Results for 'moral objectivism'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  44
    Moral Objectivism and a Punishing God.Hagop Sarkissian & Mark Phelan - 2019 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 80:1-7.
    Many moral philosophers have assumed that ordinary folk embrace moral objectivism. But, if so, why do folk embrace objectivism? One possibility is the pervasive connection between religion and morality in ordinary life. Some theorists contend that God is viewed as a divine guarantor of right and wrong, rendering morality universal and absolute. But is belief in God per se sufficient for moral objectivism? In this paper, we present original research exploring the connections between metaethics (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  27
    Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective”.James Beebe, Runya Qiaoan, Tomasz Wysocki & Miguel A. Endara - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 15 (3-4):386-401.
    Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to the study of folk metaethical beliefs. We report the results of a cross-cultural study using Chinese, Polish and Ecuadorian participants that seeks to advance this line of investigation. Individuals in all three demographic groups were observed to attribute objectivity to ethical statements in very similar patterns. Differences in participants’ strength of opinion about an issue, the level of societal agreement or disagreement about an issue, and participants’ age were found to significantly (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4.  58
    Practical Ethics and Moral Objectivism.Margarita M. Valdés - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:73-81.
    Moral philosophers working today on concrete moral issues seem to assume certain views that are opposite to those of their predecessors; chief among these is that morality has an objective basis, that it is not just the result of subjective reactions, but comprises a body of beliefs acquired through some kind of perception of certain traits of reality. However, the reasons for thinking that people who discuss substantive moral issues are committed to moral objectivism are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  33
    Moral Objectivism Across the Lifespan.James R. Beebe & David Sackris - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):912-929.
    We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6. Montaigne's Moral Objectivism.Christopher Edelman - 2011 - Philosophy and Literature 35 (1):32-50.
    "Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in" (1.31.152, VS205).1 Remarks such as this from the essay "Of cannibals" have led commentators to argue that Montaigne subscribes to the theory of moral relativism, and that he takes "reason" to be a subjective, rather than an objective, standard for judgment.2 (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  8.  32
    Putnam's Moral Objectivism.Mark Timmons - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (3):371 - 399.
  9.  39
    Ethical Objectivism‐Subjectivism: A Neglected Dimension in the Study of Moral Thought∗.F. E. Trainer - 1983 - Journal of Moral Education 12 (3):192-207.
    Abstract Previous conceptual analyses and empirical research concerning moral development and moral education have almost completely failed to take into account the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist positions on the nature of morality. This paper begins by outlining the essential elements in the two positions and pointing to the significance of the issue for the study of moral thought and for the discussion of moral maturity. Reference is briefly made to problems in current theories arising from (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10.  51
    Marxism, 'Ideology' and Moral Objectivism.Charles W. Mills - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):373 - 393.
  11. Moral Objectivism and Moral Truth.Kenneth Stern - 1986 - In Martin Tamny & K. D. Irani (eds.), Rationality in Thought and Action. Greenwood Press. pp. 29--1.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  7
    Moral Objectivism.Russell Cornett - unknown
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  1
    Corrigendum Corrigendum To: Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective 386–401, Doi: 10.1163/15685373-12342157).James Beebe, Miguel A. Endara, Tomasz Wysocki & Runya Qiaoan - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 15 (5):543-544.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  4
    The Intercultural Ethics Agenda From the Point of View of a Moral Objectivist.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2008 - Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 6 (2):101-115.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  1
    Marxism, ‘Ideology,’ and Moral Objectivism.Charles W. Mills - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):373-393.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Nature and Limits of Moral Objectivism.Steven Ross - 1998 - Philosophical Forum 29 (2):28-49.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  4
    Can Only One Person Be Right? The Development of Objectivism and Social Preferences Regarding Widely Shared and Controversial Moral Beliefs.Larisa Heiphetz & Liane L. Young - 2017 - Cognition 167:78-90.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18.  3
    Can Only One Person Be Right? The Development of Objectivism and Social Preferences Regarding Widely Shared and Controversial Moral Beliefs.Larisa Heiphetz & Liane L. Young - 2017 - Cognition 167:78-90.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy.Russ Shafer-Landau - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):331-344.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  20.  2
    Role-Based Interpretations of Moral Judgments: An Objectivist Account.Jon Tresan - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (3):369-391.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Who Cares? The Poverty of Objectivism for a Moral Epistemology.Lorraine Code - 1994 - In Allan Megill (ed.), Rethinking Objectivity. Duke University Press. pp. 179--195.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22.  3
    Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy.Russ Shafer-Landau - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):331-344.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism: A Critique of Mackie's Scepticism, and an Alternative Proposal Combining Ross's Intuitionism with a Kantian Epistemology.Simon John Duffy - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of the intuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  67
    Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: From Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance.Jeroen Hopster - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):763-780.
