Results for 'moral status of persons'

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  1. Will Cognitive Enhancement Create Post‐Persons? The Use(Lesness) of Induction in Determining the Likelihood of Moral Status Enhancement.Emilian Mihailov & Alexandru Dragomir - 2018 - Bioethics 32 (5):308-313.
    The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement (...)
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  2.  32
    The Moral Status of Post-Persons.M. Hauskeller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):76-77.
    Nicholas Agar argues that it is possible, and even likely, that radically enhanced human beings will turn out to be ‘post-persons’, that is, beings with a moral status higher than that of mere persons such as us.1 This would mean that they will be morally justified in sacrificing our lives and well-being not merely in cases of emergency, but also in cases of ‘supreme opportunities’ , that is, whenever such a sacrifice leads to ‘significant benefits for (...)
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  3.  24
    Common Ground on Surgical Abortion?--Engaging Peter Singer on the Moral Status of Potential Persons.C. C. Camosy - 2008 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (6):577-593.
    The debate over surgical abortion is certainly one of the most divisive in ethical discourse and for many it seems interminable. However, this paper argues that a primary reason for this is confusion with regard to what issues are actually under dispute. When looking at an entrenched and articulate figure on one side of the debate, Peter Singer, and comparing his views with those of his opponents, one finds that the disputed issue is actually quite a narrow one: the (...) status of potential persons. Finding this common ground clears the conceptual space for a fruitful argument: the thesis of which is that most, including Singer, who argue that potential persons do not have full personal moral status fail to make the necessary distinction between natural potential (which confers moral status) and practical potential (which admittedly does not). (shrink)
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  4.  15
    Common Ground on Surgical Abortion?—Engaging Peter Singer on the Moral Status of Potential Persons.Charles C. Camosy - 2008 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (6):577-593.
    The debate over surgical abortion is certainly one of the most divisive in ethical discourse and for many it seems interminable. However, this paper argues that a primary reason for this is confusion with regard to what issues are actually under dispute. When looking at an entrenched and articulate figure on one side of the debate, Peter Singer, and comparing his views with those of his opponents, one finds that the disputed issue is actually quite a narrow one: the (...) status of potential persons. Finding this common ground clears the conceptual space for a fruitful argument: the thesis of which is that most, including Singer, who argue that potential persons do not have full personal moral status fail to make the necessary distinction between natural potential and practical potential. (shrink)
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  5. The Moral Status of Beings Who Are Not Persons: A Casuistic Argument.J. Wetlesen - 1999 - Environmental Values 8 (3):287-323.
    This paper addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them? It argues for a biocentric answer which ascribes inherent moral status value to all individual living organisms. This position must be defended against an anthropocentric position. The argument from marginal cases propounded by Tom Regan and Peter Singer for this purpose is criticised as defective, and a different argument is proposed. The (...)
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  6.  85
    Can Consequentialists Honour the Special Moral Status of Persons?Martin Peterson - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):434-446.
    It is widely believed that consequentialists are committed to the claim that persons are mere containers for well-being. In this article I challenge this view by proposing a new version of consequentialism, according to which the identities of persons matter. The new theory, two-dimensional prioritarianism, is a natural extension of traditional prioritarianism. Two-dimensional prioritarianism holds that wellbeing matters more for persons who are at a low absolute level than for persons who are at a higher level (...)
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  7.  19
    The ontological and moral significance of persons.Jason T. Eberl - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):217-236.
    Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human beings at various stages of biological development or decline. It is often argued that a human being possesses a fundamental and inviolable moral status insofar as she is a “person”; yet, it is contested whether all or only human beings count as persons. Perhaps there are non-human person, and perhaps not every human being satisfies the definitional criteria for being (...)
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    Commentary: The Moral Status of Patients Who Are Not Strict Persons.N. S. Jecker - 1990 - Journal of Clinical Ethics 1 (1):35.
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  9.  26
    The Moral Status of the Bodies of Persons.Sara Ann Ketchum - 1984 - Social Theory and Practice 10 (1):25-38.
  10.  2
    The Moral Status of Dogs, Forests, and Other Persons.Michael Davis - 1986 - Social Theory and Practice 12 (1):27-59.
  11. Individuals, Humans, and Persons : The Issue of Moral Status.Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer - 1990 - In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the Beginning and End of Life: Readings on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Johns Hopkins University Press.
     
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  12.  58
    No Ethical Bypass of Moral Status in Stem Cell Research.Mark Brown - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (1):12-19.
    Recent advances in reprogramming technology do not bypass the ethical challenge of embryo sacrifice. Induced pluripotent stem cell (iPS) research has been and almost certainly will continue to be conducted within the context of embryo sacrifice. If human embryos have moral status as human beings, then participation in iPS research renders one morally complicit in their destruction; if human embryos have moral status as mere precursors of human beings, then advocacy of iPS research policy that is (...)
