Results for 'logical determinism'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism.Alfred J. Freddoso - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (5):257-278.
    This paper attempts to construct a systematic and plausible account of the necessity of the past. The account proposed is meant to explicate the central ockhamistic thesis of the primacy of the pure present and to vindicate Ockham's own non-Aristotelian response to the challenge of logical determinism.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  2. On a New Escape From Logical Determinism.Tobias Chapman - 1972 - Mind 81 (324):597-599.
  3.  19
    McTaggart's Logical Determinism.Gregory Williams - 1987 - Idealistic Studies 17 (3):219-229.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  17
    McTaggart's Logical Determinism.Nicholas Rescher - 1982 - Idealistic Studies 12 (3):231-241.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  1
    McTaggart’s Logical Determinism.Nicholas Rescher - 1982 - Idealistic Studies 12 (3):231-241.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  28
    Logical Determinism.Z. Jordan - 1963 - Studia Logica 14 (1):1-38.
  7. Anthony Collins and Logical Determinism.Jacopo Agnesina - 2011 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 66 (3):409-430.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Time, Truth and Logical Determinism.Ashok Kumar Gangadean - 1971 - Dissertation, Brandeis University
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Logical Determinism.Zbigniew Jordan - 1963 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 4 (1):1-38.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. The Question of so-Called Logical Determinism in Antiquity and in Modern Logic.Karel Sebela - 2010 - Filosoficky Casopis 58 (4):589-603.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. McTaggart’s Logical Determinism: A Reply to Professor Rescher.Gregory Williams - 1987 - Idealistic Studies 17 (3):219-229.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. McTaggart's Logical Determinism - A Reply to Professor Rescher.Gregory Williams - 1987 - Idealistic Studies 17:219.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, moral character, fatalism, logical determinism and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  14. Logical Non-Determinism as a Tool for Logical Modularity: An Introduction.Arnon Avron - unknown
    It is well known that every propositional logic which satisfies certain very natural conditions can be characterized semantically using a multi-valued matrix ([Los and Suszko, 1958; W´ ojcicki, 1988; Urquhart, 2001]). However, there are many important decidable logics whose characteristic matrices necessarily consist of an infinite number of truth values. In such a case it might be quite difficult to find any of these matrices, or to use one when it is found. Even in case a logic does have a (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  15.  3
    A Logical Limitation on Determinism.Bernard Mayo - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):50 - 55.
    I begin with some elementary observations about assertion. In spite of recent criticisms of philosophers who have been too ready to take the subject-predicate indicative sentence as the standard form of assertion, there is no doubt that this form of sentence does represent something very fundamental about assertion. To put the matter in a rough-and-ready way: if we are to assert anything at all, it seems obvious that we must first draw our listener's attention to something that we propose to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Future Contingents and Determinism in Aristotle's De Interpretatione IX: Some Logical Aspects of the So-Called Second Oldest Interpretation.Lennart Åqvist - 2003 - Logique Et Analyse 46 (181):13-48.
  17. Toward a Demarcation of Forms of Determinism.Vladimir Marko - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24 (1):54-84.
    In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology.Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291-309.
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Afterword to The Philosophy of Aristotle.Susanne Bobzien (ed.) - 2011 - Signet.
    ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  39
    Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will.Ari Maunu - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Looking for the Lazy Argument Candidates.Vladimir Marko - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3 & 4):363-383; 447-474.
    The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the nonuniversal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Foreknowledge and Free Will.Norman M. Swartz - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  28
    The Refutation of Determinism: An Essay in Philosophical Logic.Michael Ayers - 1968 - London: Methuen.
    Perhaps everyone who can think has the concept of possibility, but no one understands it. The metaphysical theory of Determinism is a symptom of this lack of understanding, and the inconclusiveness of its opponents’ arguments indicates that the lack is universal. In this book, first published in 1968, the author shows that there are a number of different kinds on non-logical possibility, subtly interrelated, each requiring separate explanation. An original contribution to the subject, it is essential reading for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  24.  1
    Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument.P. Roger Turner - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2125-2132.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, it follows (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Http://Www.Klemens.Sav.Sk/Fiusav/Doc/Organon/2017/1/54-84.Pdf.Vladimir Marko - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24 (1):54-84.
    In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  93
    Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism.Norman Swartz - manuscript
    For an expansion of the discussion of Sections 2-5 (Logical Determinism, Epistemic Determinism, and Modal Concepts) see Foreknowledge and Free Will ", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  22
    Fischer on Forebelief and Fatalism.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion (2017).
