Results for 'knowledge attribution'

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  1.  13
    A Bayesian Framework for Knowledge Attribution: Evidence From Semantic Integration.Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Ángel Pinillos & Keith Holyoak - 2015 - Cognition 139:92-104.
    We propose a Bayesian framework for the attribution of knowledge, and apply this framework to generate novel predictions about knowledge attribution for different types of “Gettier cases”, in which an agent is led to a justified true belief yet has made erroneous assumptions. We tested these predictions using a paradigm based on semantic integration. We coded the frequencies with which participants falsely recalled the word “thought” as “knew” (or a near synonym), yielding an implicit measure of (...)
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  2.  3
    Knowledge Attribution Revisited: A Deflationary Account.Eleonora Cresto - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest (...)
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  3.  8
    Having a Concept “See” Does Not Imply Attribution of Knowledge: Some General Considerations in Measuring “Theories of Mind”.David A. Leavens - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):123-124.
    That organisms have a concept “see” does not necessarily entail that they attribute knowledge to others or predict others' behaviors on the basis of inferred mental states. An alternative experimental protocol is proposed in which accurate prediction of the location of an experimenters' impending appearance is contingent upon subjects' attribution of knowledge to the experimenter.
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  4. A Direct Attribution Theory of Perceptual Knowledge.Jong-ho Ha - 1988 - Dissertation, Brown University
    My purposes in this dissertation are to defend Chisholm's direct attribution theory as a theory of reference and intentionality and to propose a revised version of that theory with respect to the problems of perception and epistemic justification in perceptual knowledge. The direct attribution theory of reference has a remarkable merit that it can solve some theoretical difficulties with other theories of reference and explain comprehensively our intentional acts. Although I accept Chisholm's viewpoint on reference and intentionality, (...)
     
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  5.  46
    Doing Without Believing: Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.
    We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to \ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact \ is a way for them to \. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to \ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to \, then an agent cannot (...)
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  6.  2
    Knowledge-Based Causal Attribution: The Abnormal Conditions Focus Model.Denis J. Hilton & Ben R. Slugoski - 1986 - Psychological Review 93 (1):75-88.
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  7. Knowledge as a Mental State.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced (...)
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  8. Knowledge and Luck.John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 22 (2):378-390.
    Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing credit from luck, we conducted a series of four studies on knowledge attributions. Knowledge is an achievement that involves reaching the truth. But many factors affecting the truth are beyond our control and reaching the truth is often partly due to luck. Which sorts of luck (...)
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  9. Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129:652-661.
    Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ (...)
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  10.  64
    Concessive Knowledge-Attributions: Fallibilism and Gradualism.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.
    Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.
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  11.  90
    Factive and Non-Factive Mental State Attribution.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, non-factive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers on mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind, and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or ‘reality-incongruent’ states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental (...)
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  12.  21
    Possibilities Regained: Neo-Lewisian Contextualism and Ordinary Life.Mario Piazza & Nevia Dolcini - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    According to David Lewis, the predicate ‘knows’ is context-sensitive in the sense that its truth conditions vary across conversational contexts, which stretch or compress the domain of error possibilities to be eliminated by the subject’s evidence. Our concern in this paper is to thematize, assess, and overcome within a neo-Lewisian contextualist project two important mismatches between our use of ‘know’ in ordinary life and the use of ‘know’ by ‘Lewisian’ ordinary speakers. The first mismatch is that Lewisian contextualism still overgenerates (...)
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  13.  21
    Getting Off the Wheel.Patrick Bondy & Dustin Olson - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):620-637.
    Roderick Chisholm argues that in giving an account of knowledge, we must either begin with an account of what knowledge is, and proceed on that basis to identify the particular things that we know, or else start with instances of knowledge, and proceed on that basis to formulate a definition of knowledge. Either approach begs the question against the other. This is the epistemic wheel. This article responds to Chisholm's challenge. It begins with cases of (...) attribution and builds its account from there, identifying those features that we take to be present in the cases where we have attributed knowledge and those features that seem important when we want to withhold an attribution of knowledge. The proposal does not beg the question against either particularists or methodists; it takes the best features of each view, without beginning with either, and thereby removes us from the wheel. (shrink)
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  14. The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions.Nikola Kompa - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):16-28.
    The basic idea of conversational contextualism is that knowledge attributions are context sensitive in that a given knowledge attribution may be true if made in one context but false if made in another, owing to differences in the attributors’ conversational contexts. Moreover, the context sensitivity involved is traced back to the context sensitivity of the word “know,” which, in turn, is commonly modelled on the case either of genuine indexicals such as “I” or “here” or of comparative (...)
