Results for 'lying'

917 found
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  1. Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door... One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis.Helga Varden - 2010 - Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (4):403-4211.
    Kant’s example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant’s philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it’s always wrong to lie – even if necessary to prevent a murderer from reaching his victim – and that if one does lie, one becomes partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If (...)
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  2. Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 120-133.
    What is the relationship between lying, belief, and knowledge? Prominent accounts of lying define it in terms of belief, namely telling someone something one believes to be false, often with the intent to deceive. This paper develops a novel account of lying by deriving evaluative dimensions of responsibility from the knowledge norm of assertion. Lies are best understood as special cases of vicious assertion; lying is the anti-paradigm of proper assertion. This enables an account of (...) in terms of knowledge: roughly, lying is telling someone something you know ain't so. (shrink)
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  3.  77
    Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.
    In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of lies involving partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion, and presents a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second (...)
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  4. Lying and Fiction.Emar Maier - forthcoming - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Lying and fiction both involve the deliberate production of statements that fail to obey Grice’s first Maxim of Quality (“do not say what you believe to be false”). The question thus arises if we can provide a uniform analysis for fiction and lies. In this chapter I discuss the similarities, but also some fundamental differences between lying and fiction. I argue that there’s little hope for a satisfying account within a traditional truth conditional semantic framework. Rather than immediately (...)
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  5. The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Survey of different definitions of lying and deceiving, with an emphasis on the contemporary debate between Thomas Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Paul Faulkner, Jennifer Lackey, David Simpson, Andreas Stokke, Jorg Meibauer, Seana Shiffrin, and James Mahon, among others, over whether lies always aim to deceive. Related questions include whether lies must be assertions, whether lies always breach trust, whether it is possible to lie without using spoken or written language, whether lies must always be false, whether (...)
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  6.  40
    What's the Good of Language? On the Moral Distinction Between Lying and Misleading.Sam Berstler - forthcoming - Ethics.
    I give a new argument for the moral difference between lying and misleading. First, following David Lewis (1983, 2002), I hold that conventions of Truthfulness and Trust fix the meanings of our language. These conventions generate fair play obligations. Thus, to fail to conform to the conventions of Truthfulness and Trust is unfair. Second, I argue that the liar, but not the misleader, fails to conform to Truthfulness. So the liar, but not the misleader, does something unfair. This account (...)
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  7.  33
    Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - forthcoming - Noûs.
    It is widely held that all lies are assertions: the traditional definition of lying entails that, in order to lie, speakers have to assert something they believe to be false. It is also widely held that assertion contrasts with presupposition and, in particular, that one cannot assert something by presupposing it. Together, these views imply that speakers cannot lie with presuppositions—a view that Andreas Stokke has recently explicitly defended. The aim of this paper is to argue that speakers can (...)
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  8. Lying as a Scalar Phenomenon.Neri Marsili - 2014 - In Sibilla Cantarini, Werner Abraham & Elizabeth Leiss (eds.), "Certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal space in between”,. John Benjamins Publishing.
    In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases – the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies). (...)
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  9. Lying by Promising. A Study on Insincere Illocutionary Acts.Neri Marsili - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions (...)
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  10.  68
    Davidson Was Almost Right About Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.
    Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ?must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not?. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can (...)
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  11. Lying, Accuracy, and Credence.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):195-198.
    Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer. He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback (...)
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  12. The Lying Test.Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):470-499.
    As an empirical inquiry into the nature of meaning, semantics must rely on data. Unfortunately, the primary data to which philosophers and linguists have traditionally appealed—judgments on the truth and falsity of sentences—have long been known to vary widely between competent speakers in a number of interesting cases. The present article constitutes an experiment in how to obtain some more consistent data for the enterprise of semantics. Specifically, it argues from some widely accepted Gricean premises to the conclusion that judgments (...)
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  13. Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the somewhat widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully implicating over lying. I call this the "Difference Intuition." I define lying in terms of asserting, but remain open about what precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. I define implicating as one way of meaning something without asserting it. I narrow down the kind of untruthful implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes (...)
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  14. Lying, Liars and Language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.
    This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.
