Results for 'moral perception'

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  1. Moral Perception.Robert Audi - 2013 - Princeton University Press.
    We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates (...) perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. -/- Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. -/- Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions. (shrink)
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  2. Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.
    I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a _contrast argument_, a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals to establish a phenomenal contrast between EEDI s and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for (...)
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  3. Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking.
    Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have (...)
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  4.  14
    Moral Perception and Particularity.Lawrence A. Blum - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration (...)
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  5. Moral Perception Without (Prior) Moral Knowledge.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (2):164-181.
    Proponents of impure moral perception claim that, while there are perceptual moral experiences, these experiences epistemically depend on a priori moral knowledge. Proponents of pure moral perception claim that moral experiences can justify independently of substantive a priori moral knowledge. Some philosophers, most notably David Faraci, have argued that the pure view is mistaken, since moral perception requires previous moral background knowledge, and such knowledge could not itself be perceptual. (...)
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  6. Moral Perception and Particularity.Lawrence Blum - 1991 - Ethics 101 (4):701-725.
    Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration (...)
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  7.  75
    Attentional Moral Perception.Jonna Vance & Preston J. Werner - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-24.
    Moral perceptualism is the view that perceptual experience is attuned to pick up on moral features in our environment, just as it is attuned to pick up on mundane features of an environment like textures, shapes, colors, pitches, and timbres. One important family of views that incorporate moral perception are those of virtue theorists and sensibility theorists. On these views, one central ability of the virtuous agent is her sensitivity to morally relevant features of situations, where (...)
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  8. Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
    : In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view (...)
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  9. Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge.Robert Audi - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
    This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is (...)
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  10. Doubts About Moral Perception.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-28.
    This paper defends doubts about the existence of genuine moral perception, understood as the claim that at least some moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Standard examples of moral perception are better explained as transitions in thought whose degree of psychological immediacy varies with how readily non-moral perceptual inputs, jointly with the subject's background moral beliefs, training, and habituation, trigger the kinds of phenomenological responses that moral agents are normally (...)
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  11. Moral Perception.Timothy Chappell - 2008 - Philosophy 83 (4):421-437.
    I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn and J.L. Mackie. The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.
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  12. Moral Perception.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned.
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  13. Moral Perception, Inference, and Intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.
    Sarah McGrath argues that moral perception has an advantage over its rivals in its ability to explain ordinary moral knowledge. I disagree. After clarifying what the moral perceptualist is and is not committed to, I argue that rival views are both more numerous and more plausible than McGrath suggests: specifically, I argue that inferentialism can be defended against McGrath’s objections; if her arguments against inferentialism succeed, we should accept a different rival that she neglects, intuitionism; and, (...)
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  14. Moral Perception and the Causal Objection.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):291-307.
    One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception (...)
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  15.  43
    Moral Perception Beyond Supervenience: Iris Murdoch’s Radical Perspective.Silvia Panizza - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1 (2):1-16.
    Among the possible ways of gaining moral knowledge, moral perception figures as a controversial yet fruitful option. If moral perception is possible, moral disagreement is addressed not by appealing to principles but to the process and the objects of perception, and moral progress occurs not through deliberation but by refining one’s perceptual faculties. The possibility of “seeing clearly and justly” is at the heart of Iris Murdoch’s thought, but Murdoch herself does not (...)
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  16. Moral Perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
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  17.  98
    Murdochian Moral Perception.W. Scott Clifton - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (3):207-220.
    There has been a recent surge of interest in the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch. One issue that has arisen is whether her view advocates a form of moral perception. In this paper I argue that her view does indeed advocate for a form of moral perception—what I call weak moral perception. In the process of moral reasoning weak moral perception plays a preparatory role for moral judgment, which means (...)
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  18.  29
    Emotion, Moral Perception, and Nursing Practice.P. Anne Scott - 2000 - Nursing Philosophy 1 (2):123-133.
  19. A Limited Defense of Moral Perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
    One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a (...)
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  20.  42
    Moral Perception and Particularity by Lawrence A. Blum. [REVIEW]David McNaughton - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):89-92.
  21.  87
    Moral Perception and Responsiveness.Peggy DesAutels - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):334-346.
  22.  12
    Enactivism and the Paradox of Moral Perception.Janna Van Grunsven - 2022 - Topoi 41 (2):287-298.
