Results for 'luminosity'

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Bibliography: Luminosity in Epistemology
  1.  12
    Luminosity Guaranteed.Wolfgang Barz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly: early view.
    This article aims to show that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument does not succeed if we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence that anti-luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a certain conception of what Chalmers calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts,’ luminosity is guaranteed even if the refined safety (...)
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  2.  85
    Luminosity and Determinacy.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.
    The paper discusses some ways in which the phenomenon of borderline cases may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are fully open to our view. The discussion focusses on a very influential argument (due to Tim Williamson) to the effect that, roughly, no such domains of luminous facts exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts that are best candidates for being luminous plays an (...)
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  3. Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies.Murali Ramachandran - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.
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  4.  47
    Internalism Without Luminosity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):252-272.
    Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent's internal states that explains why only these states can play whatever role the internalist thinks these states are playing? Internalists have frequently appealed to a special kind of epistemic access that we have to these states. But such claims have been challenged on both empirical and philosophical grounds. I will argue that internalists needn't appeal to any kind of privileged access claims. Rather, internalist conditions are important because of the (...)
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  5.  1
    Supplementary Report: Stimulus Generalization Gradients Along a Luminosity Continuum.Gary Olson & Richard A. King - 1962 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (4):414.
  6. Luminosity Regained.Selim Berker - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, (...)
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  7.  49
    Luminosity and Vagueness.Elia Zardini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
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  8.  81
    Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.
    According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and argues (...)
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  9.  44
    Williamson and the Argument From Luminosity.P. X. Monaghan - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):619-.
    ABSTRACT: Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental (...)
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  10.  7
    Films Blancs : Luminosity in the Films of Michael Mann.Davide Panagia - 2015 - Film-Philosophy 19:33-54.
    This paper is a study of the place of luminosity in the films of Michael Mann and the way in which luminosity is not a tool of illumination but a radiance that signals the bodying forth of appearances. The event of luminosity in Mann's films is an attempt to re-imagine the conventional value structures that create a link between film and indexicality, as if his admiration for the photoreal effects of film belies an insistence that the advenience (...)
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  11. Anti-Luminosity.Murali Ramachandran - manuscript
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. This paper examines an argument he presents against the luminosity of feeling cold, which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, the argument fails. However, our deliberations do yield two anti-luminosity results: a simple refutation of (...)
     
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  12. Luminosity and Vagueness.Zardini Elia - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
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  13. Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
    In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one (...)
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  14.  9
    Non-Transitive Self-Knowledge: Luminosity Via Modal Μ-Automata.Hasen Khudairi - manuscript
    This essay provides a novel account of iterated epistemic states. The essay argues that states of epistemic determinacy might be secured by countenancing self-knowledge on the model of fixed points in monadic second-order modal logic, i.e. the modal $\mu$-calculus. Despite the epistemic indeterminacy witnessed by the invalidation of modal axiom 4 in the sorites paradox -- i.e. the KK principle: $\square$$\phi$ $\rightarrow$ $\square$$\square$$\phi$ -- an epistemic interpretatation of the Kripke functors of a $\mu$-automaton permits the iterations of the transition functions (...)
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  15. Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
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  16. Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):718-730.
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  17. Luminosity and Indiscriminability.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
  18.  70
    On Williamson's Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument.Thomas A. Blackson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
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  19.  85
    What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is.Wai-hung Wong - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.
    Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his (...)
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  20.  27
    Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285-293.
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  21.  55
    Meditation on Natural Luminosity 9 V1.Rudolph Bauer - 2011 - Transmission 1.
    This paper focuses on meditation as natural luminousity.
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  22. Perception of Luminosity.Al Gilchrist - 1988 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 26 (6):495-495.
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  23. What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is.Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
     
