My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of (...) agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action. (shrink)

Mental action deserves a place among foundational topics in action theory and philosophy of mind. Recent accounts of human agency tend to overlook the role of conscious mental action in our daily lives, while contemporary accounts of the conscious mind often ignore the role of mental action and agency in shaping consciousness. This collection aims to establish the centrality of mental action for discussions of agency and mind. The thirteen original essays provide a wide-ranging vision of the various and nuanced (...) philosophical issues at stake. By investigating the nature, scope, and explanation of mental action, the essays presented here aim to demonstrate the significance of conscious mental action for discussions of agency and mind. Mental Action and the Conscious Mind will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and philosophy of agency, as well as to philosophically inclined cognitive scientists. -/- . (shrink)

While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...) we argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wider range of types of mental action than heretofore recognized. Conclusions yielded by two distinct bodies of current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress meditation’s suitability for this role. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to make two general points. First, I claim that the discussions in Repetti (2017) assume different, sometimes conflicting, notions of free will, so the guiding question of the book is not as clear as it could be. Second, according to Buddhist tradition, the path to enlightenment requires rejecting the delusional belief in the existence of a persisting self. I claim that if there is no persisting self, there are no intentional actions; and, if there are (...) no intentional actions, there is no hope for Buddhist enlightenment. Thus, rejecting the allegedly delusional belief in a persisting self has disastrous consequences, both for the existence of intentional action and for Buddhist soteriology. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an alternative account of action that improves upon what has come to be known as the standard story. The standard story depicts actions as events that are caused by and made intelligible through the appropriate combinations of the agent’s beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions and other motivational factors. I argue that the standard story is problematic because it depicts the relation between the agent and their bodily actions as causally mediated by their motivational factors. On the (...) alternative account that I present, whenever an agent performs a bodily action, they do so by exerting a distinctive kind of effort so as to initiate, sustain, and control their own bodily capacities, an essential feature of bodily action that is absent from the standard story. (shrink)

Richard Holton has presented an important criticism of two prominent accounts of action, a criticism that employs a notion of strength of will. Holton claims that these well-known accounts of action cannot explain cases in which an agent adheres to the dictates of a previous resolution in spite of a persistent desire to the contrary. In this chapter, I present an explanation and defense of Holton’s criticism of these accounts of action, and then I argue that while Holton highlights a (...) crucial deficiency in both, his own explanation of strength of will is problematic. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on ethical governance, which speaks to the infrastructure, processes, and practices that decrease the probability of performing ethically wrong actions and ethically bad outcomes resulting from relatively innocent actions. The ethics consultant can help spot gaps or other insufficiencies in ethical infrastructure, process, and practice. Ethics consulting consists in engaging in a due diligence process for ethical risk. The goal is to identify possible sources of ethical risk both in terms of features of the product and the (...) ways it may or may not be used, and to recommend feature changes and best practices for ethical deployment and use of the product. Ethics consulting more generally can be seen as aimed at either doing a bunch of good or avoiding a bunch of bad. Ethical challenges often arise in business because of competing assumptions and commitments that create seemingly irresolvable tensions or obscure the potentially bad consequences of particular decisions. (shrink)

Recent accounts of human agency tend to overlook the role of conscious mental action in our daily lives, while contemporary accounts of the conscious mind often ignore the role of mental action and agency in shaping consciousness. This collection aims to establish the centrality of mental action for discussions of agency and mind.

I present an alternative account of action centered around the notion of effort. I argue that effort has several unique features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to initiate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story (...) of action, I apply my account to situations in which an agent displays strength of will, such as when one struggles to perform an action while overcoming a persistent urge to do otherwise. I conclude by offering an explanation of mental action that demonstrates the extent of our powers of agency within the domain of the mental. (shrink)

The Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Rennes has recently introduced a final year group‐taught compulsory course in Business Ethics. Its organisers here describe and discuss their aims, methods and results. Michael Brent is Head of the Human Resources Department at Groupe ESC Rennes, 2 rue Robert‐d’Arbrissel, 35065 Rennes, and has an MA in Philosophy and diplomas in business and marketing, as well as several years European consultancy experience. Susan Grinsted teaches production management and related subjects at Rennes, with a first (...) degree in Metallurgy and a PhD in Engineering as well as several years UK industrial experience and a previous appointment at Warwick University, England. (shrink)

The Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Rennes has recently introduced a final year group‐taught compulsory course in Business Ethics. Its organisers here describe and discuss their aims, methods and results. Michael Brent is Head of the Human Resources Department at Groupe ESC Rennes, 2 rue Robert‐d’Arbrissel, 35065 Rennes, and has an MA in Philosophy and diplomas in business and marketing, as well as several years European consultancy experience. Susan Grinsted teaches production management and related subjects at Rennes, with a first (...) degree in Metallurgy and a PhD in Engineering as well as several years UK industrial experience and a previous appointment at Warwick University, England. (shrink)