Results for 'intentionality representation'

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  1. Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
    Haugeland doesn’t have what I would call a theory of mental representation. Indeed, it isn’t clear that he believes there is such a thing. But he does have a theory of intentionality and a correlative theory of objectivity, and it is this material that I will be discussing in what follows. It will facilitate the discussion that follows to have at hand some distinctions and accompanying terminology I introduced in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (Cummins, 1996; RTA hereafter). Couching (...)
     
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  2. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation.Walter Ott - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.
    According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the (...)
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    Internal Representation: Prologue to a Theory of Intentionality.Robert C. Richardson - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):171-212.
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  4.  18
    Intentionality and Representation.Nicholas Georgalis - 1986 - International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):45-58.
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  5.  32
    Intentionality is Not Representation.Erwin Tegtmeier - 2005 - Metaphysica 6 (1):77-84.
  6. Intentionality, Representation, and Function.David Pickles - 1989 - Sussex University, Cognitive Science Research Paper 140.
     
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  7. Saving Intentional Phenomena: Intentionality, Representation and Symbol.Jean-Michel Roy - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.
     
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  8. Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality.J. E. Brower & S. Brower-Toland - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):193-243.
    This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of (...)
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  9.  32
    Immanence, Intentionality and Representation in Thomas Aquinas.Patricia Moya Cañas - 2013 - Veritas: Revista de Filosofía y Teología 28 (28):113-131.
    El artículo se propone rehabilitar el concepto tomasiano de representación cognoscitiva que es fuertemente criticado en su versión post cartesiana. Con este objetivo se contextualiza la representación en el marco más amplio de otras características que Tomás de Aquino atribuye al conocimiento humano, concretamente las de inmanencia e intencionalidad. El análisis de estos atributos del conocimiento permite establecer el ámbito propio del acto cognoscitivo, diferenciándolo de una condición física o natural This article aims at recovering Aquinas’ concept of cognitive (...) which is strongly criticized in its post-cartesian sense. For this purpose, representation is contextualized in the wider frame of other characteristics that Thomas Aquinas attributes to human knowledge, i.e. that of immanence and intentionality. The analysis of these features allows to establish the proper scope of the cognitive act and to differentiate it from a physical or natural condition. (shrink)
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    Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality.Jeffrey E. Brower - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):193-243.
    This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts. It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with (...)
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  11.  11
    Intentionality and Modern Philosophical Psychology—II. The Return to Representation.William Lyons - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):83-102.
    Abstract In rounded terms and modern dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same (...)
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    Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy Ed. By Gyula Klima.Carl N. Still - 2016 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 54 (2):337-338.
    The fifteen essays in this volume represent the state of the art when it comes to the contemporary study of medieval philosophy of mind. The contributors are well-established scholars in the field who build on their previous work, and most advance an original argument in these essays. The focus is on western Christian philosophers and theologians from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and “the intricacies and varieties of the conceptual relationships among intentionality, cognition, and mental representation” in their (...)
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  13. Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy.Gyula Klima (ed.) - 2015 - Fordham University Press.
    It is supposed to be common knowledge about the history of ideas that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality, their directedness toward some object. As is usually the case with such commonplaces about the history of ideas, this claim is not quite true. Medieval philosophers routinely described ordinary physical phenomena, such as reflections in mirrors or sounds in the air, (...)
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  14.  15
    Intentionality, Intensionality and Representation.Alexander Rosenberg - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):137-140.
  15. Wittgenstein on Intentionality and Mental Representation.Tim Crane - 2011 - In Anne Reboul (ed.), Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    The concept of intentionality — what Brentano called ‘the mind’s direction on its obj ects’ — has been a preoccupation of many of the most significant twentieth century philosophers. The purpose of this essay is to examine the place of the concept of intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and to criticize one aspect of his treatment of intentionality. Although the word ‘intentionality’ is not (to my knowledge) used in Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings, the idea it expresses was (...)
     
