On the ethics of extending human life: healthy people have a right to carry on livingHumanity has long demonstrated a paradoxical ambivalence concerning the extension of a healthy human lifespan. Modest health extension has been universally sought, whereas extreme health extension has been regarded as a snare and delusion—a dream beyond all others at first blush, but actually something we are better off without. The prevailing pace of biotechnological progress is bringing ever closer the day when (...) humanity will be able to act on the latter view by rejecting a clear and present opportunity for much longer healthy lives. Indeed, some biogerontologists contend that that day has already arrived, to the extent that our hesitation in embarking on a vigorous “war on ageing” is already delaying the point at which a cure for ageing will be developed. Here I consider whether our present caution concerning the wisdom of truly curing ageing is likely to survive the increased scrutiny that it will receive in coming years as a result of these technical advances. I conclude that it will not, because of its irreconcilability with values that are more deeply held by the large majority of humanity than any values that argue against the quest for a cure. I further conclude that all the major current reasons given for not curing ageing are mere crutches to help us cope with the immutability of ageing that we have been brought up to accept. Our failure to set aside such irrationality is already shortening potential longevity—quite probably of those already alive today—to a staggering degree. Once we realise this, our determination to consign human ageing to history will be second …. (shrink)
Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that lifeextension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to lifeextension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Lifeextension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to lifeextension in its current (...) form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains constrained, and many obstacles to the fulfilment of an agent’s goals are preserved. Agents with longer lives are also presented with new challenges: for instance, it might be harder for them to avoid chronic boredom, and sustain their motivation to act in the pursuit of their goals. Although objections from agency and boredom are often used in combination to support the view that a much longer life is likely to bring misery or become meaningless, I argue that the acceptance of the boredom objection undermines the persuasiveness of the agency objection. (shrink)
Abstract Objections to lifeextension often focus on its effects for individual well-being. Prominent amongst these concerns is the possibility that life extending technologies will extend lifespan without preventing the ageing of the mind. Writers on the subject express the fear that life extending drugs will keep us physically youthful whilst our minds decay, succumbing to dementia, boredom, and loneliness. Generally these fears remain speculative, in part due to the absence of genuine life extending technologies. (...) In this paper, however, I examine the implications of an existing lifeextension technology. Caloric restriction (CR) and drugs that mimic its effects, such as rapamycin, metformin and resveratrol have been shown to increase average and maximum lifespan in a wide variety of organisms, and seem likely to do so in humans. Moreover, some CR mimetic drugs (CRMs) are already widely used. This means that they present a pressing test case for fears about mental ageing in an extended life. Misgivings about mental ageing can be divided into biomedical factors such as the likelihood of brain ageing, and psychological factors such as loss of meaning and boredom. I argue that studies of CR suggest that brain ageing will be beneficially slowed. However, it is less clear that deleterious aspects of psychological ageing can be similarly retarded. I argue that this reduces the desirability of lifeextension unless major social changes can be made. (shrink)
It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives although the total welfare is the same in both cases, and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss two interesting suggestion that seems to support this idea, or so it has been argued. Firstly, the idea there is a positive level of wellbeing above which (...) a life has to reach to have positive contributive value to a population, so-called Critical Level Utilitarianism. Secondly, the view that it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been, a view I call Comparativism. I shall show that although these theories do capture some of our intuitions about the value of longevity, they have such counterintuitive implications in other cases that we ultimately have to reject them. (shrink)
The worst possible way to resolve this issue is to leave it up to individual choice. There is no known social good coming from the conquest of death (Bailey, 1999). - Daniel Callahan Dramatically extending the human lifespan seems increasingly possible. Many bioethicists object that life-extension will have Malthusian consequences as new Methuselahs accumulate, generation by generation. I argue for a Life-Years Response to the Malthusian Objection. If even a minority of each generation chooses life-extension, (...) denying it to them deprives them of many years of extra life, and their total extra life-years are likely to exceed the total life-years of a majority who do not want life-extension. This is a greater harm to those who want extended life than the Malthusian harms to those who refuse extended life, both because losing an extra year of life is worse than enduring a year of Malthusian conditions, and because the would-be Methuselahs have more life-years at stake. Therefore, even if life-extension seems likely to cause severe overcrowding and resource shortages, that threat is not sufficient to justify society in restricting the development or availability of life-extension. (shrink)
