This paper relocates the philosophical discourse on the Thing (das Ding) to the world of classical Daoism. In doing so, it explores the bond between the One, the Thing and its signifier before discussing how the Thing unveils itself to the world while receiving the gift of nothingness from Dao. It furthermore contends that the two most prominent discussions of the Thing in the Western tradition--those by Heidegger and Lacan--while philosophically valuable in their own right, fail to provide the degree (...) of profundity seen via a Daoist reading. What will become apparent is that the Thing qua the One serves to delineate the cosmological and human realms of reality, negating any inclination one might have of it as being anything but mystical. (shrink)

This article investigates the concept of time as it is laid forth in the Daoist text, the Zhuangzi 莊子. Arguing that authentic time lies with cosmogony and not reality as envisioned by humanity, the Zhuangzi casts off the ontology of the present-now in favor of the existentially creative negativity of Dao 道. As the pivot of Dao, nothingness not only allows us to side-step the issue of temporal directionality, it reflects the meontological nature of Daoist cosmology in general. Framing time (...) in terms of the motion of nothingness, this paper concludes that the authentic time of Dao reveals itself through the principle of creation qua rest. Experiencing such temporal self-grounding, the sage becomes existentially awakened such that temporal ekstases becomes unfathomable. (shrink)

Abstract:Both Zhang Taiyan and Heidegger oppose the idea of unilinear teleological progress by unveiling the dimensions of decline embedded in modern (Western) civilization. In terms of the theory of dual "evolution," Zhang points out that accompanying the increase of good and happiness is the inevitable aggravation of evil and suffering. Critically appropriating Spengler, Heidegger diagnoses the current era as one of gigantic decline and speaks of Europe as the actualization of the decline of the West. Zhang attributes the meontological source (...) of evil and suffering to the abiding affective imprint and self-conceit, while Heidegger's thematization of decline is intimately bound up with his abiding concern with the history of Being. Confronted with the world of decline, Zhang puts forward a Zhuangzian proposal of "harmonizing between shi 是 and fei 非." In contrast, for Heidegger this decline at the same time offers the transition into the other inception of Western tradition. (shrink)

Of the things needing to be forgotten if we are to partake in the oneness of Dao, language is perhaps the hardest. Since the purpose of words is to delimit things, words create an artificial division between things and their image qua form. While humanity views images as distinct entities, Dao leaves them in their jumbled collectivity; while humanity feels compelled to act upon our thoughts and feelings, Dao remains silent and empty. This leads to the following question: Will modelling (...) ourselves after Dao result in a more creative form of thinking and if so, can it be carried-out without words and images? To demonstrate why the answer to this question is yes, we will first analyze why words are an obstacle to deeper thinking before looking at how images, despite their ability to connect with Dao, are nevertheless hindered by their dependency on being. It thus falls to spirit to lay bare the constant non-image of Dao, the core of the Daoist imagination and focus of the final section of this paper. (shrink)

I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristics; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration raises issues in phenomenological ontology of identity, individuation, and substance.

The aim of this essay is to examine the path of the philosopher of religion Italo Mancini related to his early speculative period on meontology and to show a theoretical consonance with his later period of “double thoughts”. The first part of the contribution argues: it is possible to explain the meontological path as prolegomena to the non-being of being through an in-depth analysis of the notions in his youthful essay “e La struttura dell’essere" e "Il trascendentale come fondamento”, (...) understood as status quaestionis on ontology in general (§1, §2); it presents also why for Mancini transcendence and functionality ground his scheme of possibilities (§3, §4); we define why the fundamental reason why Mancini’s strategy works is entirely based on a theology of oxymorons: starting with double thoughts (§5), as an open and structured path, insofar as thought and revelation appear as a hermeneutic circle (§6); in the last part, we delve into the logic of fragmentariness as an integral principle of religious hermeneutics and, finally, a summary relation between Mancini’s first speculation and the last of his posthumous work “Frammento su Dio” is assessed (§7). (shrink)

