Results for 'inner awareness'

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  1.  83
    Inner Awareness is Essential to Consciousness: A Buddhist-Abhidharma Perspective.Monima Chadha - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):83-101.
    This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness with the doctrines of no-self and momentariness are also answered.
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  2.  56
    Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.
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  3. Affording Introspection: An Alternative Model of Inner Awareness.Tom McClelland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2469-2492.
    The ubiquity of inner awareness thesis states that all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very state. UIA-Backers support this thesis while UIA-Skeptics reject it. At the heart of their dispute is a recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement. UIA-Backers claim that phenomenological investigation reveals ‘peripheral inner awareness’ to be a constant presence in their non-introspective experiences. UIA-Skeptics deny that their non-introspective experiences are characterised by inner awareness, (...)
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  4. Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):143-164.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of common sense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that they are typically based on introspection and introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue that such reasoning must guard against a potential conflation between two distinct introspective phenomena, which we call fact-introspection (...)
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  5.  44
    A Defense of Inner Awareness: The Memory Argument Revisited.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally been a central element of philosophy of consciousness, from Aristotle, to Descartes, Brentano, the phenomenological tradition, and early and contemporary analytic philosophy. Its existence, however, has recently been called into question, especially by defenders of so-called transparency of experience and first-order representationalists about phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I put forward a defense of inner awareness based on an argument from memory. Roughly, the (...)
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  6.  23
    Phenomenal intentionality, inner awareness, and the given.David Woodruff Smith - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Responding to the myth of a purely sensuous “given”, we turn to phenomenology, to the structure of consciousness in an everyday perception of an everyday object. We first consider Brentano’s model of an act of consciousness: featuring the presentation of an object “intentionally” contained “in” the act, joined by the presentation of that object-presentation in “inner consciousness”. We then dig into Husserl’s intricate “semantic” theory of intentionality: featuring “noematic” meaning within a “horizon” of implicated meaning regarding the object of (...)
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  7. Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of (...)
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  8.  65
    Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Some have argued that a subject has an inner awareness of its conscious mental states by virtue of the non-introspective, reflexive awareness that any conscious state has of itself. But, what exactly is it like to have a ubiquitous and reflexive inner awareness of one’s conscious states, as distinct from one’s outer awareness of the apparent world? This essay derives a model of ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) from Sebastian Watzl’s recent theory of (...)
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  9. Self-Awareness Deficits Following Loss of Inner Speech: Dr. Jill Bolte Taylor’s Case Study.Alain Morin - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):524-529.
    In her 2006 book ‘‘My Stroke of Insight” Dr. Jill Bolte Taylor relates her experience of suffering from a left hemispheric stroke caused by a congenital arteriovenous malformation which led to a loss of inner speech. Her phenomenological account strongly suggests that this impairment produced a global self-awareness deficit as well as more specific dysfunctions related to corporeal awareness, sense of individuality, retrieval of autobiographical memories, and self-conscious emotions. These are examined in details and corroborated by numerous (...)
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  10. Self-Awareness and the Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus: Inner Speech Use During Self-Related Processing.A. Morin & J. Michaud - 2007 - Brain Research Bulletin 74 (6):387-396.
    To test the hypothesis of a participation of inner speech in self-referential activity we reviewed 59 studies measuring brain activity during processing of self-information in the following self-domains: agency, self-recognition, emotions, personality traits, autobiographical memory, preference judgments, and REST. The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) has been shown to sustain inner speech use. We calculated the percentage of studies reporting LIFG activity for each self-dimension. 55.9% of all studies reviewed identified LIFG (and presumably inner speech) activity during (...)
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  11.  96
    Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.
    This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different (...)
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  12. Inner Speech as a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis.Alain Morin & James Everett - 1990 - New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.
    Little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in acquiring and processing information about itself. In this article, we underline the possibility that inner speech might just represent one such cognitive process. Duval and Wicklund’s theory of self-awareness and the selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge body of work that was inspired by it are reviewed, and the suggestion is put forward that inner speech parallels the state of self-awareness, is more frequently used among (...)
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  13. The Case for Intrinsic Theory XI: A Disagreement Regarding the Kind of Feature Inner Awareness Is.Thomas Natsoulas - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211.
    Motivating this article, as well as the immediately preceding article in the present series, is Kriegel’s recent “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness,” which consists of a defense of six theses regarding the content of inner awareness. I address here only the first of these six theses, along the very same lines as Kriegel does, that is, with special reference to Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological conception of inner awareness. The first thesis is as (...)
     
