The purpose of this paper is to advance understanding of intellectually virtuous honesty, by examining the relationship between a recent account of intellectual honesty and a recent account of intellectual transparency. The account of intellectual honesty comes from Nathan King, who adapts the work of Christian Miller on moral honesty, while the account of intellectual transparency comes from T. Ryan Byerly. After introducing the respective accounts, I identify four potential differences between (...) class='Hi'>intellectual honesty and intellectual transparency as understood by these accounts. I then turn to the question of how to think about the relationship between these traits in light of these potential differences. I make the case that intellectual transparency can either be regarded as an exceptionally strong or ideal variety of intellectual honesty, or it can be regarded as a distinct virtue from intellectual honesty which is a more cardinal virtue than the latter. Along the way, I also note some places where a case can be made that Miller's and King's accounts of honesty and intellectual honesty are in need of refinement or clarification. (shrink)

Until recently, almost nothing had been written about the moral virtue of honesty in the past 50 years of Western analytic philosophy. Slowly, this is beginning to change. But moral honesty is not the only kind of honesty there is. In this paper, I focus specifically on the intellectual cousin to moral honesty, and offer a preliminary account of its behavioral and motivational dimensions. The account will be centered on not intentionally distorting the facts as (...) the person takes them to be, for one of a variety of intellectually virtuous motivating reasons. (shrink)

Engaging a listener’s trust imposes moral demands upon a presenter in respect of truthtelling and completeness. An agent lies by an utterance that satisfies what are herein defined as signal and mendacity conditions; an agent deceives when, in satisfaction of those conditions, the agent’s utterances contribute to a false belief or thwart a true one. I advert to how we may fool ourselves in observation and in the perception of our originality. Communication with others depends upon a convention or practice (...) of presumed nonuniversal truthfulness. In support of an asserted duty of nondeceptiveness, I offer a reconciliation of pertinent Kantian passages, a sketch of arguments within utilitarianism, contractarianism, and other views, and an account arguing for application of that duty to assertions, implicatures, omissions, equivocation, prevarication, and sophistry insofar as they affect listeners’ doxastic states. For scholarship, this duty is exceptionless. I describe the kernel of intellectual honesty as a virtuous disposition such that when presented with an incentive to deceive, the agent will not deceive. Intellectual honesty delivers candor when it counts. I contrast this with complementary virtues and the surpassing virtue of ingenuousness. An account is given of the connection between intellectual honesty and an influential physical model of integrity. (shrink)

There is risk of intellectual dishonesty in the act of modernizing traditional doctrines. One reason theologians reform traditional doctrines is that the original formulations have become incredible to them. This is seldom honestly admitted. It is further dishonestly claimed that new formulations have a direct conceptual link to the old as if the new were the old retold. However, many times the connection between the new theology and the old is in name only, with radically new understanding for an (...) old term. Can we honestly say so? Theology should resuscitate questions of intellectual honesty that were present at the Liberal theology's origins in the interest of maximizing honest theological inquiry. Can theology construct an ethics of belief for itself? (shrink)

Nietzsche values intellectual honesty, but is dubious about what he calls the will to truth. This is puzzling since intellectual honesty is a component of the will to truth. In this paper, I show that this puzzle tells us something important about how Nietzsche conceives of our pursuit of truth. For Nietzsche, those who pursue truth occupy unstable ground, since being honest about the ultimate reasons for that pursuit would mean that truth could no longer satisfy (...) the important human needs it satisfies at present. We can pursue truth, or be honest about what in us is served by such a pursuit, but not both. Nietzsche aims to show that understanding and owning up to this instability is the sort of affirmation of human life to which we ought to aspire, and is the price we pay for being free from otherworldly morality. (shrink)

After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are, I offer three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open‐mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss several pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.

