This rich, subtle and hugely ambitious book might also have been called “why (and how) metaphysics matters”. Cooper's themes are the tensions implicit in the relation of contingent human beings to the world and the implications of those tensions, and of putative means of their.

최근 형이상학에서 (적어도 분석적 전통의 형이상학에서) 점점 더 많은 학자들은 형이상학적 근거개념을 채택하고 있다. 근거개념을 수용하는 많은 학자들은, 근거개념의 수용과 더불어, 필자가 ‘형이상학적 결정론’이라고 명명할 가정을 추가적으로 받아들인다. 필자는 이 글에서 근거개념이 형이상학적 결정론과 함께 수용되면, 우리에게 특정 형이상학적 견해가 부과될 위험이 있다는 것을 보이고, 그러한 결과를 바탕으로 근거개념의 수용과 관련해 방법론적 교훈을 이끌어 내고자 한다.

General discussion of grounding, including its formal features, relations to other notions, and applications. (Originally published 2014; revised 2021).

Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, is (...) the first to address and investigate the metaphysical idea that certain facts are grounded in other facts. An introduction introduces and surveys the debate, examining its history as well as its central systematic aspects. The volume will be of wide interest to students and scholars of metaphysics. (shrink)

An annotated bibliography for metaphysical ground.

A collection of 37 essays surveying the state of the art on metaphysical ground. -/- Essay authors are: Fatema Amijee, Ricki Bliss, Amanda Bryant, Margaret Cameron, Phil Corkum, Fabrice Correia, Louis deRosset, Scott Dixon, Tom Donaldson, Nina Emery, Kit Fine, Martin Glazier, Kathrin Koslicki, David Mark Kovacs, Stephan Krämer, Stephanie Leary, Stephan Leuenberger, Jon Litland, Marko Malink, Michaela McSweeney, Kevin Mulligan, Alyssa Ney, Asya Passinsky, Francesca Poggiolesi, Kevin Richardson, Stefan Roski, Noel Saenz, Benjamin Schnieder, Erica Shumener, Alexander Skiles, Olla (...) Solomyak, Tuomas Tahko, Naomi Thompson, Kelly Trogdon, Jennifer Wang, Tobias Wilsch, and Justin Zylstra. (shrink)

In this dissertation I argue that universal attributes are the metaphysical ground of similarity, and that the ultimate reason embracing realism is that an explanation of similarity must posit the existence of universals. Other arguments for the existence of universals are ultimately motivated by the desire to explain phenomena, such as laws of nature, general predication, and general knowledge, that seem to depend on similarity. ;This work is structured on metaphilosophical principles of Lawrence Lombard and Lawrence Powers. Within this (...) framework I defend principles for assigning weights to theoretical values such as ontological economy, explanatory power, and accordance with commonsense beliefs, and develop a realist semantic position that I use to interpret and defend an argument for the existence of universals from premises that include a simple similarity statement. ;Attributions of similarity to objects are often made with respect to kind-determining attributes or with respect to determinable attributes. I provide a realist se mantic account of such attributions, including an account of attributions of degrees of similarity. While our ways of speaking and thinking about similarities can be explained using a realist approach, nominalist theories cannot explain this central aspect of our experience. Also, nominalist theories require sweeping rejections of commonsense claims. I argue that the ontological economy of the most plausible nominalist theories is not as great as is often supposed. Thus, if we can make sense of the concept of a universal, we should accept realism. ;Because the role of universals as the ground of similarity is the ultimate motivation for positing the existence of universals, the concept of a universal is essentially associated with that role. I support this view of universals by defending a criterion of identity for universals formulated in terms of their role in grounding similarities, and disproving alternative realist criteria of identity for universals. For example, I show that Armstrong is unsuccessful in his attempt to base a criterion of identity for universals on the causal roles of universals. By providing a criterion of identity of universals, in terms of their role in grounding similarities, the essential nature of universals is demonstrated. (shrink)

In John Dewey’s logical theory, qualities or qualitative relations account for the capacity to distinguish and associate the objects of reflective thought; they are antecedent to reflective analysis and necessary for coherent processes of inquiry. In Dewey’s writings that are specifically “metaphysical” in orientation, he is much more vague about the function of qualities, but does call them “generic traits of existence.” As such, they appear to be central to his mature ontological theory. In order to more fully understand (...) the metaphysical import of qualitative relations, I first examine the details of Dewey’s logical theory, and then generalize those details in accordance with Dewey’s larger theory of nature. The end result is a novel interpretation of Dewey’s metaphysics. (shrink)