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  15.  41
    The Noble Art of Lying.James Mahon - 2017 - In Alan Goldman (ed.), Mark Twain and Philosophy. pp. 95-111.
    In this chapter, I examine the writings of Mark Twain on lying, especially his essays "On the decay of the Art of Lying" and "My First Lie, and How I Got Out of It." I show that Twain held that there were two kinds of lies: the spoken lie and the silent lie. The silent lie is the lie of not saying what one is thinking, and is far more common than the spoken lie. The greatest silent lies, (...)
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  16.  54
    The Experience of Lying in Dementia Care: A Qualitative Study.A. G. Tuckett - 2012 - Nursing Ethics 19 (1):7-20.
    This analysis examines the practice of care providers in residential aged care lying to residents with dementia. Qualitative data were collected through multiple methods. Data here represents perceptions from registered and enrolled nurses, personal care assistants, and allied health professionals from five residential aged care facilities located in Queensland, Australia. Care providers in residential aged care facilities lie to residents with dementia. Lying is conceptualized as therapeutic whereby the care provider’s intent is to eliminate harm and also control (...)
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  17.  51
    Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference Toward Truth.Don Fallis & Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    This paper is about some of the ways in which people sometimes speak while be- ing indifferent toward what they say. We argue that what Harry Frankfurt called ‘bullshitting’ is a mode of speech marked by indifference toward inquiry, the coop- erative project of reaching truth in discourse. On this view bullshitting is character- ized by indifference toward the project of advancing inquiry by making progress on specific subinquiries, represented by so-called questions under discussion. This ac- count preserves the central (...)
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  18.  57
    Dynamics of Lying.Hans van Ditmarsch - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-33.
    We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a ‘lie that $\varphi $ ’ (where $\varphi $ is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to the formula $\varphi $ . The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs (...)
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  19.  53
    Lying, Trust, and Gratitude.Collin O'neil - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (4):301-333.
    Among the various methods of deceit, lying is often thought to be a special affront on the grounds that it invites the victim’s trust. Such an explanation is incomplete without an account of the moral significance of trust. This article distinguishes two morally problematic relations to trust, betrayals and abuses, and, appealing to the idea that we should be grateful to be trusted, attempts to explain these wrongs as violations of distinct demands of gratitude for trust. Only the wrong (...)
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  20.  78
    Just Lies: Finding Augustine's Ethics of Public Lying in His Treatments of Lying and Killing.David Decosimo - 2010 - Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (4):661-697.
    Augustine famously defends the justice of killing in certain public contexts such as just wars. He also claims that private citizens who intentionally kill are guilty of murder, regardless of their reasons. Just as famously, Augustine seems to prohibit lying categorically. Analyzing these features of his thought and their connections, I argue that Augustine is best understood as endorsing the justice of lying in certain public contexts, even though he does not explicitly do so. Specifically, I show that (...)
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  21.  74
    Lying.James Edwin Mahon - 2006 - In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Reference. pp. 2--618.
    Short survey of philosophical literature on the definition of lying and the ethics of lying.
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  22.  10
    Lying, Liars and Language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.
    This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.
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  23.  39
    Respectful Lying.Alan Strudler - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):961-972.
    I argue that there are instances in which lying to an innocent and generally competent person respects her autonomy, contrary to arguments by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. These authors say that respect for a person’s autonomy requires treating her in a way consistent with the possibility of consent, but I contend that the possibility of consent condition is unworkable. I maintain that lying can respect individual autonomy when being truthful to a person undermines her choices and (...) gets her what she would reasonably see herself as having most reason to choose in the circumstances. I make my case by reflecting on lying invitations to a surprise party and on negotiation phenomena. (shrink)
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  24.  11
    Why Did Aquinas Hold That Killing is Sometimes Just, But Never Lying?John Skalko - 2016 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 90:227-241.
    Aquinas held that lying is always a sin, an evil action. In later terminology it falls under what would be called an intrinsically evil action. Under no circumstances can it be a good action. Following Augustine, Aquinas held that even if others must die, one must still never tell a lie. Yet when it comes to self-defense and capital punishment Aquinas’s reasoning seems at odds with itself. One may kill a man in self-defense. Similarly, just as a diseased limb (...)