What qualities do we need in order to be good philosophers? Wittgenstein insists that virtues of character – such as honesty, humility, courage, and strength – are more important for our philosophizing than the relevant intellectual talents and skills. These virtues are essential because doing good philosophy demands both knowing and overcoming the deep-seated desires and inclinations which lead us astray in our thinking, and achieving such self-knowledge and self-overcoming demands all of these virtues working in concert. In (...) this paper I draw together many of Wittgenstein’s seemingly offhanded remarks on these issues in order to reconstruct his understanding of philosophy’s ‘difficulties of the will’ and the virtues needed to overcome them. (shrink)

Fuller describes the place of intellectuals in the modern world—as researchers, teachers, academics, and citizens. Their job is that of developing and promoting ideas. He explains their failure to perform well and offers advice: say what you think you should say, not necessarily what you think. The advice is unsuitable; it is aimed at advisers and expert witnesses, not at intellectuals. Also, his analysis invites proposals for social reforms aimed at lowering traditional expectations of intellectuals and toward presenting them with (...) clearer and fairer job descriptions instead. (shrink)

We critique two popular philosophical definitions of intellectual humility: the “low concern for status” and the “limitations-owning.” accounts. Based upon our analysis, we offer an alternative working definition of intellectual humility: the virtue of accurately tracking what one could non-culpably take to be the positive epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. We regard this view of intellectual humility both as a virtuous mean between intellectual arrogance and diffidence and as having advantages over other recent conceptions of (...) intellectual humility. After defending this view, we sketch remaining questions and issues that may bear upon the psychological treatment of intellectual humility such as whether evidence will help determine how this construct relates to general social humility on the one hand, and intellectual traits such as open-mindedness, curiosity, and honesty on the other. (shrink)

Some commentators have argued that curiosity, not honesty, is Nietzsche’s central intellectual virtue. These commentators give minimalistic interpretations of the nature of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty, casting it as a disposition to ensure that relevant epistemic standards are applied during belief formation. I argue against such interpretations by highlighting three strands of Nietzsche’s concept of honesty which they fail to accommodate. I interpret Nietzsche’s concept of honesty against the background of his drive psychology and show (...) that it applies not only to reflective cognitive processes but also to unconscious cognitive processes. In concluding, I explain the key role which honesty plays in Nietzsche’s project of translating ‘man back into nature’. (shrink)

After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are, I offer three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss several pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.

What makes for a good education? What does one need to count as well-educated? Knowledge, to be sure. But knowledge is easily forgotten, and today's knowledge may be obsolete tomorrow. Skills, particularly in critical thinking, are crucial as well. But absent the right motivation, graduates may fail to put their skills to good use. In this book, Nathan King argues that intellectual virtues-traits like curiosity, intellectual humility, honesty, intellectual courage, and open-mindedness-are central to any education worthy (...) of the name. Further, such virtues are crucial to our functioning well in everyday life, in areas as diverse as personal relationships, responsible citizenship, civil discourse, and personal success. Our struggles in these areas often result from a failure to think virtuously. Drawing upon recent work in philosophy and psychology, King paints a portrait of virtuous intellectual character-and of the vices such a character opposes. Filled with examples and applications, this book introduces readers to the intellectual virtues: what they are, why they matter, and how we can grow in them. (shrink)

덕인식론과 지행론의 전체적인 구도를 이해하기 위한 선행 과제로서 나는 이 글에서 德과 관련한 개념들 가운데 역량과 성품이 지적 덕성과 어떤 연관에 놓여 있는지 정리하고자 한다. 애초 이 글은 똑똑하다고 칭찬받는 사람들이 왜 나쁜 일들을 스스럼없이 저지르는가에 대한 소박한 의문에서 출발한다. 이런 의문은 윤리적인 문제일 수도, 인식론적인 주제일 수도 있다. 왜냐하면 무엇을 어떻게 인식할 것인가라는 인식론적인 질문은 결국 인식론이 규범적인 영역에 속하며 인식론적인 평가에서 지적인 행위자와 그 공동체를 중시해야 한다는 것을 의미하기 때문이다. 이것은 ‘덕인식론’의 핵심적인 관점이다. 지식의 정당화에 있어서 덕인식론이 ‘덕성’에 (...) 초점을 맞추고 있다는 점은 동아시아 전통의 ‘지행론’과 닮았지만 그 문제의식은 다르다. 따라서 덕인식론과 지행론의 같고 다른 점을 우선 살펴보고 『논어』를 중심으로 역량, 성품, 지적 덕성의 관계를 검토할 것이다. 이 작업에서 나는 역량과 성품이 규범적인 가치의 문맥으로 조율되지 않으면 올바른 행위를 산출하는 지적 덕성이 되기에 부족함을 말할 것이다. (shrink)

