Results for 'moods'

308 found
Order:
See also
Bibliography: Moods in Philosophy of Mind
  1. Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.Alex Madva - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):53-78.
    Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals’ moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals’ partial awareness of their implicit biases makes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157.
    Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  3. Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time.Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):661-671.
    This essay provides an analysis of the role of affectivity in Martin Heidegger's writings from the mid to late 1920s. We begin by situating his account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time. We then discuss the role of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung in his account of human existence, explicate the relationship between the former and the latter, and consider the ways in which the former discloses the world. To give a more vivid (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4. Intentionalism About Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  5.  63
    Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.
    Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality.William Fish - 2005 - In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  62
    Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods.M. Siemer - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.
    The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  9. Affect Without Object: Moods and Objectless Emotions.Carolyn Price - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.
    Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which (...) are regarded, not as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10.  33
    The Self and Its Moods in Depression and Mania.Jennifer Radden - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
    This discussion is about the moods characteristic of depressive and manic states. Moods are distinguished from the emotions they often accompany, and the relationship between these less and more cognitive, and seemingly less and more intentional, states is provided preliminary clarification. Epistemic deficiencies identified here, when combined with differences of quality and quantity in the moods and motivations that beset the depression and mania sufferer, seem likely to hinder self-knowledge and self-integration. These deficiencies, it is argued, may (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  11.  9
    The Embodied and Situated Nature of Moods.Giovanna Colombetti - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1437-1451.
    In this paper I argue that it is misleading to regard the brain as the physical basis or “core machinery” of moods. First, empirical evidence shows that brain activity not only influences, but is in turn influenced by, physical activity taking place in other parts of the organism. It is therefore not clear why the core machinery of moods ought to be restricted to the brain. I propose, instead, that moods should be conceived as embodied, i.e., their (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Basic Moods.Craig Stephen Delancey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
    The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13.  8
    Canonical Syllogistic Moods in Traditional Aristotelian Logic.Enrique Alvarez-Fontecilla - 2016 - Logica Universalis 10 (4):517-531.
    A novel theoretical formulation of Categorical Logic based on two properties of categorical propositions and three simple axioms has been introduced recently. This formulation allowed for the suppression of the distinction between immediate and mediate inferences, and also provided a theoretical framework to study opposition relations, thus restoring the theoretical unity of traditional Aristotelian logic. By using this approach, it has been reported that a total of 3072 conclusive syllogistic moods can be found when including indefinite terms in classical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  97
    How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible?Tanja Staehler - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433.
    In Being and Time as well as in his later writings, Heidegger comes to distinguish between fundamental moods and everyday or inauthentic moods. He also claims that phenomenology, rather than psychology, is the appropriate method for examining moods. This article employs a schematic approach to investigate a phenomenology of fundamental moods in terms of its possibilities and limits. Since, in Being and Time, the distinction between fundamental moods and ordinary moods is tied to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15.  12
    Moods as Groundlessness of the Human Experience. Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Stimmung.Lucilla Guidi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1599-1611.
    The paper analyzes the ontological meaning of mood in Heidegger’s conception of Attunement, in order to relate this notion of Stimmung specifically to our “attunement” to a form of life, as conceived in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. It claims that moods spell out the constitutive impossibility to grasp and found the human experience as such. However, this impossibility is not a lack of human knowledge, but rather corresponds to the necessary opacity, indeterminability and groundlessness of every human experience, which (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Notes on Embodiment in Homer: Reading Homer on Moods and Action in the Light of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.Hubert L. Dreyfus & Sean D. Kelly - unknown
    Homer has a unique understanding of the body. On his view the body is that by means of which we are subject to moods, and moods are what attune us to our situation. Being attuned to a situation, in turn, opens us to the various ways things and people can be engaging. We agree with Homer that this receptivity is evident throughout our entire existence. It characterizes everything from our basic bodily skills for coping with objects and people (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  18
    Moods in Layers.Achim Stephan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1481-1495.
    The goal of this paper is to examine moods, mostly in comparison to emotions. Nearly all of the features that allegedly distinguish moods from emotions are disputed though. In a first section I comment on duration, intentionality, and cause in more detail, and develop intentionality as the most promising distinguishing characteristic. In a second section I will consider the huge variety of moods, ranging from shallow environmentally triggered transient moods to deep existential moods that last (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  76
    Adequate Moods for Non-Eu Decision Making in a Sequential Framework.Nathalie Etchart - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (1):1-28.
    In a dynamic (sequential) framework, departures from the independence axiom (IND) are reputed to induce violations of dynamic consistency (DC), which may in turn have undesirable normative consequences. This result thus questions the normative acceptability of non expected-utility (non-EU) models, which precisely relax IND. This paper pursues a twofold objective. The main one is to discuss the normative conclusion: usual arguments linking violations of DC to departures from IND are shown to be actually based on specific (but usually remaining implicit) (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  9
    Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: A Comment on Gallegos.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-8.