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  15.  38
    Stanley on the Knowledge-Relation.Steffen Borge - 2008 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):109-124.
    The latest newcomer on the epistemology scene is Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), which is the view that even though the semantics of the verb “know” is invariant, the answer to the question of whether someone knows something is sensitive to factors about that person. Factors about the context of the purported knower are relevant to whether he knows some proposition p or not. In this paper I present Jason Stanley's version of SSI, a theory Stanley calls Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI). The core (...)
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  16. Knowledge in and Out of Context.Kent Bach - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. pp. 105--36.
    In this chapter, the author offers another explanation of the variation in contents, which is explained by contextualism as being related to a variation in standards. The author’s explanation posits that the contents of knowledge attributions are invariant. The variation lies in what knowledge attributions we are willing to make or accept. Although not easy to acknowledge, what contextualism counts as knowledge varies with the context in which it is attributed. A new rival to contextualism, known as (...)
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  17.  93
    Aristotle on Friendship and Self-Knowledge: The Friend Beyond the Mirror.Mavis Biss - 2011 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2):125.
    Aristotle's emphasis on sameness of character in his description of the virtuous friend as "another self" figures centrally in all his arguments for the necessity of friendship to self-knowledge. Although the attribution of the Magna Moralia to Aristotle is disputed, the comparison of the friend to a mirror in this work has encouraged many commentators to view the friend as a mirror that provides the clearest and most immediate image of one's own virtue. I will offer my own (...)
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  18.  35
    Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...)
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  19. Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language.Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.
    Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts. Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding ordinary knowledge practices. Proposed is an experiment designed to test the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist defenses rely. In the cases tested, the folk pattern of knowledge attribution runs contrary to what contextualism predicts. While preliminary, (...)
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  20.  38
    Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children.James Russell - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.
    The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as 'the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts' [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432—451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes (...)
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  21. Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments About Knowledge.Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):278-289.
    One recent trend in contemporary epistemology is to study the way in which the concept of knowledge is actually applied in everyday settings. This approach has inspired an exciting new spirit of collaboration between experimental philosophers and traditional epistemologists, who have begun using the techniques of the social sciences to investigate the factors that influence ordinary judgments about knowledge attribution. This paper provides an overview of some of the results these researchers have uncovered, suggesting that in addition (...)
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  22.  23
    Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach.Sarah Wright - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):99-111.
    Attributor contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism both suggest ways in which our concept of knowledge depends on a context. Both offer approaches that incorporate traditionally non-epistemic elements into our standards for knowledge. But neither can account for the fact that the social role of a subject affects the standards that the subject must meet in order to warrant a knowledge attribution. I illustrate the dependence of the standards for knowledge on the social roles of the knower (...)
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  23.  5
    Strict Moderate Invariantism and Knowledge-Denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Strict moderate invariantism is the ho-hum, ‘obvious’ view about knowledge attributions. It says knowledge attributions are often true and that only traditional epistemic factors like belief, truth, and justification make them true. As commonsensical as strict moderate invariantism is, it is equally natural to withdraw a knowledge attribution when error possibilities are made salient. If strict moderate invariantism is true, these knowledge-denials are often false because the subject does in fact know the proposition. I argue (...)
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  24.  21
    Wittgenstein's Concept of Knowledge.A. Zvie Bar-On - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:63-75.
    Wittgenstein's Über Gewißheit shows his de facto commitment to the Three Condition Theory, according to which a knowledge-attribution implies belief, justification and truth, i.e., one can't be said to know that p unless (a) he believes that p; (b) he is in a position to justify p; and (c) 'p' is true. However, when it comes to tackling the puzzling infinite regress of justifications Wittgenstein's argument becomes entangled in an epistemological circle. It seems to oscillate between an unwelcome (...)
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  25. Wittgenstein's Concept of Knowledge.Bar-on A. Zvie - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:63-75.
    Wittgenstein's Über Gewißheit shows his de facto commitment to the Three Condition Theory, according to which a knowledge-attribution implies belief, justification and truth, i.e., one can't be said to know that p unless he believes that p; he is in a position to justify p; and 'p' is true. However, when it comes to tackling the puzzling infinite regress of justifications Wittgenstein's argument becomes entangled in an epistemological circle. It seems to oscillate between an unwelcome absolutism and a (...)
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  26. Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
    Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called ?need-for-closure?) relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy (...)
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  27. Bodily Action and Distal Attribution in Sensory Substitution.Robert Briscoe - forthcoming - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Proceedings of the British Academy.