Scientists, bioethicists, and policy makers are currently engaged in a contentious debate about the scientific prospects and morality of efforts to increase human longevity. Some demographers and geneticists suggest that there is little reason to think that it will be possible to significantly extend the human lifespan. Other biodemographers and geneticists argue that there might well be increases in both life expectancy and lifespan. Bioethicists and policy makers are currently addressing many of the ethical, social, and economic issues raised (...) by lifeextension research. However, the emphasis on philosophical argument supporting or condemning efforts to increase human longevity means that much less attention is currently being given to the factors that might play a role in generating interest in efforts to increase human longevity. This analysis considers three factors that might play a role in heightening public interest in efforts to develop biomedical technologies capable of retarding or reversing aging processes. While discussions of lifeextension research can seem quite futuristic and impractical, there are some powerful existential factors that might well generate considerable public support for lifeextension strategies if effective biomedical interventions emerge. Rather than providing philosophical justifications supporting or condemning efforts to increase human longevity, this essay seeks to promote a better understanding of the factors generating contemporary interest in prolonging life and postponing death. (shrink)
According to the agency objection to lifeextension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Lifeextension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the mean- ingfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to lifeextension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains constrained, and many obstacles to (...) the fulfilment of an agent’s goals are preserved. Agents with longer lives are also presented with new chal- lenges: for instance, it might be harder for them to avoid chronic boredom, and sustain their motivation to act in the pursuit of their goals. Although objections from agency and boredom are often used in combination to support the view that a much longer life is likely to bring misery or become meaningless, I argue that the acceptance of the boredom objection under- mines the persuasiveness of the agency objection. (shrink)
Many opinions and ideas about aging exist. Biological theories have taken hold of the popular and scientific imagination as potential answers to a “cure” for aging. However, it is not clear what exactly is being cured or whether aging could be classified as a disease. Some scientists are convinced that aging will be biologically alterable and that the human lifespan will be vastly extendable. Other investigators believe that aging is an elusive target that may only be “statistically” manipulatable through a (...) better understanding of the operational principles of systems situated within complex environments. Not only is there confusion over definitions but also as to the safety of any potential intervention. Curing cell death, for example, may lead to cell cancer. The search for a cure for aging is not a clearly beneficial endeavour. This paper will first, describe contemporary ideas about aging processes and second, describe several current lifeextension technologies. Third, it analyses these theories and technologies, focusing on two representative and differing scientific points of view. The paper also considers the public health dilemma that arises from lifeextension research and examines two issues, risk/benefit ratio and informed consent, that are key to developing ethical guidelines for lifeextension technologies. (shrink)
One of the strongest objections to the development and use of substantially life-extending interventions is that they would exacerbate existing unjust disparities of healthy lifespans between rich and poor members of society. In both popular opinion and ethical theory, this consequence is sometimes thought to justify a ban on life-prolonging technologies. However, the practical and ethical drawbacks of banning receive little attention, and the viability of alternative policies is seldom considered. Moreover, where ethicists do propose alternatives, there is (...) scant effort to consider their merits in light of developing world priorities. In response to these shortcomings, I distinguish four policy options and, on the basis of a plausible intuition about fairness, evaluate their implications for a fair distribution of healthy lifespans. I claim that even in developing nations it would be fairest to favor policies that promote equal access to at least one promising category of substantially life-extending intervention: calorie restriction mimetics. (shrink)
Picture this. You are having your regular medical checkup, when, all of a sudden, the physician turns to you and says: “Oh, did I remember to mention that you can now live forever?” You look at the doctor enquiringly and she goes on: “Well, it’s not actual immortality, you know, but they’ve invented this treatment—I don’t have the full details—that stops aging, getting physically older. It might not be for everyone, but you seem to be a suitable candidate. You could (...) still die of accidents and illness, of course, but they’ve calculated that with care and any luck you should live to be a thousand, as opposed to the hundred or so that you would now have. And in a millennium, techniques will advance further, so there could be more in store for you after that.”. (shrink)
