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Jesper Kallestrup [43]J. Kallestrup [2]
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Profile: Jesper Kallestrup (University of Edinburgh)
  1. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
    A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate (...)
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  2. Varieties of Externalism.J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.
    Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first (...)
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  3. Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):691-714.
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ ; though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments (...)
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  4.  82
    Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):84-103.
    According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically (...)
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  5.  64
    Introduction [to Logos & Episteme, Special Issue: Intellectual Humility].J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (7): 409-411.
    While it is widely regarded that intellectual humility is among the intellectual virtues, there is as of yet little consensus on the matter of what possessing and exercising intellectual humility consists in, and how it should be best understood as advancing our epistemic goals. For example, does intellectual humility involve an underestimation of one’s intellectual abilities, or rather, does it require an accurate conception? Is intellectual humility a fundamentally interpersonal/social virtue, or might it be valuable to exercise in isolation? To (...)
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  6. The Causal Exclusion Argument.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second that (...)
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  7. An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  8. Bootstrap and Rollback: Generalizing Epistemic Circularity.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):395-413.
    Reliabilists accept the possibility of basic knowledge—knowledge that p in virtue of the reliability of some belief-producing process r without antecedent knowledge that r is reliable. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002 , Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005 ) and Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000 , J Philos 105:518–539, 2008 ) have argued that one can bootstrap knowledge that r is reliable from basic knowledge. This paper provides a diagnosis of epistemic bootstrapping, and then shows that recent attempts at embracing (...)
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  9.  46
    Group Virtue Epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    According to Sosa, knowledge is apt belief, where a belief is apt when accurate because adroit. Sosa :465–475, 2010; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa’s influential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This paper (...)
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  10. Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong.Jonas Christensen & Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):513-517.
    Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
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  11. Knowledge-Wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge.Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):468-476.
    Call knowledge where so-and-so, knowledge who so-and-so, etc., knowledge-wh. The reductive view says that knowledge-wh reduces to the two-place knowledge relation Ksp. Schaffer argues that this view has no viable response to the problem of convergent knowledge: how can a knowing-wh ascription be reduced to a Ksp ascription if a second knowing-wh ascription intuitively inequivalent to the first can be reduced to the same Ksp ascription? Instead he suggests that knowledge-wh be understood as a three-place knowledge relation Kspq, where q (...)
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  12. Scepticism and Reliable BeliefBy José Zalabardo.Jesper Kallestrup - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):809-811.
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  13. Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):273-295.
    David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don't fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities. This means that some of Chalmers' criticism is unwarranted, (...)
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  14. Conceivability, Rigidity and Counterpossibles.Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):377 - 386.
    Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis’ objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright’s proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.
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  15.  56
    The Epistemology of Absence-Based Inference.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Jesper Kallestrup - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2573-2593.
    Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The (...)
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  16.  85
    Reliabilist Justification: Basic, Easy, and Brute. [REVIEW]Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.
    Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that once we carefully (...)
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  17.  34
    The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup & D. H. Pritchard - 2013 - In Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Routledge. pp. 248--269.
  18. Recent Work on McKinsey's Paradox.J. Kallestrup - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):157-171.
  19.  8
    From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):533-552.
    Epistemic anti-individualism is the view that positive epistemic statuses fail to supervene on internal, physical or mental, properties of individuals. Intellectual humility is a central intellectual virtue in the pursuit of such statuses. After some introductory remarks, this paper provides an argument for epistemic anti-individualism with respect to a virtue-theoretic account of testimonial knowledge. An outline of a dual-aspect account of intellectual humility is then offered. The paper proceeds to argue that insofar as testimonial knowledge is concerned, this stripe of (...)
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  20. Three Strands in Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory.Jesper Kallestrup - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.
    Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises. It turns out that each (...)
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  21.  50
    If Omniscient Beings Are Dialetheists, Then so Are Anti-Realists.Jesper Kallestrup - 2007 - Analysis 67 (295):252–254.
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  22. Paradoxes About Belief.Jesper Kallestrup - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117.
    Referentialism is the view that all there is to the meaning of a singular term is its referent. Referentialism entails Substitutivity, i.e., that co-referring terms are intersubstitutable salva veritate . Frege's Paradox shows that Referentialism is inconsistent given two principles: Disquotation says that if S assents to 'P', then S believes that P, and Consistency says that if S believes that P and that not-P, then S is not fully rational. Kripke's strategy was to save Substitutivity by showing that those (...)
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  23.  98
    Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):5-21.
    In response to Kripke's modal argument contemporary descriptivists suggest that referring terms, e.g., ‘water’, are synonymous with actually-rigidified definite descriptions, e.g., ‘the actual watery stuff’. Following Scott Soames, this strategy has the counterintuitive consequence that possible speakers on Perfect Earth cannot be ascribed water-beliefs without beliefs about the actual world. Co-indexing the actuality and possibility operators has the equally untoward result that possible speakers on Twin Earth are ascribed water-beliefs. So, Soames's dilemma is that the descriptivist can account for either (...)
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  24.  48
    The Mind-Body World-Not.Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Think 8 (21):37-51.
    Here Kallestrup presents a succinct introduction to some of the latest thinking about the notorious mind-body problem.
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  25.  61
    Contextualism Between Scepticism and Common-Sense.Jesper Kallestrup - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):247-266.
    This paper examines two recent objections against contextualism. The first is that contextualists are unable to assert their own position, and the second is that contextualists are forced to side with common-sense against scepticism. It is argued that once we get clear on the commitments of contextualism, neither objection succeeds in what it aims to show.
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  26. Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
    This paper offers a new solution to the knowledge argument. Both a priori and a posteriori physicalists reject the claim that Mary does not know all the facts, but they do so for different reasons. While the former think that Mary gains no new knowledge of any fact, the latter think that Mary gains new knowledge of an old fact. This paper argues that on a broad understanding of what counts as physical, it is consistent with physicalism that Mary does (...)
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  27. Perspectival Thought.Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):347-352.
    Many philosophers of language and mind have recognized the existence of two distinct kinds of content assigned to our linguistic and mental representations. Thus following Kaplan , the character is the linguistic meaning of an expression-type, while the content is the propositional content expressed by a token of that expression in a context. Perry applied Kaplan's distinction in the analysis of belief: the proposition p is what a subject S believes, and the belief state is that in virtue of which (...)
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  28. Review of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim. [REVIEW]Jesper Kallestrup - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    The debate between the reductive and emergent materialist is still very much a live one. (Antony and Levine 1997; Auyang 2000; Bechtel and Richardson 1992; Block 1997; Boyd 1999; Crane 2001; David 1997; Fodor 1989; Fodor 1997; Kim 1993b; Kim 1994; Kim 1996; Kim 1999; Le Pore and Loewer 1987; Millikan 1999; Pereboom 2002; Rueger 2000; Van Gulick 2001; Yablo 1992). We argue that the best way to settle this debate is to take a step back and consider the metaphysics (...)
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  29.  29
    Counteractuals, Counterfactuals and Semantic Intuitions.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):35-54.
    Machery et al. claim that analytic philosophers of language are committed to a method of cases according to which theories of reference are assessed by consulting semantic intuitions about actual and possible cases. Since empirical evidence suggests that such intuitions vary both within and across cultures, these experimental semanticists conclude that the traditional attempt at pursuing such theories is misguided. Against the backdrop of Kripke’s anti-descriptivist arguments, this paper offers a novel response to the challenge posed by Machery et al., (...)
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  30.  25
    Two Notions of Circularity.Jesper Kallestrup - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):486-512.
    Crispin Wright’s epistemic response to McKinsey’s paradox is to argue that introspective knowledge of the first premise fails to transmit across the semantic externalist entailment in the second premise to the conclusion that one has such untoward knowledge of the external world. This paper argues first that Stewart Cohen and Jonathan Vogel’s bootstrapping arguments suffer from a novel kind of epistemic circularity, which triggers failure of transmission but allows for the possibility of basic perceptual knowledge. It is then argued that (...)
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  31.  12
    Recent Work on McKinsey's Paradox.J. Kallestrup - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):157-171.
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  32.  12
    Introduction: Social Cognitive Ecology and Its Role in Social Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken, Jesper Kallestrup, Klemens Kappel & Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):1-5.
  33.  9
    Puzzles About Apriori Contingencies.Jesper Kallestrup - 2000 - SATS 1 (1):37-48.
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  34. Extended Epistemology.Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
     
