Results for 'intensional verbs'

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  1.  57
    Intensional Verbs and Their Intentional Objects.Friederike Moltmann - 2008 - Natural Language Semantics 16 (3):239-270.
    The complement of intensional transitive verbs, like any nonreferential complement, can be replaced by a ‘special quantifier’ or ‘special pronoun’ such as 'something', 'the same thing', or 'what'. In this paper, I will defend the ‘Nominalization Theory’ of special quantifiers against a range of apparent counterexamples involving intensional transitive verbs.
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  2.  34
    Intensional Verbs and Quantifiers.Friederike Moltmann - 1997 - Natural Language Semantics 5 (1):1-52.
    This paper discusses the semantics of intensional transitive verbs such as 'need', 'want','recognize', 'find', and 'hire'. It proposes new linguistic criteria for intensionality and defends two semantic analyses for two different classes of intensional verbs. The paper also includes a systematic classification of intensional verbs according to the type of lexical meaning they involve.
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  3. Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs.Friederike Moltmann - 2015 - In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer.
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come (...)
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  4. Intensional Verbs in Event Semantics.Graeme Forbes - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):227 - 242.
    In Attitude Problems, I gave an account of opacity in the complement of intensional transitive verbs that combined neo-Davidsonian event-semantics with a hidden-indexical account of substitution failure. In this paper, I extend the account to clausal verbs.
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  5.  64
    Intensional Transitive Verbs.Graeme Forbes - 2008 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A verb is transitive iff it usually occurs with a direct object, and in such occurrences it is said to occur transitively . Thus ‘ate’ occurs transitively in ‘I ate the meat and left the vegetables’, but not in ‘I ate then left’ (perhaps it is not the same verb ‘left’ in these two examples, but it seems to be the same ‘ate’). A verb is intensional if the verb phrase (VP) it forms with its complement is anomalous in (...)
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  6. Intensional ``Transitive'' Verbs and Abstract Clausal Complementation.Richard Larson, Marcel den Dikken & Peter Ludlow - manuscript
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  7. Intensional Transitive Verbs: The Limitations of a Clausal Analysis.Graeme Forbes - unknown
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  8.  36
    Monotonicity in Opaque Verbs.Thomas Ede Zimmermann - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):715 - 761.
    The paper is about the interpretation of opaque verbs like “seek”, “owe”, and “resemble” which allow for unspecific readings of their (indefinite) objects. It is shown that the following two observations create a problem for semantic analysis: (a) The opaque position is upward monotone: “John seeks a unicorn” implies “John seeks an animal”, given that “unicorn” is more specific than “animal”. (b) Indefinite objects of opaque verbs allow for higher-order, or “underspecific”, readings: “Jones is looking for something Smith (...)
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  9. Intentionality Without Exotica.R. M. Sainsbury - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought.
    The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.
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  10.  10
    Quantifiers, Anaphora, and Intensionality.Mary Dalrymple, John Lamping, Fernando Pereira & Vijay Saraswat - 1997 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (3):219-273.
    The relationship between Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG) functional structures (f-structures) for sentences and their semanticinterpretations can be formalized in linear logic in a way thatcorrectly explains the observed interactions between quantifier scopeambiguity, bound anaphora and intensionality.Our linear-logic formalization of the compositional properties ofquantifying expressions in natural language obviates the need forspecial mechanisms, such as Cooper storage, in representing thescoping possibilities of quantifying expressions. Instead, thesemantic contribution of a quantifier is recorded as a linear-logicformula whose use in a proof will establish the (...)
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  11.  27
    Studies of Intensional Contexts in Mohist Writings.Desheng Zong - 2000 - Philosophy East and West 50 (2):208-228.
    The Mohist School's logical study focuses mainly on the following inference rule: suppose that N and M are coextensive terms, or N a subset of M; it follows that if a verb can appear in front of N, it can also appear in front of M. That is, if 'VM' then 'VN', where V is some extensional verb. Such an approach to logical inference necessitates the study of logical relations among nouns, verbs, and the relations between these two types (...)