This paper investigates Nietzsche’s assessments of Pascal’s embrace and rejection of various branches of skepticisms that Montaigne embodies or ignores. Nietzsche admires Pascal for intellectual probity and skepticism. Pascal finds fault with Montaigne’s Academic Skepticism, viewing it as insufficiently honest, because it ceases to inquire into Nature, and takes the self as the anchor of psychological tranquility. Inspired by Pascal’s criticism of Montaigne’s Skepticism in his Essais III.13, in D 46, Nietzsche also disapproves of Montaigne’s sluggish tranquility and deems (...) this a symptom of feebleness and nihilism. Some scholars claim that Nietzsche admires Montaigne’s earthly cheerfulness and probity as that of a free spirit regarding Montaigne’s adoption of Pyrrhonian. By contrast, I argue that Nietzsche misinterprets Montaigne’s Academic Skepticism in the Essais III.13.1218 as Pyrrhonian Skepticism, because the Skepticism here is characterized by ignorance and incuriosity instead of probity. Montaigne’s very Academic Skepticism vexes Pascal because of the latter’s complacent lack of curiosity about the supernatural world. Regarding this, Nietzsche inveighs against Pascal’s insufficient honesty as entangled with a dogmatic observance of Christian truthfulness instead of a free-spirited honesty, but advocates Montaigne’s this-worldly naturalism. Nietzsche sees Pascal’s unyielding application of Christian self-examination will finally lead to his skepticism of Christianity. (shrink)

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal characters and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual (...) analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance that places perseverance in opposition to its vice -counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual virtues, including courage. These connections highlight the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive account of such virtues. (shrink)

Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willingness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification (...) of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness. (shrink)

In a recent book and journal article, I have developed an account of intellectual transparency as an other-regarding intellectual virtue, and have explored its conceptual relationship to the virtue of honesty. This paper aims to further advance understanding of intellectual transparency by examining some of the ways in which the trait is instrumentally valuable. Specifically, I argue that intellectual transparency tends to enhance its possessor’s close personal relationships, work performance, and civic engagement. On account of (...) their intellectual transparency, the intellectually transparent person is likely to enjoy better quality, more satisfied personal relationships such as romantic relationships and friendships. They are likely to contribute to better work outcomes, especially when working in a team context. And, they are likely to be more civically active and to promote epistemic values of democratic deliberation. (shrink)

Donald M. MacKinnon has been one of the most important and influential of post-war British theologians and religious philosophers. Generally eclectic, frequently allusive, usually intellectually generous, persistently richly challenging and always astonishingly erudite, he had a significant impact on the development and subsequent theological work of the likes of Rowan Williams, Nicholas Lash, David Ford and John Milbank. A younger generation largely emerging from Cambridge, but with influence elsewhere, has more recently brought MacKinnon's normally occasionalist writing to a larger audience (...) worldwide where it is beginning to receive noteworthy attention. In this collection several of MacKinnon's most outstanding papers not yet published in book format is collected together with an Editorial Introduction by a former student of one of MacKinnon's own students. They range from his reflections on theology as educational, the nature of moral reasoning, considerations of ecclesial practice, dogmatics and hope. Here is another reminder of MacKinnon's intellectual brilliance. (shrink)

Should doctors have the possibility to save children from incurable suffering and end their lives?. At first glance, the standpoints in the debate around this question seem translucent and well known and the debate intelligible. I contend that this is not the case and I will illustrate this in analysing the debate between Peter Singer and Ulrich Bleidick. Whomever wants to answer the question whether it is acceptable to end the lives of suffering small children will have to do some (...) careful reading and thinking about the different and differing moral arguments in the debate. This demands emotional restraint and intellectual honesty. Trying to understand Singer and his opponents is a challenging way of charting what exactly is at stake in this debate. (shrink)

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal traits and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual (...) analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance that places perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual virtues, including courage. These connections highlight the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive account of such virtues. (shrink)