Part I -- Scientific Composition and the New Mechanism. - 1. Laura Franklin-Hall: New Mechanistic Explanation and the Need for Explanatory Constraints. - 2. Kenneth Aizawa: Compositional Explanation: Dimensioned Realization, New Mechanism, and Ground. - 3. Jens Harbecke: Is Mechanistic Constitution a Version of Material Constitution?. - 4. Derk Pereboom: Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental. Part II -- Grounding, Science, and Verticality in Nature. - 5. Jonathan Schaffer: Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson. - 6. Jessica (...) Wilson: The Unity and Priority Arguments for Grounding. - 7. Carl Gillett: The Metaphysics of Nature, Science, and the Rules of Engagement. - 8. Andrew Melnyk: Grounding and the Formulation of Physicalism. - 9. Alyssa Ney: Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense. (shrink)

Na história da filosofia americana, há um filão de pensamento sobre os signos na natureza. Animais, insetos, árvores, flores, o clima, paisagens e a noite estrelada são todos encontrados expressivos de diversos significados. Além disso, esses fenômenos naturais são considerados por pensadores, como Ralph Waldo Emerson e Charles S. Peirce, como dotados de um caráter representativo no seu núcleo ontológico. A minha apresentação baseia-se nesta tradição, explorando a semiose da natureza em toda a sua extensão e no que diz respeito (...) ao seu ser fundamental. O seu objetivo é desvendar alguns fundamentos metafísicos que apoiariam a semiose universal, bem como defender a primazia de uma dimensão estética no centro da atividade semiótica. (shrink)

The paper proposes a strategy for understanding metaphysical grounding in deflationary terms and, more generally, proposes a form of methodological deflationism with respect to the notions of ground. The idea is to define a deflationary is grounded in-predicate by appeal to the two-place non-causal connective ‘because’ and a deflationary truth predicate. To this end, we discuss the explanatory role of the truth-predicate in non-causal explanations and develop a theory of truth for the language of the ‘because’-connective. We argue (...) that at least from a logical perspective our deflationary notion of ground is up to the task. (shrink)

The concept of metaphysical grounding refers to a dependence relation—a relation between facts that is asymmetrical and non-causal. I aim to apply this concept to a Divine Command Theory (DCT) of moral obligations. Divine command theorists say that moral obligations arise from God’s commands. I argue that the three main views on the relation between the divine command and the obligation—causal, supervenience, and identity—do not capture all that we desire in a moral theory of obligations. After attempting to (...) clarify metaphysical grounding in general, I articulate the distinction between what I call normative grounding and metaethical grounding. I then use this distinction to criticize Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s discussion of DCT and to highlight the compatibility of DCT with other ethical theories. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I develop a metaphysics of powers to ground Dispositionalism, the theory of the source of modality according to which all alethic modal truths are grounded in dispositional properties instantiated in the actual world. I consider a number of key theses that powers metaphysics display, and investigate which can be incorporated in the metaphysical base of Dispositionalism, and how. In the first part I examine the interaction of two core principles of powers ontologies: Directedness, the thesis that (...) powers ‘point at’ their manifestations, and Independence, the thesis that powers can fail to manifest. These two principles are in tension: there is an argument, known as Too Much Possibility, to the effect that they are inconsistent. I examine various strategies to resist the argument. These involve Physical Intentionality, numerical identity between power and manifestation, process ontologies, and platonic universals. I conclude that they are all unsatisfactory. In the second part, I develop a ‘minimal metaphysics of powers’ that is immune from the threat of Too Much Possibility. This involves considering unmanifested manifestations to be akin to Mere Logical Existents. I argue that the best way to avoid the tension at the heart of powers ontologies is to conceive of unmanifested manifestations as non-essentially non-spatiotemporally located entities. I then consider some consequences of minimal metaphysics: I examine which ontological category the manifestations of power can belong to, and what are the prospects of grounding metaphysical, as opposed to natural, modality. Finally, in the third part, I investigate whether further key theses of powers ontologies can be incorporated into the minimal metaphysics. This leads to discuss the relationship of the minimal metaphysics with grounding and dependency relations, the metaphysics of time, the truthmaking principle, and tendential theories of powers. (shrink)