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  25.  14
    Lying and Intersubjective Truth: A Communication Based Approach to Understanding Lying[REVIEW]MarkA Smeltzer - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (3):361-373.
    This project was undertaken as a response to a perceived deficiency regarding the role of communication in a large block of the phenomenological discourse on lying. The arguments presented here attempt to make the communication process an explicit, rather than an implicit component of this discussion. First, a ‘lie’ is explained as a communicative act that is identified by making a simple comparison between two contradictory realities, the reality presented by the lie, and some sort of ‘true’ reality. Existing (...)
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  26.  52
    The Meta-Ethical Issue of the Nature of Lying: Implications for Moral Education.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2002 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 21 (1):37-63.
    I argue that lying has many dimensions, hence, some putativecases of lying may not match our intuitions or acceptedmeanings of lying. The moral lesson we should teach must be that lying is not a simple principle or feature, buta cluster of features or spectrum of shades, where anythingin the spectrum or cluster is considered lying. I argue thatthe view regarding lying as a single principle or featurehas problematic meta-ethical implications. I do a meta-ethicalanalysis of (...)
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  27.  15
    Lying and Truthfulness.Kevin DeLapp & Jeremy Henkel (eds.) - 2016 - Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
    This anthology provides a set of distinctive selections that explore both Western and Eastern views of lying and truthfulness, including selections from Augustine, Grotius, Aristotle, the _Mahabharata_, Confucius, Kant, Plato, Sunzi, Han Feizi, Aquinas, the _Lotus Sutra_, Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Bacon, Nietzsche, and more. Hackett Readings in Philosophy is a versatile series of compact anthologies, each devoted to a topic of traditional interest in philosophy or political theory. Selections are chosen for their accessibility, significance, and ability to stimulate thought (...)
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  28. You Don't Say! Lying, Asserting and Insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): (...)
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  29.  29
    Lying and Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Andreas Stokke presents a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. He investigates how lying relates to other forms of insincerity and explores the kinds of attitudes that go with insincere uses of language. -/- Part I develops an account of insincerity as a linguistic phenomenon. Stokke provides a detailed theory of the distinction between lying and speaking insincerely, and accounts for the relationship between lying and deceiving. A novel framework of assertion underpins the analysis (...)
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  30.  95
    Paternalistic Lying and Deception.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - In Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Paternalism. Oxford, UK:
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  31.  62
    Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
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  32. Review of Seana Shiffrin, "Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law". [REVIEW]Robert Mark Simpson - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2015.
    In this review of Seana Shiffrin's 2014 book Speech Matters (Princeton University Press), written for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (see http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/57367-speech-matters-on-lyingmorality-and-the-law/), I critically digest the main themes of Shiffrin's arguments, with a focus on the question of whether her "thinker-based" theory of free speech has different, or more ambivalent, practical implications for free speech policy than she allows.
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  33.  51
    Demos on Lying to Oneself.Frederick A. Siegler - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (August):469-474.
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  34.  8
    Lying, Narrative, and Truth Shareability.Steve Matthews & Jeanette Kennett - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):86-87.
  35. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life.Sissela Bok - 1978 - Vintage Books.
    A thoughtful addition to the growing debate over public and private morality. Looks at lying and deception in law, family, medicine, government.
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  36. Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.
    The paper argues that the correct definition of lying is that to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood in terms of the notion of the common ground of a conversation. It is shown that this definition makes the right predictions for a number of cases involving irony, joking, and false implicature. In addition, the proposed account does not assume that intending to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, and hence (...)
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  37. What Is Lying?Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.
    In order to lie, you have to say something that you believe to be false. But lying is not simply saying what you believe to be false. Philosophers have made several suggestions for what the additional condition might be. For example, it has been suggested that the liar has to intend to deceive (Augustine 395, Bok 1978, Mahon 2006), that she has to believe that she will deceive (Chisholm and Feehan 1977), or that she has to warrant the truth (...)
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  38. Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.
    Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved. Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the (...)
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  39.  50
    Lying and Misleading in Discourse.Andreas Stokke - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):83-134.