This study investigates the role of advantageous comparisons and professional commitment in earning management rationalization. Our study adopted a laboratory between-subject experimental design with 139 accounting students. The results show that advantageous comparisons and professional commitment affect the rationalization of earning management actions. Moreover, compared to participants with high levels of professional commitment, those with low levels of professional commitment view earning management as a more appropriate action when they are engaged in earning management and viewing the egregious example of (...) that action. This finding is important because it explains how personal psychological factors affect the ethical cognitive processes of accountants. This study complements the lack of previous studies and argues that the propensity to compare acts of delinquency depends on an individual's commitment to their profession. We also emphasize the importance of investigating this issue outside of the US context. The results of this study may be helpful to managers, practitioners, academics, and accounting researchers with a better understanding of the potential impact of exposure to earning management practices and an individual’s professional commitment to earning management behaviour. Further, based on this study, all stakeholders may be better positioned to suggest possible remedies and mitigate these behaviours. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin has traditionally been seen as the leading figure in the group of intellectuals known as the Bakhtin Circle. The writings of other members of the Circle are considered much less important than his work, while Bakhtin's achievement has been exaggerated in proportion to the downgrading of the thinkers with whom he associated in the 1920s. This volume, which includes new translations and studies of the work of the most important members of the (...) Circle, sets out to correct the distortions in the established representations of its activity. The original contributions to literary and linguistic theory made by Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev (but frequently credited to Bakhtin) are assessed, and the distinctiveness of their approaches is highlighted. (shrink)

Purpose Intellectual honesty and integrity are the cornerstones of conducting any form of research. Over the last few years, scholars have shown great concerns over questionable research practices (QRPs) in academia. This study aims to investigate the questionable research practices amongst faculty members of medical and dental colleges in Pakistan. Method A descriptive multi-institutional online survey was conducted from June-August 2022. Based on previous studies assessing research misconduct, 43 questionable research practices in four domains: Data collection & storage, (...) Data analysis, Study reporting and Collaboration & authorship were identified and investigated. Descriptive (Frequencies, Percentages, Mean, SD) and Inferential (chi square) statistics were calculated. Results A total of 654 faculty members responded. Every respondent reported committing at least one QRP in their career. The most common QRPs included deliberately failing to mention funding, publishing program evaluation data not meant for research purposes or approved by an ethical body, inappropriately storing identifiable information and non-disclosure of any conflicts. There was significant association of age, gender and academic rank with QRPs in ‘Data collection and storage’ and ‘Data Analysis’ domains. Conclusion Medical and dental faculty members participating in this study are involved in a range of questionable research practices (QRPs) in Pakistan. Their confession might have contributed to the faculty developing self-awareness and reinforcing academic integrity. There is a need for reviewing policies and practices to improve research culture. Future research should explore the factors resulting in such practices. (shrink)

The central thesis of this book is that we need to reform philosophy and join it to science to recreate a modern version of natural philosophy; we need to do this in the interests of rigour, intellectual honesty, and so that science may serve the best interests of humanity. Modern science began as natural philosophy. In the time of Newton, what we call science and philosophy today – the disparate endeavours – formed one mutually interacting, integrated endeavour of (...) natural philosophy: to improve our knowledge and understanding of the universe, and to improve our understanding of ourselves as a part of it. Profound discoveries were made, indeed one should say unprecedented discoveries. It was a time of quite astonishing intellectual excitement and achievement. And then natural philosophy died. It split into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. This happened during the 18th and 19th centuries, and the split is now built into our intellectual landscape. But the two fragments, science and philosophy, are defective shadows of the glorious unified endeavour of natural philosophy. Rigour, sheer intellectual good sense and decisive argument demand that we put the two together again, and rediscover the immense merits of the integrated enterprise of natural philosophy. This requires an intellectual revolution, with dramatic implications for how we understand our world, how we understand and do science, and how we understand and do philosophy. There are dramatic implications, too, for education. And it does not stop there. For, as I show in the final chapter, resurrected natural philosophy has dramatic, indeed revolutionary methodological implications for social science and the humanities, indeed for the whole academic enterprise. It means academic inquiry needs to be reorganized so that it comes to take, as its basic task, to seek and promote wisdom by rational means, wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge, technological know-how and understanding, but much else besides. The outcome is institutions of learning rationally designed and devoted to helping us tackle our immense global problems in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, thus helping us make progress towards a good world – or at least as good a world as possible. (shrink)

