Results for 'inferential scepticism'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  81
    Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams.Thomas Grundmann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):345-352.
    In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  31
    Scepticism and the Principle of Inferential Justification.Christopher Hookway - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):344 - 365.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  16
    The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs.Josep E. Corbi - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):377 - 385.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  13
    The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs.Josep E. Corbí - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):377-385.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  1
    Scepticism and the Principle of Inferential Justification.Christopher Hookway - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):344-365.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  60
    Undercutting Underdetermination‐Based Scepticism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2015 - Theoria 81 (4):333-354.
    According to Duncan Pritchard, there are two kinds of radical sceptical problem; the closure-based problem, and the underdetermination-based problem. He argues that distinguishing these two problems leads to a set of desiderata for an anti-sceptical response, and that the way to meet all of these desiderata is by supplementing a form of Wittgensteinian contextualism with disjunctivist views about factivity. I agree that an adequate response should meet most of the initial desiderata Pritchard puts forward, and that some version of Wittgensteinian (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - In D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner (eds.), Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein's Last Work. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinge propositions” in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis—viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the ‘unearned warrant’ thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  9. On Metaepistemological Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Michael Bergmann & Brett Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the related position outlined by Stroud. It is argued that there are at least three interesting points of contact between Fumerton and Stroud’s metaepistemology. The first point of contact is that both Fumerton and Stroud think that (1) externalist theories of justification permit a kind of non-inferential, perceptual justification for our beliefs about non-psychological reality, but it’s not sufficient for philosophical assurance. However, Fumerton claims, while Stroud denies, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  27
    Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2014 - In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    I focus on a family of inferences that are intuitively incapable of producing knowledge of their conclusions, although they appear to satisfy sufficient conditions for inferential knowledge postulated by plausible epistemological theories. They include Moorean inferences and inductive-bootstrapping inferences. I provide an account of why these inferences are not capable of producing knowledge. I argue that the reason why these inferences fail to produce knowledge of their conclusions is that inferential knowledge requires that the subject is more likely (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Carroll's Regress and the Epistemology of Logic.Patrice Philie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):183 - 210.
    On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll’s regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll’s regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws. Such a standpoint (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  33
    Scepticism and Epistemic Kinds.John Greco - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):366 - 376.
    This paper responds to a claim by Christopher Hookway, that Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ) is a platitude, and that skeptical arguments that deploy it depend essentially on a substantive thesis about the nature of epistemic kinds. This paper argues that, contrary to Hookway, the thesis about epistemic kinds is not necessary to generate skeptical results, and PIJ is sufficient to do so.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  90
    Hegel on Scepticism in the Logic of Essence.Ioannis Trisokkas - 2017 - In Klaus Vieweg, Stella Synegianni, Georges Faraklas & Jannis Kozatsas (eds.), Hegel and Scepticism. De Gruyter. pp. 99-120.
    Early in the Logic of Essence, the second main part of Hegelian Logic, Hegel identifies a logical structure, seeming (Schein), with “the phenomenon of scepticism.” The present paper has two aims: first, to flesh this identification out by describing the argument that leads up to it; and, second, to argue that it is mistaken. I will proceed as follows. Section 1 deciphers the opening statement of the Logic of Essence, “the truth of being is essence,” by specifying the meaning (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Probability and Scepticism.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-86.
    If we add as an extra premise that the agent does know H, then it is possible for her to know E — H, we get the conclusion that the agent does not really know H. But even without that closure premise, or something like it, the conclusion seems quite dramatic. One possible response to the argument, floated by both Descartes and Hume, is to accept the conclusion and embrace scepticism. We cannot know anything that goes beyond our evidence, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. An Early Critic of Locke: The Anti-Scepticism of Henry Lee.Han Thomas Adriaenssen - 2011 - Locke Studies 11:17-47.
    Although Henry Lee is often recognized to be an important early critic of Locke's 'way of ideas', his Anti-Scepticism (1702) has hardly received the scholarly attention it deserves. This paper seeks to fill that lacuna. It argues that Lee's criticism of Locke's alleged representationalism was original, and that it was quite different from the more familiar kind of criticism that was launched against Locke's theory of ideas by such thinkers as John Sergeant and Thomas Reid. In addition, the paper (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  93
    Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Scepticism.Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Crispin Wright maintains that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this fact doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance.Adina L. Roskies - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (1):19-30.
    Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that although neuroimaging does bear (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  19. Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology.Theodore Sider - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):75-97.
    Eternalists say that non-present entities (for instance dinosaurs) exist; presentists say that they do not. But some sceptics deny that this debate is genuine, claiming that presentists simply represent eternalists' quantifiers over non-present entities in different notation. This scepticism may be refuted on purely logical grounds: one of the leading candidate ‘presentist quantifiers’ over non-present things has the inferential role of a quantifier. The dispute over whether non-present objects exist is as genuine and non-verbal as the dispute over (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  20. Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.
    I focus on a key argument for global external world scepticism resting on the underdetermination thesis: the argument according to which we cannot know any proposition about our physical environment because sense evidence for it equally justifies some sceptical alternative (e.g. the Cartesian demon conjecture). I contend that the underdetermination argument can go through only if the controversial thesis that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility is true. I also suggest a reason to doubt (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  21. Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
    This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual relativism and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  22. Movin' on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.
    Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  23. Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism.Tim Kraft - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):49-70.
    The relation of scepticism to infallibilism and fallibilism is a contested issue. In this paper I argue that Cartesian sceptical arguments, i.e. sceptical arguments resting on sceptical scenarios, are neither tied to infallibilism nor collapse into fallibilism. I interpret the distinction between scepticism and fallibilism as a scope distinction. According to fallibilism, each belief could be false, but according to scepticism all beliefs could be false at the same time. However, to put this distinction to work sceptical (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2016 - In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-60.
    Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  10
    Probability Theory Plus Noise: Descriptive Estimation and Inferential Judgment.Fintan Costello & Paul Watts - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (1):192-208.
    We describe a computational model of two central aspects of people's probabilistic reasoning: descriptive probability estimation and inferential probability judgment. This model assumes that people's reasoning follows standard frequentist probability theory, but it is subject to random noise. This random noise has a regressive effect in descriptive probability estimation, moving probability estimates away from normative probabilities and toward the center of the probability scale. This random noise has an anti-regressive effect in inferential judgement, however. These regressive and anti-regressive (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Modal Scepticism, Yablo-Style Conceivability, and Analogical Reasoning.Peter Hartl - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):269-291.
    This paper offers a detailed criticism of different versions of modal scepticism proposed by Van Inwagen and Hawke, and, against these views, attempts to vindicate our reliance on thought experiments in philosophy. More than one different meaning of “ modal scepticism” will be distinguished. Focusing mainly on Hawke’s more detailed view I argue that none of these versions of modal scepticism is compelling, since sceptical conclusions depend on an untenable and, perhaps, incoherent modal epistemology. With a detailed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27. Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'.Chantal Bax - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  35
    Closure Scepticism and The Vat Argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):667-690.
    If it works, I can use Putnam’s vat argument to show that I have not always been a brain-in-a-vat. It is widely thought that the vat argument is of no use against closure scepticism – that is, scepticism motivated by arguments that appeal to a closure principle. This is because, even if I can use the vat argument to show that I have not always been a BIV, I cannot use it to show that I was not recently (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action.Thor Grünbaum - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
    I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  30.  81
    Ramseyan Humility, Scepticism and Grasp.Alexander Kelly - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):705-726.
    In ‘Ramseyan Humility’ David Lewis argues that a particular view about fundamental properties, quidditism, leads to the position that we are irredeemably ignorant of the identities of fundamental properties. We are ignorant of the identities of fundamental properties since we can never know which properties play which causal roles, and we have no other way of identifying fundamental properties other than by the causal roles they play. It has been suggested in the philosophical literature that Lewis’ argument for Humility is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31. On the 'Simulation Argument' and Selective Scepticism.Jonathan Birch - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):95-107.
    Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32. Scepticism and Naturalism in Cavell and Hume.Peter S. Fosl - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1):29-54.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 29 - 54 This essay argues that the exploration of scepticism and its implications in the work of Stanley Cavell and David Hume bears more similarities than is commonly acknowledged, especially along the lines of what I wish to call “sceptical naturalism.” These lines of similarity are described through the way each philosopher relates the “natural” and “nature” to the universal, the necessary, and the conventional.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  93
    Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism.Howard Sankey - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (4):395-412.
    This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. Logic in Action: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism and the Impotence of Scepticism.Daniele Moyal-Sharrock - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (2):125-148.
