Results for 'moral testimony'

988 found
Order:
  1.  12
    Sabellius libyen, Libye sabellienne?Xavier Morales - 2022 - Augustinianum 62 (1):19-48.
    Was Sabellius really a Libyan? Examining contemporary sources and ancient historiography on one of the most enigmatic heretics in the history of dogmas, the article shows that the Libyan origin of Sabellius is unlikely, and that it is an exaggeration to claim that Libya was a Sabellian home in the third century. Eusebius of Caesarea is probably guilty of having identified the adversaries of Dionysius of Alexandria located in Ptolemais as disciples of Sabellius, and the testimony of Origen on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  8
    Elements of Philosophy by Andrés Bello: an approach to the documentary genesis of the perceptions from some manuscript notes.Abel Aravena Zamora & Francisco Cordero Morales - 2023 - Alpha (Osorno) 56:164-187.
    Resumen: El artículo estudia los Elementos de Filosofía (EdF), dictados por Andrés Bello a Juan Alemparte en Santiago de Chile hacia los años 1840-1843 y conservados actualmente en una copia manuscrita. Se muestra que los EdF corresponden a un esbozo preliminar de las materias abordadas por Bello tanto en las entregas del periódico El Crepúsculo como en su obra póstuma Filosofía del Entendimiento. Por ello, se plantea que estas lecciones manuscritas constituyen un testimonio exclusivo de las clases particulares del maestro (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  25
    Diéguez Lucena, Antonio. La evolución del conocimiento. De la mente animal a la mente humana.Morales Juan Diego & Alejandro Rosas - 2012 - Ideas Y Valores 61 (150):289-298.
    Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling.Guy Fletcher - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:45-73..
    It is commonly claimed that reliance upon moral testimony is problematic in a way not common to reliance upon non-moral testimony. This chapter provides a new explanation of what the problem consists in—one that enjoys advantages over the most widely accepted explanation in the extant literature. The main theses of the chapter are as follows: that many forms of normative deference beyond the moral are problematic, that there is a common explanation of the problem with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  5. Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation.Laura Frances Callahan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):437-459.
    Why is there a felt asymmetry between cases in which agents defer to testifiers for certain moral beliefs, and cases in which agents defer on many other matters? One explanation influential in the literature is that having understanding of a proposition is both in tension with acquiring belief in the proposition by deferring to another's testimony and distinctively important when it comes to moral propositions, as compared with what we might think of as many ‘garden variety’ facts. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  6. Moral testimony and its authority.Philip Nickel - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.
    A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  7. Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others.Daniel Groll & Jason Decker - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):54-74.
    What, if anything, is wrong with acquiring moral beliefs on the basis of testimony? Most philosophers think that there is something wrong with it, and most point to a special problem that moral testimony is supposed to create for moral agency. Being a good moral agent involves more than bringing about the right outcomes. It also involves acting with "moral understanding" and one cannot have moral understanding of what one is doing via (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  8.  88
    Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive.Eric Wiland - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    Is there anything peculiarly bad about accepting moral testimony? According to pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an inadequate substitute for working out your moral views on your own. Enlightenment requires thinking for oneself, at least where morality is concerned. Optimists, by contrast, aim to show that trusting moral testimony isn’t bad largely by arguing that it’s no worse than trusting testimony generally. Essentially, they play defense. However, this chapter goes on the offensive. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  9. Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation.Alison Hills - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):399-414.
    The status of moral testimony has recently been challenged, for both epistemic and non‐epistemic reasons. This paper distinguishes two methods of teaching: transmission, “classic” learning from testimony, that results in second hand knowledge, and propagation which results in first hand knowledge and understanding. Moral propagation avoids most of the epistemic and non‐epistemic problems of transmission. Moreover, moral propagation can develop and refine non‐cognitive attitudes too. Therefore moral testimony should (and normally does) take the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  10. Moral Testimony.Alison Hills - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (6):552-559.