    How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. Are Children Moral Objectivists? Children's Judgments About Moral and Response-Dependent Properties.Shaun Nichols & Trisha Folds-Bennett - 2003 - Cognition 90 (2):23-32.
    Researchers working on children's moral understanding maintain that the child's capacity to distinguish morality from convention shows that children regard moral violations as objectively wrong. Education in the moral domain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). However, one traditional way to cast the issue of objectivism is to focus not on conventionality, but on whether moral properties depend on our responses, as with properties like icky and fun. This paper argues that the moral/conventional task is inadequate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  26.  42
    Ignorance and Moral Obligation, Written by Michael J. Zimmerman. [REVIEW]Jonathan Spelman - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (3):364-367.
    In 2006, Michael Zimmerman published an underappreciated paper on the nature of moral obligation in which he argued that our moral obligations depend, not on the facts or our beliefs, but on the evidence available to us. Two years later, he published a lengthy book in which he argued more thoroughly for the same conclusion. In this book, Zimmerman returns to the central question of those works to respond to objections that have been brought against the views he (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  14
    Children’s Developing Metaethical Judgments.Marco F. H. Schmidt, Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera & Michael Tomasello - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 164:163-177.
    Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N = 136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children’s metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  2
    Moral Realism as Moral Motivation: The Impact of Meta-Ethics on Everyday Decision-Making.Liane Young & A. J. Durwin - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2):302-306.
    People disagree about whether “moral facts” are objective facts like mathematical truths (moral realism) or simply products of the human mind (moral antirealism). What is the impact of different meta-ethical views on actual behavior? In Experiment 1, a street canvasser, soliciting donations for a charitable organization dedicated to helping impoverished children, primed passersby with realism or antirealism. Participants primed with realism were twice as likely to be donors, compared to control participants and participants primed with antirealism. In (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer.Cory Davia & Michele Palmira - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625.
    Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.
    It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  31.  69
    Moral Perception.Robert Audi - 2013 - Princeton University Press.
    We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  32.  10
    Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson.Daniel Coren - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (3):1-21.
    I argue that by attending to a distinction among perspectives on the root causes of our reactive attitudes, we can better understand the bases and limitations of long-standing debates about free will and moral responsibility. I characterize this distinction as “objectivism vs. subjectivism.” I bring out this distinction by, first, scrutinizing an especially sharp divergence between Peter Strawson and Peter John Olivi: for Olivi, our ordinary human attitudes make it obvious that we have free will, and our attitudes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  7
    Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John J. Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2014 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy: Volume 2. New York, NY, USA: pp. 169-192.
    It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary folk understanding of morality involves a rejection of moral relativism and a belief in objective moral truths. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist intuitions when confronted with questions about individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions as they were confronted with questions about individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. In light of these data, the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Against Moral Truths.Seungbae Park - 2012 - Cultura 9 (1):179-194.
    I criticize the following three arguments for moral objectivism. 1. Since we assess moral statements, we can arrive at some moral truths (Thomson, 2006). 2. One culture can be closer to truths than another in moral matters because the former can be closer to truths than the latter in scientific matters (Pojman, 2008). 3. A moral judgment is shown to be true when it is backed up by reason (Rachels and Rachels, 2010). Finally, I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 9. Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36.  8
    Evolution and Moral Disagreement.Michael Klenk - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).
    Several philosophers have recently argued that evolutionary considerations undermine the justification of all objectivist moral beliefs by implying a hypothetical disagreement: had our evolutionary history been different, our moral beliefs would conflict with the moral beliefs of our counterfactual selves. This paper aims at showing that evolutionary considerations do not imply epistemically relevant moral disagreement. In nearby scenarios, evolutionary considerations imply tremendous moral agreement. In remote scenarios, evolutionary considerations do not entail relevant disagreement with our (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. C.D. Broad on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue: Methods of Ethics (3):168-183.
    C.D. Broad’s Reflections stands out as one of the few serious examinations of Moral Sense Theory in twentieth century analytic philosophy. It also constitutes an excellent discussion of the interconnections that allegedly exist between questions concerning what Broad calls the ‘logical analysis’ of moral judgments and questions about their epistemology. In this paper I make three points concerning the interconnectedness of the analytical and epistemological elements of versions of Moral Sense Theory. First, I make a general point (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  98
    Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?Carla Bagnoli - 2015 - Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):31-45.
    Some moral claims strike us as objective. It is often argued that this shows morality to be objective. Moral experience – broadly construed – is invoked as the strongest argument for moral realism, the thesis that there are moral facts or properties.See e.g. Jonathan Dancy, “Two conceptions of Moral Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 : 167–187. Realists, however, cannot appropriate the argument from moral experience. In fact, constructivists argue that to validate the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  48
    Moral Ambivalence, Relativism, and Pluralism.Agustín Vicente & Agustín Arrieta - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):207-223.
