystical conceptions of (...)
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  3. In This Text Where I Never Am: Discourses of Desire in Derrida.Nancy Holland - 2000 - In Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), Philosophy and Desire. Routledge. pp. 159-170.
     
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  4.  15
    Reason and Desire in C. I. Lewis.Eric B. Dayton - 1975 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 11 (4):289 - 304.
    In this paper c i lewis's theory of practical reason is discussed. the purpose is to explicate the role which value experience plays in the thinking of a rational agent who is attempting to determine imperatives of action. lewis, who vehemently opposed noncognitivism in ethics, believed that the objectivity of ethics could be shown to be the result of the logical demands of consistency upon the deliberative consciousness of an active self-determining agent. rightness, for lewis, was not primarily a moral (...)
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  5. In This Text Where I Never Am: Discourses of Desire.In Derrida - 2000 - In Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), Philosophy and Desire. Routledge. pp. 7--159.
     
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  6. 'I Thought I Felt a Sinful Desire': The Question of Celibacy for Eighteenth-Century Methodists.Anna Lawrence - 2003 - Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 85 (2):177-193.
  7. Unspoken Unity : I, Who Enjoy and Desire.Adriaan Peperzak & Stacy Bautista - 2012 - In Scott Davidson & Diane Perpich (eds.), Totality and Infinity at 50. Duquesne University Press.
     
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  8.  5
    I Want to Hold Your Hand: Abstinence Curricula, Bioethics, and the Silencing of Desire. [REVIEW]Abby Wilkerson - 2013 - Journal of Medical Humanities 34 (2):101-108.
    The abstinence approach to sex education remains influential despite its demonstrated ineffectiveness. One bill forbids the “promotion” of “gateway sexual activity,” while requiring outright condemnation of “non-abstinence,” defined so loosely as to plausibly include handholding. Bioethics seldom (if ever) contributes to sex-ed debates, yet exploring the pivotal role of medical discourse reveals the need for bioethical intervention. Sex-ed debates revolve around a theory of human flourishing based on heteronormative temporality, a developmental teleology ensuring the transmission of various supposed social goods (...)
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  9. Desire and Death in the Constitution of I-Ness.B. B. Barratt - 2004 - In Joseph Reppen, Jane Tucker & Martin A. Schulman (eds.), Way Beyond Freud: Postmodern Psychoanalysis Observed. Open Gate Press. pp. 264--279.
     
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  10. Excess and Desire : Commentary on Totality and Infinity, Section I, Part D.Jeffrey Bloechl - 2010 - In Kevin Hart & Michael Alan Signer (eds.), The Exorbitant: Emmanuel Levinas Between Jews and Christians. Fordham University Press.
     
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  11. Oeuvres Complètes de Malebranche. Édition critique par Désiré Roustan en collaboration avec Paul Schrecker. Tome I.Ernst Cassirer - 1938 - Theoria 4 (1/3):297.
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  12. Seeing Through the Gendered I: Feminist Film TheoryTechnologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and FictionThe Desire to Desire: The Woman's Film of the 1940sThe Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and CinemaHome Is Where the Heart Is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman's FilmThe Women Who Knew Too Much: Hitchcock and Feminist Theory.Paula Rabinowitz, Teresa de Lauretis, Mary Ann Doane, Kaja Silverman, Christine Gledhill & Tania Modleski - 1990 - Feminist Studies 16 (1):151.
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  13.  53
    Freedom and Desire.Wright Neely - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (September):32-54.
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  14. The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire.Amy Kind - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):421-439.
    The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel mental states?what they call desire-like imaginings or i-desires. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the i-desire solution to the puzzle of imaginative desire. The introduction of i-desires is both ontologically profligate (...)
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  15.  98
    Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.
    Welfare is at least occasionally a temporal phenomenon: welfare benefits befall me at certain times. But this fact seems to present a problem for a desire-satisfaction view. Assume that I desire, at 10am, January 12th, 2010, to climb Mount Everest sometime during 2012. Also assume, however, that during 2011, my desires undergo a shift: I no longer desire to climb Mount Everest during 2012. In fact, I develop an aversion to so doing. Imagine, however, that despite my aversion, I am (...)
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  16.  86
    Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being.Donald W. Bruckner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):15 - 29.
