Results for 'infallibilism'

71 found
Order:
  1.  46
    Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples.Alex Davies - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien.
    Infallibilism is commonly rejected because it is apparently subject to easy counter-examples. I describe a strategy that infallibilists can use to resist this objection. Because the sentences used in the counter-examples to express evidence and belief are context-sensitive, the infallibilist can insist that such counter-examples trade on a vacillation between different readings of these sentences. I describe what difficulties await those who try to produce counter-examples against which the proposed strategy is ineffective.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
    When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  4. Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism.Tim Kraft - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):49-70.
    The relation of scepticism to infallibilism and fallibilism is a contested issue. In this paper I argue that Cartesian sceptical arguments, i.e. sceptical arguments resting on sceptical scenarios, are neither tied to infallibilism nor collapse into fallibilism. I interpret the distinction between scepticism and fallibilism as a scope distinction. According to fallibilism, each belief could be false, but according to scepticism all beliefs could be false at the same time. However, to put this distinction to work sceptical scenarios (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  31
    The Redundancy Problem: From Knowledge-Infallibilism to Knowledge-Minimalism.Stephen Hetherington - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Among the epistemological ideas commonly associated with the Descartes of the Meditations, at any rate, is a knowledge-infallibilism. Such an idea was seemingly a vital element in Descartes’s search for truth within that investigative setting: only a true belief gained infallibly could be knowledge, as the Meditations conceived of this. Contemporary epistemologists are less likely than Descartes was to advocate our ever seeking knowledge-infallibility, if only because most are doubtful as to its ever being available. Still, they would agree—in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
    Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  7. The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
    Anthony Brueckner argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9.  70
    Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy.Feit Neil - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304–327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  10. Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):626-635.
    According to one contemporary formulation of infallibilism, probability 1 infallibilism, if a subject knows that p, then the probability of p on her evidence is 1. To avoid an implausible scepticism about knowledge, probability 1 infallibilism needs to allow that, in a wide range of cases, a proposition can be evidence for itself. However, such infallibilism needs to explain why it is typically infelicitous to cite p as evidence for p itself. I argue that probability 1 (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. C. S. Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism.Jaime Nubiola - 2008 - Cognitio 9 (1):73-84.
    George M. Searle (1839-1918) and Charles S. Peirce worked together in the Coast Survey and the Harvard Observatory during the decade of 1860: both scientists were assistants of Joseph Winlock, the director of the Observatory. When in 1868 George, a convert to Catholicism, left to enter the Paulist Fathers, he was replaced by his brother Arthur Searle. George was ordained as a priest in 1871, was a lecturer of Mathematics and Astronomy at the Catholic University of America, and became the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. The Case for Infallibilism.Julien Dutant - 2007 - In C. Penco, M. Vignolo, V. Ottonelli & C. Amoretti (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy. Genoa: University of Genoa. pp. 59-84.
    Infallibilism is the claim that knowledge requires that one satisfies some infallibility condition. I spell out three distinct such conditions: epistemic, evidential and modal infallibility. Epistemic infallibility turns out to be simply a consequence of epistemic closure, and is not infallibilist in any relevant sense. Evidential infallibilism i s unwarranted but it is not an satisfactory characterization of the infallibilist intuition. Modal infallibility, by contrast, captures the core infallibilist intuition, and I argue that it is required to solve (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13.  12
    Theism and Infallibilism: Can the Marriage Be Saved? Response to Blaauw.Robert Oakes - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):355.
    This essay constitutes a brief response to Martin Blaauw's paper, 'Divorcing theism from infallibilism', "Religious Studies," 43 (2007), 349-354, in which he raises a number of thought-provoking objections to an earlier paper of mine which appeared in this journal: 'Theism and infallibilism: a marriage made in heaven?', "Religious Studies," 40 (2004), 193-201. In the following counter-response, I hope to show that the argument developed in my original essay manages to survive his objections. (All page references in the text (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  11
    Divorcing Theism From Infallibilism: A Reply to Robert Oakes.Martijn Blaauw - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):349.