    David Wong has introduced the notion of moral ambivalence in the philosophical debate. In this paper, we focus on the nature of moral ambivalence and on its interpretation. We hold that moral ambivalence is not a phenomenon that provides evidence for relativism, as Wong claims, and as relativism is usually understood. Rather, ambivalence denotes a pluralist attitude, an attitude characterized by the thought that two different, even incompatible, courses of action can both be permissible when considered from (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Business Practice: Applied Moral Philosophy.Stephen Hicks - 2002 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 4 (8):321-326.
    STEPHEN R. C. HICKS reviews Ayn Rand and Business. He argues that management professors Donna Greiner and Theodore Kinni have written a fine, short volume integrating Ayn Rand’s moral theory with management theory and practice. This book will be useful to professionals seeking an introduction to the relevance of Objectivism’s ethics to successful business practice.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  27
    Objectivity.Ross Colebrook & Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - In Todd K. Shackelford & Vivian A. Weekes-Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science.
    In this entry, we outline the ways in which evolutionary theory has implications for the objectivity of morality.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. The Argument From Moral Experience.Don Loeb - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory. In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  43. How to Know the Good: The Moral Epistemology of Plato's Republic.Jyl Gentzler - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):469-496.
    John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44.  63
    The Rational Inescapability of Value Objectivism.Tim Mawson - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 49 (17-18):43-48.
    I argue for the rational inescapability of value objectivism, the thesis that at least some normative appraisal is not simply a matter of how, subjectively, we feel about the world; it is a matter of how, objectively, the world ought to be. I do this via a two-stage argument, the first stage of which is based around a thought experiment, the second stage of which is based on how those who reject the argument of the first stage must present (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Moral Agents and Their Deserts: The Character of Mu'tazilite Ethics.Sophia Vasalou - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
    Must good deeds be rewarded and wrongdoers punished? Would God be unjust if He failed to punish and reward? And what is it about good or evil actions and moral identity that might generate such necessities? These were some of the vital religious and philosophical questions that eighth- and ninth-century Mu'tazilite theologians and their sophisticated successors attempted to answer, giving rise to a distinctive ethical position and one of the most prominent and controversial intellectual trends in medieval Islam. The (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  19
    Ethical Objectivity and Moral Education.Brenda Cohen - 1983 - Journal of Moral Education 12 (2):131-136.
    Abstract The view that links a subjectivist view in ethics to an open approach to moral education is challenged, as well as the converse view that an objectivist ethical view entails a conformist approach. An objectivist analysis involves recognizing the possibility of error or moral misjudgement, while a subjectivist analysis is consistent with strong conviction. It does not follow from the fact that there are different ideas about right and wrong that anyone should view them all impartially. And (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47.  10
    The Moral Truth About Normative Constructivism.Stuart Toddington - 2016 - The Owl of Minerva 48 (1/2):95-108.
    Kenneth Westphal provides here a masterful evolutionary account of Normative Constructivism in its classical development, which encompasses Hobbes, Hume, Kant and Rousseau, and culminates in Hegel’s vision of Sittlichkeit. In the process of endorsing the comprehensive moral anthropology of the latter, Westphal rejects the essentialist/objectivist rhetoric of Plato’s Euthyphro and invokes Hume’s alternative to Moral Realism, which is articulated in the view that what might appear “artificial” and “conventional” in our understanding of the rules of Justice does not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  54
    The Incompleat Projectivist: How to Be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist.T. D. J. Chappell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66.
    What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. El reino de los derechos y la objetividad de la moral.J. J. Moreso - 2003 - Análisis Filosófico 23 (2):117-150.
    This paper intends to show that it is possible to take convincingly into account the platitudes which underlie our moral practice. It deals with the articulation of an indirect strategy to answer the arguments of moral scepticism: if we can generate a conceptual space that takes such platitudes into account, perhaps we could ignore the sceptic doubts.Several metaethical conceptions can ecumenically carry out this task. Particularly, even if moral realism implies cognitivism and objectivism, moral (...) –the plausibility of rational agreement in morals- does presuppose necessarily neither realism nor cognitivism.An argument against moral relativism is also presented. It is argued that there are several ways of pluralism compatible with the very field of moral objectivity.The conclusion maintains that only an objectivist account of our moral practice is apt to make sense of our institutional designs that acknowledge universal human rights. (shrink)
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  8
    Aspects of Folk Morality: Objectivism and Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. London, UK: pp. 212-224.
    Most moral philosophers work under the assumption that ordinary folk morality is committed to objectivism—that ordinary folk view morality in absolute terms. This datum serves to constrain and shape philosophical metaethics, since those working in this field feel compelled to make sense of it. In this chapter, I discuss why philosophers take on this commitment. I also outline the relevant experimental research exploring whether, and to what extent, ordinary folk think of morality in absolute terms. Finally, I turn (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000