Some of the objections to life-extension stem from a concern with overpopulation. I will show that whether or not the overpopulation threat is realistic, arguments from overpopulation cannot ethically demand halting the quest for, nor access to, life-extension. The reason for this is that we have a right to life, which entitles us not to have meaningful life denied to us against our will and which does not allow discrimination solely on the grounds of (...) age. If the threat of overpopulation creates a rights conflict between the right to come into existence, the right to reproduce, the right to more opportunities and space , and the right to life, the latter ought to be given precedence. (shrink)
Some bioethicists have questioned the desirability of a line of biomedical research aimed at extending the length of our lives over what some think to be its natural limit. In particular, Leon Kass has argued that living longer is not such a great advantage, and that mortality is not a burden after all. In this essay, I evaluate his arguments in favour of such a counterintuitive view by elaborating upon some critical remarks advanced by John Harris. Ultimately, I argue that (...) nothing substantial has been said by Kass to undermine the desirability of life-extending technologies. (shrink)
Some bioethicists have questioned the desirability of a line of biomedical research aimed at extending the length of our lives over what some think to be its natural limit. In particular, Leon Kass has argued that living longer is not such a great advantage, and that mortality is not a burden after all. In this essay, I evaluate his arguments in favour of such a counterintuitive view by elaborating upon some critical remarks advanced by John Harris. Ultimately, I argue that (...) nothing substantial has been said by Kass to undermine the desirability of life-extending technologies. (shrink)
It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives although the total welfare is the same in both cases, and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss two interesting suggestions that seem to support this idea. Firstly, the idea there is a positive level of well-being above which a life has to reach (...) to have positive contributive value to a population. This view is usually called critical level utilitarianism. Secondly, the viewthat it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been. I shall call this view comparativism. Firstly, I shall describe what I call the pure case of lifeextension versus replacement. Then I shall very briefly describe some different views about the value of lifeextension and indicate why I think some of the arguments in favor and against lifeextension fail. I shall then turn to the implications of critical level utilitarianism and comparativism in regards to lifeextension versus replacement, which is the main topic of this chapter. (shrink)
Future technology may dramatically extend the human lifespan. Peter Singer argues that we should reject lifeextension because developing it would result in a world with lower total and average happiness. Singer’s argument depends on the claim that we should maximise average happiness per moment. I will argue that developing the life-extending drug would not be impermissible because doing so will maximise average happiness per person. I offer an independent argument for why we should adopt a consequentialist (...) principle which says to maximise average happiness per person. (shrink)
It has been claimed that increasing the length of existing lives with positive welfare is better than creating new lives with positive welfare although the total sum of well-being is the same in both cases, or less in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss an interesting suggestion --- that it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been --- that seem to support this idea. I call this view Comparativism.
This paper argues that the goal the proponents of radical lifeextension wish to attain is in fact unattainable, and that with regard to this goal, the whole project of conquering ageing and death is therefore likely to fail. What we seek to achieve is not the prolongation of life as such, but rather the prolongation of a healthy and youthful life. Yet even though it may one day be possible to prevent the body from ageing (...) beyond a certain stage , it may never be possible to arrest the ageing of the mind, which is what we desire most of all. (shrink)
Discussions of lifeextension ethics have focused mainly on whether an extended life would be desirable to have, and on the social consequences of widely available lifeextension. I want to explore a different range of issues: four ways in which the advent of lifeextension will change our relationship with death, not only for those who live extended lives, but also for those who cannot or choose not to. Although I believe that, (...) on balance, the reasons in favor of developing lifeextension outweigh the reasons against doing so, most of these changes probably count as reasons against doing so. First, the advent of lifeextension will alter the human condition for those who live extended lives, and not merely by postponing death. Second, it will make death worse for those who lack access to lifeextension, even if those people live just as long as they do now. Third, for those who have access to lifeextension but prefer to live a normal lifespan because they think that has advantages, the advent of lifeextension will somewhat reduce some of those advantages, even if they never use lifeextension. Fourth, refusing lifeextension turns out to be a form of suicide, and this will force those who have access to lifeextension but turn it down to choose between an extended life they don't want and a form of suicide they may consider immoral. (shrink)
