Results for 'inverted qualia'

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  1. I: The Knowledge Argument for Qualia.Epiphenomenal Qualia - 2006 - In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 102.
  2. Invisible Disagreement: An Inverted Qualia Argument for Realism.Justin Donhauser - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):593-606.
    Scientific realists argue that a good track record of multi-agent, and multiple method, validation of empirical claims is itself evidence that those claims, at least partially and approximately, reflect ways nature actually is independent of the ways we conceptualize it. Constructivists contend that successes in validating empirical claims only suffice to establish that our ways of modelling the world, our “constructions,” are useful and adequate for beings like us. This essay presents a thought experiment in which beings like us intersubjectively (...)
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  3. Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind. The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.
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  4.  23
    Do Pseudonormal Persons Have Inverted Qualia? Scientific Hypotheses and Philosophical Interpretations.Uwe Meyer - forthcoming - Facta Philosophica.
  5. Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
  6. Supervenience, Physicalist Reduction and Inverted Qualia.Jonas Dagys - 2007 - Problemos 71:108-115.
    Funkcinës psichiniø savybiø analizës atveriama jø materialiojo ákûnijimo ávairovës galimybë verèia materialistiná monizmà sàmonës filosofijoje formuluoti ne psichiniø ir fiziniø savybiø tapatumo, bet pirmøjø pareities nuo antrøjø tezæ. Pareities sàvoka sàmonës filosofijoje iðreiðkia minimalius reikalavimus fizikalistinëms teorijoms – paneigus pareities fizikalizmà bûtø paneigtos ir stipresnës fizikalizmoversijos. Straipsnyje tyrinëjama fizikalizmo kritika paremta vadinamuoju kokybiø perkeitimo galimybës argumentu. Parodoma, kad, viena vertus, toks argumentas negali bûti atremtas nuorodomis áempirinius duomenis, nes svarstoma hipotetinë situacija numano jos empiriná nestebimumà; kita vertus, jei svarstoma situacija (...)
     
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  7. Do Pseudonormal Persons Have Inverted Qualia?Ulrich Meyer - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2:309-25.
     
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  8.  94
    Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Tye - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):159-183.
  9.  43
    From Inverted Spectra to Colorless Qualia: A Wittgensteinian Critique.William H. Brenner - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (4):360-381.
    This is terribly hard, Thouless, I'm sorry. I have thought over all this for years. … It is now as if we had ploughed furrows in different parts of a field. There is a lot left to do. Judging from their writings, most contemporary analytic philosophers have not been persuaded that “the inverted spectrum problem” is – as Wittgenstein maintained – really a conceptual puzzle calling for dissolution, rather than a straight problem calling for a solution. In this paper, (...)
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  10. Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
  11.  56
    Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Tye - 1994 - Noûs 28 (2):159-183.
  12. Wittgenstein, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.David G. Stern - 2010 - In Arley Moreno (ed.), Wittgenstein: Certeza? UNICAMP, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência.
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  13. On the Correct Treatment of Inverted Earth.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311.
    The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that (...)
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  14. Ned Block, Wittgenstein, and the Inverted Spectrum.John V. Canfield - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):691-712.
    In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise (...)
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  15. Mad Qualia.Umut Baysan - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):467-485.
    This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. (...)
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  16. Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum.Jason Ford - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.
    Michael Tye’s considered position on visual experience combines representationalism with externalism about color, so when considering spectrum inversion, he needs a principled reason to claim that a person with inverted color vision is seeing things incorrectly. Tye’s responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum ( 2000 , in: Consciousness, color, and content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and 2002a , in: Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford) rely on a teleological (...)
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  17.  65
    How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Inverted Spectrum.Timothy Schoettle - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):98-115.
    It is possible for a person and their environment to be physically identical each day and yet the representational content of their beliefs about color are inverted. Each day they utter the same words, ‘Wow! The colors of everything have switched again today.’ In uttering these words, they express a different proposition each day. This supports the view held by Reichenbach and Carnap that when it comes to representations of colored objects, relations of similarity and difference are fundamental. There (...)