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  13. Disputes Over Moral Status: Philosophy and Science in the Future of Bioethics.Lisa Bortolotti - 2007 - Health Care Analysis 15 (2):153-8.
    Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic significance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals (...)
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  14. The Separateness of Persons: A Moral Basis for a Public Justification Requirement.Jason Tyndal - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):491-505.
    In morally grounding a public justification requirement, public reason liberals frequently invoke the idea that persons should be construed as “free and equal.” But this tells us little with regard to what it is about us that makes us free or how a claim about our status as persons can ultimately ground a requirement of public justification. In light of this worry, I argue that a public justification requirement can be grounded in a Nozick-inspired argument from the (...)
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  15. Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons.Melinda A. Roberts - 2010 - Springer.
     
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  16. Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?David DeGrazia - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.
    Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of (...)
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  17.  30
    The Ontological and Moral Status of Organizations.Christopher McMahon - 1995 - Business Ethics Quarterly 5 (3):541-554.
    The paper has two parts. The first considers the debate about whether social entities should be regarded as obiects distinct from their members and concludes that we should let the answer to this question be determined by the theories that social science finds to have the most explanatory power. The second part argues that even if the theory with the most explanatory power regards social entities such as organizations as persons in their own right, we should not accord them (...)
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  18. Genetic Enhancement, Post-Persons and Moral Status: A Reply to Buchanan.D. DeGrazia - 2012 - Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (3):135-139.
    Responding to several leading ideas from a paper by Allen Buchanan, the present essay explores the implications of genetic enhancement for moral status. Contrary to doubts expressed by Buchanan, I argue that genetic enhancement could lead to the existence of beings so superior to contemporary human beings that we might aptly describe them as post-persons. If such post-persons emerged, how should we understand their moral status in relation to ours? The answer depends in part (...)
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    Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?David DeGrazia - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.
    Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of (...)
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  20.  37
    The Moral Status of a Human Fetus: A Response to Lee.S. Griffith - 2004 - Christian Bioethics 10 (1):55-62.
    It is an undeniable empirical fact that a human fetus is a member of the species homo sapiens from the moment of conception. There is thus an important sense in which it is a human being in itself, and not simply part of a pregnant woman's body, despite what defenders of abortion on demand might want us to think. It is also reasonable to suppose that all human beings, and thus human fetuses, are persons, with all that entails, but (...)
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  21.  32
    Infanticide, Moral Status and Moral Reasons: The Importance of Context.Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):289-292.
    Giubilini and Minerva ask why birth should be a critical dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for terminating existence. Their argument is that birth does not change moral status in the sense that is relevant: the ability to be harmed by interruption of one's aims. Rather than question the plausibility of their position or the argument they give, we ask instead about the importance to scholarship or policy of publishing the article: does it to any extent make (...)
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    Highlights From This Issue: The Biomedical Enhancement of Moral Status.Russell Powell - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):65-66.
    The biomedical enhancement of human capacities has emerged as one of the most philosophically invigorating areas of contemporary bioethical research. In exploring the ethical dimensions of emerging biotechnologies and human–machine interfaces, the literature on human enhancement has made significant contributions to traditional problems in moral philosophy. One such area concerns the enhancement of cognitive capacities that bear on moral status. Could biotechnological or other forms of neurocognitive intervention result in the creation of ‘postpersons’ who possess a (...) status that is higher than that of ‘mere persons’? If the creation of postpersons with a higher moral status is indeed possible, is it morally wrong to bring this about? Nicholas Agar takes up these two questions in his Feature Article for this issue, in which he defends affirmative answers to both.Most moral philosophers in the Kantian tradition would agree that were we to enhance the cognitive capacities of a non-rational sentient creature so as to confer on it the psychological properties associated with personhood, we will have increased that creature's intrinsic moral worth relative to non-rational sentient beings, and thus we will have enhanced its moral status. Virtually all parties to the moral status enhancement debate agree on this much. Why then would it not be similarly possible in principle to enhance the cognitive capacities of mere persons so as to create postpersons who possess a higher moral status than that of mere persons? While this may seem like a reasonable extrapolation from the first scenario, it is here that moral philosophical boats begin to diverge.Allen Buchanan was the first to address systematically the possibility of moral status enhancement1 and his work …. (shrink)
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  23. Saving Seven Embryos or Saving One Child? Michael Sandel on the Moral Status of Human Embryos.Gregor Damschen & Dieter Schönecker - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Ethics and the Life Sciences):239-245.
    Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, (...)
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    Brain Death as Irreversible Loss of a Human’s Moral Status.Piotr Grzegorz Nowak - 2018 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 8 (3-4):167-178.