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  12.  7
    Comments on Ede Zimmermann's "Monotonicity in Opaque Verbs".Paul Egré - unknown
    This is the handout of my comments on E. Zimmermann's paper "Monotonicity in Opaque Verbs", which I prepared for the workshop on Intensional Verbs and Non-Referential Terms held at IHPST on January 14, 2006.
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  13.  20
    Intensional Transitives and Presuppositions (Transitivos Intensionales y Presuposiciones).R. M. Sainsbury - 2008 - Critica 40 (120):129 - 139.
    My commentators point to respects in which the picture provided in Reference without Referents is incomplete. The picture provided no account of how sentences constructed from intensional verbs (like "John thought about Pegasus") can be true when one of the referring expressions fails to refer. And it gave an incomplete, and possibly misleading, account of how to understand certain serious uses of fictional names, as in "Anna Karenina is more intelligent than Emma Bovary" and "Anna Karenina does not (...)
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  14. Intensional Transitives and Presuppositions.R. M. Sainsbury - 2008 - Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 40 (120):129-139.
    My commentators point to respects in which the picture provided in Reference without Referents is incomplete. The picture provided no account of how sentences constructed from intensional verbs can be true when one of the referring expressions fails to refer. And it gave an incomplete, and possibly misleading, account of how to understand certain serious uses of fictional names, as in "Anna Karenina is more intelligent than Emma Bovary" and "Anna Karenina does not exist". In the present response, (...)
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  15. Certain Verbs Are Syntactically Explicit Quantifiers.Anna Szabolcsi - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 6 (1):5.
    Quantification over individuals, times, and worlds can in principle be made explicit in the syntax of the object language, or left to the semantics and spelled out in the meta-language. The traditional view is that quantification over individuals is syntactically explicit, whereas quantification over times and worlds is not. But a growing body of literature proposes a uniform treatment. This paper examines the scopal interaction of aspectual raising verbs (begin), modals (can), and intensional raising verbs (threaten) with (...)
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  16.  45
    Partee Verbs.Takashi Yagisawa - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (3):253 - 270.
    Approximately thirty years ago, Barbara H. Partee tried to think of counterexamples to David Lewis’s observation that no intransitive verbs appeared to have intensional subject positions. She came up with such verbs as ‘rise,’ ‘change,’ and ‘increase.’ Lewis agreed that they were indeed counterexamples to his observation. He mentioned it to Richard Montague, who incorporated these verbs into his now famous grammatical theory for English.
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  17.  49
    Intensionality: What Are Intensional Transitives?Jennifer M. Saul - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):101–119.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes. In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an (...)
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  18.  9
    Token Dependency Semantics and the Paratactic Analysis of Intensional Constructions.M. Dahllof - 2002 - Journal of Semantics 19 (4):333-368.
    This article introduces Token Dependency Semantics (TDS), a surface‐oriented and token‐based framework for compositional truth‐conditional semantics. It is motivated by Davidson's ‘paratactic’ analysis of semantic intensionality (‘On Saying That’, 1968, Synthèse 19: 130–146), which has been much discussed in philosophy. This is the first fully‐fledged formal implementation of Davidson's proposal. Operator‐argument structure and scope are captured by means of relations among tokens. Intensional constituent tokens represent ‘propositional’ contents directly. They serve as arguments to the words introducing intensional contexts, (...)
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  19.  56
    Limits of Propositionalism.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):819-838.
    Propositionalists hold that, fundamentally, all attitudes are propositional attitudes. A number of philosophers have recently called the propositionalist thesis into question. It has been argued, successfully I believe, that there are attitudes that are of or about things but which do not have a propositional content concerning those things. If correct, our theories of mind will include non-propositional attitudes as well as propositional attitudes. In light of this, Sinhababu’s recent attack on anti-propositionalists is noteworthy. The present paper aims to sharpen (...)
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  20.  36
    A Unified Approach to Split Scope.Klaus Abels & Luisa Martí - 2010 - Natural Language Semantics 18 (4):435-470.
    The goal of this paper is to propose a unified approach to the split scope readings of negative indefinites, comparative quantifiers, and numerals. There are two main observations that justify this approach. First, split scope shows the same kinds of restrictions across these different quantifiers. Second, split scope always involves low existential force. In our approach, following Sauerland, natural language determiner quantifiers are quantifiers over choice functions, of type <<,t>,t>. In split readings, the quantifier over choice functions scopes above other (...)
