This paper explores what happens when artists fail to execute their goals. I argue that taxonomies of failure in general, and of failed-art in particular, should focus on the attempts which generate the failed-entity, and that to do this they must be sensitive to an attempt’s orientation. This account of failed-attempts delivers three important new insights into artistic practice: there can be no accidental art, only deliberate and incidental art; art’s intention-dependence entails the possibility of performative failure, but not (...) of failed-art; and art’s intention-dependence is perfectly compatible with the role that luck plays in artistic creation. (shrink)

Attempting art: an essay on intention-dependenceIt is a truism among philosophers that art is intention-dependent—that is to say, art-making is an activity that depends in some way on the maker's intentions. Not much thought has been given to just what this entails, however. For instance, most philosophers of art assume that intention-dependence entails concept-dependence—i.e. possessing a concept of art is necessary for art-making, so that what prospective artists must intend is to make art. And yet, a mounting body of anthropological (...) and art-historical evidence and philosophical argument suggests that not only is such a criterion unsatisfied by most of the art-historical canon, but it also rests on a false premise: concepts of 'art' are not shared between cultures, nor even in the same culture across time. My dissertation aims to rectify this error by first exploring what our commitment to art's intention-dependence actually entails, and then showing that, properly understood, intention-dependence sets a number of important constraints on theories of art with respect to explanatory desiderata such as the success- and failure-conditions of art-attempts, the cross-cultural identification of art, and the reference of 'art' and art-kind terms. I begin by situating art's intention-dependence in the philosophical literature on intentional action, arguing that, properly conceived, intention-dependence is a weak criterion which can be satisfied either directly or indirectly. It therefore does not necessarily entail concept-dependence. I then use this distinction to motivate a new treatment of the success- and failure-conditions for art-attempts, arguing that the extant model's emphasis on compliance with 'the manner intended' is far too restrictive to capture actual artistic practices. I go on to show that Ruth Millikan's model of linguistic conventions supplies an independently plausible explanation of art's concept-independent origins in terms of the development of a system of indirectly intention-dependent conventions called an 'artworld'. I argue that this account of artworld development supplies us with the tools we need to distinguish art-kinds from other artifactual kinds. Finally, I turn my attention to methodological issues, arguing that even though 'art' is a social kind with its roots in arbitrary and historically-contingent networks of conventions, the philosophy of art is not merely an exercise in bare conceptual analysis. In fact, there is now a great deal of evidence to show that the ways we think about 'art' are inconsistent, incomplete, imperialistic, and largely unprincipled. Yet I argue that this does not mean that the artworld data have no bearing on theories of art. Instead, I argue that our best reflective understanding of our artworld practices sets the constraints on the reference of 'art' and art-kind terms. I argue that we have no privileged epistemic access to the ontology of social kinds; our only privilege lies in our ability to determine the proper subject of our inquiries. (shrink)