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  14. The Case for Intrinsic Theory: III. Intrinsic Inner Awareness and the Problem of Straightforward Objectivation.Thomas Natsoulas - 1998 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19.
    Aron Gurwitsch, phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness4, contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; whenever an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Moreover, inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its very own individual structure. Gurwitsch further argues that inner awareness is a merely concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the particular objectivating act, for (...)
     
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  15. Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness?Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Abstract: According to (what I will call) an inner awareness theory of consciousness, you are in a (phenomenally) conscious state only if you are aware, in some sense, of your being in the state. This theory is widely held, but what arguments are there for holding it? In this paper, I gather together in a systematic way the main arguments for holding the theory and suggest that none of them is persuasive. I end the paper by asking what (...)
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  16.  52
    "Inner Perception Can Never Become Inner Observation”: Brentano on Awareness and Observation.Mark Textor - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Self-representational theories of consciousness hold that a mental phenomenon is conscious if, and only if, it presents, among other things, itself. But in conscious perception one may lose oneself in the object perceived and not be aware of one’s perceiving. The paper develops a Brentano-inspired response to this objection. He follows Aristotle in holding that one is aware of one’s perceiving only ‘on the side’: when one perceives something one’s perception neither is nor can become observation of itself. I argue (...)
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  17. Self-Awareness Part 2: Neuroanatomy and Importance of Inner Speech.Alain Morin - 2011 - Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2:1004-1012.
    The present review of literature surveys two main issues related to self-referential processes: (1) Where in the brain are these processes located, and do they correlate with brain areas uniquely specialized in self-processing? (2) What are the empirical and theoretical links between inner speech and self-awareness? Although initial neuroimaging attempts tended to favor a right hemispheric view of selfawareness, more recent work shows that the brain areas which support self-related processes are located in both hemispheres and are not (...)
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  18. The Case for Intrinsic Theory: X. A Phenomenologist's Account of Inner Awareness.Thomas Natsoulas - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (2):97-121.
    This article is in large part an exposition and interpretation of the Woodruff Smith intrinsic-theoretical account of inner awareness. And, it is propaedeutic to considering, subsequently in the present series, the first of six theses regarding inner awareness that Kriegel defended in a recently published issue of this journal. Included here, as well, is some of the relevant background about intrinsic theory and other theories of inner awareness. Kriegel defended his first thesis with special (...)
     
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  19. Possible Links Between Self-Awareness and Inner Speech: Theoretical Background, Underlying Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence.Alain Morin - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):115-134.
    been recently proposed (Morin, 2003; 2004). The model takes into account most known mechanisms and processes leading to self-awareness, and examines their multiple and complex interactions. Inner speech is postulated to play a key-role in this model, as it establishes important connections between many of its ele- ments. This paper first reviews past and current references to a link between self-awareness and inner speech. It then presents an analysis of the nature of the relation between these (...)
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  20. Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):169-196.
    Consciosuness is the property mental-occurrence instances have when the subject has immediate awareness of them. According to intrinsic theory, this immediate awareness is intrinsic to the conscious4 mental-occurrence instance, whereas according to appendage theory, it forms a separate mental-occurrence instance. Assuming, rather than arguing for, the correctness of intrinsic theory, this paper investigates a number of theses about the specific intentional content of the immediate awareness built into conscious4 mental-occurrence instances. These theses are mostly drawn from work (...)
     
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  21. The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XIII. The Role of the Qualitative in a Modal Account of Inner Awareness.Thomas Natsoulas - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):319-350.
    Theorists of consciousness differ in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a qualitative character, and in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a reflexive character. This article mainly discusses one such theory, wherein it is proposed that both the qualitative character and the reflexive character are intrinsic to each state of consciousness that possesses them and are modal characters of each state of (...)
     