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  35. Socially Extended Knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  36. Socially Extended Knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  37. Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation.Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: What happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties?
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  38. Knowledge-Wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge.Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):468-476.
    Call knowledge where so-and-so, knowledge who so-and-so, etc., knowledge-wh. The reductive view says that knowledge-wh reduces to the two-place knowledge relation Ksp. Schaffer argues that this view has no viable response to the problem of convergent knowledge: how can a knowing-wh ascription be reduced to a Ksp ascription if a second knowing-wh ascription intuitively inequivalent to the first can be reduced to the same Ksp ascription? Instead he suggests that knowledge-wh be understood as a three-place knowledge relation Kspq, where q (...)
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  39. Methods and Skills for Philosophy: An Advanced Guide.Jesper Kallestrup - 2018 - Routledge.
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  40. Privileged Acces and Two Kinds of Semantic Externalism.Jesper Kallestrup - 2003 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 38.
     
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  41. Semantic Externalism.Jesper Kallestrup - 2011 - Routledge.
    Semantic externalism is the view that the meanings of referring terms, and the contents of beliefs that are expressed by those terms, are not fully determined by factors internal to the speaker but are instead bound up with the environment. The debate about semantic externalism is one of the most important but difficult topics in philosophy of mind and language, and has consequences for our understanding of the role of social institutions and the physical environment in constituting language and the (...)
     
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  42. Scepticism Versus Dogmatism.Jesper Kallestrup - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
     
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  43. Extended Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Adam Carter (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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