    According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the (...)
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  28.  15
    Reconciling Justice and Attribution Research to Advance Climate Policy.Huggel Christian, Wallimann-Helmer Ivo, Stone Dáithí & Cramer Wolfgang - forthcoming - .
    The Paris Climate Agreement is an important step for international climate policy, but the compensation for negative effects of climate change based on clear assignment of responsibilities remains highly debated. From both a policy and a science perspective, it is unclear how responsibilities should be defined and on what evidence base. We explore different normative principles of justice relevant to climate change impacts, and ask how different forms of causal evidence of impacts drawn from detection and attribution research could (...)
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  29.  36
    A Social Psychological View of Morality: Why Knowledge of Situational Influences on Behaviour Can Improve Character Development Practices.Steven M. Samuels & William D. Casebeer - 2005 - Journal of Moral Education 34 (1):73-87.
    Results from research in social psychology, such as findings about the fundamental attribution error and other situational influences on behaviour, are often used to justify attacking the existence of character traits. From this perspective, character development is an illusion, an impossibility, or both. We offer a different interpretation of how these issues interact with character development concerns. Rather than undermining the very idea of character traits, social psychology actually sheds light on the manner in which character development can occur. (...)
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  30. "Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Agent Based Knowledge".Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor - forthcoming - In Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue.
    “Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Epistemic Virtue” by Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor: A modification of F.P. Ramsey’s success semantics supports a naturalized theory of epistemic virtue that includes motivational components and can potentially explain both epistemic reliability and responsibility with a single normative-explanatory principle. An “epistemic Ramsey success” will also provide a better account of the “because of” condition central to virtue-reliabilist accounts of knowledge from Greco, Sosa and Pritchard. Ramsey said that the truth condition of a (...)
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  31.  39
    Fish Traps and Rabbit Snares: Zhuangzi on Judgement, Truth and Knowledge.Deborah H. Soles & David E. Soles - 1998 - Asian Philosophy 8 (3):149 – 164.
    We argue that the common attribution to Zhuangzi of both perspectivalism or relativism on the one hand, and scepticism on the other is fundamentally mistaken. While granting that it is reasonable to construe Zhuangzi as offering a perspectiva! position on judgement, we argue that Zhuangzi's perspectivalism does not commit him to a relativist position on truth or to scepticism about human knowledge. Rather, we maintain that Zhuangzi's attacks on the concepts of truth and knowledge are better seen (...)
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  32.  5
    Lost in the Crowd: Entitative Group Membership Reduces Mind Attribution.Carey K. Morewedge, Jesse J. Chandler, Robert Smith, Norbert Schwarz & Jonathan Schooler - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1195-1205.
    This research examined how and why group membership diminishes the attribution of mind to individuals. We found that mind attribution was inversely related to the size of the group to which an individual belonged . Mind attribution was affected by group membership rather than the total number of entities perceived at once . Moreover, mind attribution to an individual varied with the perception that the individual was a group member. Participants attributed more mind to an individual (...)
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  33.  8
    Implicit and Explicit Knowledge: One Representational Medium or Many?James A. Hampton - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):769-770.
    In Dienes & Perner's analysis, implicitly represented knowledge differs from explicitly represented knowledge only in the attribution of properties to specific events and to self-awareness of the knower. This commentary questions whether implicit knowledge should be thought of as being represented in the same conceptual vocabulary; rather, it may involve a quite different form of representation.
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  34.  1
    Attribution is More Likely to Be Demonstrated in More Natural Contexts.M. D. Matheson, M. Cooper, J. Weeks, R. Thompson & D. Fragaszy - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):124-126.
    We propose a naturalistic version of the “guesser–knower” paradigm in which the experimental subject has an opportunity to choose which individual to follow to a hidden food source. This design allows nonhumans to display the attribution of knowledge to another conspecific, rather than a human, in a naturalistic context (finding food), and it is readily adapted to different species.
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  35.  13
    Psychological Metaphysics.Peter A. White - 1993 - Routledge.
    Psychological Metaphysics is an exploration of the most basic and important assumptions in the psychological construction of reality, with the aim of showing what they are, how they originate, and what they are there for. Peter White proposes that people basically understand causation in terms of stable, special powers of things operating to produce effects under suitable conditions. This underpins an analysis of people's understanding of causal processes in the physical world, and of human action. In making a radical break (...)
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  36. Verbal Reports About Causal Influences on Social Judgments: Private Access Versus Public Theories.Richard E. Nisbett & Nancy Bellows - 1977 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (9):613-624.