Meontology of Gorgias vs. Nihilism. The purpose of this paper is to challenge Gorgias’ image of a “nihilist existentialist”. The original thesis ouden estin, too frequently rendered as „nothing exists”, thus reducing the verb “to be” to denote “bare” existence, and ouden to denote “nothingness”. On close inspection, it turns out that, in Gorgias, neither do we have a negation of reality nor an affirmative treatment of the word “nothingness”.Therefore, ouden” should not be understood as a negation of all (...) reality or a kind of affirmative “nothingness”, whereas “estin” should not be reduced to “bare” existence. (When existence is negated what we obtain is annihilation). Such practices still affect the various translations of Gorgias’ treaty On the non-being or on Nature. Gorgias’ “sophist” thought is typically interpreted as a joke or a parody of dialectical thinking of the Eleatics. In fact, as it turns out, he made no parody of dialectic but applied the elenctic, apagogic method in Zeno’s masterly manner. He did so not for an artificial purpose but to prove the absurdity of the hypothesis of absolute, transcendent (hence incognizable) one Truth-Being, which eliminates the non-being of becoming as absolute non-being. Gorgias argued in earnest in favour of relative being as such, Becoming as the only reality, which from the point of view of absolute being is after all non-being, but not-this-being, or relative non-being but not non-relative non-being, as the Eleatics had claimed. Gorgias’ positions appears to be an apologia of non-being which is, that is of Becoming. We do not transform the “nothing” into a “no thing”. The main question of the treaty is: what is predicated by the word “nothing”? Gorgias’ position can be recapitulated as “nothing is sc. true, there is no criterion because, after all, everything is opinion. It is reinforced further by meontological, i.e. anti-eleatic Gorgias’ emphasis: “No thing is Being (substance)”, because everything is Becoming. Thus the title if Gorgias’ treaty can thus be treated as as an antithesis to that of Melissos’, which – in our opinion – is to emphasize the “non-beingness” of nature, the non-substantiality of things. Therefore, if Gorgias’ text was polemical, and it questioned (while at the same time maintaining the positivity of Becoming as non-being) only the immutability of things, and thus we cannot speak of the existence or the cognizability of natures or of essences of things. In sum, the reasoning of Zeno and Melissos was of a kind that is apt to cut both ways, and that is what Gorgias showed. The argument given as peculiar to himself was to this effect. “What is not” is not, so, it is just as much as “what is”. It is as if the onset of the issues that Plato will take up in The Sophist as the problem of non-being understood as difference. The axis of Gorgias’s anti-eleatic critique, in our view, is his polemic with Parmenides’ famous thesis B3 regarding the relationship of identity or equality between noein and einai. It is an additional and perhaps the most important point of his critique that aims at demonstrating that such relationship is impossible. In brief, things are not words just as thoughts are not words. (shrink)

Explores the cosmological and metaphysical thought in the Zhuangzi from the perspective of nothingness. Zhuangzi and the Becoming of Nothingness offers a radical rereading of the Daoist classic Zhuangzi by bringing to light the role of nothingness in grounding the cosmological and metaphysical aspects of its thought. Through a careful analysis of the text and its appended commentaries, David Chai reveals not only how nothingness physically enriches the myriad things of the world, but also why the Zhuangzi prefers nothingness over (...) being as a means to expound the authentic way of Dao. Chai weaves together Dao, nothingness, and being in order to reassess the nature and significance of Daoist philosophy, both within its own historical milieu and for modern readers interested in applying the principles of Daoism to their own lived experiences. Chai concludes that nothingness is neither a nihilistic force nor an existential threat; instead, it is a vital component of Dao’s creative power and the life-praxis of the sage. “Chai provides an elaborate philosophical meontological interpretation of the ontology/cosmology found in the Zhuangzi and the implications for existential practice. It’s a close, careful, but in many respects quite original reading of the classic that contributes significantly to the field of philosophical Daoist studies.” — Geir Sigurðsson, author of Confucian Propriety and Ritual Learning: A Philosophical Interpretation. (shrink)

