Results for 'moral intuition'

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  1. Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.
    The evidential value of moral intuitions has been challenged by psychological work showing that the intuitions of ordinary people are affected by distorting factors. One reply to this challenge, the expertise defence, claims that training in philosophical thinking confers enhanced reliability on the intuitions of professional philosophers. This defence is often expressed through analogy: since we do not allow doubts about folk judgments in domains like mathematics or physics to undermine the plausibility of judgments by experts in these domains, (...)
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    Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition.Dario Cecchini - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):4-28.
    Moral intuitions are generally understood as automatic strong responses to moral facts. In this paper, I offer a metacognitive account according to which the strength of moral intuitions denotes the level of confidence of a subject. Confidence is a metacognitive appraisal of the fluency with which a subject processes information from a morally salient stimulus. I show that this account is supported by some empirical evidence, explains the main features of moral intuition and is preferable (...)
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  3. Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.
    Recently psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people's moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the content of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers' moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers (...)
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  4. Moral intuitions and the expertise defence.J. Ryberg - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):3-9.
    Are the moral intuitions of philosophers more reliable than the intuitions of people who are not philosophically trained? According to what has become known as ‘the expertise defence’, the answer is in the affirmative. This answer has been sustained by drawing on analogies to expertise in other fields. However, in this article it is argued that the analogies presuppose two assumptions – the causal assumption and the quality assumption – which are not satisfied in relation to philosophical expertise. Thus, (...)
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  5. Moral intuition: Its neural substrates and normative significance.James Woodward & John Allman - 2007 - Journal of Physiology-Paris 101 (4-6):179-202.
    We use the phrase "moral intuition" to describe the appearance in consciousness of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment. This paper investigates the neural substrates of moral intuition. We propose that moral intuitions are part of a larger set of social intuitions that guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly changing social interactions. Such intuitions are shaped by learning. The neural (...)
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  6. Moral intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously (...)
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  7. Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - In Neil Levy & Jens Clausen (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.
    Psychologists and philosophers use the term 'intuition' for a variety of different phenomena. In this paper, I try to provide a kind of a roadmap of the debates, point to some confusions and problems, and give a brief sketch of an empirically respectable philosophical approach.
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  8. Expert Moral Intuition and Its Development: A Guide to the Debate.Michael Lacewing - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):1-17.
    In this article, I provide a guide to some current thinking in empirical moral psychology on the nature of moral intuitions, focusing on the theories of Haidt and Narvaez. Their debate connects to philosophical discussions of virtue theory and the role of emotions in moral epistemology. After identifying difficulties attending the current debate around the relation between intuitions and reasoning, I focus on the question of the development of intuitions. I discuss how intuitions could be shaped into (...)
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  9. Moral Intuitions from the Perspective of Contemporary Descriptive Ethics.Petra Chudárková - 2019 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 41 (2):259-282.
    In the last twenty years, there has been an enormous growth of scientific research concerning the process of human moral reasoning and moral intuitions. In contemporary descriptive ethics, three dominant approaches can be found – heuristic approach, dual-process theory, and universal moral grammar. Each of these accounts is based on similar empirical evidence combining findings from evolutionary biology, moral psychology, and neuroethics. Nevertheless, they come to different conclusions about the reliability of moral intuitions. The aim (...)
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  10.  12
    Are moral intuitions intellectual perceptions?Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):31-40.
    This paper discusses an influential view of moral intuition, according to which moral intuition is a kind of intellectual perception. The core claim of this quasi-perceptualist theory is that intuitions are like perceptual experiences in presenting propositions as true. In this work, it is argued that quasi-perceptualism is explanatorily superfluous in the moral domain: there is no need to postulate a sui generis quasi-perceptual mental state to account for moral intuition since rival theories (...)
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  11. Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement.David Killoren - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.
    There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, there is a relatively young, and very lively, (...)