Mit der Vielzahl von Daten aus genetischen Untersuchungsverfahren wächst das Problem von „Zufallsbefunden“, d. h. von zufällig erhobenen Nebenbefunden, die mit der ursprünglichen Fragestellung nicht in Verbindung stehen und dennoch eine Bedeutung für Gesundheit und Reproduktionsverhalten der untersuchten Person selbst oder ihrer Anverwandten haben. In Ermangelung nationaler oder internationaler Richtlinien greifen die Autoren die aktuelle Diskussion um den Umgang mit genetischen Zufallsbefunden in Behandlungs- und Forschungskontext auf. Dabei nehmen sie auf die für Deutschland relevanten rechtlichen und ethischen Rahmenbedingungen Bezug. Nach (...) Gendiagnostikgesetz (GenDG) muss in Deutschland im Rahmen eines Behandlungsvertrages auf die Möglichkeit von Zufallsbefunden hingewiesen werden. Es ist Bestandteil der Aufklärung und Einwilligung, inwieweit Zufallsbefunde mitgeteilt werden, wobei das Recht auf Nichtwissen und der Schutz nicht-einwilligungsfähiger Personen berücksichtigt werden müssen. Im Forschungskontext greift das GenDG nicht, aber auch hier sollte über mögliche Zufallsbefunde aufgeklärt werden, wenngleich eine Rückmeldung nicht zwingend, aber bei Befunden mit hohem klinischen Nutzen ethisch geboten sein kann. Folgende Aspekte sind im Umgang mit Zufallsbefunden zu berücksichtigen: 1) Art und Umfang der Aufklärung und Einwilligung bei einer unüberschaubaren Zahl von möglichen Befunden. 2) Einordnung der klinischen Bedeutung einer genetischen Veränderung im Sinne von gesichertem, wahrscheinlichem, möglichem oder fraglichem/unbekanntem klinischen Nutzen. 3) Prozessierung des Informationsrückflusses für Gegenwart und Zukunft. 4) Ressourcenplanung im Hinblick auf die klinische Validierung, die Erläuterung von Befunden und den Transfer in die klinische Praxis. Im Umgang mit genetischen Zufallsbefunden besteht erheblicher empirisch-ethischer Forschungs- und politischer Regelungsbedarf. Zeitgleich ist es unabdingbar, die Wahrnehmung und das Verständnis der untersuchten Personen sowie die Grundhaltung gegenüber Zufallsbefunden im Rahmen von Studien zu beleuchten und entsprechende Bildungs- und Kommunikationswerkzeuge zu entwickeln. (shrink)

Many important social and political goals are at least partially funded by charitable donations (e.g. environmental, public health, and educational). Recently a number of laboratory experiments have shown that a potential donor’s incidental emotions—those felt at the time of the decision but unrelated to the decision itself—are important factors. We extend these findings by examining the effect of incidental emotions on charitable giving using a natural field experiment, where the potential donors are unaware of the intervention. In partnership (...) with a pledge drive at a small national liberal arts college, we demonstrate that participants who were asked to recall a person or event that has benefited them since graduating, pledged larger amounts (an increase of 92%) compared to the control group, although the probability of making a pledge was statistically no different. (shrink)

In this paper, I review arguments that have been offered in favor of the view that humans' art and/or aesthetic behaviors are (in part) a product of our biologically evolved human nature, either as adaptations in their own right or as incidental byproducts of adaptations with non-art and non-aesthetic functions. I present an overview of the main positions and options, critically evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, and outline their presuppositions.

Sexual selection theory provides interesting tools to address the evolution of human art behavior as it contains models that explain the evolution of elaborate male display traits and these traits exhibit conspicuous similarities with human art behavior. In sexual selection theory, it is recently suggested sensory exploitation hypothesis offers a valuable alternative to good genes and Fisherian runaway. Because, one, it can explain the origins of male display traits while good genes and Fisherian runaway cannot, and two, it can even (...) explain how these traits are maintained, namely without the need of any selection on female preferences in the sexual context, thus solely by female sensory biases maintained by selection in another context. Good genes and Fisherian runaway were previously applied to model the evolution of human art and aesthetics. The above implies application of sensory exploitation to model human art could offer a valuable addition to these models. I use some of the concepts (like dual inheritance) developed by the authors of the cultural runaway hypothesis, Boyd and Richerson, to develop a model for the evolution of art based on sensory exploitation hypothesis applied to the cultural level, which I call cultural sensory exploitation hypothesis. Boyd and Richerson's model suggest human aesthetic and artistic expression evolve as a consequence of a cultural runaway process, but in my proposed model they can originate even without this process. Finally, I use this hypothesis to address the conundrum of the creative explosion, a burst of elaborate art some 50,000 years ago and the sudden emergence of cave paintings. I conclude that some evidence indicates that the creative explosion was a consequence of a change in effective population size (i.e. interacting pool of social learners), which made maintenance of innovations necessary for the production of elaborate art possible. These innovations were maintained and selected because they offered the ability to (self)exploit preexisting sensory biases through art. In this view it does not matter whether art initially served any function in human evolution as it readily evolves as a mere consequence of sensory biases. In other words I suggest that the incidental exploitability of sensory biases through art may be the most fundamental driving force behind the origin of art and that it may play an important role in its subsequent maintenance and evolution as well. (shrink)