Abstract:In contemporary debates, the materialist ethics of Cārvāka has primarily been discussed in relation to and on the backdrop of ethical schema suited for systems whose metaphysics permits the notions of God and soul. This essay elaborates on this insight and draws attention to the significance of the metaphysical backdrop of ethical theories. We also briefl y discuss two aspects of Cārvāka materialistic ethics, which attends to the metaphysics of Cārvāka justly, namely the crucial role of pain in their (...) ethical theory and the lack of inherent moral value to actions. (shrink)

The scientific realist wants to read the metaphysical picture of reality through our best fundamental physical theories. The traditional way of doing so is in terms of objects, properties, and laws of nature. For instance, there are families of fundamental particles individuated by their properties of mass and charge, which determine how they move around. One could call this view an object-oriented metaphysics grounded on properties. In this paper, I wish to present an alternative view that one can dub (...) a thin object oriented metaphysics grounded on structure: there are fundamental entities with no fundamental properties other than the one(s) needed to specify their nature. I argue that my view has several advantages over the received one. In particular, I compare my proposal to the traditional view in the quantum domain and I argue that my view provides a better fit for both approaches to quantum metaphysics, namely the primitive ontology programme and wave-function realism. (shrink)

Recently, many philosophers have claimed that the world has an ordered, hierarchical structure, where entities at lower ontological levels are said to metaphysically ground entities at higher ontological levels. Other philosophers have recently claimed that our language has an ordered, hierarchical structure. Semantically primitive sentences are said to conceptually ground less primitive sentences. It’s often emphasized that metaphysical grounding is a relation between things out in the world, not a relation between our sentences. But conflating these relations is (...) easy to do, given that both types of grounding are expressed by non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between metaphysical and conceptual grounding. I argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual grounding, then it does not involve metaphysical grounding. I also develop some heuristics for deciding which type of grounding is relevant in a given case. These heuristics suggest that many proposed cases of metaphysical grounding do not actually involve metaphysical grounding at all. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify the relation between two types of grounding: metaphysical and conceptual. Metaphysical grounding relates entities at more and less fundamental ontological levels. Conceptual grounding relates semantically primitive sentences and semantically derivative sentences. It is important to distinguish these relations given that both types of grounding can underwrite non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims. In this paper, I argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual (...) grounding, then it does not involve metaphysical grounding. I then present two heuristics for deciding which type of grounding is relevant to a given case. These heuristics suggest that certain proposed cases of metaphysical grounding may not actually involve metaphysical grounding at all. (shrink)

Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important—possibly an indispensable—role in metaphysical explanation. Or both. I argue that saying that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature, but that this view is untenable. We ought therefore (...) to be ‘separatists’ and view grounding and explanation as distinct. As it turns out, though, once grounding has been in this sense distinguished from the explanation it backs, the view that the role grounding plays in explanation justifies its introduction ends up in serious trouble. I conclude that the role grounding plays in explanation does not justify attributing to grounding whatever nature we think it has, and it most likely does not give us any special reason to think grounding exists. (shrink)

Attempts to elucidate grounding are often made by connecting grounding to metaphysical explanation, but the notion of metaphysical explanation is itself opaque, and has received little attention in the literature. We can appeal to theories of explanation in the philosophy of science to give us a characterization of metaphysical explanation, but this reveals a tension between three theses: that grounding relations are objective and mind-independent; that there are pragmatic elements to metaphysical explanation; and (...) that grounding and metaphysical explanation share a close connection. Holding fixed the mind-independence of grounding, I show that neither horn of the resultant dilemma can be blunted. Consequently, we should reject the assumption that grounding relations are mind-independent. (shrink)