    In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  17
    Moods and Philosophy.Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber - 2011 - In Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.), Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Springer. pp. 3--10.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  18
    Ontology of Sentential Moods.Berislav Žarnić - 2016 - In Myśli o języku, nauce i wartościach. Seria druga. Profesorowi Jackowi Juliuszowi Jadackiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin. pp. 323-339.
    In this paper ontological implications of the Barcan formula and its converse will be discussed at the conceptual and technical level. The thesis that will be defended is that sentential moods are not ontologically neutral since the rejection of ontological implications of Barcan formula and its converse is a condition of a possibility of the imperative mood. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section a systematization of semantical systems of quantified modal logic is introduced for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  30
    Can There Be an Epistemology of Moods?Stephen Mulhall - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 41:191-210.
    By entitling her recent collection of essays on philosophy and literature Love's Knowledge , Martha Nussbaum signals her commitment to giving a positive answer to the question posed by the title of this paper. If love can deliver or lay claim to knowledge, then moods must be thought of as having a cognitive significance, and so must not only permit but require the attentions of the epistemologist. As Nussbaum points out, such a conclusion runs counter to a central strand (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Anxiety the Birth Pangs of the Absolute: Longing and Angst in Schelling and Kierkegaard / B. Bergo ; Attunement and Disorientation: The Moods of Philosophy in Heidegger and Sartre / S. Mulhall ; Anxiety and Identity: Beyond Husserl and Heidegger.Y. Senderowicz - 2011 - In Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.), Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Springer.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  4
    Collective Moods. A Contribution to the Phenomenology and Interpersonality of Shared Affectivity.Nina Trcka - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1647-1662.
    Collective moods are ubiquitous in social life. People may experience the sharing of a mood at a large sporting event, a concert or a religious ceremony, but also at a small family celebration or as part of a tour group. However, in philosophical discussions, collective moods are often framed as experiences of ecstasy, intoxication or even disinhibition at mass events without examining other aspects. Yet we practice and cultivate the sharing of moods in quite varied forms. In (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  9
    Why Bad Moods Matter. William James on Melancholy, Mystic Emotion, and the Meaning of Life.Heleen Pott - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1635-1645.
    William James’s reputation in the field of emotion research is based on his early psychological writings where he defines emotions as ‘feelings of bodily changes’. In his later work, particularly in his study of mystic emotion, James comes up with what looks like a completely different approach. Here his focus is on positive feelings of inspiration and joy, but also on downbeat moods like melancholy and depression. He examines how these feeling states give meaning to an individual’s life. Theorists (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  5
    Changing Moods.Hagi Kenaan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1469-1479.
    We are all familiar with the fact that moods change. But, what is the significance of this familiar fact? Is change merely a factual characteristic of moods or can it also offer us a lens for gaining a deeper understanding of mood’s essence?. The essay’s starting point is Heidegger’s treatment of moods and their manner of changing. Heidegger, I show, is interested in our ordinary shifts in mood as indicators of a fundamental existential structure that underlies the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  7
    Moved by Masses? Shared Moods and Their Impact on Immoral Behavior.Weber-Guskar Eva - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1663-1679.
    It is often suggested that people in large groups behave and act differently than when they are alone. More precisely, it is an often-repeated claim that they tend to act in a morally problematic or plainly reprehensible way. Still, a fully satisfying explanation has not yet been given for why this is the case. In this paper, I suggest that the phenomenon of shared moods may play a crucial role here. In order to explicate and support this thesis, first, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  6
    Situating Moods.Dina Mendonça - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1453-1467.
    The paper aims to better identify the relationship between moods and emotions showing their link to the overall environment. Adopting a Situated Approach to Emotions, 209–227, 2012; Stephan Emotion Review, 4, 157–162, 2012; Stephen et al. Philosophical Psychology, 27, 65–81 2014) enables showing that the link to emotions to the environment is best understood using the term situation, while moods’ link to the environment is best captured by the notion of context. Exploring the difference points out that what (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  5
    Latent Moods in Heidegger and Sartre: From Being Assailed by Moods to Not Conceding to Moods That Assail Us.Simone Neuber - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1563-1574.
    This paper focusses on two prima facie independent assumptions of a – broadly – “Heideggerian” approach to moods: One concerning an apparent methodological impact of moods for a fundamental-ontological enterprise and one concerning a presumed human tendency towards Verfallenheit or inauthenticity. It shows that the liaison of those two assumptions challenges theoretical claims according to which subjects are simply assailed by moods and passive with respect to being in a mood. To do so, it follows Heidegger’s reflections (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Introduction Moods and Philosophy.I. Ferber & H. Kenaan - 2011 - In Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.), Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Springer.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  7
    Moods Between Intelligibility and Articulability. Re-Examining Heidegger’s and Hegel’s Accounts of Affective States.Lucian Ionel - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1587-1598.
    Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  20
    Attunement and Disorientation: The Moods of Philosophy in Heidegger and Sartre.Stephen Mulhall - 2011 - In Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.), Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Springer. pp. 123--139.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  34
    Are Moods Cognitive?: A Critique of Schmitt on Heidegger. [REVIEW]Jasper Hopkins - 1972 - Journal of Value Inquiry 6 (1):64-71.
    If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  27
    Aristotle on the Reducibility of All Valid Syllogistic Moods to the Two Universal Moods of the First Figure (APrA7, 29b1–25). [REVIEW]Hermann Weidemann - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (1):73-78.
    In Prior Analytics A7 Aristotle points out that all valid syllogistic moods of the second and third figures as well as the two particular moods of the first figure can be reduced to the two universal first-figure moods Barbara and Celarent. As far as the third figure is concerned, it is argued that Aristotle does not want to say, as the transmitted text suggests, that only those two valid moods of this figure whose premisses are both (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  3
    Gaining Perspectives on Our Lives: Moods and Aesthetic Experience.Susanne Schmetkamp - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1681-1695.
    This article examines the role of moods in aesthetic experience by focussing on film. It considers specifically the function of moods in relation to narrative and aesthetic perspectives which a film provides and which recipients are invited to adopt. I distinguish superficial transitory moods from profound enduring ones. This differentiation is important with regard to the question why moods in film matter and why they are different from emotions. I will focus on Lars von Trier’s film (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  29
    From Moods to Modules: Preliminary Remarks for an Evolutionary Theory of Mood Phenomena.Dylan Evans - unknown
    In the past few decades, research in the psychology of emotion has benefited greatly from being located in a firm evolutionary framework. It is argued that research in the psychology of mood might attain equal rigour by taking a similar approach. An evolutionary framework for mood research would be based on evolutionary psychology, the main thesis of which is the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. Translating the folk-psychological language of moods into the scientific language of modules might clarify many theoretical questions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  9
    The Proto-Ethical Dimension of Moods.Shlomo Cohen - 2011 - In Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.), Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Springer. pp. 173--184.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  7
    Kant on the Affective Moods of Morality.Ido Geiger - 2011 - In Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.), Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Springer. pp. 159--172.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Otherness Kant on Moral Attunement / I. Geiger ; The Proto-Ethical Dimension of Moods / Shlomo Cohen ; When Reason is in a Bad Mood: A Fanonian Philosophical Portrait.L. Gordon - 2011 - In Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.), Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Springer.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  16
    Imprisoned by the Past: Unhappy Moods Lead to a Retrospective Bias to Mind Wandering.Jonathan Smallwood & Rory C. O'Connor - 2011 - Cognition and Emotion 25 (8):1481-1490.
  41.  80
    Methodological Anxiety: Heidegger on Moods and Emotions.Sacha Golob - 2017 - In Alix Cohen & Robert Stern (eds.), Thinking about the Emotions : A Philosophical History. Oxford: OUP.
    In the context of a history of the emotions, Martin Heidegger presents an important and yet challenging case. He is important because he places emotional states, broadly construed, at the very heart of his philosophical methodology—in particular, anxiety and boredom. He is challenging because he is openly dismissive of the standard ontologies of emotions, and because he is largely uninterested in many of the canonical debates in which emotions figure. My aim in this chapter is to identify and critique the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43.  6
    Moral Moods.C. Jason Throop - 2014 - Ethos 42 (1):65-83.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  44. Toward a Theory of Moods.Eric Lormand - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  45.  17
    Mood Regulation and Memory: Repairing Sad Moods with Happy Memories.Braden R. Josephson - 1996 - Cognition and Emotion 10 (4):437-444.
  46.  31
    Moods and Performances.Donald Davidson - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 9--20.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  47. Feelings, Moods, and Introspection.Bruce Aune - 1963 - Mind 72 (April):187-208.
  48.  7
    Emotions, Moods, and Conscious Awareness; Comment on Johnson-Laird and Oatley's “the Language of Emotions: An Analysis of a Semantic Field”.Andrew Ortony & Gerald L. Clore - 1989 - Cognition and Emotion 3 (2):125-137.
  49.  30
    The Truth About Moods.Kirk Ludwig - 1997 - ProtoSociology 10:19-66.
    Assertoric sentences are sentences which admit of truth or falsity. Non-assertoric sentences, imperatives and interrogatives, have long been a source of difficulty for the view that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as the core of a theory of meaning. The trouble for truth-theoretic semantics posed by non-assertoric sentences is that, prima facie, it does not make sense to say that imperatives, such as 'Cut your hair', or interrogatives such as 'What time is it?', are truth (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50.  72
    How It Feels to Be Alive: Moods, Background Orientations, and Existential Feelings.Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. de Gruyter.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 308