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  24.  19
    Review of David Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence[REVIEW]David S. Pacini - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
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  25.  19
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. By David Walsh.T. Remington Harkness - 2011 - Heythrop Journal 52 (1):153-154.
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  26.  23
    Citsukha's View on Self-Luminosity.M. M. Trivedi - 1987 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (2):115-123.
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  27.  1
    Luminosity and its Origin in a South African Earthworm.J. D. F. Gilchrist - 1918 - Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa 7 (1):203-212.
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  28.  1
    Review of On Reciprocal Action in the Retina as Studied by Means of Some Rotating Discs, Luminosity and Photometry, and Ueber den Einfluss des Maculapigments Auf Farbengleichungen. [REVIEW]C. L. Franklin - 1897 - Psychological Review 4 (5):539-541.
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  29. On Williamson’s Argument for in His Anti-Luminosity Argument.Thomas A. Blackson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
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  30. The Concept of Self-Luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta.Girdhari Lal Chaturvedi - 1982 - Adarsha Prakashan.
     
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  31.  50
    Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics.Khudairi Hasen - manuscript
    This dissertation concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The dissertation demonstrates how phenomenal consciousness and gradational possible-worlds models in Bayesian perceptual psychology relate to epistemic modal space. The dissertation demonstrates, then, how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; deontic modality; logical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the (...)
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  32.  54
    Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics.Hasen Khudairi - 2017 - https://archive.org.
    This dissertation concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The dissertation demonstrates how phenomenal consciousness and gradational possible-worlds models in Bayesian perceptual psychology relate to epistemic modal space. The dissertation demonstrates, then, how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; deontic modality; logical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the (...)
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  33. A survey of stars of high luminosity in the Northern Milk Way.J. J. Nassau - 1962 - Scientia 56 (97):48.
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  34. The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. [REVIEW]Robert Vigliotti - 2011 - International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):120-122.
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  35.  9
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence.David Walsh - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution breaks new ground by demonstrating the continuity of European philosophy from Kant to Derrida. Much of the literature on European philosophy has emphasised the breaks that have occurred in the course of two centuries of thinking. But as David Walsh argues, such a reading overlooks the extent to which Kant, Hegel, and Schelling were already engaged in the turn toward existence as the only viable mode of philosophising. Where many similar studies summarise individual thinkers, this book (...)
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  36. Participation and Luminosity: Eric Voegelin’s Critique of Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology.R. White John - 2012 - Quaestiones Disputatae 3 (1):252-271.
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  37. Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said. [REVIEW]Kelly Becker - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.
    Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
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  38. If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom.Susanne Bobzien - 2012 - In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in play (...)
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  39.  97
    The Comforts of Home.Earl Conee - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):444–451.
    The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
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  40. The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.
    The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.
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  41. Just Do It? When to Do What You Judge You Ought to Do.Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role (...)
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  42. Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it (...)
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  43. Skeptical Success.Troy Cross - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:35-62.
    The following is not a successful skeptical scenario: you think you know you have hands, but maybe you don't! Why is that a failure, when it's far more likely than, say, the evil genius hypothesis? That's the question.<br><br>This is an earlier draft.
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  44. Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  45. Assertion, Knowledge, and Action.Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99-118.
    We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue (...)
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  46. Inexact Knowledge with Introspection.Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179-227.
    This paper supersedes an ealier version, entitled "A Non-Standard Semantics for Inexact Knowledge with Introspection", which appeared in the Proceedings of "Rationality and Knowledge". The definition of token semantics, in particular, has been modified, both for the single- and the multi-agent case.
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  47. Discrimination and Self-Knowledge.Patrick Greenough - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
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  48. Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions.Glen Hoffmann - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
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  49.  55
    How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):133-140.
    The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...)
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  50.  71
    Rationality as a Virtue.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.
    A concept that can be expressed by the term ‘rationality’ plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics -- and especially in formal epistemology and decision theory. It is argued here that when the term is used in this way, the concept of “rationality” is the concept of a kind of virtue, with all the central features that are ascribed to the virtues by Plato and Aristotle, among others. Interpreting rationality as a kind of virtue helps to solve several (...)
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