In a beautiful recent essay, the philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explains the reasons for his departure from evangelical Christianity, the religious culture in which he was brought up. Sinnot-Armstrong contrasts the interpretive methods used by good philosophers and fundamentalist believers: Good philosophers face objections and uncertainties. They follow where arguments lead, even when their conclusions are surprising and disturbing. Intellectual honesty is also required of scholars who interpret philosophical texts. If I had distorted Kant’s view to make him reach (...) a conclusion that I preferred, then my philosophy professor would have failed me. The contrast with religious reasoning is stark. My Christian friends seemed happy to hide serious problems in the Bible and in their arguments. They preferred comfort to intellectual honesty. I couldn’t. To what extent can we, historians of philosophy, claim the virtue of intellectual honesty? Speaking frankly, I do not find the practice criticized by Sinnot-Armstrong’s philosophy professor rare or unusual at all. We very frequently distort the views of past philosophers in order to reach the conclusions we prefer. We just call it “Charitable Interpretation.” In this essay, I discuss and criticize the logic behind so-called charitable interpretations in the history of philosophy. This phenomenon is ubiquitous and is not at all restricted to a particular philosophical strand or ideology. Analytic philosophers and post-modernists, Marxists, liberals, secularists, and fundamentalists, we all engage in the very same domestication project. Even more disturbing than the sheer ideological pervasiveness of this phenomenon is the fact that, on many occasions, superb philosophers and historians take part in this fairly childish endeavor. In the first part of this essay, I discuss the general logic of charitable interpretations in the history of philosophy, mostly by addressing discussions in metaphysics and epistemology. In the second part, I focus on the somewhat less noticed use of charitable interpretations in the study of political philosophy, and point out the quintessential role ideology plays in these discussions. In both parts, I concentrate mostly on the interpretation of Spinoza’s thought. I do so not because I have special fondness for Spinoza (“guilty as charged,” I admit), but because Spinoza is such a beast (and may I add, an enchanting beast) and attracts a disproportionate share of the domestication efforts from historians and philosophers of all creeds and persuasions. In the third and final part of the paper, I will begin to outline an alternative methodology, which suggests that past philosophers can be most relevant to our current philosophical discussion, to the extent that they provide us with well-motivated challenges to our common-sense beliefs. Such challenges have the invaluable virtue of being able to undermine our most fundamental and secure beliefs, and force us to engage with the most fundamental questions. What more can we expect from good philosophy? (shrink)

English summary: Grappling with the tension between our religious orientations and modernity's drive to lend authority to things based on arguments against the backdrop of scientific and historial knowledge has made intellectual honesty a guiding principle in the modern era. The ascent of the concept of religiousness in the 19th and 20th centuries was a reflection of this state of mind. Thus the intellectual climate in the modern era was defined less by religious tone-deafness as it was (...) by an awareness of the crisis caused by scientism and historicism. However, modernity has always seen this crisis as a chance for the religious to make itself more concise. This volume seeks to shed light on the contribution that the quest for intellectual honesty has made to the creation of religious identity in the modern era, a contribution which has by no means been exhausted. German description: Im Bewusstsein der Spannung zwischen religiosen Lebensorientierungen und der Notigung des Gewissens, ihnen durch das Geben und Nehmen von Grunden im Horizont des modernen Wissens Verbindlichkeit zu verleihen, ist die intellektuelle Redlichkeit ein Leitideal der Moderne geworden. Die Konjunktur des Religiositatsbegriffs im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert reflektiert diese Geisteslage. So war das intellektuelle Klima in der klassischen Moderne weniger von ereligioser Unmusikalitat' bestimmt als von dem Bewusstsein der Krise, in die Szientismus und Historismus die Artikulation von Religiositat gefuhrt hatten. Diese Krise wurde aber immer auch als Chance einer Pragnanzbildung des Religiosen gesehen. Die Autoren dieses Bandes gehen der Frage nach, welchen Beitrag der Anspruch der intellektuellen Redlichkeit zur Dynamisierung und Individualisierung religioser Identitatsbildung in der Moderne geleistet hat und nach wie vor leistet. (shrink)