This book challenges received notions of ontology in political theory and international relations by offering a psychoanalytically informed critique of depoliticisation in prominent liberal, post-liberal, dialogic and agonistic approaches to pluralism in world politics. Paipais locates the temptation of depoliticisation in their labouring under the fundamental fantasy of various guises of foundationalism (in the form of either political anthropology or ontology as ‘in the last instance’ ground) or, conversely, anti-foundationalism (the denial of all grounds, yet still operating within a foundationalist (...) imaginary). He argues, instead, for a formal political ontology of the void (against historicism) shot through an ‘incarnate’ messianic nihilism (against ethicism and teleological forms of politics). In so doing, the author offers critical readings of the messianic nihilism of Benjamin, Agamben, Taubes and Žižek by problematising the antinomian tendencies in their respective political theologies. The book argues for a version of Žižek’s Badiouian politics of militancy supplemented by a proper participatory understanding of St Paul’s messianic meontology and incarnational Christology as a means to reconceptualise the nexus between subjectivity, universality and political action in world politics. It will be of interest to students and scholars of International Relations theory, political theory, critical social theory and political theology. (shrink)

The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented a (...) certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted. (shrink)

This paper aims to argue that Jean-Luc Marion’s philosophical theology is an axio-meonto-Theo-logy which proposes a new way of approaching God. The traditional way of approaching God in theo-logy attained God by the predication and the predicate in the categories of being. However, Marion’s theology attempts to bring out the freedom of God from all categories of being. It provides a critique of the traditional way of approaching God and two arguments for Marion’s alternative approach. On the grounds of the (...) axiological argument and the meontological argument, I defend Marion’s theology from some recent criticisms. (shrink)

In Augustine's theological reflection, the biblical truth of “creation out of nothingness” becomes the dogmatic foundation of his philosophical speculation. Augustine argues that since “matter” is eternal, nothing can be derived from “nothingness”. He thus opposes the metaphysical paradigm of Christian thought which places God (“efficient cause”) and nothingness (“deficient cause”) as the origin of all existence. The “material cause” is no longer the “prime cause” of all beings but is replaced by the meontological dimension of absolute nothingness. The shifting (...) of the metaphysical paradigm in Augustine's speculation on the revealed truth of creatio ex nihilo leads to a theoretical gain: “nothingness” becomes a philosophical foundation capable of preserving both the truth of God's absolute freedom and the negation of all pantheism. (shrink)

In the paper/chapter, I examine Nishitani's appropriation of Buddhist thought as a response to nihilism and I regard his stance as an 'anontology' (neither ontology nor meontology), a neologism I've applied in my discussions of Nishida in other works as well.

This article examines the extent to which two of Meister Eckhart’s Latin writings fall prey to Heidegger’s charge of ontotheology. It argues that the intellectualist, ‘meontological’ approach to God in Eckhart’s First Parisian Question and the analogical, ontological approach in his Opus tripartitum are not as different as may initially appear. Not only do both rest on Eckhart’s peculiar doctrine of analogy; both serve to dismantle the ontotheological architecture. Indeed, rather than an intellectualist alternative to ontotheology, Eckhart’s First Parisian Question (...) presents a meticulously crafted dialectic designed to explode rational distinctions. Rather than a traditional account of God as the highest being, Eckhart’s Opus tripartitum obliterates hierarchies with its appeal to treat all being as God. Still, although both approaches contribute to an appreciation of Eckhart’s principal concern—the basic unity of the ground of the soul and the Godhead in releasement—neither suffices for unfolding its deepest implications. An ontotheological residue remains. (shrink)