    One version of the desire satisfaction theory of well-being (i.e., welfare, or what is good for one) holds that only the satisfaction of one's present desires for present states of affairs can affect one's well-being. So if I desire fame today and become famous tomorrow, my well-being is positively affected onlyif tomorrow, when I am famous, I still desire to be famous. Call this the present desire satisfaction theory of well-being. I argue, contrary to this theory, that the satisfaction of (...)
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  17.  16
    Desire and the Good: In Search of the Right Fit.Graham Oddie - forthcoming - In Deonna J. & Lauria F. (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    I argue for an evaluative theory of desire—specifically, that to desire something is for it to appear, in some way or other, good. If a desire is a non-doxastic appearance of value then it is no mystery how it can rationalize as well as cause action. The theory is metaphysically neutral—it is compatible with value idealism (that value reduces to desire), with value realism (that it is not so reducible), and with value nihilism (all appearances of value are illusory). Despite (...)
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  18.  3
    The Self-Determination of Force: Desire and Practical Self-Consciousness in Kant and Hegel.Thomas Khurana - 2018 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Begehren / Desire. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. pp. 179-204.
    In a broadly Kantian context, it is often assumed that practical self-consciousness and rational self-determination can only be understood in opposition to pleasure and desire. I argue instead that, already for Kant, rational self-determination is itself a determination of our faculty of desire. Drawing on resources from Kant and Hegel, the paper shows that sensible desire can be understood as a self-determination of our vital forces which is connected to a sensible awareness of our practical existence. In order to constitute (...)
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  19. Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  20. Virtue, Desire, and Silencing Reasons.Neil Sinhababu - 2016 - In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 158-168.
    John McDowell claims that virtuous people recognize moral reasons using a perceptual capacity that doesn't include desire. I show that the phenomena he cites are better explained if desire makes us see considerations favoring its satisfaction as reasons. The salience of moral considerations to the virtuous, like the salience of food to the hungry, exemplifies the emotional and attentional effects of desire. I offer a desire-based account of how we can follow uncodifiable rules of common-sense morality and how some reasons (...)
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  21. The Authority of Desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
    The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...)
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  22.  91
    Attraction, Description and the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Welfare.Eden Lin - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-8.
    The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says that what is basically good for a subject is the satisfaction of his desires. One challenge to this view is the existence of quirky desires, such as a desire to count blades of grass. It is hard to see why anyone would desire such things, and thus hard to believe that the satisfaction of such desires could be basically good for anyone. This suggests that only some desires are basically good when satisfied, and that (...)
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  23.  34
    Desire Satisfaction, Death, and Time.Duncan Purves - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):799-819.
    Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in (...)
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  24. A Desire of One's Own.Michael E. Bratman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.
    You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the (...)
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  25. The Meanings of “Imagine” Part II: Attitude and Action.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):791-802.
    In this Part II, I investigate different approaches to the question of what makes imagining different from belief. I find that the sentiment-based approach of David Hume falls short, as does the teleological approach, once advocated by David Velleman. I then consider whether the inferential properties of beliefs and imaginings may differ. Beliefs, I claim, exhibit an anti-symmetric inferential governance over imaginings: they are the background that makes inference from one imagining to the other possible; the reverse is not true, (...)
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  26. Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
    One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one’s desires provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories about two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure or welfare (...)
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  27. Duty, Desire and the Good Person: Towards a Non‐Aristotelian Account of Virtue.Nomy Arpaly - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):59-74.
    This paper presents an account of the virtuous person, which I take to be the same as the good person. I argue that goodness in a person is based on her desires. Contra Aristotelians, I argue that one does not need wisdom to be good. There can be a perfectly good person with mental retardation or autism. Contra Kantians, I argue that the sense of duty - which does exist! - is compatible with a desire-based moral psychology.
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  28. Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant's Incorporation Thesis.Tamar Schapiro - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):147-167.
    In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to (...)
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  29.  59
    Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire.John N. Williams - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.
    Is there a Moore ’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative (...)
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  30.  46
    Desire, Love, Emotions: A Philosophical Reading of M. Karagatsis Kitrinos Fakelos.Eleni Leontsini - 2014 - Modern Greek Studies (Australia and New Zealand) 16:74-109.