The lecture is an argument for a marriage of theory and experience. It contains something old, something new, something borrowed and something true. The argument is that the dichotomy between science and art, between theory and experience is resolved and the components unified when the role of consensus in the acceptance of theory and the conception of experience is made clear. Moreover, the unification achieved brings with it a method for unifying the empiricism of Moritz Schlick1 with the consensualism of (...) Otto Neurath.2 In earlier work, I developed a mathematical model of consensus with Carl Wagner. That work concerned the aggregation of probabilities by weights of respect assigned by members of a community to each other that converged toward a consensual probability. The convergence depended on connectedness among the members of the group in terms of positive weights. We thought of the probabilities as probabilities of scientific theories or hypotheses. The process converging toward consensus was mathematically equivalent to finding consensual weights to be assigned to members of the group that could be used as a measure of competence and expertise. The consensual weights can be applied to find consensus concerning factors other than probabilities. The use of probabilities was in fact an incidental, though formally well articulated, application of the underlying aggregation of weights to obtain convergence toward consensual weights. (shrink)

Dominic McIver Lopes and Yuriko Saito claim that the Japanese tea ceremony, or chadō, is a non‐Western art form. Stephen Davies also defends that claim. In this article, I utilize the tea ceremony as a test case for pancultural definitions of art that claim to be inclusive of non‐Western cultures without relying on Western ethnocentrism to justify their status as artworks. I argue that Davies's (2015) hybrid definition is not justified in assuming a homogenous art tradition and/or a unified conception (...) of artistic practices in a non‐Western culture. Moreover, the cladistic structure of his definition fails to accommodate the spontaneous instantiation of new art traditions. Additionally, Jerrold Levinson's Intentional‐Historical definition cannot satisfactorily accommodate chadō. First, the nonart origins that were formative for the regard that is required for appreciation of the tea ceremony mean that the relational interpretation of the definition fails. Second, Rikyū’s tea ceremony does not count as art incidentally, as it is not a form of mimesis nor does the Japanese wabi aesthetic that is central to chadō have a precursor in known Western art. Third, if chadō does satisfy Levinson's extended theory, it comes at the cost of embracing Western ethnocentrism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Tolstoy’s Art and Thought, 1847–1880John GoodliffeTolstoy’s Art and Thought, 1847–1880, by Donna Tussing Orwin; viii & 296 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, $35.00.In the opening words of the introduction, “this book is an attempt to reconstruct the ideas that led Tolstoy to write the masterpieces of his youth and middle age” (p. 3). Covering the first three decades of Tolstoy’s creative life, it focuses first on his (...) “initial vision” in the 1850s, principally derived from Rousseau’s belief in the superiority of natural morality over the artificial values created by so-called civilization. Then, by way of an analysis of The Cossacks (1863), it seeks to show how Tolstoy came to see that “natural morality was not enough” (p. 96). So, in War and Peace, he tried to depict a world in which human beings were at one with nature, where everything, even war, was natural and part of God’s purpose, so that there was no dichotomy between what is natural and what is civilized. The key word for War and Peace is thus sopriaganie—“linkage.”By the 1870s, when Tolstoy was writing Anna Karenina, he no longer