The Role of Negation in the Description of the World According to Aristote’s Metaphysics. The notions of ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ have entered philosophical language, forming the basis of ontology and meontology, as the counterparts of the Greek expressions to on and to me on (nominalised forms, affirmative and negative, of the participle of the verb einai). Originally, however, these expressions did not have any objectifying meaning, but played the role of meta-language names, representing the copula einai in all its (...) forms, most generally in its affirmative and negative forms. The copula itself, which in later philosophy took on the existential meaning, had functioned only as a semantically empty connective of predicates. Over time the participle on has been used as a universal name of all predicates. The above-mentioned expressions became central in Greek philosophical terminology thanks to the debates, initiated by Parmenides, on the role of negation in the description of the world. Parmenides himself proposed a complete excision of negative sentences as describing by elimination, and created a positive-monistic system which abandoned multiplicity, divisibility, and variability. Later philosophers defended negation, fighting back against the paradoxes formulated by the Eleatics and later by the Sophists. Plato observed that without negation it is impossible to describe the multiplicity of things. He also distinguished a relative negation which does not eliminate anything but makes it possible to confront some things with others. According to the atomists, the divisibility of physical things forces us to accept that they consist of a positive element in the form of an impenetrable body, and of another element lacking any characteristics, i.e. the void. Finally, Aristotle, when analysing the process of change, justified the consistency of the statement that something comes out of “not being” and “being”, under the assumption that the former is understood as being actual, and the latter as being potential. In all these conceptions there is nothing non-existent, there are only proposals of how to identify the aspects of reality whose explanation justifies the use of negation. The affirmative and negative forms of the above expressions have also provoked reflection on the problem of truth and falsity. It has been observed that they are used in everyday language not only to state an agreement or disagreement with the actual facts of the matter, but also to affirm or deny something. (shrink)

In the midst of the ongoing debate over the uniqueness of Christ and of Christianity, Stanislas Breton’s work Unicité et monothéisme offers new categories of reflection which may come to bridge the fundamental theological differences between pluralist and inclusivist perspectives. While his notions of méontology and of the Cross as the symbol of self-effacement create a radical openness to the distinctive truth of other religious traditions, this openness is itself firmly grounded within Christian self-understanding. Breton also reminds us that the (...) ultimate Christian basis for salvation lies not so much in assent to particular doctrines, but in the act of total self-givenness to others, in particular to “the least of these my brethren” (Matt. 25). (shrink)

Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy contests the ancient opposition between Athens and Jerusalem by retrieving the concept of meontology - the doctrine of nonbeing - from the Jewish philosophical and theological tradition. For Emmanuel Levinas, as well as for Franz Rosenzweig, Hermann Cohen and Moses Maimonides, the Greek concept of nonbeing clarifies the meaning of Jewish life. These thinkers of 'Jerusalem' use 'Athens' for Jewish ends, justifying Jewish anticipation of a future messianic era as well as portraying (...) the subjects intellectual and ethical acts as central in accomplishing redemption. This book envisions Jewish thought as an expression of the intimate relationship between Athens and Jerusalem. It also offers new readings of important figures in contemporary Continental philosophy, critiquing previous arguments about the role of lived religion in the thought of Jacques Derrida, the role of Plato in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and the centrality of ethics in the thought of Franz Rosenzweig. (shrink)

Phenomenology tries to uncover the pre-linguistic foundation of logical operators, in order to show how our logical thinking is grounded in reality, and does not have a merely psychological value. If negation is grounded in the pre-predicative experience, though, it seems to follow that reality somehow contains something negative. It has been in order to avoid such consequence that Brentano has promoted a reform of ‘classical’ logic, which, among others, avoids negative terms. Husserl answered to such a reform with a (...) partial counter-reform that preserves a more classical understanding of logic. His logical and phenomenological investigations recognize the logical value of negation as such. However, such a recognition does not imply an ontological, or better ‘meontological’, commitment. This is possible precisely thanks to a more carefully phenomenological description of the formation and the structure of negative judgments. (shrink)