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  12. Moral Intuition.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    This chapter articulates a standard practice in moral theory: eliciting intuitions and adjusting one’s moral theory to accommodate them. It then critically discusses different views about the nature of moral intuitions, and different views about the epistemic role of moral intuitions. Along the way, it examines various philosophical and empirical concerns that inform the current debates.
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  13. Moral intuitions, moral expertise and moral reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
    In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is needed, but it cannot replace intuitive thinking. Following Robin Hogarth, I argue that intuitive judgements can be improved. The expertise model (...)
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  14. A Humean theory of moral intuition.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.
    According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, (...)
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  15. Moral intuition.Jeff McMahan - 2000 - In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell. pp. 92--110.
     
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  16. Trusting Moral Intuitions.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2020 - Noûs (4):956-984.
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  17.  38
    Moral Intuition or Moral Disengagement? Cognitive Science Weighs in on the Animal Ethics Debate.Simon Christopher Timm - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):225-234.
    In this paper I problematize the use of appeals to the common intuitions people have about the morality of our society’s current treatment of animals in order to defend that treatment. I do so by looking at recent findings in the field of cognitive science. First I will examine the role that appeals to common intuition play in philosophical arguments about the moral worth of animals, focusing on the work of Carl Cohen and Richard Posner. After describing the (...)
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  18. On moral intuitions and moral heuristics: A response.Cass R. Sunstein - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):565-570.
    Moral heuristics are pervasive, and they produce moral errors. We can identify those errors as such even if we do not endorse any contentious moral view. To accept this point, it is also unnecessary to make controversial claims about moral truth. But the notion of moral heuristics can be understood in diverse ways, and a great deal of work remains to be done in understanding the nature of moral intuitions, especially those that operate automatically (...)
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  19. Do framing effects make moral intuitions unreliable?Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):1-22.
    I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then (...)
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  20. Moral intuitions, cognitive psychology, and the Harming-versus-not-aiding distinction.F. M. Kamm - 1998 - Ethics 108 (3):463-488.
  21.  9
    Moral Intuitions: seeming or believing?Christopher B. Kulp - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.
    There is not agreement among moral intuitionists on the nature of moral intuitions: some favor a doxastic interpretation, others a non-doxastic interpretation. This paper argues that although both interpretations have legitimacy, the doxastic interpretation is preferable. The paper discusses three salient roles for moral intuitions:Role 1: To serve as a test for moral theories.Role 2: To provide a particularist grounding for moral judgment.Role 3: To stop a vicious infinite regress of justified moral belief.The doxastic (...)
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    From Moral Intuitions to Free Will Intuitions: A Dual Interacting-Process Model.Ayhan Sol & Özge Dural Özer - 2019 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 9 (9:4):881-897.
    In this essay, after first briefly reviewing the literature on experimental philosophy and how and why it is important especially for contemporary analytic philosophy, we focus on two earliest experimental research papers on free will intuitions. We also present psychological mechanisms that try to explain why both philosophers and ordinary people have incompatibilist and compatibilist intuitions and free will and moral responsibility. We then move on to another experimental research on moral intuitions and develop a dual process model (...)
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    Cognitive biases can affect moral intuitions about cognitive enhancement.Lucius Caviola, Adriano Mannino, Julian Savulescu & Nadira Faber - 2014 - Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8.
    Research into cognitive biases that impair human judgment has mostly been applied to the area of economic decision-making. Ethical decision-making has been comparatively neglected. Since ethical decisions often involve very high individual as well as collective stakes, analyzing how cognitive biases affect them can be expected to yield important results. In this theoretical article, we consider the ethical debate about cognitive enhancement and suggest a number of cognitive biases that are likely to affect moral intuitions and judgments about CE: (...)
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  24. The evolution of moral intuitions and their feeling of rightness.Christine Clavien & Chloë FitzGerald - forthcoming - In Joyce R. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy.