saw God as directly involved in human affairs. Now God was “farther away, but higher and more indubitable” (from a letter to the poet Fet). From this shift in thinking is derived the “drama” of Anna Karenina, as distinct from the “epic” oneness of War and Peace. Whereas in the latter work Tolstoy wanted to see all aspects of life, human or otherwise, in harmony, in Anna Karenina, partly under the baleful influence of Schopenhauer, he came to depict an essential disharmony in life, which he and Levin sought vainly to resolve. Having reached this impasse, Tolstoy abandoned fiction as a medium for his ideas and turned to direct expression of them in essays, tracts, and the like.In writing her book Orwin set herself the virtually impossible task of presenting Tolstoy’s work “as he may have understood it himself” (p. 5). She succeeds in this as well as may be reasonably expected, largely through a detailed analysis of the relevant works of fiction and by drawing on Tolstoy’s correspondence with, for example, N. N. Strakhov. This type of approach is a risky one, since it inevitably treats the fictional texts principally as vehicles for philosophy, when clearly they are much more than that. It is to her credit that, in spite of this, Orwin generally succeeds in her task, although her bias is evident in the bold statement that without “moral law,” Anna Karenina would be Dallas (p. 207)! The other risk is that of treating the fictional texts as though they are somehow separate from Tolstoy the human being, as opposed to Tolstoy the thinker. In her conclusion Orwin refers belatedly and almost incidentally to Tolstoy’s marriage, his family and his growing older. But these factors were surely more crucial for the development of his ideas than she seems to have allowed for; the optimism of War and Peace reflecting the harmony of the early years of his marriage and the darker notes of Anna [End Page 166] Karenina indicating growing disillusion as the relationship between him and his wife lost its early bloom and Tolstoy approached his fifties.Deserving of fuller treatment too were the currents of thought in Russian intellectual circles in the 1860s and 70s which formed an essential background for Tolstoy’s ideas. These too are accorded only quite brief mention. In fact, the commentary on the fictional works, impressive in its depth, tends to be almost too detailed, in places verging on the repetitious. The book could have been more satisfactory if the detailed textual commentary had been more concise and the broader considerations given more extensive analysis. But Orwin’s decision to use a comparatively narrow focus was clearly deliberate and, if we accept its limitations, we can still recognize the importance of her book for Tolstoy studies.John GoodliffeUniversity of Canterbury, New ZealandCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Business ethics courses have been launched with professors from business pulling on one oar, and professors of philosophy pulling on the other, but they lack a sense of direction. Let's begin with the basics: What is an ehtical decision? More fundamentally, why the interest in professional ethics in the first place?There are over 300 centers for the study of appIied ethics in this country-why? The events which face our society today are outside the business-oriented collection of shared beIiefs that set (...) our pubIic policy agenda. Cur beIiefs are too narrow, thus we see, understand, and control small slices of life.Business ethics should be the study of the structure and impact on us of what we call "business science," e.g., accounting, marketing, economics, law, etc., and the corresponding study of the process of what Carl Jung called individuation: learning to become one's own uniqueself in the face of these bodies of professional knowledge which have structured our lives and charted the direction for our sensibilities for too long. (shrink)