    So-called 'hinge propositions', Wittgenstein's version of our basic beliefs, are not propositions at all, but heuristic expressions of our bounds of sense which, as such, cannot meaningfully be said but only show themselves in what we say and do. Yet if our foundational certainty is necessarily an ineffable, enacted certainty, any challenge of it must also be enacted. Philosophical scepticism – being a mere mouthing of doubt – is impotent to unsettle a certainty whose salient conceptual feature is that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  35. Socratic Scepticism.Roger Wertheimer - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (4):344-62.
    The Socratic Paradox (that only Socrates is wise, and only because only he recognizes our lack of wisdom) is explained, elaborated and defended. His philosophical scepticism is distinguished from others (Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, Humean, Kripkean Wittgenstein, etc.): the doubt concerns our understanding of our beliefs, not our justification for them; the doubt is a posteriori and inductive, not a priori. Post-Socratic philosophy confirms this scepticism: contra-Descartes, our ideas are not transparent to us; contra-Verificationism, no criterion distinguishes sense from nonsense. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. McDowell, Scepticism, and the 'Veil of Perception'.David Macarthur - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):175-190.
    McDowell has argued that external world scepticism is a pressing problem only in so far as we accept, on the basis of the argument from illusion, the claim that perceiving that p and hallucinating that p involve a highest common factor.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  37. Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):467 - 479.
    One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell's view, at least when suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argumentation that he may (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  38.  83
    Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo.Cameron Boult & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):27-35.
    We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
    Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. Safety, Virtue, Scepticism: Remarks on Sosa.Peter Baumann - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (45):295-306.
    Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge – a view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  84
    Information, Possible Worlds and the Cooptation of Scepticism.Luciano Floridi - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):63 - 88.
    The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an informationtheoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borei numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42. Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
    An overview of the import of disjunctivism to the problem of radical scepticism is offered. In particular, the disjunctivist account of perceptual experience is set out, along with the manner in which it intersects with related positions such as naïve realism and intentionalism, and it is shown how this account can be used to a motivate an anti-sceptical proposal. In addition, a variety of disjunctivism known as epistemological disjunctivism is described, and it is explained how this proposal offers a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  88
    The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
    This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44.  23
    Inferential Erotetic Logic Meets Inquisitive Semantics.Andrzej Wiśniewski & Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1585-1608.
    Inferential erotetic logic and inquisitive semantics give accounts of questions and model various aspects of questioning. In this paper we concentrate upon connections between inquisitiveness, being the core concept of INQ, and question raising, characterized in IEL by means of the concepts of question evocation and erotetic implication. We consider the basic system InqB of INQ, remain at the propositional level and show, inter alia, that: a disjunction of all the direct answers to an evoked question is always inquisitive; (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Sosa on Scepticism[REVIEW]Jessica Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397--405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  46. Scepsis and Scepticism.Italo Testa - 2012 - In De Laurentis Allegra & Edwards Jeffrey (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel. Bloomsbury/Continuum (2012). Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 273-278.
    Hegel's philosophy aims at responding to the questions raised by modern scepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. A key-role in Hegel's argumentative strategy against modern scepticism is played here by Hegel's theory of recognition. Recognition mediates the constitution of individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: self-knowledge is not logically independent of the awareness of other minds. At the same time, recognition institutes the possibility of objective reference to the world. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Making Sense of Doubt: Strawson's Anti-Scepticism.John J. Callanan - 2011 - Theoria 77 (3):261-278.
    Strawson's philosophical attitude towards scepticism is frequently thought to have undergone a significant shift from the “strong” or “robust” employment of transcendental arguments in Individuals to a more “modest” understanding of the efficacy of such arguments in Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. I argue that this interpretation is based upon a misunderstanding of the function of transcendental arguments in Strawson's earlier works. Examining the continuity of Strawson's modest naturalistic approach to scepticism can offer some insight as to the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  21
    Hume's Scepticism and Realism - His Two Profound Arguments Against the Senses in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.Jani Hakkarainen - 2007 - Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere.
    The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49.  68
    Scepticism, Stoicism and Subjectivity: Reappraising Montaigne's Influence on Descartes.Jesús Navarro - 2010 - Contrastes: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofía 15 (1-2):243-260.
    According to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  18
    Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.
    In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments. One of the main reasons in favour of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000