Philosophers have long suspected that thought and discourse about what we ought to do differ in some fundamental way from statements about what is. But the difference has proved elusive, in part because the two kinds of statement look alike. Focusing on judgments that express decisions--judgments about what is to be done, all things considered--Allan Gibbard offers a compelling argument for reconsidering, and reconfiguring, the distinctions between normative and descriptive discourse--between questions of "ought" and "is." Gibbard considers how our actions, (...) and our realities, emerge from the thousands of questions and decisions we form for ourselves. The result is a book that investigates the very nature of the questions we ask ourselves when we ask how we should live, and that clarifies the concept of "ought" by understanding the patterns of normative concepts involved in beliefs and decisions. An original and elegant work of metaethics, this book brings a new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues, and will significantly alter the long-standing debate over "objectivity" and "factuality" in ethics. Table of Contents: I. Preliminaries 1. Introduction: A Possibility Proof 2. Intuitionism as Template: Emending Moore II. The Thing to Do 3. Planning and Ruling Out: The "Frege-Geach" Problem 4. Judgment, Disagreement, Negation 5. Supervenience and Constitution 6. Character and Import III. Normative Concepts 7. Ordinary Oughts: Meaning and Motivation 8. Normative Kinds: Patterns of Engagement 9. What to Say about the Thing to Do: The Expressivistic Turn and What it Gains Us IV. Knowing What to Do 10. Explaining with Plans 11. Knowing What to Do 12. Ideal Response Concepts 13. Deep Vindication and Practical Confidence 14. Impasse and Dissent References Index This is a remarkable book. It takes up a central and much-discussed problem - the difference between normative thought and "descriptive" thought. It develops a compelling response to that problem with ramifications for much else in philosophy. But perhaps most importantly, it brings new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues. It will take some time to come to terms with the details of Gibbard's discussion. It is absolutely clear, however, that the book will reconfigure the debate over objectivity and "factuality" in ethics. --Gideon Rosen, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University Gibbard,/author> writes elegantly, and the theory he develops is innovative, philosophically sophisticated, and challenging. Gibbard defends his theory vigorously and with admirable intellectual honesty. --David Copp, Professor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University. (shrink)

Political protests, debates on college campuses, and social media tirades make it seem like everyone is speaking their minds today. Surveys, however, reveal that many people increasingly feel like they're walking on eggshells when communicating in public. Speaking your mind can risk relationships and professional opportunities. It can alienate friends and anger colleagues. Isn't it smarter to just put your head down and keep quiet about controversial topics? In this book, Hrishikesh Joshi offers a novel defense of speaking your mind. (...) He explains that because we are social creatures, we never truly think alone. What we know depends on what our community knows. And by bringing our unique perspectives to bear upon public discourse, we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth on a variety of important matters. Speaking your mind is also important for your own sake. It is essential for developing your own thinking. And it's a core aspect of being intellectually courageous and independent. Joshi argues that such independence is a crucial part of a well-lived life. The book draws from Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, and a range of contemporary thinkers to argue that it's OK to speak your mind. Key Features Shows that we have not just a right but a moral duty to publicly share what we know. Argues that discussing your unique ideas with others is essential for developing as a critical thinker. Explores the value of intellectual honesty and independence in the writings of John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche and connects their thinking to contemporary problems. Argues that avoiding cultural blind spots today is important for the fate of future generations. (shrink)

Rush Rhees (1905-1989) was a philosopher, and a pupil and close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein. While some of Rhees's own published papers became classics, most of his work remained unpublished during his lifetime. After his death, his papers were found to comprise sixteen thousand pages of manuscript on every aspect of philosophy, from philosophical logic to Simone Weil. This collection of unpublished papers, edited by D. Z. Phillips, includes Rhees's outstanding work on philosophy and religion. Written over an academic lifetime, (...) some of the papers are sympathetic to religion while others are not. It is Rhees's ability to interweave the personal and philosophical, and his integrity and intellectual honesty, which make this one of the most impressive books in twentieth-century philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Several recent studies and initiatives have emphasized the importance of a strong ethical organizational DNA (ODNA) to create and promote an effective corporate governance culture of trust, integrity and intellectual honesty. This paper highlights the drawbacks of an excessively heavy reliance on rules-based approaches that increase the cost of doing business, overshadow essential elements of good corporate governance, create a culture of dependency, and can result in legal absolutism. The paper makes the case that the way forward for (...) effective corporate governance is to strike an optimal balance between rules-based and principles-based approaches. The recent corporate scandals have demonstrated that the ethical ODNA is critical to the driving force and basis of legal and regulatory requirements. Effective governance means adhering to ethical principles, not merely complying with rules, and is a crucial guardian of a firm’s reputation and integrity. It is through an effective corporate governance program (that is, one that optimally captures and integrates the appropriate aspects of rules-based and principles-based approaches, and identifies and assesses the related risks) that an organization can reconfigure its ODNA for improved performance. Focusing on the ethical ODNA as the basis of new governance measures provides an opportunity to develop a competitive advantage as it represents a potential source of differentiation, strengthens the relationship with all stakeholders of the organization by building a culture of trust and integrity, and re-instills investor confidence. This paper employs dialectical reasoning that links the ODNA through principles-driven rules in developing a risks-based approach. A comparison from a risk assessment perspective between rules-based and principles-based approaches is presented. Although there have been few applications employing dialectical reasoning in business research, this methodology can be extremely useful in isolating ethical issues and integrating them into the business process. The risks-based approach captures the benefits of both rules-based and principles-based approaches, and incorporates trust-based principles such␣as solidarity, subsidiarity and covenantal relationships. (shrink)