    Despite the widespread use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why the capacity to experience moral intuitions evolved in humans. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. Drawing lessons from this analysis, we propose a novel account of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic, and evolutionary features. Moral intuitions are composed of two (...)
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  25.  57
    Moral intuition, good deaths and ordinary medical practitioners.M. Parker - 1990 - Journal of Medical Ethics 16 (1):28-34.
    Debate continues over the acts/omissions doctrine, and over the concepts of duty and charity. Such issues inform the debate over the moral permissibility of euthanasia. Recent papers have emphasised moral sensitivity, medical intuitions, and sub-standard palliative care as some of the factors which should persuade us to regard euthanasia as morally unacceptable. I argue that these lines of argument are conceptually misdirected and have no bearing on the bare permissibility of voluntary euthanasia. Further, some of the familiar slippery (...)
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  26. Moral intuitions and justification in ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):77 - 95.
  27. Moral Intuitions, Moral Facts, and Justification in Ethics.Stefan S. Sencerz - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    A central and fundamental problem in moral philosophy is that of understanding how moral principles and theories can be justified. It involves finding rational solutions to both theoretical problems and to substantial moral questions . According to Moral Intuitionism, some normative judgments, usually called moral intuitions, justify moral principles and theories. Typically, moral intuitionists promise a method that is supposed to yield progress toward finding the answers to ethical disputes and controversies. ;I argue, (...)
     
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  28.  35
    Moral Intuition.John Kekes - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1):83 - 93.
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  29. The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.
    A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in (...)
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  30. Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization.Charles Arthur Campbell - 1948 - London: G. Cumberlege.
     
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  31.  5
    Moral Intuitions and the Religious System: An Adaptationist Account.Jordan Kiper & Richard Sosis - 2014 - Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 1 (2):172.
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  32. Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses.Kelby Mason - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):441-458.
    Peter Singer has argued for a radical anti-intuitionism on the basis of recent empirical research into the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral intuition. There is, however, a gap between the putative genealogy of moral intuition that Singer offers and his desired methodological claim. I explore three ways to bridge the gap, and argue that the promising way is to construe the genealogy as a debunking genealogy. I sketch an account of how debunking arguments work, and (...)
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  33.  34
    Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization. Henriette Hertz Lecture. By C. A. Campbell.G. R. G. Mure - 1949 - Philosophy 24 (89):160-161.
  34.  59
    Moral Intuitions versus Game Theory: A Response to Marcoux on Résumé Embellishing.John Douglas Bishop - 2006 - Journal of Business Ethics 67 (2):181-189.
    Marcoux argues that job candidates ought to embellish non-verifiable information on their résumés because it is the best way to coordinate collective action in the résumé ‚game’. I do not dispute his analysis of collective action; I look at the larger picture, which throws light on the role game theory might play in ethics. I conclude that game theory’s conclusions have nothing directly to do with ethics. Game theory suggests the means to certain ends, but the ethics of both the (...)
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  35. Moral intuitions and heuristics.Piotr M. Patrzyk - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
     
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  36.  14
    Evaluating Moral Intuitions in Neuroethics: A Neurophenomenological Perspective.Hillel D. Braude - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2 (2):22-24.
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  37.  8
    Are Moral Intuitions Heritable?Kevin Smith & Peter K. Hatemi - 2020 - Human Nature 31 (4):406-420.
    Two prominent theoretical frameworks in moral psychology, Moral Foundations and Dual Process Theory, share a broad foundational assumption that individual differences in human morality are dispositional and in part due to genetic variation. The only published direct test of heritability, however, found little evidence of genetic influences on moral judgments using instrumentation approaches associated with Moral Foundations Theory. This raised questions about one of the core assumptions underpinning intuitionist theories of moral psychology. Here we examine (...)
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  38.  11
    Moral Intuitions.R. Corkey - 1950 - Philosophy 25 (92):40 - 53.