Antonioni's approach to filmmaking provides a clear example of philosopher Wilhelm Wurzer's notion of *filming*, a term Wurzer uses neither to signify the specific practice of filmmaking, nor in the sense of a 'quantitative proliferation of images' that carry out the calculative and productivist goals of the visual in a technocratic society. [1] *Filming* denotes, among other things, 'an imaginal mode of discerning which releases the imagination toward radical disinterestedness . . . imagination's fall from the principle of *telos*', and (...) the possibility of representation being 'free of the explicit dominance of subjectivity'. [2] In this discussion I would like to examine a few scenes from Antonioni's _Blowup_ (1966) that consistently enact the representational features just mentioned. By radically deconstructing notions of illusion no less than those of reality, Antonioni ultimately demonstrates that the psychoanalytic notion of the imaginary -- adopted by Christian Metz and others, and based on the persistent opposition reality/illusion -- is no less implicated in a metaphysical dynamics of presence than any naive notions of realism. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of metaphysically opaque grounding, a largely neglected form of metaphysical grounding that challenges the commonly held assumptions that grounding is an especially intimate and powerful connection between facts and that it is necessarily connected with the essences of things. I provide a definition of opaque grounding, identify some interesting philosophical views that are committed to it, and explore some consequences for the general theory of grounding. Finally, I briefly address (...) some natural initial doubts about opaque grounding and find them unwarranted. The upshot is that the notion deserves more attention than it has previously received. (shrink)

Antonioni's approach to filmmaking provides a clear example of philosopher Wilhelm Wurzer's notion of *filming*, a term Wurzer uses neither to signify the specific practice of filmmaking, nor in the sense of a 'quantitative proliferation of images' that carry out the calculative and productivist goals of the visual in a technocratic society. [1] *Filming* denotes, among other things, 'an imaginal mode of discerning which releases the imagination toward radical disinterestedness... imagination's fall from the principle of *telos*', and the possibility of (...) representation being 'free of the explicit dominance of subjectivity'. [2] In this discussion I would like to examine a few scenes from Antonioni's _Blowup_ that consistently enact the representational features just mentioned. By radically deconstructing notions of illusion no less than those of reality, Antonioni ultimately demonstrates that the psychoanalytic notion of the imaginary -- adopted by Christian Metz and others, and based on the persistent opposition reality/illusion -- is no less implicated in a metaphysical dynamics of presence than any naive notions of realism. (shrink)

The past few decades have witnessed an extraordinary revival of interest in metanormative non-naturalism. Despite this interest, it is still unclear how to understand the distinctive metaphysical commitments of this view. We illustrate the relevant difficulties by examining what is arguably the most prominent class of contemporary attempts to formulate non-naturalism’s metaphysical commitments. This class of proposals, exemplified in work by Gideon Rosen and Stephanie Leary, characterizes the distinctive metaphysical commitments of non-naturalism in terms of metaphysical (...) grounding and essence. We argue that these proposals overgeneralize: they either misclassify intuitively naturalistic hypotheses about the metaphysics of normativity as “non-naturalist”, or misclassify hypotheses in other areas of metaphysics. We argue that this problem stems from features of grounding itself. We suggest a more promising alternative for formulating non-naturalism, which revolves around the notion of objective similarity between classes of properties. We conclude by drawing some general lessons for inquiry about the metaphysics of normativity, and about metaphysics in general. (shrink)

According to the deductive-nomological account of ground, a fact A grounds another fact B in case the laws of metaphysics determine the existence of B on the basis of the existence of A. Accounts of grounding of this particular variety have already been developed in the literature. My aim in this paper is to sketch a new version of this account. My preferred account offers two main improvements over existing accounts. First, the present account is able to deal with (...) necessitarian as well as non-necessitarian cases of grounding by acknowledging the existence of two types of metaphysical laws. I will argue that we should assume that metaphysical laws come in the necessitarian as well as in the non-necessitarian varietyclosely paralleling the distinction between strict and non-strict laws in the philosophy of science. The second main improvement of the present account is that this account is able to provide an explanation of why the laws of metaphysics have a direction built into them. I will argue that we should characterize metaphysical laws with the help of Theodore Sider’s (2011) notion of structure, which is a descendent of David Lewis’s (1983) notion of naturalness. According to the account of metaphysical laws developed in this paper, metaphysical laws express in their antecedents either perfectly structural truths or more structural truths than in their consequents. Since on Sider’s account structural features of reality are fundamental features of reality, the account is able to explain as to why the laws of metaphysics take us from the fundamental to the derivative. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Jonathan Schaffer presents a novel framework for understanding grounding. Metaphysical laws play a central role. In addition, Schaffer argues that, contrary to what many have thought, there is no special 'explanatory gap' between consciousness and the physical world. Instead, explanatory gaps are everywhere. I draw out and criticize the methodology for metaphysics implicit in Schaffer's presentation. In addition, I argue that even if we accept Schaffer's picture, there remains a residual explanatory gap (...) between consciousness and the physical. The residual gap does most of the same philosophical work as the original. Schaffer has introduced a troublesome metaphysical methodology that fails to follow through on its biggest promise: to deflate the explanatory gap. (shrink)