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  18. Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars.Hilan Bensusan & Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of (...)
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  19.  62
    The Functional Mapping Hypothesis.Michael Pauen - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):107-118.
    Dissociation thought experiments like Zombie and Inverted Spectrum cases play an essential role in the qualia debate. Critics have long since argued that these cases raise serious epistemic issues, undermining first person access to phenomenal states also in normal subjects. Proponents have denied this because, due to their phenomenal experience, normal subjects have epistemic abilities that Zombies don’t have. Here I will present a modified version of these thought experiments: Part-time Zombies and Part-time Inverts switch between normal and (...)
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  20. Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
    endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint (...)
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  21. Qualia and Introspection.Michael Beaton - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.
    The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further (...)
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  22. Let's Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument.B. van Heuveln, Eric Dietrich & M. Oshima - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249.
    David Chalmers' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even (...)
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  23. Qualia: They’Re Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.
    Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for (...)
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  24.  61
    Capturing Qualia: Higher-Order Concepts and Connectionism.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):29-41.
    Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classifications of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scientific explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or subjective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, complex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental states from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanations. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, these (...)
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  25. The Experience of Left and Right.Geoffrey Lee - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
  26. Pain is Mechanism.Simon van Rysewyk - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Tasmania
    What is the relationship between pain and the body? I claim that pain is best explained as a type of personal experience and the bodily response during pain is best explained in terms of a type of mechanical neurophysiologic operation. I apply the radical philosophy of identity theory from philosophy of mind to the relationship between the personal experience of pain and specific neurophysiologic mechanism and argue that the relationship between them is best explained as one of type identity. Specifically, (...)
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  27. Inverted Spectrum Arguments.David J. Cole - manuscript
    Formerly a spectral apparition that haunted behaviorism and provided a puzzle about our knowledge of other minds, the inverted spectrum possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. The inverted spectrum hypothesis raises the possibility that two individuals might think and behave in the same way yet have different qualia. The traditional supposition is of an individual who has a subjective color spectrum that is inverted with regard to that had by (...)
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  28. Black and White and the Inverted Spectrum.Justin Broackes - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.
    To the familiar idea of an undetectable spectrum inversion some have added the idea of inverted earth. This new combination of ideas is even harder to make coherent, particularly as it applies to a supposed inversion of black and white counteracted by an environmental switch of these. Black and white exhibit asymmetries in their connections with illumination, shadow and visibility, which rule out their being reversed. And since the most saturated yellow is light and the most saturated blue dark, (...)
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  29. Functionalism and Inverted Spectra.David J. Cole - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):207-22.
    Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been of (...)
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  30. Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, And Affective States.Neil Campbell - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):239-255.
    I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is not a possibility we should take seriously. The principle reason is that if someone's qualia were inverted in the specified manner there is reason to believe the phenomenal difference would manifest itself in behaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, I suggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, are partly constituted by an affective component which would be inverted along with the connected qualia. The resulting affective (...)
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  31.  94
    Qualia Compression.Lieven Decock & Igor Douven - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):129-150.
    Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons’ color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed ‘‘color qualia compression’’—and argues that the (...)
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  32. Subduing Subjectivity and Capturing Qualia: A Reply to First-Person Isolationism in the Philosophy of Mind.Bryon J. Cunningham - 2000 - Dissertation, Emory University
    The current orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind can be thought of as a kind of third-person imperialism, viz. the view that consciousness, like other natural phenomena, will yield to scientific explanation at some level of analysis. Among its dissenters are a group of antireductionists and antimaterialists who advocate a kind of first-person isolationism, viz. the view that consciousness, unlike other natural phenomena, will fail to yield to scientific explanation at any level of analysis. In its various forms, the latter (...)
     
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  33. Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content.Brad Thompson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.
    In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content. It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum - inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience.
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  34. Color, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. pp. 55-66.
    Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color is experienced (...)
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  35.  65
    Computationalism and the Locality Principle.David Longinotti - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):495-506.