In this article, I elucidate the meaning of the act of philosophizing as a research activity in academia. My main thesis is that, as academic philosophers, we need to change our existing relation to thinking in academia, which requires a radical re-evaluation of the ēthos, or, the dwelling-place of philosophy. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s thought, I offer a place-based thinking, taking up the issue of being-in-academia as part of the question of dwelling. First, I explore the technological nature of being-in-academia (...) departing from Heidegger’s account of scientific research as ‘constant activity’. After identifying the ontological character of our situation in academia as captivation in the world, I bring up the matter of overcoming modern academia, discussing the possibility of orienting ourselves at the limits of education. I argue that reassessing our utilitarian relation to world and language, and recognizing the meontological dimension of thinking, is key for being able to de-structure academia and make room for ‘ontological freedom’. I conclude that the emergence of a new dwelling-place requires a poietic process of place-making at the limits of academia. (shrink)

Kenneth Reinhard - Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 370-371 Martin Kavka. Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xiii + 241. Cloth, $65.00. In Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy, Martin Kavka traces a subterranean history of what he calls "the Jewish meontological tradition," a recurrent encounter with questions of non-being both indigenous to Jewish religious (...) and philosophical thinking and arising in the Jewish relation to Greek meontology and its ethical afterlife in Western philosophy. Kavka argues that these strands of meontological ideas in turn inform a crucial mode of Jewish messianic thought, providing it with conceptual.. (shrink)

Abstract: This article examines Nishitani Keiji’s standpoint of emptiness as it is found in his work Religion and Nothingness. Since the term “emptiness” (kū 空) is here a way to point out to ultimate reality, this use of a negative language is regarded as an expression of a non-dualistic thought, in debt with Nishida’s philosophy and Zen Buddhism spiritual tradition as well as a viewpoint akin to apophatism in Christian mysticism.

This review highlights The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Philosophy’s focus on “departures from nothingness.” These departures are seen in four themes: the definition of tetsugaku, interpersonal relationships, culture, and the socio-political sphere. In the first theme, I examine the dialogical character of nothingness and how it might relate with being. In the second, I show how this engagement with being connects to how we relate with the Thou, and examine its particulars in a unique spiritual form of Japanese (...) feminism. In the third, I examine how this relational nothingness connects to society, social imaginaries, and aesthetics. And in the fourth, I delve into the complex interrelationship of nothingness and politics. I end with a note on the philosophical relevance of Yusa’s ordering of these chapters, and the potential of both departing from and returning to nothingness. (shrink)

This essay interprets the implications of Levinas's idea of a pre-philosophical ethics for the discourses of philosophy and theology, and it suggests that his work pushes philosophy and theology, and the ethics they bear, beyond the modern division of theory and practice. This view defines the ethical according to a rhythm of ontological interpretation of human action and sheer meontological responsiveness between acting persons. This rhythm becomes discernible in a creative form of moral praxis uniting philosophy, theology, and traditional ethics (...) before an event to which the three forms of reasoning can give witness, but which they cannot comprehend. A Levinasian ethics requires this movement of thought and potentially reshapes moral discourse in response. (shrink)

A critical concern with Kant's treatment of appearance and reality gives rise to this fascinating study. The first part contains the author's speculations about the relationships between appearance and the totally different other. In the second and third parts Samuel discusses a number of logical and psychological theories in the light of these "meontological" investigations, thereby developing his own views.--K. H.

The main concern of both Berdjaev's and Bulgakov's philosophical strivings consists in developing a concept of the person as the foundation of human dignity and creativity within a Christian world view. Once attracted by Marxism with its emphasis on human dignity and social justice, they started to struggle against Marxism's atheist materialism because of its lack of a concept of person. However, the same concern will lead both thinkers down very different paths with different consequences. This paper argues that, even (...) though Berdjaev has become famous as a philosopher of the person and a herald of creative ethics, Bulgakov developed a more solid Christian justification of the same claims. Both systems are presented by means of comparing some crucial notions within their concepts of personality—potentiality, trinity and autonomy. (shrink)