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  16.  11
    The Fallacy of Misplaced Intentionality in Social Representation Research.Wolfgang Wagner - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (3):243–165.
    This paper argues that social representations cannot be used as independent variables in causal explanations of social behaviour. It is shown that the structure of investigations often follows a causally explanatory design despite explicit statements to the contrary by the researchers. This fact is analyzed with three investigations. It is argued that verbal data used to assess the contents of a representation as independent variable are logically equivalent to data obtained from the “dependent” overt behaviour. Therefore these two kinds (...)
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  17.  5
    Wittgenstein on Intentionality and Representation.Miguel García-Valdecasas - 2012 - Quaestio 12:343-368.
    Wittgenstein’s concept of intentionality is strongly connected with his views on language and thinking. Although his views progressively developed over time, Wittgenstein came to realise that intentionality is a property of thought that can only be accounted for in the context of ordinary language. On this basis, the view of intentionality that regards it as a natural property, or as a scientifically examinable property that can be found in the natural world is hostage to a number of (...)
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    Hume on Mental Representation and Intentionality.Jonathan David Cottrell - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass:e12505.
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    Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality.Erwin Tegtmeier - 2017 - In Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg. De Gruyter. pp. 129-136.
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  20.  16
    Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy, Edited by Gyula Klima. [REVIEW]Nicole Wyatt - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):204-204.
  21.  36
    Representation, Intentionality, and Quantifiers.Timothy Mccarthy - 1984 - Synthese 60 (3):369 - 411.
  22.  2
    Internal Representation: Prologue to a Theory of Intentionality.Robert C. Richardson - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):171-211.
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  23. Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy.Gyula Klima (ed.) - 2015 - Fordham University Press.
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  24. On Meta-Representation: The Theoretical and Practical Consequences of Intentionality.Ian Rory Owen - 2015 - In Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy. Springer Verlag.
     
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  25. Intentionality, IntenSionality and Representation.Alexander Rosenberg - 1989 - Behavior and Philosophy 17 (2):137.
     
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  26.  94
    What Intentionality Is Like.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
    Intentionality is a mark of the mental, as Brentano (1874) noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality, which informally put, is the feature of being about something that may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Aesthetic experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality as we focus attention on the phenomenology of the sensory exemplar. This (...)
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  27. Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis.Richard Menary - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):31-43.
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I (...)
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  28.  89
    A Brief Introduction to the Guidance Theory of Representation.Gregg H. Rosenberg & Michael L. Anderson - unknown
    Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of homo sapiens--an intelligent, evolved, biological agent--and its signature contribution is the emergence of a philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of human being. Applying this agency-oriented line of thinking to the problem of representation, this paper introduces the Guidance Theory, according to (...)
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  29.  88
    How Authentic Intentionality Can Be Enabled: A Neurocomputational Hypothesis. [REVIEW]Matteo Colombo - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (2):183-202.
    According to John Haugeland, the capacity for “authentic intentionality” depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland’s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand “authentic intentionality”. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect (...)
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  30.  64
    Dress Rehearsals, Previews, and Encores: A New Account of Mental Representation.Nancy Salay - 2014 - Theoria 80 (1):84-97.
    One of the central debates in cognitive science is the dispute over the role of representation in cognition: on computational/representational accounts, representations are theoretically central; on dynamic systems approaches in which cognition is investigated as a particular sort of physical process, representations play either no role, or, at best, a derivative one. But these two perspectives lead to a deeply unsatisfying theoretical divide: accounts situated in the representational camp are plagued by the inscrutable problem of intentionality, while those (...)
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    Turning Representation Inside Out: An Adverbial Approach to the Metaphysics of Language and Mind.Steven F. Geisz - 2009 - Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.
    In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of (...)
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  32. Experience and Representation.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
     
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  33.  35
    Intentionality and Information Processing: An Alternative Model for Cognitive Science.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):121-38.
    This article responds to two unresolved and crucial problems of cognitive science: (1) What is actually accomplished by functions of the nervous system that we ordinarily describe in the intentional idiom? and (2) What makes the information processing involved in these functions semantic? It is argued that, contrary to the assumptions of many cognitive theorists, the computational approach does not provide coherent answers to these problems, and that a more promising start would be to fall back on mathematical communication theory (...)
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  34. Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
     