    Computationalism, a specie of functionalism, posits that a mental state like pain is realized by a ‘core’ computational state within a particular causal network of such states. This entails that what is realized by the core state is contingent on events remote in space and time, which puts computationalism at odds with the locality principle of physics. If computationalism is amended to respect locality, then it posits that a type of phenomenal experience is determined by a single type of computational (...)
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  36. Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts.Diana I. Perez - 2002 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 17 (2):359-379.
    In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism, there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: the explanatory gap argument, and two (...)
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    Tertium Datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's Consciousness Reconsidered.Allin Cottrell - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103.
    Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a (...)
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  38.  30
    Constrained Inversions of Sensations.Erik Myin - 2001 - Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.
    Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments won't work. (...)
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  39.  21
    Do We Need Qualia to Do Physics?Marek Suwara - 2012 - Dialogue and Universalism 22 (4):67-74.
    Following the well known inverted spectrum argument by John Locke we examine the necessity of the first person experience in creating scientific knowledge, in particular, in physics. It is found that Locke’s argument is irrelevant for creating objective knowledge as the necessary things we need to do physics are: ability to perform measurements in terms of comparing certain quantities, ability to create theoretical ideas (in dependence inter alia on cultural principles, changing in the course of history), and the brain (...)
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    Illusionism and Definitions of Phenomenal Consciousness.Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper aims to uncover where the disagreement between illusionism and anti-illusionism about phenomenal consciousness lies fundamentally. While illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, many philosophers of mind regard illusionism as ridiculous, stating that the existence of phenomenal consciousness cannot be reasonably doubted. The question is, why does such a radical disagreement occur? To address this question, I list various characterisations of the term “phenomenal consciousness”: (1) the what-it-is-like locution, (2) inner ostension, (3) thought experiments such as philosophical (...)
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  41. What Is It Like to See with Your Ears? The Representational Theory of Mind.Dominic M. McIver Lopes - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.
    Representational theories of mind cannot individuate the sense modalities in a principled manner. According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of experiences is determined by their contents. The usual objection is that inverted qualia are possible, so the phenomenal character of experiences may vary independently of their contents. But the objection is inconclusive. It raises difficult questions about the metaphysics of secondary qualities and it is difficult to see whether or not inverted qualia are possible. This paper (...)
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  42.  20
    The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.Brian Beakley - 1999 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):664-666.
    Building on earlier papers on the same theme, Chalmers argues here for a dualism which is epiphenomenalist, yet naturalistic. After establishing the elements of his position, Chalmers explores numerous applications, including arguments against missing and inverted qualia; the congeniality of his view to panpsychism, functionalism, and artificial intelligence, and even the proper interpretation of quantum physics.
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  43. Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):429-457.
    Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia’. First, they are irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset (...)
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  44. Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness.Robert James M. Boyles - 2012 - In Proceedings of the DLSU Congress 2012. pp. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, (...)
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  45. Growing Evidence That Perceptual Qualia Are Neuroelectrical Not Computational.Mostyn W. Jones - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):89-116.
    Computational neuroscience attributes coloured areas and other perceptual qualia to calculations that are realizable in multiple cellular forms. This faces serious issues in explaining how the various qualia arise and how they bind to form overall perceptions. Qualia may instead be neuroelectrical. Growing evidence indicates that perceptions correlate with neuroelectrical activity spotted by locally activated EEGs, the different qualia correlate with the different electrochemistries of unique detector cells, a unified neural-electromagnetic field binds this activity to form (...)
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  46. Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  47. Agency, Qualia and Life: Connecting Mind and Body Biologically.David Longinotti - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Cham: Springer. pp. 43-56.
    Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency, mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which (...)
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  48. Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 309--328.
    It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the (...)
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  49. Four Meta-Methods for the Study of Qualia.Lok-Chi Chan & Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):145-167.
    In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ employed in scientific and philosophical research of qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of qualia that we immediately observe through introspection ; the argument-centred meta-method is interested in (...)
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  50. Two Types of Qualia Theory.Pär Sundström - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.
    This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.
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