We decided to use our editors’ introduction to briefly address a difficult, somewhat deeper, and in some ways more classical problem: that of what genuine open mindedness really is and how it can contribute to the Mind Sciences. The material in the collection speaks for itself. Here, and in contrast to the vast collection that is Open MIND, we want to be concise. We want to point to the broader context of a particular way of thinking about the mind. And (...) we want to propose an account of what open mindedness could mean in the context of the contemporary, interdisciplinary Mind Sciences. This variant of open mindedness is characterized by epistemic humility, intellectual honesty, and a new culture of charity. It also has a pragmatic dimension: open mindedness of this kind is research generating and fosters an environment of sincere and constructive interdisciplinary collaboration. And it is profoundly inspired by the classical ideals of philosophy as a pursuit of genuine insight and rational inquiry, the importance of a critical and in a certain sense non-judgmental attitude, and the deep relationship between wisdom and skepticism as an epistemic practice. Finally, and again very classically, open mindedness has an ethical dimension as well: it implies sensitivity to normative issues, including issues of an anthropological, sociocultural, and political kind. By bringing these different strands of ideas together and creating a bigger (and admittedly still sketchy) picture of what “open mindedness” might mean in the interdisciplinary Mind Sciences, we hope to start a conversation about how an open-minded attitude and a charitable culture of collaboration can be cultivated in the future. This is very much intended as an invitation to further think about and develop this topic. We hope our readers will join us in this endeavor. DOI: 10.15502/9783958571044 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571044 ISBN: 9783958571044. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: notes.

This paper examines Nietzsche’s philosophical self-understanding and focuses particularly on the concept of intellectual honesty. It discusses, first, thewritings of his middle period, particularly Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science, and analyses Nietzsche’s critique of religion, Christianity, andWestern philosophy and science. In so doing, it introduces his (Socratic) emphasis on the role of modesty and intellectual honesty as a key to understanding his(early and) middle philosophy. The paper then moves on to show that (...) and why his later philosophical works express less of a concern for intellectual honesty thanhis earlier works. It examines the radical (Dionysian) character of Nietzsche’s later philosophy and draws attention to the intrinsic paradoxes of his later thought. Itthus discusses an important development in Nietzsche’s philosophy and dialectic within modern thought that deserves close attention if an adequate understanding of the course of modern thought is at stake. (shrink)

Editorial independence is a bedrock principle of academic publishing. The growing domination of academic publishing by large, for-profit corporations threatens this independence. There is alarming evidence that large companies too often serve their own business interests and those of powerful clients rather than serving the scientific community and the general public. This evidence includes the publication of infelicitous commercial science and concealing scientific misconduct. We present two case studies in which the UK-based publisher Taylor & Francis interfered in the editorial (...) process by blocking publication of legitimate criticism that had been reviewed and approved for publication by its specialized editors. The integrity of science depends in part on the transparency and intellectual honesty of all stakeholders. The widely acknowledged inadequacies of English libel law are reviewed as context for some of Taylor & Francis’s fearful decisions. (shrink)

This paper reports an attempt to develop a code of ethics for marketing educators at colleges and universities throughout the world. The paper describes the process of development and the outcome. The code of ethics details social responsibilities of marketing educators in relation to certain publics and actions. Social responsibilities related to certain publics include ethical prescriptions such as treating others with respect and dignity, upholding justice, providing information to others about matters that may significantly affect their well being, providing (...) access to needed and affordable resources, protecting the privacy of others, allowing the expression of a grievance and providing a mechanism for redress, providing fair credit, and ensuring safety. Social responsibilities related to certain actions include avoiding conflict of interest; conducting ourselves with the highest standards of intellectual honesty, professionalism, and objectivity; adhering to all policies of our academic institutions and challenging unjust or ineffective policies; mentoring our junior colleagues and students; being selfless in contributing to the marketing discipline and society at large, and defending the principles of academic freedom. (shrink)