    In this paper I home in on an ethical phenomenon that is powerfully elucidated by means of enactive resources but that has, to my knowledge, not yet been explicitly addressed in the literature. The phenomenon in question concerns what I will term the paradox of moral perception, which, to be clear, does not refer to a logical but to a phenomenological-practical paradoxicality. Specifically, I have in mind the seemingly contradictory phenomenon that perceiving persons as moral subjects is (...)
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    Ii—Moral Perception.Jonathan Dancy - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):99-117.
    I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned.
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  24.  48
    Moral Perception.Ana P. Gantman & Jay J. Van Bavel - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (11):631-633.
  25. The Case for Moral Perception.J. Jeremy Wisnewski - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):129-148.
    In this paper, I defend the view that we can literally perceive the morally right and wrong, or something near enough. In defending this claim, I will try to meet three primary objectives: to clarify how an investigation into moral phenomenology should proceed, to respond to a number of misconceptions and objections that are most frequently raised against the very idea of moral perception, and to provide a model for how some moral perception can be (...)
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  26. The Mystery of Moral Perception.Daniel Crow - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):187-210.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
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  27.  89
    Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge.David Faraci - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (1):63-73.
    Given a traditional intuitionist moral epistemology, it is notoriously difficult for moral realists to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs. This has led some to go looking for an alternative to intuitionism. Perception is an obvious contender. I previously argued that this is a dead end, that all moral perception is dependent on a priori moral knowledge. This suggests that perceptualism merely moves the bump in the rug where the reliability challenge is (...)
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  28. A Hard Look at Moral Perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
    This paper concerns what I take to be the primary epistemological motivation for defending moral perception. Offering a plausible account of how we gain moral knowledge is one of the central challenges of metaethics. It seems moral perception might help us meet this challenge. The possibility that we know about the instantiation of moral properties in something like the way we know that there is a bus passing in front of us raises the alluring (...)
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  29.  67
    Reidian Moral Perception.Terence Cuneo - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):229 - 258.
    It is a common antirealist strategy to reject realism about some domain of entities for broadly epistemological reasons. When this strategy is applied to realism about moral facts, it takes something like the following form.
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  30.  52
    Moral Perception and Morally Relevant Perception.Jacob Sparks - 2018 - ASEBL Journal 13:19-27.
    You might bear witness to some injustice, but can you witness the injustice itself? At first glance, it’s tempting to say “yes.” Sometimes we see things that provoke an immediate judgement that some act is wrong just as we sometimes see things that provoke the immediate judgement that e.g. the book is red or that our friend is angry. It seems like we perceive the injustice just as we perceive the redness or the anger. Natural as that position is, I (...)
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  31.  16
    The Mystery of Moral Perception.Daniel Crow - 2014 - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
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  32.  13
    Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2021 - Critica 52 (156).
    Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a limited defense of (...)
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    Making Sense of Moral Perception.Rafe McGregor - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):745-758.
    The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense theory offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. I introduce Hutcheson’s work in §1 and indicate why the existence of a sixth sense is not implausible. I provide a summary of Robert Cowan and Robert Audi’s respective theories of evaluative perception in §2, identifying three problematic objections: the Directness Objection to Cowan’s ethical perception and the aesthetic and perceptual model objections to Audi’s (...)
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  34.  55
    Moral Perception’ Reflects Neither Morality Nor Perception.Chaz Firestone & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):75-76.
  35.  20
    Moral Perception and Global Visions.Susan Sherwin - 2001 - Bioethics 15 (3):175–188.
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  36. Moral Perception and Knowledge by Principles.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In Jill Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. London: Continuum. pp. 84-105.
  37.  7
    Managers' Moral Perceptions: Change in Finland During the 1990s.Johanna Kujala - 2004 - Business Ethics: A European Review 13 (2-3):143-165.
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  38.  9
    Managers' Moral Perceptions: Change in Finland During the 1990s.Johanna Kujala - 2004 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 13 (2-3):143-165.
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  39.  27
    Moral Perception, Cognition, and Dialogue.Vojko Strahovnik - 2016 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 24 (1):14-23.