    128 female Ss were asked to make 4 judgments about a young woman after reading her "job application portfolio." Five characteristics of the young woman were manipulated orthogonally. Ss were asked to report how each of the 5 manipulated factors had influenced each of their judgments. "Observer Ss," who had access only to very impoverished descriptions of each of the 5 factors, were asked to predict how each of the factors would influence each of the judgments. Results show that S (...)
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  37.  47
    Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology.James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosopohy.
    We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials (...)
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  38.  86
    The Role of Context in Contextualism.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2341-2366.
    According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.
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  39.  93
    The Cognitive Act and the First-Person Perspective: An Epistemology for Constructive Type Theory.Schaar Maria van der - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):391 - 417.
    The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb 'to know' that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of (...)
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  40.  52
    Epistemic Comparative Conditionals.Linton Wang - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):133 - 156.
    The interest of epistemic comparative conditionals comes from the fact that they represent genuine ‘comparative epistemic relations’ between propositions, situations, evidences, abilities, interests, etc. This paper argues that various types of epistemic comparative conditionals uniformly represent comparative epistemic relations via the comparison of epistemic positions rather than the comparison of epistemic standards. This consequence is considered as a general constraint on a theory of knowledge attribution, and then further used to argue against the contextualist thesis that, in some (...)
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  41.  74
    Understanding Phenomena.Christoph Kelp - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3799-3816.
    The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowledge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast, their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essentially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an account of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected (...)
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  42.  73
    Depth and Deference: When and Why We Attribute Understanding.Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, Dillon Plunkett & Tania Lombrozo - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):373-393.
    Four experiments investigate the folk concept of “understanding,” in particular when and why it is deployed differently from the concept of knowledge. We argue for the positions that people have higher demands with respect to explanatory depth when it comes to attributing understanding, and that this is true, in part, because understanding attributions play a functional role in identifying experts who should be heeded with respect to the general field in question. These claims are supported by our findings that (...)
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  43.  59
    Knowing‐'Wh', Mention‐Some Readings, and Non‐Reducibility.B. R. George - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):166-177.
    This article presents a new criticisms of reductive approaches to knowledge-‘wh’ (i.e., those approaches on which whether one stands in the knowledge-‘wh’ relation to a question is determined by whether one stands in the knowledge-‘that’ relation to some answer(s) to the question). It argues in particular that the truth of a knowledge-‘wh’ attribution like ‘Janna knows where she can buy an Italian newspaper’ depends not only on what Janna knows about the availability of Italian newspapers, (...)
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  44. When Is A Belief True Because Of Luck?Preston Greene - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):465-475.
    Many epistemologists are attracted to the claim that knowledge possession excludes luck. Virtue epistemologists attempt to clarify this idea by holding that knowledge requires apt belief: belief that is true because of an agent's epistemic virtues, and not because of luck. Thinking about aptness may have the potential to make progress on important questions in epistemology, but first we must possess an adequate account of when a belief is true because of luck. Existing treatments of aptness assume a (...)
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  45.  81
    Relativism, Sceptical Paradox, and Semantic Blindness.Dirk Kindermann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):585-603.
    Abstract Relativism about knowledge attributions is the view that a single occurrence of ‘S knows [does not know] that p’ may be true as assessed in one context and false as assessed in another context. It has been argued that relativism is equipped to accommodate all the data from speakers’ use of ‘know’ without recourse to an error theory. This is supposed to be relativism’s main advantage over contextualist and invariantist views. This paper argues that relativism does require the (...)
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  46.  24
    Temporal Delays Can Facilitate Causal Attribution: Towards a General Timeframe Bias in Causal Induction.Marc J. Buehner & Stuart McGregor - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (4):353 – 378.
    Two variables are usually recognised as determinants of human causal learning: the contingency between a candidate cause and effect, and the temporal and/or spatial contiguity between them. A common finding is that reductions in temporal contiguity produce concomitant decrements in causal judgement. This finding had previously (Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) been interpreted as evidence that causal induction is based on associative learning processes. Buehner and May (2002, 2003, 2004) have challenged this notion by demonstrating that the impact of temporal delay (...)
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  47.  4
    Letter Knowledge in Parent–Child Conversations: Differences Between Families Differing in Socio-Economic Status.Sarah Robins, Dina Ghosh, Nicole Rosales & Rebecca Treiman - unknown
    Copyright © 2014 Robins, Ghosh, Rosales and Treiman. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
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  48. Subjects of Experience.E. J. Lowe - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
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  49. The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge.Peter Carruthers - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.
     
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  50. Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred Dretske - 1981 - MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by viewing (...)
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