Business ethics courses have been launched with professors from business pulling on one oar, and professors of philosophy pulling on the other, but they lack a sense of direction. Let's begin with the basics: What is an ehtical decision? More fundamentally, why the interest in professional ethics in the first place?There are over 300 centers for the study of appIied ethics in this country-why? The events which face our society today are outside the business-oriented collection of shared beIiefs that set (...) our pubIic policy agenda. Cur beIiefs are too narrow, thus we see, understand, and control small slices of life.Business ethics should be the study of the structure and impact on us of what we call "business science," e.g., accounting, marketing, economics, law, etc., and the corresponding study of the process of what Carl Jung called individuation: learning to become one's own uniqueself in the face of these bodies of professional knowledge which have structured our lives and charted the direction for our sensibilities for too long. (shrink)

We explore themes in Nobel Prize–winning economist James M. Buchanan’s work and apply his Ethics and Economic Progress to problems facing individuals and firms. We focus on Buchanan’s analysis of the individual work ethic, his exhortations to “pay the preacher” of the “institutions of moral-ethical communication,” and his notion of law as “public capital.” We highlight several ways people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to social flourishing and some of the ways those who have “affected to trade for the public (...) good” might want to redirect their efforts. We show how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business. (shrink)

Abstract…observations of skylfull pylotts is the onlye waye to bring it in rule; for it passeth the reach of naturall philosophy. – Michael Gabriel, 1576 (Collinson, 1867, p. 30)Abstract The tension between empirical data and formal theory pervades the entire history of geomagnetism, from the Middle Ages up to the present day. This paper explores its early-modern history (1500–1800), using a hybrid approach: it applies a methodological framework used in modern geophysics to interpret early-modern developments, exploring to what extent formal (...) conjectures shaped observation and vice versa. A range of pertinent case studies supports classification of this entire period as proto-scientific, characterised by the initial formation of theories being largely disconnected from observational constraints, and their subsequent evolution being advanced primarily by their empirical falsification, and not necessarily associated with the introduction of an alternative. The few exceptional instances of purely data-driven discovery were essentially due to an improved signal-to-noise ratio. (shrink)

NOT SAUSSURE: A CRITIQUE OF POST?SAUSSUREAN LITERARY THEORY by Raymond Tallis London: Macmillan, 1988. 273 pp., £33 (£10.95 paper).

The increasing availability of passively observed data has yielded a growing interest in “data fusion” methods, which involve merging data from observational and experimental sources to draw causal conclusions. Such methods often require a precarious tradeoff between the unknown bias in the observational dataset and the often-large variance in the experimental dataset. We propose an alternative approach, which avoids this tradeoff: rather than using observational data for inference, we use it to design a more efficient experiment. We consider the case (...) of a stratified experiment with a binary outcome and suppose pilot estimates for the stratum potential outcome variances can be obtained from the observational study. We extend existing results to generate confidence sets for these variances, while accounting for the possibility of unmeasured confounding. Then, we pose the experimental design problem as a regret minimization problem subject to the constraints imposed by our confidence sets. We show that this problem can be converted into a concave maximization and solved using conventional methods. Finally, we demonstrate the practical utility of our methods using data from the Women’s Health Initiative. (shrink)

Helps individual readers to overcome procrastination and build self-esteem Reveals how to create a culture of accountability, and how to hold someone accountable Gives leaders a step-by-step process for helping team members become more self-responsible Explains commitment reluctance and how to encourage self-responsibility among team members Uncovers why we blame others and shows how to defeat a blame culture Provides an easy read with no consultant-speak In recent years, HORN Training and Consulting was awarded the distinguished Gold Medal by the (...) Canadian Society for Training and Development for its leadership development program designed for one of the world’s largest international banks; and HORN is currently executing leadership development projects on a global scale for companies in the consumer packaged goods and pharmaceutical industries. (shrink)

A collection of photographs depicts life on Chicago's west side between 1949 and mid-1960s.

1. ʻArve naḥal, ḥashivuto shel kol Yehudi --2. Isur hitḥabrut ʻim reshaʻim--3. Ketsad la-ʻazor le-vaʻale teshuvah.

Adults spend most of their conscious life speaking, comprehending, writing, and reading discourse. It is entirely appropriate for cognitive science to investigate discourse especially as transmitted texts or printed media, such as books, newspapers, magazines, and computers. However, there is another reason why text understanding has been one of the prototypical areas of study in cognitive science: Interdisciplinary work is absolutely essential. As cognitive scientists have unraveled the puzzles of text comprehension, they have embraced the insights and methodologies from several (...) disciplines. (shrink)

We humans are a curious species. Of all the life forms that inhabit the earth, we alone strive to make sense of the world in which we find ourselves. For thousands of years we understood the world through stories. Our ancestors told stories of how the world began, how our people originated and came to be at this place, and how those people across the river or beyond the mountains came to be where they are. Some stories were of animals (...) and plants in our neighborhood, and their powers to help us, feed us, or cure our ailments. But in the last few centuries, starting in Europe and spreading throughout the world, a new way of understanding began competing with storytelling as a means of comprehending our world. Science supplanted storytelling largely because it empowered us to transform the world in ways that were unimaginable to our ancestors. We understand the world scientifically by describing the world instead of by telling stories about it. The stories our ancestors told no longer explain the world, but are data within the world, part of the world that science describes. Our stories have become myths, cultural artifacts that may be interesting and a subject of study, but cannot possibly be true. Yet even in societies that have thoroughly embraced science as a means of understanding the world, myths remain a powerful force. Myth and science exist side by side, often creating confusion and conflict. (shrink)