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  22. The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XII. Inner Awareness Conceived of as a Modal Character of Conscious Experiences.Thomas Natsoulas - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):183-214.
  23.  97
    Perception Vs. Inner Sense: A Problem About Direct Awareness[REVIEW]Jay F. Rosenberg - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):143-160.
  24. Self-Awareness and the Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus: Selective Involvement of Inner Speech in Self-Related Processes.Alain Morin & J. Michaud - manuscript
  25.  9
    Towards Multiple Interactions of Inner and Outer Sensations in Corporeal Awareness.Giuliana Lucci & Mariella Pazzaglia - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  26.  19
    Self-Awareness Without Inner Speech: A Commentary on Morin☆.Robert W. Mitchell - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):532-534.
    Morin’s identification of inner speech with self-awareness is problematic. Taylor’s description of her experience before, during, and after her stroke and operation is also problematic; it is at times confusing and difficult to comprehend conceptually. Rather than being global, her deficits in self-awareness seem piecemeal. She describes self-awareness that exists independent of inner speech. I offer interpretations of her experience alternative to those of Morin and Taylor.
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  27.  4
    Becoming Aware of Inner Self-Critique and Kinder Toward Self: A Qualitative Study of Experiences of Outcome After a Brief Self-Compassion Intervention for University Level Students.Per-Einar Binder, Ingrid Dundas, Signe Hjelen Stige, Aslak Hjeltnes, Vivian Woodfin & Christian Moltu - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  28. Young Children's Awareness of Their Inner World: A Neo-Structural Analysis of the Development of Intrapersonal Intelligence.Susan Griffin - 1991 - In Roland Case (ed.), The Mind's Staircase: Exploring the Conceptual Underpinnings of Children's Thought and Knowledge. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  29. Self-Awareness Part 1: Definition, Measures, Effects, Functions, and Antecedents.Alain Morin - 2011 - Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5: 807-823.
    Self-awareness represents the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention. In this state one actively identifies, processes, and stores information about the self. This paper surveys the self-awareness literature by emphasizing definition issues, measurement techniques, effects and functions of self-attention, and antecedents of self-awareness. Key self-related concepts (e.g., minimal, reflective consciousness) are distinguished from the central notion of self-awareness. Reviewed measures include questionnaires, implicit tasks, and self-recognition. Main effects and functions of self-attention consist in (...)
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  30. Visual Awareness and Visuomotor Action.Andy Clark - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12):1-18.
    Recent work in "embodied, embedded" cognitive science links mental contents to large-scale distributed effects: dynamic patterns implicating elements of (what are traditionally seen as) sensing, reasoning and acting. Central to this approach is an idea of biological cognition as profoundly "action-oriented" - geared not to the creation of rich, passive inner models of the world, but to the cheap and efficient production of real-world action in real-world context. A case in point is Hurley's (1998) account of the profound role (...)
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  31.  38
    Sensory Awareness.Russell Hurlburt & Christopher L. Heavey - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    Sensory awareness -- the direct focus on some specific sensory aspect of the body or outer or inner environment -- is a frequently occurring yet rarely recognized phenomenon of inner experience. It is a distinct, complete phenomenon; it is not merely, for example, an aspect of a perception. Sensory awareness is one of the five most common forms of inner experience, according to our results . Despite its high frequency, many people do not notice its (...)
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  32.  3
    The Inner Dimension: Philosophy and the Experience of Consciousness.J. Shear - 2014 - Harmonia Books.
    "The Inner Dimension" examines the philosophical significance of a remarkable family of experiences central to Eastern philosophical and meditation traditions, and reported by creative geniuses in the West from Plato through Einstein. Empirical research on ordinary people practicing traditional Eastern meditation techniques now indicates that these otherwise rarely encountered experiences actually reflect widely accessible universal potentials of ordinary human awareness. The "Inner Dimension" responds to this research by exploring the significance of these experiences for a wide range (...)
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  33. Developing Self-Awareness with Inner Speech: Theoretical Background, Underlying Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence.Alain Morin - manuscript
  34.  66
    The Phenomena of Inner Experience.Christopher L. Heavey & Russell T. Hurlburt - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):798-810.
    This study provides a survey of phenomena that present themselves during moments of naturally occurring inner experience. In our previous studies using Descriptive Experience Sampling we have discovered five frequently occurring phenomena—inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness. Here we quantify the relative frequency of these phenomena. We used DES to describe 10 randomly identified moments of inner experience from each of 30 participants selected from a stratified sample of college students. We (...)
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  35. Self-Awareness and Affection.Dan Zahavi - 1998 - In N. Depraz & D. Zahavi (eds.), Alterity and Facticity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 205-228.
    Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,1 and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its 'gaze' at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) (...)
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  36. Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye".Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
    What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that (...)
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  37. Inner Speech and Consciousness.Alain Morin - 2009 - In W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.
    Inner speech represents the activity of talking to oneself in silence. It can be assessed with questionnaires, sampling methods, and electromyographic recordings of articulatory movements. Inner speech has been linked to thought processes and self-awareness. Private speech (speech-for-self emitted aloud by children) serves an important self-regulatory function. The frequency of private speech follows an inverted-U relation with age, peaking at 3-4 years of age and disappearing at age 10. Social and inner speech share a common neurological (...)
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  38.  21
    Self-Knowledge and the 'Inner Eye'.Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
    What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that (...)
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  39. Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have (...)
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  40. The Relationship Between Children's Early Literacy Skills and Awareness of Inner Speech.Lisa Marie Otte - unknown
  41. Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 1999 - Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104.
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, (...)
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  42.  63
    Descartes Discarded? Introspective Self-Awareness and the Problems of Transparency and Compositionality☆.Markus Werning - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):751-761.
    What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of it is possible? The paper asks if Descartes’s idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles: the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought. In the former case self-awareness turns out empty (...)
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  43. Right Hemispheric Self-Awareness: A Critical Assessment.Alain Morin - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):396-401.
    In this commentaryI evaluate the claim made byKeenan, Nelson, OÕConnor, and Pascual-Leone (2001) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere. This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating brain activityand self-awareness; I closelyexamine their analysis of one (...)
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  44. Intrinsic Awareness in Sartre.Frederick B. Mills - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):1-16.
    This essay argues that Sartre offers a version of the intrinsic theory of inner awareness that is based on a feature of the internal negation that determines the relation between the for-itself and the in-itself : non-positional awareness. Non-positional awareness is the implicit consciousness of being conscious of an object that is a component of every conscious mental state. For example, the perceptual experience of this table is directed towards the table, but at the same time (...)
     
