Results for 'minimal self'

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  1. The minimal self hypothesis.Timothy Lane - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103029.
    For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual (...)
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  2. Minimal Self-Awareness: from Within A Developmental Perspective.A. Ciaunica & L. Crucianelli - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):207-226.
    This article focuses on the question of how we perceive and represent ourselves at the most minimal, pre-reflective level. We first review recent work emphasizing the multisensory basis of our perceptual experiences and the embodied nature of self-awareness. We then focus on interoceptive and tactile signals, as key components of bodily self-consciousness, and discuss one crucial yet overlooked aspect of our embodiment, namely the fact that bodily self-consciousness emerges from the outset within the body of another (...)
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  3. The minimal self needs a social update.Miriam Kyselo - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1057-1065.
    REVIEW ESSAY The minimal self needs a social update Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame, by Dan Zahavi, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, 304 pp.
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  4.  82
    Between Minimal Self and Narrative Self: A Husserlian Analysis of Person.Jaakko Belt - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (4):305-323.
    ABSTRACTThe distinction between minimal self and narrative self has gained ground in recent discussions of selfhood. In this article, this distinction is reassessed by analysing Zahavi and Gallagher’s account of selfhood and supplementing it with Husserl’s concept of person. I argue that Zahavi and Gallagher offer two compatible and complementary notions of self. Nevertheless, the relationship between minimal self and narrative self requires further clarification. Especially the embeddedness of self, the interplay between (...)
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  5. Beyond the Minimal Self.Di Huang - 2021 - Philosophy Today 65 (3):691-708.
    This article reconstructs Sartre’s theory of selfhood against the background of the contemporary debate between minimal-self theories and narrative-self theories. I argue that Sartre’s theory incorporates both an emphasis on the singular first-person perspective, which is characteristic of minimal-self theories, and an emphasis on the practical intelligibility of experience, which is characteristic of narrative-self theories. The distinctiveness of the Sartrean combination of these motifs consists in its idea of the necessary ideal-relatedness of consciousness. According (...)
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  6. Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership.Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual (...)
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  7. Minimal self and narrative self. A distinction in need of refinement.D. Zahavi - 2010 - In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Heningnsen. pp. 3--11.
     
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  8. The “minimal self” in psychopathology: Re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum☆.Michel Cermolacce, Jean Naudin & Josef Parnas - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):703-714.
    The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the ‘mineness’ of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the (...)
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  9.  45
    Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.Jakub Limanowski & Felix Blankenburg - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
  10.  23
    Is minimal self preserved in schizophrenia? A subcomponents view☆.Aaron L. Mishara - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):715-721.
  11.  36
    Minimal Self and Timing Disorders in Schizophrenia: A Case Report.Brice Martin, Nicolas Franck, Michel Cermolacce, Jennifer T. Coull & Anne Giersch - 2018 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12.
    For years, phenomenological psychiatry has proposed that distortions of the temporal structure of consciousness contribute to the abnormal experiences described before schizophrenia emerges, and may relate to basic disturbances in consciousness of the self. However, considering that temporality refers mainly to an implicit aspect of our relationship with the world, disturbances in the temporal structure of consciousness remain difficult to access. Nonetheless, previous studies have shown a correlation between self disorders and the automatic ability to expect an event (...)
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  12.  89
    The minimal self.Galen Strawson - unknown
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  13.  33
    The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times.Robert Ehrlich - 1984 - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 1984 (62):223-230.
    Few works of social criticism about contemporary America have elicited so much response as The Culture of Narcissism. There Christopher Lasch argued that the traditional American emphasis on individualism has degenerated into a narcissistic preoccupation with the self. He explained this transformation by pointing to the psychological consequences resulting from changes in the nature of production, consumption, and socialization. Of particular importance was the shift from handicraft to factory modes of production and the subsequent takeover of workers' knowledge by (...)
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  14. Naïve Realism and Minimal Self.Daniel S. H. Kim - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):150-159.