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  21.  57
    Predication in Conceptual Realism.Nino Cocchiarella - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):301-321.
    Conceptual realism begins with a conceptualist theory of the nexus of predication in our speech and mental acts, a theory that explains the unity of those acts in terms of their referential and predicable aspects. This theory also contains as an integral part an intensional realism based on predicate nominalization and a reflexive abstraction in which the intensional contents of our concepts are “object”-ified, and by which an analysis of predication with intensional verbs can be given. (...)
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  22. Representing Unicorns: How to Think About Intensionality.Mark Sainsbury - 2012 - In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications.
    The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional (...)
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  23.  21
    Austinian Truth, Attitudes and Type Theory ∗.Robin Cooper - unknown
    This paper is part of a broader project whose aim is to present a coherent unified approach to natural language dialogue semantics using tools from type theory. Here we explore aspects of our approach which relate to situation theory and situation semantics. We first point out a relationship between type theory and the Austinian notion of truth. We then consider how records in type theory might be used to represent situations and how dependent record types can be used to model (...)
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  24.  90
    Variable Objects and Truthmaking.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - In Mircea Dumitru (ed.), Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality. Themes from Kit Fine. Oxford University Press.
    This paper will focus on a philosophically significant construction whose semantics brings together two important notions in Kit Fine’s philosophy, the notion of truthmaking and the notion of a variable embodiment, or its extension, namely what I call a ‘variable object’. The analysis of the construction this paper will develop will be based on an account of clausal complements of intensional verbs that is of more general interest, based on truthmaking and the notion of a cognitive product, such (...)
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  25.  13
    Book Review: 'Fiction and Fictionalism' by Mark Sainsbury. [REVIEW]Emily Caddick Bourne - unknown
    What is a fictional character? Nothing, according to Mark Sainsbury. Yet it is true to say that there are fictional characters. How? Because there are fictions according to which there are specific individuals. And it can be true to say that Anna Karenina is more intelligent than Emma Bovary. How? Because the truth-value of the sentence is to be assessed under the (false) presupposition that there are such people as Emma and Anna. And it is true to say that Conan (...)
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  26.  18
    Parasitic Degree Phrases.Jon Nissenbaum & Bernhard Schwarz - 2011 - Natural Language Semantics 19 (1):1-38.
    This paper investigates gaps in degree phrases with too, as in John is too rich [for the monastery to hire ___ ]. We present two curious restrictions on such gapped degree phrases. First, the gaps must ordinarily be anteceded by the subject of the associated gradable adjective. Second, when embedded under intensional verbs, gapped degree phrases are ordinarily restricted to surface scope, unlike their counterparts without gaps. Just as puzzlingly, we show that these restrictions are lifted when there (...)
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  27.  8
    Sheffler on Believing-True.Charles Echelbarger - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:495-509.
    The author examines Scheffler’s extensional alternative to the usual notion of belief and shows that it is necessarily inadequate to serve the purpose for which it was designed. This point is established by showing that Scheffler’s proposed substitute for psychologically intensional verbs like ‘believes’ can not deliver philosophers from the classical puzzles over propositional attitudes and can not be used in all cases even to provide materially equivalent extensional substitutes for ordinary belief-statements.
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  28.  5
    Ambiguity and Belief.S. G. Williams - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:253-278.
    This paper is concerned with the notion of ambiguity—or what I shall refer to more generally as homonymy—and its bearing upon various familiar puzzles about intensional contexts. It would hardly of course be a novel claim that the unravelling of such puzzles may well involve recourse to something like ambiguity. After all, Frege, who bequeathed to us one of the most enduring of the puzzles, proposed as part of his solution an analysis of intensional contexts according to which (...)
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  29.  1
    Ambiguity and Belief1: S. G. Williams.S. G. Williams - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:253-278.
    This paper is concerned with the notion of ambiguity—or what I shall refer to more generally as homonymy—and its bearing upon various familiar puzzles about intensional contexts. It would hardly of course be a novel claim that the unravelling of such puzzles may well involve recourse to something like ambiguity. After all, Frege, who bequeathed to us one of the most enduring of the puzzles, proposed as part of his solution an analysis of intensional contexts according to which (...)