    Singer claims that there are two ways of challenging the fact that brain-dead patients, from whom organs are usually retrieved, are in fact biologically alive. By means of the first, the so called dead donor rule may be abandoned, opening the way to lethal organ donation. In the second, it might be posited that terms such as “life” and “death” do not have any primary biological meaning and are applicable to persons instead of organisms. This second possibility permits one (...)
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  25. The Universality of Moral Requirements and Duties to Close Persons.A. V. Prokofyev - 2018 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 11:103-113.
    The article traces origins of the contradiction that calls into being the polemics on the moral status of duties to close persons. Special obligations are created by the unique life narrative of an actor that makes different recipients of her actions more or less distant. Those who are less distant are “close ones.” Those who are more distant are “strangers.” The basis of this distance can be different: individual sympathy, consanguinity, belonging to cultural, territorial and political communities. (...)
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  26. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things.Mary Anne Warren - 1997 - Clarendon Press.
    Mary Anne Warren investigates a theoretical question that is at the centre of practical and professional ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? That is: what does it take to be an entity towards which people have moral considerations? Warren argues that no single property will do as a sole criterion, and puts forward seven basic principles which establish moral status. She then applies these principles to three controversial moral issues: voluntary euthanasia, (...)
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  27. Profound Intellectual Disability and the Bestowment View of Moral Status.Simo Vehmas & Benjamin Curtis - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (3):505-516.
    This article engages with debates concerning the moral worth of human beings with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMDs). Some argue that those with such disabilities are morally less valuable than so-called normal human beings, whereas others argue that all human beings have equal moral value and so each group of humans ought to be treated with equal concern. We will argue in favor of a reconciliatory view that takes points from opposing camps in the debates about the (...)
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    The Moral Status of the Corporation.R. E. Ewin - 1991 - Journal of Business Ethics 10 (10):749 - 756.
    Corporations are moral persons to the extent that they have rights and duties, but their moral personality is severely limited. As artificial persons, they lack the emotional make-up that allows natural persons to show virtues and vices. That fact, taken with the representative function of management, places significant limitations on what constitutes ethical behavior by management. A common misunderstanding of those limitations can lead ethical managers to behave unethically and can lead the public to have (...)
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  29. Human and Animal Subjects of Research: The Moral Significance of Respect Versus Welfare.Rebecca L. Walker - 2006 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):305-331.
    Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without (...)
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  30.  12
    Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things.Laura Purdy & Mary Anne Warren - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):569.
    Moral Status asks what creates moral obligations toward entities. Warren’s thesis is that attempts to ground moral status on a single criterion have been unsuccessful, as they inevitably lead to Procrustean measures to fit diverse values into a single mold. She proposes instead a “multi-criterial’ approach that promises to accommodate these values. In so doing, she expands and generalizes on a strategy she uses quite successfully in her 1990 article “The Moral Significance of Birth” (...)
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  31. Moral Status. Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things, by Mary Anne Warren (Oxford University Press, 1997).Richard Joyce - unknown
    Warren’s goal is to present a ‘multi-criterial’ account of moral status—she eschews any view that holds ‘X has moral status iff X has N’ (where ‘N’ might be life, or personhood, or sentience, for example). Moral status, she asserts, is a more complex affair: it comes in degrees and there are a variety of sufficient conditions. The first part of the book (roughly three quarters of it) is devoted to outlining some standard ‘uni-lateral’ accounts, (...)
     
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  32. The Basis of Human Moral Status.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):159-179.
    When philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species—in this case, human beings—over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all (...)
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  33. The Problem with Person‐Rearing Accounts of Moral Status.Travis Timmerman & Bob Fischer - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):119-128.
    Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum recently developed the ingenious and novel person‐rearing account of moral status, which preserves the commonsense judgment that humans have a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. It aims to vindicate speciesist judgments while avoiding the problems typically associated with speciesist views. We argue, however, that there is good reason to reject person‐rearing views. Person‐rearing views have to be coupled with an account of flourishing, which will (according to Jaworska and Tannenbaum) be (...)
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  34. The Grounds of Moral Status.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
    This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.
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  35.  60
    Persons or Property – Freedom and the Legal Status of Animals.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):20-45.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a (...)
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  36.  82
    The Genetic Account of Moral Status: A Defense.S. Matthew Liao - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):265-277.
    Christopher Grau argues that the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding is problematic because it fails to grant all human beings the moral status of rightholding; it grants the status of rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve such status; and it assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value. Grau also argues that those who are (...)
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    Persons or Property – Freedom and the Legal Status of Animals.Andreas T. Schmidt - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a (...)
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  38. Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem.David Leech Anderson - 2012 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 312-333.
    According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious way to escape (...)
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  39.  40
    The Moral Status of Fish. The Importance and Limitations of a Fundamental Discussion for Practical Ethical Questions in Fish Farming.Bernice Bovenkerk & Franck L. B. Meijboom - 2012 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 25 (6):843-860.