Chemical brain preservation allows the brain to be preserved for millennia. In the coming decades; the information in a chemically preserved brain may be able to be decoded and emulated in a computer. I first examine the history of brain preservation and recent advances that indicate this may soon be a real possibility. I then argue that chemical brain preservation should be viewed as a life-saving medical procedure. Any technology that significantly extends the human life span faces many (...) potential criticisms. However; standard medical ethics entails that individuals should have the autonomy to choose chemical brain preservation. Only if the harm to society caused by brain preservation and future emulation greatly outweighed any potential benefit would it be ethically acceptable to refuse individuals this medical intervention. Since no such harm exists; it is ethical for individuals to choose chemical brain preservation. (shrink)
One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human lifeextension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this article, I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if lifeextension did reduce the (...) evolvability of the species, this will be undesirable for three reasons: it may increase the species’ susceptibility to extinction risks, it may adversely affect institutions and practices that promote well-being, and it may impede moral progress. (shrink)
Biomedical technologies capable of sharply reducing or ending human aging, “radical lifeextension”, call for a Christian response. The authors featured in this article offer some preliminary thoughts. Common themes include: What kind of life counts as a “good life;” the limits, if any, of human freedom; the consequences of extended life on the human species and on the Earth; the meaning and value of finite and vulnerable embodied life; the experience of time; anthropological (...) self-understanding; and human dignity. Notably, all four authors share serious concerns about RLE’s potential effects. (shrink)
Background: Recent studies on public attitudes toward lifeextension technologies show a mix of ambivalence toward and support for extending the human lifespan. Attitudes toward genetic modification of organisms and technological enhancements may be used to categorize individuals according to political or ideological orientation such as technoprogressive or conservative and it could be easy to assume that these categories are related to more general categorizations related to culture, e.g. between Traditional and Secular-rational values in the World Values Survey. (...) This paper discusses how attitudes toward aspects of radical lifeextension may be related to cultural values as revealed in an online deliberative survey among university students conducted between January 2012 to January 2013. Survey results suggest that attitudes toward radical lifeextension tend to be mixed among groups categorized as Traditional, Secular-rational, Survivalist, and Self-expressionist. The study explored the relation between responses of 326 university students to 5 key questions on radical lifeextension and the cultural values they tend to favor as indicated by their response to 20 statements from the World Values Survey.Design and Method: The survey consisted of 3 stages: an online pre-discussion survey, face-to-face discussion, and post-discussion survey. After completing the 5 main survey questions in stage 1, participants were presented two additional questionnaires: one on cultural attitudes using 20 statements from the 2004-2008 World Values Survey and another on health attitudes with 12 statements from Dutta-Bergman’s 2004 study. In stage 2, participants were engaged in a face-to-face discussion in class focusing on their responses to the five key questions. After the discussion, they were invited to reconsider the choices and reasons they posted in stage 1 in the light of the face-to-face class discussion in stage 2.Results: Responses to the five survey questions showed that there tended to be more individuals across groups who disagreed with adopting technologies that radically extend the human lifespan beyond the current limit of 120 years. Attitudes toward radical lifeextension did not correspond to cultural attitudes indicated by responses to the WVS questions. The proportion of agreement/disagreement to statements presented in each of the five questions varied across cultural groups and there tended to be more individuals who disagreed with radical lifeextension in all groups. Changes in responses after the discussion stage were not significant and most respondents maintained their prior views.Discussion: Cultural attitudes associated with familiar technologies may not correspond with attitudes toward newer technologies since beliefs and values may need to be adapted to new imagined situations that the new technologies elicit. Moral understandings associated with familiar technological habits and beliefs are not necessarily carried over to new technologies. (shrink)
In Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement, Nicholas Agar presents a novel argument against the prospect of radical life-extension. Agar’s argument hinges on the claim that extended lifespans will result in people’s lives being dominated by the fear of death. Here we examine this claim and the surrounding issues in Agar’s discussion. We argue, firstly, that Agar’s view rests on empirically dubious assumptions about human rationality and attitudes to risk, and secondly, that even if those assumptions (...) are granted, the fears that Agar adverts to are unlikely to dominate people’s lives if and when radical life-extension is made possible. Further, we claim that the structure of the decision-making process around life-extension is unlikely to be the way that it would have to be in order for Agar’s claims about fear of death to make sense. Finally, we argue that Agar is implicitly committed to a narrow conception of human value. In response, we suggest that the pursuit of life-extension can itself be seen as an expression of certain important aspects of our distinctively human nature. (shrink)
In response to Bernard Williams’ suspicion that we would inevitably become bored with immortal life, John Martin Fischer has argued that we could continue to enjoy repeatable pleasures such as fine wine, beautiful music, and spiritual experiences. In more recent work on near-death experiences, Fischer has also explored the non-religious meaning of spiritual experiences in more depth. I join this deeper exploration of spiritual experience, and I also join Williams’ critics who question his view that character and desire are (...) needed to explain the desirability of life, while providing additional reason for concern that Williams’ way of valuing life may itself actually be a cause of boredom with life. With an eye to spiritual experience, I indicate how we can distance ourselves even further from Williams’ view, and I suggest how the attitude that life is good but death is not bad emerges from spiritual experience, as expressed in numerous religious and secular spiritual traditions. This lends support to the conclusion that radically extended life is desirable even if not actively desired. (shrink)
The ethics of human enhancement has been a hotly debated topic in the last 15 years. In this debate, some advocate examining science fiction stories to elucidate the ethical issues regarding the current phenomenon of human enhancement. Stories from science fiction seem well suited to analyze biomedical advances, providing some possible case studies. Of particular interest is the work of screenwriter Andrew Niccol, which often focuses on ethical questions raised by the use of new technologies. Examining the movie In Time, (...) the aim of this paper is to show how science fiction can contribute to the ethical debate of human enhancement. In Time provides an interesting case study to explore what could be some of the consequences of radical life-extension technologies. In this paper, we will show how arguments regarding radical life-extension portrayed in this particular movie differ from what is found in the scientific literature. We will see how In Time gives flesh to arguments defending or rejecting radical life-extension. It articulates feelings of unease, alienation and boredom associated with this possibility. Finally, this article will conclude that science fiction movies in general, and In Time in particular, are a valuable resource for a broad and comprehensive debate about our coming future. (shrink)
Populations in developed societies are rapidly aging: fertility rates are at all-time lows while life expectancy creeps ever higher. This is triggering a social crisis in which shrinking youth populations are required to pay for the care and retirements of an aging majority. Some people argue that by investing in the right kinds of lifespan extension technology – the kind that extends the healthy and productive phases of life – we can avoid this crisis (thereby securing a (...) ‘longevity dividend’). This chapter argues that this longevity dividend is unlikely to be paid if lifespan extension coincides with rampant technological unemployment. This does not mean that we should not pursue lifespan extension, but it does mean that the argument in its favor needs to rest on other grounds. After articulating these grounds, the chapter proceeds to consider the implications this has for our vision of the extended life, postwork utopia. It argues that this vision may need to be reconceived and suggests that one plausible reconception involves prioritizing the role of games in the well-lived life. (shrink)
This research examines the practice of cryonics and provides empirical evidence for an improved understanding of the motivations and attitudes of participants. Cryonics is the freezing of a person who has died of a disease in hopes of restoring life at some future time when a cure may be available. So far, about 300 people have been cryopreserved, and an additional 1200 have enrolled in such programs. The current work has three vectors. First, the results of a worldwide cryonics (...) survey carried out as part of this research are discussed. Second, a theoretical model is developed from the survey results to propose a Theory of Cryonic LifeExtension which explains an individual’s decision to select cryopreservation. Third, the most distinctive survey result, a conceptualization of personal identity malleability, is extended with a philosophical formulation. Personal identity is found to be emergent, not fundamental, and thus may continue to evolve in concept and application, particularly in the longer time frames implicated by cryonics. The potential consequences of this work are that the conceptual norms materializing in the cryonics community could be forerunners of wider societal trends of how humans understand themselves as subjects in an era increasingly configured by science and technology. (shrink)