    My aim in this paper is to attempt a philosophical reading of M. Karagatsis’ novel Kitrinos Fakelos (1956), focusing my analysis on the passions and the emotions of its fictional characters, aiming at demonstrating their independence as well as the presentation of their psychography in Karagatsis’ novel where the description of the emotions caused by love is a dominant feature. In particular, I will examine the expression of desire, love (erôs) and sympathy in this novel – passions and emotions that (...)
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  31.  18
    Shame and Honor: Aristotle’s Thumos as a Basic Desire.Victor Saenz - 2018 - Apeiron 51 (1):73-95.
    One of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, is thumos (‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two are epithumia (‘appetite’) and boulêsis (‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account of thumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue that thumos has two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor (...)
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  32.  55
    Desire, Judgment, and Reason: Exploring the Path Not Taken.Paul Hurley - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 11 (4):437-463.
    At the outset of The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel charts two paths out of the fundamental dilemma confronting metaethics. The first path rejects the claim that a persuasive account of the motivational backing of ethical judgments must involve an agent’s desires. But it is the second path, a path that Nagel charts but does not himself take, that is the focus of this essay. This path retains the standard account, upon which all motivation involves desire, but denies that desires (...)
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  33. Desire Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm.Douglas W. Portmore - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):27 - 38.
    This paper argues that the standard account of posthumous harm is untenable. The standard account presupposes the desire-fulfillment theory of welfare, but I argue that no plausible version of this theory can allow for the possibility of posthumous harm. I argue that there are, at least, two problems with the standard account from the perspective of a desire-fulfillment theorist. First, as most desire-fulfillment theorists acknowledge, the theory must be restricted in such a way that only those desires that pertain to (...)
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  34.  45
    Emotion, Desire, and Numismatic Experience in Descartes, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming.Brian Bruya - 2001 - Ming Qing Yanjiu 2001:45-75.
    In this article, I explore the relationship between desire and emotion in Descartes, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming with the aim of demonstrating 1) that Zhu Xi, by keying on the detriments of selfishness, represents an improvement over the more sweeping Cartesian suggestion to control desires in general; and 2) that Wang Yangming, in turn, represents an improvement over Zhu Xi by providing a more sophisticated hermeneutic of the cosmology of desire.
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  35. Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.
    The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings (...)
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  36. From Desire to Subjective Value: On the Neural Mechanisms of Moral Motivation.Daniel Hartner - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):1-26.
    Increasingly, empirically minded moral philosophers are using data from cognitive science and neuroscience to resolve some longstanding philosophical questions about moral motivation, such as whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire to motivate. These empirical approaches are implicitly committed to the existence of folk psychological mental states like beliefs and desires. However, data from the neuroscience of decision-making, particularly cellular-level work in neuroeconomics, is now converging with data from cognitive and social neuroscience to explain the processes through which (...)
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  37.  14
    How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.
    In this paper I highlight two noteworthy features of assertions about our desires, and then highlight two ways in which they can mislead us into drawing unwarranted conclusions about desire. Some of our assertions may indicate that we are sometimes motivated independently of desire, and other assertions may suggest that there are vast divergences between our normative judgements and our desires. But I suggest that some such assertions are, in this respect, potentially misleading, and have in fact misled authors such (...)
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  38.  54
    Desire and Pleasure in John Pollock's Thinking About Acting. [REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):447–454.
    The first third of John Pollock’s Thinking about Acting is on the topics of pleasure, desire, and preference, and these topics are the ones on which this paper focuses. I review Pollock’s position and argue that it has at least one substantial strength (it elegantly demonstrates that desires must be more fundamental than preferences, and embraces this conclusion wholeheartedly) and at least one substantial weakness (it holds to a form of psychological hedonism without convincingly answering the philosophical or empirical objections (...)
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  39. Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams's Thesis.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs039.
    I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences.
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  40.  15
    The Irreducibility of Pleasure to Desire.Olivier Massin - 2008 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    One common answer to the question of the unity of pleasures is to try to define pleasantness by appealing to a kind of mental states whose unity is less questionable. Desires have been conceived as the best candidates for this unifying role. Indeed, one way of classifying the preceding options concerning the definition of pleasantness, is to constrast conative (or motivational) theories of pleasure with non conative ones. Conative theories of pleasure are often considered as one homogeneous type of pleasure (...)
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  41.  28
    A Davidsonian Reconciliation of Internalism, Objectivity, and the Belief-Desire Theory.Paul Hurley - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (1):1-20.