Interest in Leo Strauss is greater now than at any time since his death, mostly because of the purported link between his thought and the political movement known as neoconservatism. Steven B. Smith, though, surprisingly depicts Strauss not as the high priest of neoconservatism but as a friend of liberal democracy—perhaps the best defender democracy has ever had. Moreover, in _Reading Leo Strauss, _Smith shows that Strauss’s defense of liberal democracy was closely connected to his skepticism of both the extreme (...) Left and extreme Right._ It was as a skeptic, Smith argues, that Strauss considered the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between reason and revelation—a conflict Strauss dubbed the “theologico-political problem.” Calling this problem “_the_ theme of my investigations,” Strauss asked the same fundamental question throughout his life: what is the relation of the political order to revelation in general and Judaism in particular? Smith organizes his book with this question and assesses Strauss’s attempt to direct the teaching of political science away from the examination of mass behavior and interest-group politics and toward the study of the philosophical principles on which politics are based. With his provocative, lucid study, Smith establishes a distinctive form of Straussian liberalism himself. _ “By returning to the source and examining what Strauss actually wrote, Mr. Smith lets the breeze of reason into the feverish sickroom of ideology. He portrays a Strauss who cherished democracy as the best bulwark against tyranny, and who valued intellectual honesty above all. By the time Mr. Smith is done, nothing is left of the Strauss caricature except the ignorance and malice that fathered it.”—Adam Kirsch, _New York__ Sun_. (shrink)

The major emphasis of the "sociology of scientific knowledge" has been on the natural sciences. Recently, however, the field has taken a reflexive turn. I examine the relation between this kind of reflexivity and that in the history of the sociology of knowledge generally with an eye to assessing its place in social theory. Although reflexive adequacy, like other criteria for choice of theory, is not an absolute and overriding cognitive good, reflexive considerations often are critical in assessing the prospective (...) claims of a research program and in evaluating the intellectual honesty and seriousness of these claims. (shrink)

The Enlightenment invented a new unique format for philosophical thinking, turning philosophy into a force that affects the real world. The author calls for recognition of the productive forces of the Enlightenment, which appear as defenders of rational transparency and intellectual honesty. By rejecting the teleological context and focusing on formal aspects, Enlightenment ideas lead to a loss of connection with concrete reality and the purpose of actions. The last decades have seen a revival of the classical tradition, (...) but there are difficulties in understanding the physical order and its relationship with the moral order. The author agrees with the criticism of the Enlightenment project, but opposes the rejection of any universalist project in general. Considering value pluralism as a result of the late Enlightenment, the author points out that the universalist project is opposed by various forms of relativism. It is in this context that tradition should resume its role. (shrink)

Every successful health care system should be based on some general humanistic ideals. However, the nationally organized health care systems of most European countries usually suffer from a deficiency in common ethical values based on universal human principles. When transitional societies, such as that of Bosnia-Herzegovina are concerned, health care organizational models are even more dysfunctional. The sources of a dysfunction in medical care system of Bosnia-Herzegovina are manifold and mutually controversial, including a lack of shared principles, an inappropriate involvement (...) of politicians in medical care and practice, administrative difficulties arising from superficial communication systems, as well as economic limits concerned with the financing of health care. The deficiency of a moral culture of medicine, which is correlated to a general collapse of morality is also responsible for many problems affecting various aspects of life including medical care. Hence, medical ethics from a virtue perspective is becoming an important ingredient of any improvement deigned to provide better-quality medical care.The aim of this paper is to underline the influence of humanism on the organization of health care systems and the ethics of medical interrelations in the society of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not intended to diagnose or resolve the problems, but to analyze them. It is also a critique of specific socio-political-economic influences on this health care system, inquiring if well-educated individuals in the virtues, which are involved in medical practice and education, would counteract them.In conclusion, humanism creates a universal ethical structure, which is based on human values such as fidelity, trust, benevolence, intellectual honesty, courage, compassion and truthfulness. These values should represent the standard around which medical care is organized. Since the health care system in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not entirely founded upon humanistic ideals, addressing the socio-political-economic conditions that constantly undermine those values is a prerequisite for any much-needed improvements of the medical care. (shrink)