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  30. Sheffler on Believing-True.Charles Echelbarger - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:495-509.
    The author examines Scheffler’s extensional alternative to the usual notion of belief and shows that it is necessarily inadequate to serve the purpose for which it was designed. This point is established by showing that Scheffler’s proposed substitute for psychologically intensional verbs like ‘believes’ can not deliver philosophers from the classical puzzles over propositional attitudes and can not be used in all cases even to provide materially equivalent extensional substitutes for ordinary belief-statements.
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  31.  34
    Attitude Problems: An Essay on Linguistic Intensionality.Graeme Forbes - 2006 - Clarendon Press.
    Ascriptions of mental states to oneself and others give rise to many interesting logical and semantic problems. Attitude Problems presents an original account of mental state ascriptions that are made using intensional transitive verbs such as 'want', 'seek', 'imagine', and 'worship'. Forbes offers a theory of how such verbs work that draws on ideas from natural language semantics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics.
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  32. Variabilism.Samuel Cumming - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):525-554.
    Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation) may also be shifted by operators in the representation language. Indeed verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like ‘think’, are treated as operators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. By contrast, metaphysical modal operators shift the world of assessment only. Names, (...)
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  33. Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):277-326.
    This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church’s intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency also model other (...)
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  34.  90
    Extensional Scientific Realism Vs. Intensional Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:46-52.
    Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while (...)
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  35.  67
    It Wasn't Up to Jones: Unavoidable Actions and Intensional Contexts in Frankfurt Examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.
    In saying that it was up to someone whether or not she acted as she did, we are attributing a distinctive sort of power to her. Understanding such power attributions is of broad importance for contemporary discussions of free will. Yet the ‘is up to…whether’ locution and its cognates have largely escaped close examination. This article aims to elucidate one of its unnoticed features, namely that such power attributions introduce intensional contexts, something that is easily overlooked because the sentences (...)
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  36.  16
    Definite Descriptions and Negative Existential Quantifiers.Paul Elbourne - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Previous theorists have claimed that Russell’s theory of definite descriptions gives the wrong truth conditions to sentences in which definite descriptions are embedded under certain other operators; but the other operators used, such as conditionals and propositional attitude verbs, have introduced intensional and hyperintensional complications that might be thought to obscure the point against Russell. This paper shows that the same kind of problem arises when the operator in question allows the context to be extensional. It is further (...)
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  37. Names and the Mass-Count Distinction.Friederike Moltmann - manuscript
    This paper reviews the role of sortals in the syntax and semantics of proper names and the related question of a mass-count distinction among proper names. The paper argues that sortals play a significant role with proper names and that that role matches individuating or ‘sortal’ classifiers in languages lacking a mass-count distinction. Proper names do not themselves classify as count, but may classify as mass or rather number-neutral. This also holds for other expressions or uses of expressions that lack (...)
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  38.  23
    Structured Lexical Concepts, Property Modifiers, and Transparent Intensional Logic.Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):321-345.
    In a 2010 paper Daley argues, contra Fodor, that several syntactically simple predicates express structured concepts. Daley develops his theory of structured concepts within Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic . I rectify various misconceptions of Daley’s concerning TIL. I then develop within TIL an improved theory of how structured concepts are structured and how syntactically simple predicates are related to structured concepts.
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  39.  50
    Sententialism and Berkeley's Master Argument.Zoltan Gendler Szabo - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):462 - 474.
    Sententialism is the view that intensional positions in natural languages occur within clausal complements only. According to proponents of this view, intensional transitive verbs such as 'want', 'seek' or 'resemble' are actually propositional attitude verbs in disguise. I argue that 'conceive' (and a few other verbs) cannot fit this mould: conceiving-of is not reducible to conceiving-that. I offer a new diagnosis of where Berkeley's 'master argument' goes astray, analysing what is odd about saying that Hylas (...)
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  40.  60
    Propositions and the Substitution Anomaly.Steven E. Boër - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):549-586.