    This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how phenomenological discussions of minimal self-consciousness can enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experiences. As a case study, I investigate the nature of the relationship between naïve realism, a contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, and experiential minimalism (or, the ‘minimal self’ view), a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness originated in the Phenomenological tradition. (...)
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    The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times.R. Ehrlich - 1984 - Télos 1984 (62):223-230.
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  16.  27
    Sociality and the minimal self: On Dan Zahavi’s “group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy”.Matt E. M. Bower - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1):78-85.
    I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self-awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.
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  17.  8
    Giving thickness to the minimal self: coenesthetic depth and the materiality of consciousness.István Fazakas, Mathilde Bois & Tudi Gozé - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Contemporary phenomenological psychopathology has raised questions concerning selfhood and its possible alterations in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Although the notion of the self is central to several accounts of anomalies, it remains a question how exactly the radically minimal experiential features of selfhood can be altered. Indeed, the risk is to reduce the notion of selfhood so drastically, that it can no longer account for alterations of experience. Here we propose to give thickness to the minimal self. (...)
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  18.  27
    Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership.Sanneke Haan & Leon Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a (...)
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  19.  7
    Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware?Constantinos Picolas - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:539665.
    Patients in a Minimally Conscious State (MCS) constitute a subgroup of awareness impaired patients who show minimal signs of awareness as opposed to patients in a Vegetative State who do not exhibit any such signs. While the empirical literature is rich in studies investigating either overt or covert signs of awareness in such patients the question of self-awareness has only scarcely been addressed. Even in the occasion where self-awareness is concerned, it is only higher-order or reflective (...)-awareness that is the target of such investigations. In the first part of this paper, I briefly review the relevant clinical neuroscience literature to demonstrate that the conception of self-awareness at play in such studies is indeed that of reflective self-awareness. In the second part, I present the philosophical notion of pre-reflective (or minimal) self-awareness. This is shown to primarily refer to the implicit awareness of our embodied subjectivity which essentially permeates all our experiences. As discussed, this minimal self-awareness is not specifically addressed when clinically or experimentally assessing patients in MCS. My suggestion is that neuroimaging studies targeting minimal self-awareness as in First-Person Perspective-taking paradigms could be used with MCS patients to shed light on the question of whether those individuals are minimally self-aware even in the case where they lack self-reflective abilities. Empirical evidence of this kind could have important theoretical implications for the discussion about the notion of self-awareness but also potential medical and social/legal implications for awareness impaired patients’ management. (shrink)
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  20.  88
    First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.
    In this paper, I present one possible way of arguing for the theory of minimal self-consciousness, namely, by an argument by elimination. Central to the argument are the following two claims: a) If a theory of consciousness cannot explain first-person self-reference, then the theory is false, and b) An anonymity theory cannot explain first-person self-reference. Consequently, the anonymity theory is false.
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  21. Rousseau and the minimal self: A solution to the problem of amour-propre.Michael Locke McLendon - 2014 - European Journal of Political Theory 13 (3):341-361.
    Over the past few decades, scholars have reassessed the role of amour-propre in Rousseau’s thought. While it was once believed that he had an entirely negative valuation of the emotion, it is now widely held that he finds it useful and employs it to strengthen moral attachments, conjugal love, civic virtue and moral heroism. At the same time, scholars are divided as to whether this positive amour-propre is an antidote to the negative or dangerous form. Some scholars are confident that (...)
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  22. Thought Insertion and the Minimal Self.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 14 (2):32-41.