    Testimony is an important source of our knowledge about the world. But to some, there seems something odd, perhaps even wrong, about trusting testimony about specifically moral matters. In this paper, I discuss several different explanations of what might be wrong with trusting moral testimony. These include the possibility that there is no moral knowledge; that moral knowledge cannot be transmitted by moral testimony; that there are reasons not to trust (...) testimony either because you should try to gain and use “moral understanding” to make your moral judgements instead or because doing so is damaging to your moral character in various ways. Finally, I discuss some “debunking explanations” according to which it is right and rational to trust moral testimony from a trustworthy source. © 2013 The Author. Philosophy Compass © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  11. Moral Testimony under Oppression.Nicole Dular - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):212-236.
    ​The traditional datum concerning moral testimony is that it is (epistemically or morally) problematic--or at least more problematic--than non-moral testimony. More recently, some have sought to analyze the issue of moral testimony within a narrower lens: instead of questioning whether moral testimony on the whole is (more) problematic or not, they have instead focused on possible conditions under which moral deference would be legitimate or forbidden. In this paper, I consider two (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  12. Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):261-284.
    Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  13. Moral testimony and moral epistemology.Alison Hills - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):94-127.
  14. In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
    In defense of moral testimony Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-21 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6 Authors Paulina Sliwa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  15. Moral Testimony as Higher Order Evidence.Marcus Lee, Jon Robson & Neil Sinclair - 2021 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Are the circumstances in which moral testimony serves as evidence that our judgement-forming processes are unreliable the same circumstances in which mundane testimony serves as evidence that our mundane judgement-forming processes are unreliable? In answering this question, we distinguish two possible roles for testimony: (i) providing a legitimate basis for a judgement, (ii) providing (‘higher-order’) evidence that a judgement-forming process is unreliable. We explore the possibilities for a view according to which moral testimony does (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Moral Testimony and Moral Understanding.McShane Paddy Jane - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):245-271.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17.  43
    Guided by Voices: Moral Testimony, Advice, and Forging a 'We'.Eric Wiland - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    We often rely on others for guidance about what to do. But wouldn't it be better to rely instead on only your own solo judgment? Deferring to others about moral matters, after all, can seem to conflict what Enlightenment demands. In Guided by Voices, however, Eric Wiland argues that there is nothing especially bad about relying on others in forming your moral views. You may rely on others for forming your moral views, just as you can your (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  18.  95
    Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance.Iskra Fileva - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):722-735.
    1. If you tell me that it’s raining outside, I would, presumably, be justified in acquiring the belief that it is raining on the basis of your say-so.1 But if you tell me that some war is unjust or...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  57
    Moral Testimony and Re-Conceived Understanding: A Reply to Callahan.Emily Slome - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):763-770.
    In the article ‘Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation’, Callahan argues that her re-conceived view of understanding can explain the issue with deference to moral testimony better than the more traditional understanding-based accounts. In this paper, I argue that Callahan fails to give a more successful explanation of the problem with moral testimony for two reasons. First, I argue that Callahan fails to adequately prove her claim that deference to testimony disincentivizes her re-conceived (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
    Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  21. Changing Minds and Hearts: Moral Testimony and Hermeneutical Advice.Paulina Sliwa - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
  22. Moral Testimony.Laura Frances Callahan - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 123-134.
  23. II—Roger Crisp: Moral Testimony Pessimism: A Defence.Roger Crisp - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):129-143.
    This paper defends moral testimony pessimism, the view that there is something morally or epistemically regrettable about relying on the moral testimony of others, against several arguments in Lillehammer. One central such argument is that reliance on testimony is inconsistent with the exercise of true practical wisdom. Lillehammer doubts whether such reliance is always objectionable, but it is important to note that moral testimony pessimism is best understood as a view about the pro (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  24. Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far.Elizabeth Harman - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 6:165-185.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. I—Hallvard Lillehammer: Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):111-127.
    According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  26.  62
    Moral Testimony, Knowledge and Understanding.Kumar Viswanathan - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 45 (3):297-319.
    Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 297-319, July 2022.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Moral Dependence: Reliance on Moral Testimony.Philip J. Nickel - 2002 - Dissertation, Ucla
    Moral dependence is taking another person's assertion or "testimony" that C as a reason to believe C (where C is some moral claim), such that whatever justificatory force is associated with the person's testimony endures or remains as one's reason for believing C. People are justified in relying on one another's testimony in non-moral matters. The dissertation takes up the question whether the same is true for moral beliefs. My method is to divide (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  40
    Moral and Non-moral Testimony { Revisiting an Alleged Asymmetry.Maximilian Kiener - 2017 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):25-44.
    In this essay, I oppose the ‘Asymmetry Thesis’ according to which moral matters are simply different in kind from non-moral matters when it comes to testimony because moral matters require understanding in a way in which non-moral matters do not. I argue that the requirement of understanding is not unique to morality and also deny that there is a genuine requirement of understanding after all. Instead, cases of moral and non-moral testimony are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  91
    Against epistemic pessimism about moral testimony.Paddy Jane McShane - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):200-223.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30.  58
    First-Personal Moral Testimony: a Defence.David A. Borman - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):163-179.
    Several authors have discussed and defended what is sometimes called the Asymmetry Thesis in social epistemology: that while reliance on testimony is essentially incontrovertible in epistemology, it is uniquely problematic for moral knowledge. This conclusion results, I argue, from considering the wrong sort of moral testimony: namely, ‘third-personal’ rather than ‘first-personal’ testimony. First-personal moral testimony is an inescapable part of the constitution of legitimate moral norms, and its role cannot be deflated as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Iris Murdoch, privacy, and the limits of moral testimony.Cathy Mason - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1125-1134.
    Recent discussions of moral testimony have focused on the acceptability of forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony, but there has been little acknowledgement of the limits to testimony's capacity to convey moral knowledge. In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.Paddy Jane McShane - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):629-647.
    In this paper I defend dependence on moral testimony. I show how going defenses of dependence on moral testimony have portrayed it as second-best by centering on how and why it is an important means to overcoming our defects. I argue that once we consider the pervasiveness of moral testimony in the context of intimate relationships, we can see that the value of dependence on moral testimony goes beyond this: it is not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  33. Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism.Andrew Reisner & Joseph Van Weelden - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):429-448.
    According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Why don't we trust moral testimony?James Andow - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):456-474.
    Is there a problem with believing based on moral testimony? The intuition that there is a problem is a starting point for much research on moral testimony. To arbitrate between various attempts to account for intuitions about moral testimony, we need to know the exact nature of those intuitions. The current study investigates this empirically. The study confirms an asymmetry in the way we think about testimony about moral and descriptive matters and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  35. Transformative Experiences and Reliance on Moral Testimony.Elizabeth Harman - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):323-339.
    Some experiences are transformative in that it is impossible to imagine experiencing them until one experiences them. It has been argued that pregnancy and parenthood are like that, and that therefore one cannot make a rational decision whether to become a mother. I argue that pregnancy and parenthood are not like that; but that if even if they are, a woman can still make a rational decision by relying on testimony about the value of these experiences. I then discuss (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  36. Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony.Joshua Blanchard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1141-1153.
    Moral realism and some of its constitutive theses, e.g., cognitivism, face the following challenge. If they are true, then it seems that we should predict that deference to moral testimony is appropriate under the same conditions as deference to non-moral testimony. Yet, many philosophers intuit that deference to moral testimony is not appropriate, even in otherwise ordinary conditions. In this paper I show that the challenge is cogent only if the appropriateness in question (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37.  35
    Guided by Voices. Moral Testimony, Advice, and Forging a ‘We’. [REVIEW]Gloria Mähringer - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):523-525.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Moral Understanding and Cooperative Testimony.Kenneth Boyd - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):18-33.
    It is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity.Michel Croce - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):373-389.
    While possessing moral understanding is agreed to be a core epistemic and moral value, it remains a matter of dispute whether it can be acquired via testimony and whether it involves an ability to engage in moral reasoning. This paper addresses both issues with the aim of contributing to the current debates on moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue ethics. It is argued that moral epistemologists should stop appealing to the argument from (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40. Testimonial Insult: A Moral Reason for Belief?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Logos and Episteme (1):27-48.