    John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. A Flawed Conception of Determinism in the Consequence Argument.S. Sehon - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):30-38.
    According to the Consequence Argument, the truth of determinism plus other plausible principles would yield the conclusion that we have no free will. In this paper I will argue that the conception of determinism typically employed in the various versions of the Consequence Argument is not plausible. In particular, I will argue that, taken most straightforwardly, determinism as defined in the Consequence Argument would imply that the existence of God is logically impossible. This is quite an implausible (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample.Seth Shabo - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):239-252.
    Here I motivate and defend a new counterexample to logical (or non-causal) versions of the direct argument for responsibility-determinism incompatibilism. Such versions purport to establish incompatibilism via an inference principle to the effect that non-responsibility transfers along relations of logical consequence, including those that hold between earlier and later states of a deterministic world. Unlike previous counterexamples, this case doesn't depend on preemptive overdetermination; nor can it be blocked with a simple modification of the inference principle. In (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  30.  71
    The Principle of Least Action as the Logical Empiricist's Shibboleth.M. Stoltzner - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (2):285-318.
    The present paper investigates why logical empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of their day, the principle of least action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a new (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  31.  35
    John Stuart Mill, Determinism, and the Problem of Induction.Elijah Millgram - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):183-199.
    Auguste Comte's doctrine of the three phases through which sciences pass (the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive) allows us to explain what John Stuart Mill was attempting in his magnum opus, the System of Logic: namely, to move the science of logic to its terminal and 'positive' stage. Both Mill's startling account of deduction and his unremarked solution to the Humean problem of induction eliminate the notions of necessity or force—in this case, the 'logical must'—characteristic of a science's (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  69
    Determinism.Raymond D. Bradley - unknown
    The abstract noun "Determinism" functions like a family name for a group of philosophical doctrines each of which asserts that, in some sense or other, events occur of necessity when and as they do. Different members of the family stake out different doctrinal territories, some construing the necessity involved in purely logical terms, some in causal terms, and still others in terms of predictability. Each has to do with necessary connections between past, present and future.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  8
    Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument.P. Roger Turner - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-8.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, it follows (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  44
    Temporal Relations Vs. Logical Reduction: A Phenomenal Theory of Causality. [REVIEW]Alba Papa-Grimaldi - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (3):339-358.
    Kant, in various parts of his treatment of causality, refers to determinism or the principle of sufficient reason as an inescapable principle. In fact, in the Second Analogy we find the elements to reconstruct a purely phenomenal determinism as a logical and tautological truth. I endeavour in this article to gather these elements into an organic theory of phenomenal causality and then show, in the third section, with a specific argument which I call the “paradox of phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  40
    Logical Space and Metaphysical Systems.Bogusław Wolniewicz - 1983 - Studia Logica 42 (2-3):269 - 284.
    The paper applies the theory presented in A Formal Ontology of Situations (this journal, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations. Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the situation semantics of Perry and Barwise is discussed.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  9
    Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism.Mark Thomas Walker - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):199 – 227.
    Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  29
    Nonconservation of Energy and Loss of Determinism II. Colliding with an Open Set.David Atkinson & Porter Johnson - 2010 - Foundations of Physics 40 (2):179-189.
    An actual infinity of colliding balls can be in a configuration in which the laws of mechanics lead to logical inconsistency. It is argued that one should therefore limit the domain of these laws to a finite, or only a potentially infinite number of elements. With this restriction indeterminism, energy nonconservation and creatio ex nihilo no longer occur. A numerical analysis of finite systems of colliding balls is given, and the asymptotic behaviour that corresponds to the potentially infinite system (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Free-Will and Determinism.A. J. Ayer - 1991 - In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. The Meaning of Life and Other Essays.A. J. Ayer - 1990
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  12
    Logical and Natural Compulsion in Free Will.Gardner Williams - 1945 - Journal of Philosophy 42 (March):185-191.
  41.  22
    Applications of Squares of Oppositions and Their Generalizations in Philosophical Analysis.Jan Woleński - 2008 - Logica Universalis 2 (1):13-29.
    . This papers examines formal properties of logical squares and their generalizations in the form of hexagons and octagons. Then, several applications of these constructions in philosophical analysis are elaborated. They concern contingency (accidentality), possibility, permission, axiological concepts (bonum and malum), the generalized Hume thesis (deontic and epistemic modalities), determinism, truth and consistency (in various senses. It is shown that relations between notions used in various branches of philosophy fall into the same formal scheme.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42.  53
    Determinism and Ontology.Gordon Belot - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1):85 – 101.