    This paper contributes to the debate in the philosophy of psychiatry regarding the relation between thought insertion in schizophrenia and the sense of selfhood. Some scholars have suggested that thought insertion presents a case where the sense of selfhood is lacking. Other scholars have disputed this by proposing that a form of minimal selfhood is a necessary feature of consciousness that is still present in thought insertion, albeit in a disturbed manner. Herein, I argue that the notion of (...) selfhood that is used by these scholars is ambiguous between two meanings. The first is an ontological notion concerning the first-person individuation of consciousness. The second is a phenomenological notion concerning how a conscious experience is experienced as being given to the first-person subject. I argue that the former ontological notion is indeed a necessary feature of conscious experience, but the latter phenomenological notion is only a contingent feature. Therefore, even if it is possible that thought insertion presents a case where the feeling of first-person givenness is lacking or disturbed, the first-person individuation of consciousness remains present and undisturbed. As well as further clarifying the connection between consciousness and selfhood, this philosophical analysis reveals the extent to which schizophrenia can and cannot be said to comprise a disorder of selfhood. (shrink)
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  23.  68
    Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain.Julian Kiverstein - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
    This paper explores the possibility of a neuroscientific explanation of consciousness, and what such an explanation might look like. More specifically, I will be concerned with the claim that for any given experience there is neural representational system that constitutes the minimal supervenience base of that experience. I will call this hypothesis the minimal supervenience thesis. I argue that the minimal supervenience thesis is subject to two readings, which I call the localist and holist readings. Localist theories (...)
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  24.  46
    The destructive nature of severe and ongoing trauma: Impairments in the minimal-self.Yochai Ataria & Omer Horovitz - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):254-276.
    This paper argues that severe and ongoing trauma (SOT) can lead to impairment at the level of the minimal self (MS), which is the core element in the structure of subjectivity. In the long-term, such impairments can result in complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) and schizophrenia. The paper tackles this issue while trying to create meaningful bridges between phenomenology and neuroscience.
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  25.  34
    Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge: A Dissolution of Ebbs's Puzzle.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 427-439.
  26. Self-Consciousness without an “I”: A Critique of Zahavi’s Account of the Minimal Self.Lilian Alweiss - 2022 - Research in Phenomenology 52 (1):84-119.
    This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. (...)
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  27.  3
    James and the Minimal Self.Yumiko Inukai - 2019 - In Clifford S. Stagoll & Michael P. Levine (eds.), Pragmatism Applied: William James and the Challenges of Contemporary Life. Albany: SUNY Press. pp. 169-193.
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  28.  33
    Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):509-520.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of (...)
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  29. First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Gr Unbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag.
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  30.  49
    Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2018 - Topoi:1-12.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of (...)
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  31. A phenomenological-enactive theory of the minimal self.Brett Welch - 2015 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that (...)
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  32.  11
    A Window to the (Dissolved) Self? : Psychedelic Ego-dissolution as a Case of Minimal Self-consciousness.Jesper Johansson - unknown
    A Window to the (Dissolved) Self? : Psychedelic Ego-dissolution as a Case of Minimal Self-consciousness.
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  33.  80
    Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances.Jelle Bruineberg & Erik Rietveld - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:1-14.
    In this paper, we set out to develop a theoretical and conceptual framework for the new field of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience. This framework should be able to integrate insights from several relevant disciplines: theory on embodied cognition, ecological psychology, phenomenology, dynamical systems theory, and neurodynamics. We suggest that the main task of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience is to investigate the phenomenon of skilled intentionality from the perspective of the self-organization of the brain-body-environment system, while doing justice to the (...)
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  34.  5
    Corrigendum: Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware?Constantinos Picolas - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  35.  17
    Application of molecular dynamics computer simulations in the design of a minimal self-replicating molecular machine.Paweł Weroński, Yi Jiang & Steen Rasmussen - 2008 - Complexity 13 (4):10-17.
  36.  11
    In search of the “mechanisms” of persistence of subjectivity: Minimal self and agency.Ivana Anton Mlinar - 2019 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 8 (2):502-515.
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  37.  75
    The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion.Monima Chadha - 2013 - Asian Philosophy 23 (1):24-42.
    In this paper I revisit the early Nyāya argument for the existence of a self. In section 1, I reconstruct the argument in Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.10 as an argument from recognition following the interpretation in the Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya and the Nyāya-Vārttika. In Section 2, I reassess the plausibility of the Nyāya argument from memory/recognition in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika in the light of recent empirical research. I conclude that the early Nyāya version of the argument from recognition can only establish (...)
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  38. Comment: Minimal conditions for the simplest form of self-consciousness.Adrian J. T. Smith - 2010 - In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence, disorders. Schattauer.
    Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003.
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  39.  25
    Self-Organizing Dynamics of a Minimal Protocell.Walter Riofrio - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:185-191.
    In this paper, we present an argument showing why the general properties of a self-organizing system (e.g. being far from equilibrium) may be too weak to characterize biological and proto-biological systems. The special character of biological systems, tell us that its distinctive capacities could have been developed in pre-biotic times. In other words, the basic properties of life would be better comprehended if we think that they were much more likely early in time. We developed a conceptual proposal on (...)
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  40. Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain.Julian Kiverstein - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1).
    Cognitive neuroscientists are currently busy searching for the neural signatures of conscious experience. I shall argue that the notion of neural correlates of consciousness employed in much of this work is subject to two very different interpretations depending on how one understands the relation between the concepts of “state consciousness” and “creature consciousness”. Localist theories treat the neural correlates of creature consciousness as a kind of background condition that must be in place in order for the brain to realise particular (...)
     
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  41.  30
    How Minimal Can Self-Consciousness Be?Anna Strasser - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):39-62.
    In many cases, the ascription of self-consciousness is uncontroversial. For example, the ability to use the first person pronoun ‘I’ in the right way is obviously related to self-consciousness, although this is not true in all cases. The ascription of self-consciousness to infants, to persons with psychopathological syndromes, or to animals is controversial. In this paper, I will focus on the question of how ascribing self-consciousness to infants can be justified. There are two main subjects relevant (...)
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  42.  36
    Self-Knowledge and the Minimal Conditions of Responsibility: A Traffic-Participation View on Human Agency.Maureen Sie - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):271-291.
    “I demote practical reason from the conductor’s podium on which it is traditionally pictured, leading the performance. I picture practical reason less as an orchestral conductor than as a theatrical prompter — out of sight, following the action in case it needs to be nudged back into an intelligible course.” (David Velleman 2009, p. 4)IntroductionIn this paper I discuss our practice of exchanging explanatory and justifying reasons with one another, that is, reasons with which we explain or justify our actions, (...)
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  43.  21
    Minimal Rationality and Self-Transformation.Andrew W. Schwartz - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (2):215-228.
  44.  64
    Idealizations, essential self-adjointness, and minimal model explanation in the Aharonov–Bohm effect.Shech Elay - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4839-4863.
    Two approaches to understanding the idealizations that arise in the Aharonov–Bohm effect are presented. It is argued that a common topological approach, which takes the non-simply connected electron configuration space to be an essential element in the explanation and understanding of the effect, is flawed. An alternative approach is outlined. Consequently, it is shown that the existence and uniqueness of self-adjoint extensions of symmetric operators in quantum mechanics have important implications for philosophical issues. Also, the alleged indispensable explanatory role (...)
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  45. Killing Minimally Responsible Threats.Saba Bazargan - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):114-136.
    Minimal responsibility threateners are epistemically justified but mistaken in thinking that imposing a nonnegligible risk on others is permissible. On standard accounts, an MRT forfeits her right not to be defensively killed. I propose an alternative account: an MRT is liable only to the degree of harm equivalent to what she risks causing multiplied by her degree of responsibility. Harm imposed on the MRT above that amount is justified as a lesser evil, relative to allowing the MRT to kill (...)
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  46.  34
    Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self.Anna Bortolan - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):67-84.
    In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a (...)
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  47. Mineness without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
    In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of (...)
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  48. Vision, Self‐Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):137-155.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, one’s own location can be among the things that visual experience represents, even when one’s body is entirely out of view. By contrast, the Minimal View denies this, and says that visual experience represents things only as "to the right", etc., and never as "to the right of me". But the Minimal View is phenomenologically inadequate: it cannot explain the difference between a visual experience of self-motion and one of an oppositely (...)
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  49.  58
    The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: A psychological perspective.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.
    The paper argues that Zahavi’s defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. “identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena”, and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object “feels” like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of (...)
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  50. Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self.James R. O’Shea - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):619-625.
    At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. In these remarks (...)
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