    When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a moral reason to believe the testimony (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41.  27
    Moralism, Moral Individualism and Testimony.Stephen Mulhall - 2021 - In Maria Balaska (ed.), Cora Diamond on Ethics. Springer Verlag. pp. 175-195.
    In this paper, I consider the debate between moral individualists and those whose moral philosophy is influenced by Wittgenstein, and in particular the extent to which its participants appear to be talking past one another. In the hope of illuminating, and perhaps alleviating, this mutual incomprehensibility, I demonstrate the pervasive reliance of these Wittgensteinian opponents of moral individualism upon the moral testimony of others, and the ways in which that reliance reflects a central element of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  68
    #MeToo and testimonial injustice: An investigation of moral and conceptual knowledge.Hilkje C. Hänel - 2021 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 48 (6):833-859.
    Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 6, Page 833-859, July 2022. Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  43.  55
    #MeToo and testimonial injustice: An investigation of moral and conceptual knowledge.Hilkje C. Hänel - 2022 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 48 (6):833-859.
    Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to being sexually violated by others have political and/or epistemic priority, others have (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44.  6
    Testimonial Injustice and the Disquieting Conclusion: A Critique of the Critical Consciousness Requirement for Moral Culpability.Pamela Ann Boongaling - 2022 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 2022 (4):469-482.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Testimony from the Top : Three CEO's Perspectives on Morality and Business.Regina Wentzel Wolfe - 2021 - In Daniel K. Finn (ed.), Business ethics and Catholic social thought. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony.Daniel Wodak - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    If a reliable testifier tells you that a song is beautiful or that an act is wrong, do you thereby have a reason to approve of the painting and disapprove of the agent's action? Many insist that we don’t: normative testimony does not give us reasons for affective attitudes like approval. This answer is often treated as a datum in the literatures on moral and aesthetic testimony. I argue that once we correct for a common methodological mistake (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Towards Social Accounts of Testimonial Asymmetries.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):49–73.
    there seems to be some kind of asymmetry, at least in some cases, between moral testimony and non-moral testimony, between aesthetic testimony and non-aesthetic testimony, and between religious testimony and non-religious testimony. In these domains, at least in some cases, we object to deference, and for this reason expect people to form their beliefs on non-testimonial grounds, in a way that we do not object to deference in paradigm cases of testimonial knowledge. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  48.  72
    Political testimony.Han van Wietmarschen - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (1):23-45.
    I argue that reliance on political testimony conflicts with two democratic values: the value of mutual justifiability and the value of equality of opportunity for political influence. Reliance on political testimony is characterized by a reliance on the assertions of others directly on a political question the citizen is asked to answer as part of a formal democratic decision procedure. Reliance on expert testimony generally, even in the context of political decision-making, does not similarly conflict with democratic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  49.  12
    Testimonial Withdrawal and The Ontology of Testimonial Injustice.Emily C. McWilliams - 2024 - Southwest Philosophy Review 40 (1):115-126.
    Concepts like testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007) and testimonial violence (Dotson, 2011) articulate that marginalized epistemic agents are unjustly undermined as testifiers when dominant agents cannot or will not hear, understand, or believe their testimony. This paper turns attention away from these constraints on uptake, and towards pragmatic, social, and political constraints on how dominant audiences receive and react to testimony. I argue that these constraints can also be sources of testimonial injustice and epistemic violence. Specifically, I explore a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  17
    Criminal Testimonial Injustice.Jennifer Lackey - 2023 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Through a detailed analysis that draws on work across philosophy, the law, and social psychology, this book shows that, from the very beginning of the American criminal legal process in interrogation rooms to its final stages in front of parole boards, testimony is extracted from individuals through processes that are coercive, manipulative, or deceptive. This testimony is then unreasonably regarded as representing the testifiers’ truest or most reliable selves. With chapters ranging from false confessions and eyewitness misidentifications to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 988