    Robert Oakes has argued that theism defeats the 'doctrine of public-world fallibilism'. That is, Oakes has argued that theism supports infallibilism about public-world beliefs such as 'There is an olive on the floor', or 'I have two hands'. Given the enormous discussion of radical scepticism in the recent epistemological literature, this argument is well worth investigating. In this short note, however, I argue that the argument Oakes presents is unconvincing. The truth of theism does not support public-world infallibilism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Infallibilism About Self-Knowledge.T. Parent - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):411-424.
    Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  16. Infallibilism About Self-Knowledge II: Lagadonian Judging.T. Parent - manuscript
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 7 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):195-199.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  4
    C. S. Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism.Jaime Nubiola - 2008 - Cognitio 9 (1):73-84.
    Understanding Peirce requires dealing with Peirce's religious concerns, which are increasingly recognized as being as philosophically relevant as his scientific concerns. In recent times, even Peirce's regular religious practice in his Milford years has been documented (L 244), including, at least occasionally, week-day Eucharist services, which were "the hallmark of Tractarian or Anglo-Catholic parishes". -/- I have argued elsewhere that for Peirce, scientific activity is a genuine religious enterprise, perhaps even the religious activity par excellence, and that to divorce religion (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  11
    Theism and Infallibilism: A Marriage Made in Heaven?Robert Oakes - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (2):193-201.
    Many philosophers ardently subscribe to what can be called the doctrine of public-world fallibilism (DPWF), i.e. the doctrine that human persons can never have infallible awareness of the truth of propositions such as that expressed by the sentence ‘There is an olive on the kitchen floor’. It has, of course, been standard to contrast such claims with epistemically tentative first-person phenomenological reports, e.g. ‘It seems to me that there is olive on the kitchen floor’. According to the DPWF, for any (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  14
    Modal Infallibilism and Basic Truth.Scott Sturgeon - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. pp. 40.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  4
    Substantive Philosophy, Infallibilism and the Critique of Metaphysics: Hegel and the Historicity of Philosophical Reason.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2013 - In Lisa Herzog (ed.), Hegel's Thought in Europe: Currents, Crosscurrents and Undercurrents. pp. 192.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
    There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  23. Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.
    Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  24. Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.
    The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  25. The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. Infallibility Naturalized: Reply to Hoffmann.T. Parent - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):353-358.
    The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view does not preclude a Quinean epistemology, wherein every belief is subject to empirical revision.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Locke on Empirical Knowledge.Nathan Rockwood - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (4).
    This paper explores two related issues concerning Locke’s account of epistemic justification for empirical knowledge. One issue concerns the degree of justification needed for empirical knowledge. Commentators almost universally take Locke to hold a fallibilist account of justification, whereas I argue that Locke accepts infallibilism. A second issue concerns the nature of justification. Many (though not all) commentators take Locke to have a thoroughly internalist conception of justification for empirical knowledge, whereas I argue that he has a (partly) externalist (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  9
    Colivan Commitment, Vis-À-Vis Moore’s Paradox.Ted Parent - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-11.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  19
    Skepticism and the Acquisition of “Knowledge”.Shaun Nichols & N. Ángel Pinillos - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):397-414.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  25
    Gottes Notwendige Existenz Stiftet Sinn. Versuch Eines Transzendental-Modallogischen Beweises.Gregor Damschen - 2014 - In Martina Bär & Maximilian Paulin (eds.), Macht Glück Sinn? Theologische und philosophische Erkundungen. Ostfildern, Germany: Matthias Grünewald Verlag. pp. 96-111.
  31.  85
    The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism.Mylan Engel Jr - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):163-178.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  92
    Antiskeptical Conditionals.Theodore J. Everett - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.
    Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals, which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind: An Essay in Neo-Sellarsian Philosophy.T. Parent - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   104 citations  
  35. Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Two Kinds of a Priori Infallibility.Glen Hoffmann - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):241-253.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. Warrant Without Truth?E. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.