    Abstract In the philosophical literature, there are two common criteria for a physical theory to be deterministic. The older one is due to the logical empiricists, and is a purely formal criterion. The newer one can be found in the work of John Earman and David Lewis and depends on the intended interpretation of the theory. In this paper I argue that the former must be rejected, and something like the latter adopted. I then discuss the relevance of these (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  23
    In Defense of the Smart Aleck: A Reply to Ted Honderich.Richard Double - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9.
    In “Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism” I argued that contrary to Ted Honderich’s thesis in his How Free Are You? determinism has no consequences, whether logical, moral, or psychological, about how we must view persons we beIieve to be determined. Honderich replied in “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck” that there is a sense in which our belief in determinism has consequences that any reasonable human being must recognize. My present paper examines Honderich’s reply.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  11
    Between Physics and Philosophy.Philipp Frank - 1941 - Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press.
    Introduction: Historical background.--The law of causality and experience (1908)--The importance of Ernst Mach's philosophy of science for our times (1917)--Physical theories of the twentieth century and school philosophy (1929)--Is there a trend today toward idealism in physics? (1934)--The positivistic and the metaphysical conception of physics (1935)--Logical empiricism and the philosophy of the Soviet Union (1935)--Philosophical misinterpretations of the quantum theory (1936)--What "length" means to the physicist (1937)--Determinism and indeterminism in modern physics (1938)--Ernst Mach and the unity of science (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45.  15
    A Inteligência Dos Futuros Contingentes: Interrogando G. W. Leibniz Sobre Deus E a Verdade.Paulo Renato Jesus - 2016 - Trans/Form/Ação 39 (1):9-36.
    RESUMO: A presente investigação questiona a essência teo-lógica dos futuros contingentes. Para o efeito, analisa-se, primeiramente, a argumentação segundo a qual, sob certas condições lógicas, teológicas, ontológicas e cosmológicas antinecessitantes, detetadas por G. W. Leibniz, a abertura contingente do futuro parece ser compatível com o regime das "verdades contingentes pré-determinadas", regime enquadrado teologicamente pelo princípio do "futuro melhor" ou do "único futuro verdadeiro". No entanto, os futuros contingentes incitam, com e contra Aristóteles, ao desenvolvimento de uma lógica temporal e plurivalente, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  24
    Wilhelm von Ockhams Prädestinationstraktat: Von der ontologischen Sparsamkeit zum logischen Determinismus. Büter - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (3):346-366.
    In seinem Traktat über Prädestination diskutiert Ockham die philosophischen Schwierigkeiten, die das christliche Dogma der Vorherbestimmung des Menschen zu ewiger Seligkeit oder Verdammnis aufwirft als einen spezifischen Fall des Problems des logischen Determinismus. Es gelingt Ockham nicht, dieses Problem zu lösen, was einerseits in seinem semantischen Wahrheitsbegriff, andererseits in einer fehlenden Differenzierung zwischen einem ontologischen und einem logischen Verständnis von Kontingenz begründet liegt. Diese Punkte führen zu einer Reihe von Ambivalenzen in Ockhams Argumentation, die darauf hindeuten, dass dieser zwar über (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  14
    Wilhelm von Ockhams Prädestinationstraktat: Von der ontologischen Sparsamkeit zum logischen Determinismus.Büter Anke - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (3):346-366.
    In seinem Traktat über Prädestination diskutiert Ockham die philosophischen Schwierigkeiten, die das christliche Dogma der Vorherbestimmung des Menschen zu ewiger Seligkeit oder Verdammnis aufwirft als einen spezifischen Fall des Problems des logischen Determinismus. Es gelingt Ockham nicht, dieses Problem zu lösen, was einerseits in seinem semantischen Wahrheitsbegriff, andererseits in einer fehlenden Differenzierung zwischen einem ontologischen und einem logischen Verständnis von Kontingenz begründet liegt. Diese Punkte führen zu einer Reihe von Ambivalenzen in Ockhams Argumentation, die darauf hindeuten, dass dieser zwar über (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  33
    ``Accidental Necessity and Power Over the Past&Quot.Alfred Freddoso - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):54-68.
    The thesis of this paper is that an agent S has the power to bring it about that a proposition p is or will be true at a moment t only if S has at the same time the power to bring it about that it has always been the case that p would be true at t. The author first constructs a prima facie compelling argument for logical determinism and then argues that whoever accepts an Ockhamistic response (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49. Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise.Christian List - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  50. Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000