Results for 'intentional stance'

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  1.  54
    Unlikely Allies: Embodied Social Cognition and the Intentional Stance.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.
    I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the (...) stance is not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology. (shrink)
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  2.  5
    Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
    In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the (...)
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  3. The Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1987 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  4.  51
    Precis of the Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited in artificial (...)
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  5. Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance.Kristin Andrews - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make (...)
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  6.  64
    A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.
    I examine the way in which Daniel Dennett (1987, 1995) uses his 'intentional' and 'design' stances to make the claim that intentionality is derived from design. I suggest that Dennett is best understood as attempting to supply an objective, nonintentional, naturalistic rationale for our use of intentional concepts. However, I demonstrate that his overall picture presupposes prior application of the intentional stance in a preconditional, ineliminable,'sense-giving' role. Construed as such, Dennett's account is almost identical to the (...)
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  7.  32
    On the Evolution of Intentionality as Seen From the Intentional Stance.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1994 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):287-310.
    Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories (...)
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  8.  43
    Behavioral Traits, the Intentional Stance, and Biological Functions.Marcel Weber - unknown
    It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuating the behavioral traits of an (...)
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  9.  10
    Cognition, Natural Selection, and the Intentional Stance.Daisie M. Radner & Michael Radner - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.
    Abstract Daniel Dennett advocates the use of the intentional stance in adaptationist biology and in cognitive ethology. He sees intentional system theory as closely related to decision theory and game theory. In biological decision and game theory models, nature ?chooses? the strategy by which the animal chooses a course of action. The design of the animal imposes constraints on the model. For Dennett, by contrast, the description of nature's rationale imposes constraints on the design of the animal. (...)
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  10.  17
    Taking the Intentional Stance at 12 Months of Age.György Gergely, Zoltán Nádasdy, Gergely Csibra & Szilvia Bíró - 1995 - Cognition 56 (2):165-193.
  11.  10
    When Does the Intentional Stance Work?Daniel C. Dennett - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):763.
  12. The Intentional Stance.Daniel Dennett - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.
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  13. Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance.William P. Bechtel - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (4):265-92.
  14.  3
    The Intentional Stance.Patricia Kitcher & Daniel C. Dennett - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):126.
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  15.  5
    Taking the Intentional Stance Seriously.DanielC Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):379.
  16.  85
    Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance.Marc Slors - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):93-98.
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  17.  35
    The Intentional Stance: Developmental and Neurocognitive Perspectives.Richard Griffin - 2002 - In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.
    Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often (...)
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  18.  18
    Persons and the Intentional Stance.William Dibrell - 1988 - Journal of Critical Analysis 9 (1):13-25.
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  19.  12
    The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.
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  20.  6
    Aristotle, Final Cause, and the Intentional Stance.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):758-759.
  21.  3
    The Intentional Stance Reexamined.Radu J. Bogdan - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):759.
  22. Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance Reviewed By.Warren Dow - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (8):300-304.
     
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  23.  10
    What is the Intentional Stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.
  24.  11
    The Intentional Stance.Susan J. Brison - 1989 - Philosophical Books 30 (3):169-172.
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  25.  26
    The Intentional Stance and the Imitation Game.Ajit Narayanan - 1996 - In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.
  26.  13
    The Intentional Stance[REVIEW]Edward N. Zalta - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 43 (2):397-400.
  27.  13
    Book Review. The Intentional Stance. D Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-16.
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  28.  12
    Witnessed Behavior and Dennett's Intentional Stance.Sherisse Webb - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-70.
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  29.  6
    Witnessed Behavior and Dennett's Intentional Stance.Stephen Webb - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-470.
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  30.  6
    The Intentional Stance and the Knowledge Level.Allen Newell - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.
  31. The Intentional Stance.C. Dennett Daniel - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):619-624.
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  32. The Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):101-109.
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  33. The Intentional Stance.C. Dennett Daniël - 1990 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (2):350-351.
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  34. Dennett, D. C., "The Intentional Stance". [REVIEW]D. Jacquette - 1988 - Mind 97:619.
     
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  35. Implementing the Intentional Stance.Yoav Shoham - 1991 - In Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press.
     
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  36. Witnessed Behavior and Dennett’s Intentional Stance.Webb Stephen - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-470.
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  37.  67
    Dennett's Stance on Intentional Realism.David Davies - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.
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  38.  1
    Dennett’s Stance on Intentional Realism.David Davies - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.
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  39. Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):7-15.
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers (...)
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  40.  28
    The Rationality Assumption.Richard Dub - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer. pp. 93-110.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be (...)
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  41. Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise.Christian List - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...)
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  42.  49
    The Natural Origins of Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.
    We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland’s baseball (...)
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  43.  22
    Biological Pedagogy as Concern for Semiotic Growth.Ramsey Affifi - 2014 - Biosemiotics 7 (1):73-88.
    Deweyan pedagogy seeks to promotes growth, characterized as an increased sensitivity, responsiveness, and ability to participate in an environment. Growth, Dewey says, is fostered by the development of habits that enable further habit formation. Unfortunately, humans have their own habitual ways of encountering other species, which often do not support growth. In this article, I briefly review some common conceptions of learning and the process of habit-formation to scope out the landscape of a more responsible and responsive approach to taking (...)
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  44.  80
    Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science?Jonathan Knowles - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical (...)
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  45.  43
    Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):495-513.
    I argue that a attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief—the prag- matic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among others—implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary control over your actions, and what actions you perform in part determines what (...)
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  46.  70
    Phenomenology: Neither Auto- nor Hetero- Be. [REVIEW]John J. Drummond - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):57-74.
    Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the first-person perspective into account.
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  47. Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative?Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, (...)
     
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  48.  13
    Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom.Edgar Maraguat - 2016 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 41 (1):111-134.
    the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.
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  49.  61
    The Contextual Stance.Gordon R. Foxall - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
    The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional (...)
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  50.  22
    Dennett’s Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: An Innovative Play at Second Base.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):593-609.
    I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s (...)
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