    This paper argues that Donald Davidson''s account ofassertions of evaluative judgments contains ahere-to-fore unappreciated strategy forreconciling the meta-ethical ``inconsistenttriad.'''' The inconsistency is thought to resultbecause within the framework of thebelief-desire theory assertions of moraljudgments must have conceptual connections withboth desires and beliefs. The connection withdesires is necessary to account for theinternal connection between such judgments andmotivation to act, while the connection withbeliefs is necessary to account for theapparent objectivity of such judgments.Arguments abound that no class of utterancescan coherently be understood (...)
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  42. Reason and the Structure of Davidson's "Desire-Belief Model".Henk Bij de Weg - manuscript
    of “Reason and the structure of Davidson’s ‘Desire-Belief-Model’ ” by Henk bij de Weg In the present discussion in the analytic theory of action, broadly two models for the explanation or justification of actions can be distinguished: the internalist and the externalist model. Against this background, I discuss Davidson’s version of the internalist Desire-Belief Model . First, I show that what Davidson calls “pro attitude” has two distinct meanings. An implication of this is that Davidson’s DBM actually comprises two different (...)
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  43.  85
    A Puzzle About Desire.Chase Wrenn - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.
    The following four assumptions plausibly describe the ideal rational agent. (1) She knows what her beliefs are. (2) She desires to believe only truths. (3) Whenever she desires that P → Q and knows that P, she desires that Q. (4) She does not both desire that P and desire that ~P, for any P. Although the assumptions are plausible, they have an implausible consequence. They imply that the ideal rational agent does not believe and desire contradictory propositions. She neither (...)
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  44.  12
    Why It is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory.Janis David Schaab - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want (...)
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  45.  81
    Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis.Charles B. Cross - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
    I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (...)
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  46.  66
    Savoring Time: Desire, Pleasure and Wholehearted Activity. [REVIEW]Talbot Brewer - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):143-160.
    There is considerable appeal to the Aristotelian idea that taking pleasure in an activity is sometimes simply a matter of attending to it in such a way as to render it wholehearted. However, the proponents of this idea have not made adequately clear what kind of attention it is that can perform the surprising feat of transforming otherwise indifferent activities into pleasurable ones. I build upon Gilbert Ryle's suggestion that taking pleasure in an activity is tantamount to engaging in the (...)
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  47.  30
    Respect in Mengzi as a Concern-Based Construal: How It Is Different From Desire and Behavioral Disposition.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2014 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13 (2):231-250.
    Previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s 孟子 four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature, and the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. For example, Angus Graham interprets sìduān 四端 as “incipient moral impulses” to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous inclinations” toward virtues or moral good. However, this view is incompatible with the recently proposed more sound views that regard Mengzi’s four (...)
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  48.  28
    Desire and the Good in Plotinus.Michael Wiitala - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):649-666.
    Plotinus calls the first principle the One and the Good. According to Plotinus, ‘Good’ is an appropriate name for the One because the One is that which all things desire. Since he says that the One is beyond knowledge, beyond language, beyond intellect, and beyond being, however, what philosophical evidence can he provide for his claim that the One is that which all desire? In this article I offer some philosophical evidence, aside from mystical union with the One, for why (...)
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  49.  21
    The Physiology of Desire.Keith Butler - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (1):69-88.
    I argue, contrary to wide-spread opinion, that belief-desire psychology is likely to reduce smoothly to neuroscientific theory. I therefore reject P.M. Churchland's eliminativism and Fodor's nonreductive materialism. The case for this claim consists in an example reduction of the desire construct to a suitable construct in neuroscience. A brief account of the standard view of intertheoretic reduction is provided at the outset. An analysis of the desire construct in belief-desire psychology is then undertaken. Armed with these tools, the paper moves (...)
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  50.  20
    A Phenomenology of Cognitive Desire.Daniel Dwyer - 2006 - Idealistic Studies 36 (1):47-60.
    In this article I articulate how phenomenology can and should appropriate the theme of Platonic cognitive erôs. Erôs has two principal meanings: sexual passion and the desire for the whole that characterizes the philosophical life; in its cognitive sense, it implies dissatisfaction with partial truth and aiming at the givenness of the whole. The kind of lived-experience in which the being-true of the world is presented to and affectively allures the knower is a phenomenological analogue to what in Plato is (...)
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