    The Substitution Anomaly is the failure of intuitively coreferential expressions of the corresponding forms “that S” and “the proposition that S” to be intersubstitutable salva veritate under certain ‘selective’ attitudinal verbs that grammatically accept both sorts of terms as complements. The Substitution Anomaly poses a direct threat to the basic assumptions of Millianism, which predict the interchangeability of “that S” and “the proposition that S”. Jeffrey King has argued persuasively that the most plausible Millian solution is to treat the (...)
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  41.  12
    Intensionality and Variable Objects.B. -U. Yi - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):431-436.
    This article examines Moltmann’s analysis of intensional transitive verbs , and argues that the analysis fails because the key notion it employs, ‘variable satisfier’, is inconsistent.
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  42.  55
    The Proper Treatment of Predication in Fine-Grained Intensional Logic.Christopher Menzel - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:61-87.
    In this paper I rehearse two central failings of traditional possible world semantics. I then present a much more robust framework for intensional logic and semantics based liberally on the work of George Bealer in his book Quality and Concept. Certain expressive limitations of Bealer's approach, however, lead me to extend the framework in a particularly natural and useful way. This extension, in turn, brings to light associated limitations of Bealer's account of predication. In response, I develop a more (...)
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  43.  53
    A Constructive Type-Theoretical Formalism for the Interpretation of Subatomically Sensitive Natural Language Constructions.Bartosz Więckowski - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (4):815-853.
    The analysis of atomic sentences and their subatomic components poses a special problem for proof-theoretic approaches to natural language semantics, as it is far from clear how their semantics could be explained by means of proofs rather than denotations. The paper develops a proof-theoretic semantics for a fragment of English within a type-theoretical formalism that combines subatomic systems for natural deduction [20] with constructive (or Martin-Löf) type theory [8, 9] by stating rules for the formation, introduction, elimination and equality of (...)
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  44.  21
    Sententialism and Berkeley's Master Argument.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):462–474.
    Sententialism is the view that intensional positions in natural languages occur within clausal complements only. According to proponents of this view, intensional transitive verbs such as 'want', 'seek' or 'resemble' are actually propositional attitude verbs in disguise. I argue that 'conceive' cannot fit this mould: conceiving-of is not reducible to conceiving-that. I offer a new diagnosis of where Berkeley's 'master argument' goes astray, analysing what is odd about saying that Hylas conceives a tree which is not (...)
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  45.  64
    What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth?John Fox - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  46.  38
    Intensionality: Graeme Forbes.Graeme Forbes - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):75–99.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes (2000b). In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or (...)
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  47. Meaning Postulates, Inference, and the Relational/Notional Ambiguity.Graeme Forbes - manuscript
    This paper in revised form appears in Facta Philosophica 5:1 (2003) 49­75. It addresses some problems about intensional transitives raised by Moltmann and Zimmerman, corrects some oversights in my paper in The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (S.V. for 2002), and adds new material on binary vs. tripartite construals of “relational/notional”, bridge inferences, weakening inferences, and the relevance problem. Its other sections are, like the PASS paper, concerned with the conjunctive force of disjunctive NP complements of intensional transitive (...)
     
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  48.  25
    Types of Relations.Jan van Eijck - unknown
    Many arguments for flexible type assignment to syntactic categories have to do with the need to account for the various scopings resulting from the interaction of quantified DPs with other quantified DPs or with intensional or negated verb contexts. We will define a type for arbitrary arity relations in polymorphic type theory. In terms of this, we develop the Boolean algebra of relations as far as needed for natural language semantics. The type for relations is flexible: it can do (...)
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  49.  18
    Briefly Noted.Chris Fox & Shalom Lappin - unknown
    Intensional logic (IL) and its application to natural language, which the present monograph addresses, was first developed by Richard Montague in the late 1960s (e.g., Montague 1970a, 1970b). Through the efforts of (especially) Barbara Partee (e.g., Partee 1975, 1976), and Richmond Thomason, who edited the posthumous collection of Montague’s works (Thomason 1974), this became the main framework for those who aspired to a formal semantic theory for natural language, and these included computational linguists as early as Jerry Hobbs in (...)
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  50.  1
    Intensionality.Graeme Forbes & Jennifer Saul - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 76:75-119.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes. In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an (...)
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