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  45.  46
    Gerda Walther: On the Possibility of a Passive Sense of Community and the Inner Time Consciousness of Community.Antonio Calcagno - 2012 - Symposium 16 (2):89-105.
    If community is determined primarily in consciousness as a mental state of oneness, can community exist when there is no accompanying mental state or collective intentionality that makes us realise that we are one community? Walther would respond affirmatively, arguing that there is a deep psychological structure of habit that allows us to continue to experience ourselves as a community. The habit of community works on all levels of our person, including our bodies, psyches and spirits. It allows us to (...)
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  46.  30
    A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology.Anthony J. Lisska - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:1-19.
    This paper investigates Aquinas’s thought on the vis cogitativa, in order to determine whether Aquinas’s use of the inner sense of the vis cogitative is an embarrassment , or whether it is rather an important element in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind that calls for serious study . An examination of Aquinas’s theory of inner sense reveals that, for Aquinas, the vis cogitativa has two cognitive functions: to be aware of an individual as an individual, and to recognize an (...)
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  47.  44
    A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology.Anthony J. Lisska - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:1-19.
    This paper investigates Aquinas’s thought on the vis cogitativa, in order to determine whether Aquinas’s use of the inner sense of the vis cogitative is an embarrassment (as Dorothea Frede recently suggested), or whether it is rather an important element in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind that calls for serious study (as John Haldane argued several years ago in an ACPA plenary address). An examination of Aquinas’s theory of inner sense (as found in the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima) (...)
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  48.  4
    “An Inner Comprehension of the Pueblo Indian’s Point of View”: Carl Gustav Jung’s 1925 Visit to Taos, New Mexico.Zbigniew Maszewski - 2015 - Text Matters - a Journal of Literature, Theory and Culture 5 (1):178-189.
    Carl Jung paid a short visit to Taos, New Mexico, in January 1925. A brief account of his stay at the Pueblo appeared in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, edited by Aniela Jaffe in 1963. Remembering his conversations with Mountain Lake, Jung wrote of the confrontation between the “European consciousness,” or the “European thought,” with the Indian “unconscious.” My article provides a reading of Jung’s text as a meeting ground of the aesthetic, emotional, visionary and of the analytical, rational, explanatory. Like many (...)
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  49.  38
    Inner Speech and Introspection.Kengo Miyazono - 2011 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (2):2_83-2_98.
    This article explores “Inner Speech Account of Introspection”, according to which inner speech is the source of our introspective self-knowledge. The view hypothesizes that we come to know that we are thinking that p by being aware of the sentence of inner speech “p” accompanying the thought. I argue for Inner Speech Account by showing that it explains six explananda imposed for the philosophical theories of introspection; peculiar access, privileged access, detection condition, the lack of phenomenology, (...)
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  50.  6
    Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: A Reply to Lycan.Charles Siewert - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Lycan is concerned that I fail to explain my sense of 'phenomenal consciousness' sufficiently, and that I would unjustifiably criticize his "inner sense" theory for consciousness neglect. In response, I argue that my explanation of what I mean provides an adequate basis for disambiguating and answering Lycan's questions about the relation of phenomenal consciousness to "visual awareness" and the like. While I do not charge Lycan's theory with consciousness neglect, I do argue it employs a notion of non-conceptual (...)
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