    As the world population is growing and government directives tell us to consume more fatty acids, the demand for fish is increasing. Due to declines in wild fish populations, we have come to rely more and more on aquaculture. Despite rapid expansion of aquaculture, this sector is still in a relatively early developmental stage. This means that this sector can still be steered in a favorable direction, which requires discussion about sustainability. If we want to avoid similar problems to the (...)
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    The Moral Status of Children.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2018 - In Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder & Jurgen De Wispelaere (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children. Routledge Press. pp. 67-78.
    Broadly speaking, an entity has moral status if and only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Some philosophers, who think of moral status in terms of duties and rights owed to an entity, allow that moral status can come in degrees, with only some beings having status of the highest degree – that is, full moral status (FMS). We critically review the competing accounts of what qualifies (...)
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  41. An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism.Thaddeus Metz - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.
    The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist ndividualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind bud but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage (...)
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  42.  20
    Bernstein on Moral Status and the Comparative Value of Lives.Mylan Engel Jr - 2017 - Journal of Animal Ethics 7 (2):204.
    By stipulation, the Human Superiority Thesis [HST] consists of two claims: (1) the interests of humans should be given preferential consideration relative to the like interests of nonhuman animals, and (2) the lives of humans are more valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals. In his recent book, Mark Bernstein argues that both claims are false. I present and assess Bernstein’s main arguments, pointing out where they succeed and where they fall short. I then suggest ways of shoring up and (...)
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  43. Moral Status of Animals From Marginal Cases.Julia Tanner - 2011 - In Michael Bruce Steven Barbone (ed.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    It matters a great deal whether animals have moral status. If animals have moral status, it may be wrong for us to use them as we currently do – hunting, farming, eating, and experimenting on them. The argument from marginal cases provides us with a reason to think that some animals have moral status that is equal to that of “marginal” humans.
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  44. Metaphysical and Moral Status of Cryopreserved Embryos.Jason T. Eberl - 2012 - The Linacre Quarterly 79 (3):304-315.
    Those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research argue for a clear position on the metaphysical and moral status of human embryos. This position does not differ whether the embryo is present inside its mother’s reproductive tract or in a cryopreservation tank. It is worth examining, however, whether an embryo in “suspended animation” has the same status as one actively developing in utero. I will explore this question from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical account of human (...)
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  45.  6
    The Moral Status of Human‐Animal Chimeras with Human Brain Cells.Julie A. Tannenbaum - 2019 - Hastings Center Report 49 (5):34-36.
    The moral status of human-animal chimeras that have human brain cells is especially concerning. The concern is that such animals have the same high moral status as human beings. Why? Julian Koplin suggests that support for this concern is based on this claim: capacities unique to humans gives one a high or full moral status. Koplin then proceeds to convincingly object this claim. However, I argue that the concern is instead based on a different (...)
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    The Moral Status of Extraterrestrial Life.Erik Persson - 2012 - Astrobiology 12:976-984.
    If we eventually discover extraterrestrial life, do we have any moral obligations for how to treat the life-forms we find; does it matter whether they are intelligent, sentient, or just microbial—and does it matter that they are extraterrestrial? -/- In this paper, I examine these questions by looking at two of the basic questions in moral philosophy: What does it take to be a moral object? and What has value of what kind? I will start with the (...)
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  47.  77
    Moral Status and the Direction of Duties.Simon Căbulea May - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):113-128.
    Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue (...)
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  48.  79
    Moral Status Revisited: The Challenge of Reversed Potency.Bernard Baertschi & Alexandre Mauron - 2010 - Bioethics 24 (2):96-103.
    Moral status is a vexing topic. Linked for so long to the unending debates about ensoulment and the morality of abortion, it has recently resurfaced in the embryonic stem cell controversy. In this new context, it should benefit from new insights originating in recent scientific advances. We believe that the recently observed capability of somatic cells to return to a pluripotential state (a capability we propose to name 'reversed potency') in a controlled manner requires us to modify the (...)
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  49.  65
    Book ReviewsDavid Rodin,, and Henry Shue,, Eds. Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers.New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 320. $100.00. [REVIEW]Saba Bazargan - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):602-606.
    Book Reviews:Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers.
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  50. On the Notion of Moral Status and Personhood in Biomedical Ethics.Azam Golam - 2010 - The Dhaka Univrsity Studies 67 (1):83-96.
    Personhood argument is important in moral philosophy specially to determine the moral status of a being (human or non-human) and organism. Justifying moral status of these is significant and necessary because without knowing whether those substances have moral status, it is difficult to sketch a moral considering framework for moral action towards them. There are a number of standards e.g. sentience, higher cognitive capacities, the capacity to flourish, sociability, the possession of (...)
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