    This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under discussion. It argues that to mislead is to disrupt the pursuit of the goal of inquiry—that is, to discover how things are. Lying is seen as a special case requiring assertion of disbelieved information, where (...)
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  40. Lying, Risk and Accuracy.Sam Fox Krauss - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):726-734.
    Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose a risk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either (...)
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  41. The Definition of Lying.Thomas L. Carson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):284–306.
    Few moral questions have greater bearing on the conduct of our everyday lives than questions about the morality of lying. These questions are also important for ethical theory. An important test of any theory of right and wrong is whether it gives an adequate account of the morality of lying. Conceptual questions about the nature of lying are prior to questions about the moral status of lying. Any theory about the moral status of lying presupposes (...)
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  42.  77
    Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    1. Lying -- 2. The problem of what is said -- 3. What is said -- 4. Is lying worse than merely misleading? -- 5. Some interesting cases.
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  43.  13
    Lying About.Richard Holton - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (2):99-105.
    We do not report lies with that-clauses but with about-clauses: he lied about x. It is argued that this is because the content of a lie need not be the content of what is said, and about-clauses give us the requisite flexibility. Building on the work of Stephen Yablo, an attempt is made to give an account of lying about in terms of partial content and topic.
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  44.  20
    The Ease of Lying.Bruno Verschuere, Adriaan Spruyt, Ewout H. Meijer & Henry Otgaar - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):908-911.
    Brain imaging studies suggest that truth telling constitutes the default of the human brain and that lying involves intentional suppression of the predominant truth response. By manipulating the truth proportion in the Sheffield lie test, we investigated whether the dominance of the truth response is malleable. Results showed that frequent truth telling made lying more difficult, and that frequent lying made lying easier. These results implicate that the accuracy of lie detection tests may be improved by (...)
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  45. Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Lying.Adam J. Arico & Don Fallis - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):790 - 816.
    There are many philosophical questions surrounding the notion of lying. Is it ever morally acceptable to lie? Can we acquire knowledge from people who might be lying to us? More fundamental, however, is the question of what, exactly, constitutes the concept of lying. According to one traditional definition, lying requires intending to deceive (Augustine. (1952). Lying (M. Muldowney, Trans.). In R. Deferrari (Ed.), Treatises on various subjects (pp. 53?120). New York, NY: Catholic University of America). (...)
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  46. Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):348-359.
    This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Two new developments in this area are considered: first, the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of lying without the intent to deceive , and second, recent work on the distinction between lying and merely misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions for (...)
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  47. Lying and Deception.Don Fallis - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.
    According to the standard philosophical definition of lying, you lie if you say something that you believe to be false with the intent to deceive. Recently, several philosophers have argued that an intention to deceive is not a necessary condition on lying. But even if they are correct, it might still be suggested that the standard philosophical definition captures the type of lie that philosophers are primarily interested in (viz., lies that are intended to deceive). In this paper, (...)
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  48.  14
    Nietzsche's Notion of Lying.Yann Wermuth - 2019 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 50 (1):149-169.
    Not only is he lying, who speaks against his knowledge, but even more so he, who speaks against his ignorance [Nichtwissen].Augustine provided the first attempt to define lies in De Mendacio. It is central to his account that lying involves being dishonest. Many still follow Augustine in this. His definition shall serve as a background against which to contrast Nietzsche's notion of lying.2 The dishonesty definition of lying claims that telling a lie involves saying something the (...)
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  49. What Is Wrong with Lying?Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
    One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This paper aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a (...)
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  50.  55
    Lying and Smiling: Informational and Emotional Deception in Negotiation.Ingrid Smithey Fulmer, Bruce Barry & D. Adam Long - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 88 (4):691-709.
    This study investigated attitudes toward the use of deception in negotiation, with particular attention to the distinction between deception regarding the informational elements of the interaction (e.g., lying about or misrepresenting needs or preferences) and deception about emotional elements (e.g., misrepresenting one's emotional state). We examined how individuals judge the relative ethical appropriateness of these alternative forms of deception, and how these judgments relate to negotiator performance and long-run reputation. Individuals viewed emotionally misleading tactics as more ethically appropriate to (...)
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