    In all ethical discussion there is an implicit assumption that in our everyday experience we are often able to recognize, as if by direct perception, that the situation confronting us is indubitably bad or unquestionably good in an ethical sense. If, e.g. , on a bright afternoon we meet a capable Scout leader with a troop of healthy-minded boys on a hiking expedition through a beautiful district, sharing with one another as they go botanical information, and all obviously happy together, (...)
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    Defending moral intuition.Sabine Roeser - 2005 - In Rene van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge. Ontos-Verlag. pp. 231--250.
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  40.  61
    Moral Intuitions and fMRI Research.Alastair Norcross - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (2):19-23.
  41.  12
    Moral Intuitions and Philosophical Method.Martin Perlmutter - 1998 - In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason & Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham University Press. pp. 10--203.
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  42.  9
    On moral intuitions and moral heuristics: A response.Sunstein Cr - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4).
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  43. Moral intuitions in bioethics.Harry Lesser - 2010 - In Matti Häyry (ed.), Arguments and Analysis in Bioethics. Rodopi.
     
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  44. Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics.Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Dissertation,
    This dissertation is a contribution to the field of empirically informed metaethics, which combines the rigorous conceptual clarity of traditional metaethics with a careful review of empirical evidence. More specifically, this work stands at the intersection of moral psychology, moral epistemology, and philosophy of action. The study comprises six chapters on three distinct (although related) topics. Each chapter is structured as an independent paper and addresses a specific open question in the literature. The first part concerns the psychological (...)
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  45.  11
    Taming the Emotional Dog: Moral Intuition and Ethically-Oriented Leader Development.Maxim Egorov, Armin Pircher Verdorfer & Claudia Peus - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 160 (3):817-834.
    Traditional approaches describe ethical decision-making of leaders as driven by conscious deliberation and analysis. Accordingly, existing approaches of ethically-oriented leader development usually focus on the promotion of deliberative ethical decision-making, based on normative knowledge and moral reasoning. Yet, a continually growing body of research indicates that a considerable part of moral functions involved in ethical decision-making is automatic and intuitive. In this article, we discuss the implications of this moral intuition approach for the domain of ethically-oriented (...)
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  46.  20
    Are moral intuitions self‐evident truths?Richard A. Shweder - 1994 - Criminal Justice Ethics 13 (2):24-31.
  47. Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists.Caleb Perl - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):62-72.
    This paper develops an argument that, if rule consequentialism is true, it’s not possible to defend it as the outcome of reflective equilibrium. Ordinary agents like you and me are ignorant of too many empirical facts. Our ignorance is a defeater for our moral intuitions. Even worse, there aren’t enough undefeated intuitions left to defend rule consequentialism. The problem I’ll describe won’t be specific to rule consequentialists, but it will be especially sharp for them.
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  48.  66
    The pre-theoreticality of moral intuitions.Christopher B. Kulp - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3759-3778.
    Moral intuitionism, once an apparently moribund metaethical position, has seen a resurgence of interest of late. Robert Audi, a leading moral intuitionist, has argued that in order for a moral belief to qualify as intuitional, it must fulfill four criteria: it must be non-inferential, firmly held, comprehended, and pre-theoretical. This paper centers on the fourth and seemingly most problematic criterion: pre-theoreticality. The paper begins by stipulating the defensibility of the moral cognitivism upon which moral intuitionism (...)
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    The intelligence of the moral intuitions: A comment on Haidt (2001).David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom - 2003 - Psychological Review 110 (1):193-196.
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  50.  78
    How Neuroscience Can Vindicate Moral Intuition.Christopher Freiman - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1011-1025.
    Imagine that an anthropologist returns from her study of a group of people and reports the following:They refuse to kill one person even to avert the death of all involved—including that one person;They won’t directly push someone to his death to save the lives of five others, but they will push a lever to kill him to save five others;They punish transgressors because it feels right, even when they expect the punishment to cause far more harm than good—and even when (...)
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