    This paper advances the debate over the question whether false beliefs may nevertheless have warrant, the property that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. The paper’s first main part—which spans Sections 2–4—assesses the best argument for Warrant Infallibilism, the view that only true beliefs can have warrant. I show that this argument’s key premise conflicts with an extremely plausible claim about warrant. Sections 5–6 constitute the paper’s second main part. Section 5 presents an overlooked puzzle about warrant, and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  38. Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
    In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ?infallibilism?, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  39. Confusion About Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.
    Concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are knowledge attributions of the form ‘S knows p, but it’s possible that q’, where q obviously entails not-p (Rysiew, Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 35:477–514, 2001). The significance of CKAs has been widely discussed recently. It’s agreed by all that CKAs are infelicitous, at least typically. But the agreement ends there. Different writers have invoked them in their defenses of all sorts of philosophical theses; to name just a few: contextualism, invariantism, fallibilism, infallibilism, and that the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  40.  26
    "John Wesley's Non-Literal Literalism and Hermeneutics of Love".Rem B. Edwards - 2016 - Wesleyan Theological Journal 51 (2):26-40.
    A thorough examination of John Wesley’s writings will show that he was not a biblical literalist or infallibilist, despite his own occasional suggestions to the contrary. His most important principles for interpreting the Bible were: We should take its words literally only if doing so is not absurd, in which case we should “look for a looser meaning;” and “No Scripture can mean that God is not love, or that his mercy is not over all his works.” Eleven instances of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. On the Obvious.Robin Jeshion - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):333-355.
    Infallibilism about a priori justification is the thesis that for an agent A to be a priori justified in believing p, that which justifies A's belief that p must guarantee the truth of p. No analogous thesis is thought to obtain for empirically justified beliefs. The aim of this article is to argue that infallibilism about the a priori is an untenable philosophical position and to provide theoretical understanding why we not only can be, but rather must be, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  42. Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic.Dylan Dodd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.
    Timothy Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is 1. I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  43.  11
    Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):31-38.
    ABSTRACT According to the fallibilist, it is possible for us to know things when our evidence doesn't entail that our beliefs are correct. Even if there is some chance that we're mistaken about p, we might still know that p is true. Fallibilists will tell you that an important virtue of their view is that infallibilism leads to skepticism. In this paper, we'll see that fallibilist impurism has considerable skeptical consequences of its own. We've missed this because we've focused (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44. Pragmatic Encroachment: It's Not Just About Knowledge. McGrath & Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  45. Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions.Glen Hoffmann - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  36
    Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía.
    According to the fallibilist, it is possible for us to know things when our evidence doesn't entail that our beliefs are correct. Even if there is some chance that we're mistaken about p, we might still know that p is true. Fallibilists will tell you that an important virtue of their view is that infallibilism leads to skepticism. In this paper, we'll see that fallibilist impurism has considerable skeptical consequences of its own. We've missed this because we've focused our (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  31
    Truthmaking, Evidence Of, and Impossibility Proofs.Adrian Heathcote - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):363-375.
    Beginning with Zagzebski (The Philosophical Quarterly 44:65–73, 1994), some philosophers have argued that there can be no solution to the Gettier counterexamples within the framework of a fallibilist theory of knowledge. If true, this would be devastating, since it is believed on good grounds that infallibilism leads to scepticism. But I argue here that these purported proofs are mistaken and that the truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is both cogent and fallibilist in nature. To show this I develop (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48.  80
    A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism.Ram Neta - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):658-695.
    According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49. From E = K to Scepticism?Clayton Littlejohn - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):679-684.
    In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about die external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  50.  39
    Understanding Fallible Warrant and Fallible Knowledge: Three Proposals.Stephen Hetherington - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    One of contemporary epistemology's more important conceptual challenges is that of understanding the nature of fallibility. Part of why this matters is that it would contribute to our understanding the natures of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. This article evaluates two candidates – and describes a shared form of failing. Each is concealedly infallibilist. This failing is all-too-representative of the difficulty of doing justice to the notion of fallibility within the notions of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. The article ends (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 71