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  35. Two Notions of Mental Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 161-179.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  36.  18
    Intentionality Lite or Analog Content?Gerard O’Brien & Jon Opie - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):723-729.
    In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. (...)
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  37. Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 1999 - Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104.
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, (...)
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  38.  53
    Plasticity, Motor Intentionality and Concrete Movement in Merleau-Ponty.Timothy Mooney - 2011 - Continental Philosophy Review 44 (4):359-381.
    Merleau-Ponty’s explication of concrete or practical movement by way of the Schneider case could be read as ending up close to automatism, neglecting its flexibility and plasticity in the face of obstacles. It can be contended that he already goes off course in his explication of Schneider’s condition. Rasmus Jensen has argued that he assimilates a normal person’s motor intentionality to the patient’s, thereby generating a vacuity problem. I argue that Schneider’s difficulties with certain movements point to a means (...)
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  39.  3
    On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-10.
    The intuition that we can think about non-existent objects seems to be in tension with philosophical concerns about the relationality of intentionality. Tim Crane’s psychologism removes this tension by proposing a psychologistic account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects, and as such is insufficiently plausible to convince us to reject the relationality of intentionality.
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    Primitive Representation and Misrepresentation.Ken Warmbrōd - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):89-101.
    This paper develops a statistical approach to the problem of primitive representation. Representation of the kind commonly attributed to litmus paper, fuel gauges and tree rings occurs when, so to speak, there is a sufficiently good correlation between two variables. The fundamental distinction between misrepresentation and non-representation is explained in terms of the notion of an informationally useful correlation. The paper further argues that the statistical approach satisfactorily resolves well known puzzles such as Fodor's disjunction problem.
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    Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience.Jennifer Matey - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (3).
    Phenomenal intentionality is a view about the representational content of conscious experiences that grounds the content of experiences in their phenomenal character. The view is motivated by evidence from introspection, as well as theoretical considerations and intuitions. This paper discusses one potential problem with the view. The view has difficulty accounting for the intentionality of color experiences. Versions of the view either fail to count things as part of the content of color experience that should be counted, resulting (...)
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    Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience.Jennifer Matey - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):241-254.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a view about the representational content of conscious experiences that grounds the content of experiences in their phenomenal character. The view is motivated by evidence from introspection, as well as theoretical considerations and intuitions. This paper discusses one potential problem with the view. The view has difficulty accounting for the intentionality of color experiences. Versions of the view either fail to count things as part of the content of color experience that should be counted, resulting (...)
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    The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties (...)
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    Non-Propositional Intentionality: An Introduction.Alex Grzankowski & M. Montague - forthcoming - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Book synopsis: Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality — how it is that our minds make contact with the world — is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds (...)
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  45. Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language--verbs such as "believes," "fears," "seeks," or "imagines." Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or (...)
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  46. Mental Representation.Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.) - 1994 - Blackwell.
  47. What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?Ruth G. Millikan - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-125.
    "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32).
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  48.  32
    Biology and Representation.Graham F. Macdonald - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):186-200.
  49.  91
    Developing Mental Abilities by Representing Intentionality.Radu J. Bogdan - 2001 - Synthese 129 (2):233-258.
    Communication by shared meaning, themastery of word semantics,metarepresentation and metamentation aremental abilities, uniquely human, that share a sense ofintentionality or reference. The latteris developed by a naive psychology or interpretation – acompetence dedicated to representingintentional relations between conspecifics and the world. Theidea that interpretation builds new mentalabilities around a sense of reference is based on three linesof analysis – conceptual, psychological andevolutionary. The conceptual analysis reveals that a senseof reference is at the heart of the abilitiesin question. Psychological data track (...)
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  50.  38
    The Third Meditation on Objective Being: Representation and Intentional Content.Amy Schmitter - 2014 - In David Cunning (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 149-67.
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