Famously, Bernard Williams has argued that although death is an evil if it occurs when we still have something to live for, we have no good reason to desire that our lives be radically extended because any such life would at some point reach a stage when we become indifferent to the world and ourselves. This is supposed to be so bad for us that it would be better if we died before that happens. Most critics have rejected Williams’ (...) arguments on the grounds that it is far from certain that we will run out of things to live for, and I don't contest these objections. Instead, I am trying to show that they do not affect the persuasiveness of Williams’ argument, which in my reading does not rely on the claim that we will inevitably run out of things to live for, but on the far less contentious claim that it is not unthinkable we will do so and the largely ignored claim that if that happens, we will have died too late. (shrink)
This article deals both with greatly extended finite life and with immortality and uses the term ‘greatly extended life’ to cover both. Except where indicated, it proceeds from some assumptions adapted from Christine Overall. First, people would know the life expectancy in their society or would know that they were immortal. Second, everyone would have the opportunity to choose greatly extended life. Third, greatly extended life would not be mandatory; people would be able to opt (...) out at any point. (shrink)
The value of extending the human lifespan remains a key philosophical debate in bioethics. In building a case against the extension of the species-typical human life, Nicolas Agar considers the prospect of transforming human beings near the end of their lives into Galapagos tortoises, which would then live on decades longer. A central question at stake in this transformation is the persistence of human consciousness as a condition of the value of the transformation. Agar entertains the idea that (...) consciousness could persist in some measure, but he thinks little is to be gained from the transformation because the experiences available to tortoises pale in comparison to those available to human beings. Moreover, he thinks persisting human consciousness and values would degrade over time, being remade by tortoise needs and environment. The value available in the transformation would not, then, make the additional years of life desirable. Agar’s account does not, however, dispose of the tortoise transformation as a defensible preference. Some people might still want this kind of transformation for symbolic reasons, but it would probably be better that no human consciousness persist, since that consciousness would be inexpressible as such. Even so, it is not irrational to prefer various kinds of lifespan extension even if they involve significant modifications to human consciousness and values. (shrink)
BackgroundThe LifeExtension Medical Decision law enacted on February 4, 2018 in South Korea was the first to consider the suspension of futile life-sustaining treatment, and its enactment caused a big controversy in Korean society. However, no study has evaluated whether the actual implementation of life-sustaining treatment has decreased after the enforcement of this law. This study aimed to compare the provision of patient consent before and after the enforcement of this law among cancer patients who (...) visited a tertiary university hospital's emergency room to understand the effects of this law on the clinical care of cancer patients.MethodsThis retrospective single cohort study included advanced cancer patients aged over 19 years who visited the emergency room of a tertiary university hospital. The two study periods were as follows: from February 2017 to January 2018 and from May 2018 to April 2019. The primary outcome was the length of hospital stay. The consent rates to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation, intubation, continuous renal replacement therapy, and intensive care unit admission were the secondary outcomes.ResultsThe length of hospital stay decreased after the law was enforced from 4 to 2 days. The rates of direct transfers to secondary hospitals and nursing hospitals increased from 8.2 to 21.2% and from 1.0 to 9.7%, respectively. The consent rate for admission to the ICU decreased from 6.7 to 2.3%. For CPR and CRRT, the consent rates decreased from 1.0 to 0.0% and from 13.9 to 8.8%, respectively, but the differences were not significant.ConclusionAfter the enforcement of the LifeExtension Medical Decision law, the length of stay in the tertiary university hospital decreased in patients who established their life-sustaining treatment plans in the emergency room. Moreover, the rate of consent for ICU admission decreased. (shrink)
Life-extension was the focus for the 10th annual Congress of the International Association of Biomedical Gerontology, held last September at Cambridge University. This scientific convention included a panel of several bioethicists, including Art Caplan, John Harris, and others. The presentations on the ethics of life-extension are reviewed here.
Important scientific, ethical and sociological debates are emerging over the trans-humanist goal to achieve therapeutic treatments to âcureâ the debilitation of age-related illness and extend the healthy life span of individuals through interventive biogerontological research. The scientific and moral discourses surrounding this contentious scientific field are mapped out, followed by a normative argument favouring âstrongâ deliberative democratic control of human lifeextension research. This proposal incorporates insights from constructive and participatory technology assessment, upstream public engagement and back-casting (...) analysis; to outline a programme of participatory approaches to encourage two-way dialogue between scientific and citizen perspectives, and foster the long-term deliberative democratic governance of this developing field. (shrink)