    The aim of the paper is to analyse the concept of moral perception. Moral perception gets characterized as a distinctive, non-inferential moral response to concrete situations. In order to relate moral perception with a suitable model of moral cognition the position labelled morphological rationalism is elaborated. Moral judgment follows a dynamical model of reasons, according to which reasons are situated in an agent’s structured morphological background, chromatically illuminating the judgment. The key (...)
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    Moral Perception’, by Audi, Robert: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, Pp. Xii + 180, $US35.00 (Hardback). [REVIEW]Lei Zhong - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):585-587.
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    Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension.Xinyan Jiang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:215-220.
    Moral Perception is the moral agent’s perception of the morally significant situation. In recent decades, the question about the role of moral perception in the moral life has drawn more and more attention in contemporary ethical theories. It has been widely acknowledged that the virtuous person perceives a given morally significant situation differently from others. But, current discussions of moral perception have been focused on the cognitive function of moral (...) i.e., moral perception 's making a certain feature of a given situation salient for the agent, but there is not much that has been said about the evaluative nature of moral perception, i.e., moral perception 's offering the agent a certain evaluation of the saliently perceived feature of a given situation. This paper is intended to show that moral perception has both cognitive and evaluative dimensions. More specifically, it argues that moral perception is not only a matter of saliently seeing certain features of a morally significant situation but also a matter of evaluating these features. It is such an integration of cognitive and evaluative dimensions of moral perception that provides with the agent motivational power and makes her action possible. (shrink)
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  42. Emotion, Moral Perception, and Character.Charles B. Starkey - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    This dissertation challenges the common belief that the value of emotions, if any, lies chiefly in their ability to motivate. It argues that emotions are vital to being able to properly evaluate what one encounters in the world. The dissertation focuses on moral evaluation, examining the role of emotion in determining moral character by way of the effect of emotion on moral perception. The term "moral perception" refers to an evaluative apprehension or "taking in" (...)
     
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  43.  9
    Moral Perception and Particularity.Lynne McFall - 1996 - Ethics 106 (2):449-450.
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  44.  4
    Perception, Empathy, and Judgment: An Inquiry Into the Preconditions of Moral Performance.Arne Johan Vetlesen - 1993 - Pennsylvania State University Press.
    _In Perception, Empathy, and Judgment_ Arne Johan Vetlesen focuses on the indispensable role of emotion, especially the faculty of empathy, in morality. He contends that moral conduct is severely threatened once empathy is prevented from taking part in an interplay with cognitive faculties in acts of moral perception and judgment. Drawing on developmental psychology, especially British "object relations" theory, to illuminate the nature and functioning of empathy, Vetlesen shows how moral performance is constituted by a (...)
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  45.  21
    Moral Perception and Heuristics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Modern Schoolman 86 (3-4):327-347.
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  46. Moral Perception and Moral Realism: An "Intuitive" Account of Epistemic Justification.Kevin DeLapp - 2007 - Review Journal of Political Philosophy 5:43-64.
    This essay examines the relationship between ethical intuitionism and moral perception, and leverages a hybrid account of those two positions to defend moral realism against objections.
     
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  47.  7
    Moral Perception and Particularity.Norman S. Care - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):477-479.
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  48. Book Review: Robert Audi, 'Moral Perception'. [REVIEW]Danny Frederick - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (1):164-69.
    I summarise Robert Audi's 'Moral Perception.' I concede that there is such a thing as moral perception. However, moral perceptions are culturally-relative, which refutes Audi’s claims that moral perception may ground moral knowledge and that it provides inter-subjectively accessible grounds which make ethical objectivity possible. Audi's attempt to avoid the refutation tends to convert rational disputes into ad hominem ones. I illustrate that with the example of the ethics of prostitution.
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    Moral Perception and the Pursuit of Medical Philosophy.David J. Casarett - 1999 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (2):125-139.
    This paper begins by examining the claim that the practice of medicine is essentially a moral endeavor. According to this view, all clinical practice has moral content, and each clinical situation has a moral dimension. I suggest that in order to recognize this moral dimension, clinicians must engage in an interpretive process, and that they must be able to interpret clinical data in ethical terms. However, clinicians often lack the ‘moral perception’ required to appreciate (...)
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    (Book Review of) Moral Perception and Particularity. [REVIEW]Mark van Roojen - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):543.
    Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration (...)
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