In this classic text, Kant sets out to articulate and defend the Categorical Imperative - the fundamental principle that underlies moral reasoning - and to lay the foundation for a comprehensive account of justice and human virtues. This new edition and translation of Kant's work is designed especially for students. An extensive and comprehensive introduction explains the central concepts of Groundwork and looks at Kant's main lines of argument. Detailed notes aim to clarify Kant's thoughts and to correct some commonmisunderstandings (...) of his doctrines. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of papers that advance our understanding of the metaphysics of powers — properties such as fragility and electric charge. The metaphysics of powers is a fast developing research field with fundamental questions at the forefront of current research, such as Can there be a world of only powers? What is the manifestation of a power? Are powers and their manifestations related by necessity? What are the prospects for dispositional accounts of causation? The papers focus on (...) questions concerning the metaphysics of powers that cut across any particular subject-specific ontological domain -- whether philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, epistemology – investigating the metaphysical structure of powers, the nature of the manifestation of powers, the necessity or contingency of a power’s relation to its manifestations, and powers and causation. A number of authors also engage in discussion with Humean and neo-Humean treatments of causation, thereby making contributions to a larger metaphysical debate beyond powers. Additionally, the authors engage critically with the latest contributions to the debate on powers in the literature, thereby bringing together in a wholesome and analytical way the most recent and noteworthy theoretical developments in this research field. (shrink)

Thinking about metaphysical problems in terms of grounding has its uses, but those uses are limited. This paper argues against attempts to see issues of grounding as having a central and organising role in metaphysical inquiry. After arguing that grounding does some useful work, this paper will argue that grounding is neither the central tool for understanding explanation in metaphysics, nor defines the subject matter of metaphysics. Instead, grounding tracks only some of the (...) metaphysical explanations we should be looking for, and is only one among many of the topics metaphysics aims to address. (shrink)

The past few decades have witnessed an extraordinary revival of interest in metanormative non-naturalism. Despite this interest, it is still unclear how to understand the distinctive metaphysical commitments of this view. We illustrate the relevant difficulties by examining what is arguably the most prominent class of contemporary attempts to formulate non-naturalism’s metaphysical commitments. This class of proposals, exemplified in work by Gideon Rosen and Stephanie Leary, characterizes the distinctive metaphysical commitments of non-naturalism in terms of metaphysical (...) grounding and essence. We argue that these proposals overgeneralize: they either misclassify intuitively naturalistic hypotheses about the metaphysics of normativity as “non-naturalist”, or misclassify hypotheses in other areas of metaphysics. We argue that this problem stems from features of grounding itself. We suggest a more promising alternative for formulating non-naturalism, which revolves around the notion of objective similarity between classes of properties. We conclude by drawing some general lessons for inquiry about the metaphysics of normativity, and about metaphysics in general. (shrink)

Pragmatist Metaphysics proposes a pragmatist re-articulation of the nature, aims and methods of metaphysics. Rather than regarding metaphysics as a ‘first philosophy’, an inquiry into the world independent of human perspectives, the pragmatist views metaphysics as an inquiry into categorizations of reality laden with human practices. Insofar as our categorizations of reality are practice-laden, they are also, inevitably, value-laden. Sami Pihlström argues that metaphysics does not, then, study the world’s ‘own’ categorial structure, but a structure we, through our conceptual and (...) practical activities, impose on the reality we experience and interact with. Engaging with the classical American pragmatists, in particular William James, and neopragmatists, including Hilary Putnam, the author seeks to correct long-held misconceptions regarding the nature of the relationship between metaphysics and pragmatism. He argues that a coherent metaphysical alternative to the currently fashionable realist metaphysics emerges from pragmatism and that pragmatism itself should be reinterpreted in a metaphysically serious manner. Moreover, the book argues that, from a pragmatist perspective, metaphysics must be inextricably linked with ethics. (shrink)