Results for 'motivational internalism'

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  1.  49
    Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates.Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–20.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection (...)
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  2. Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism.Danielle Bromwich - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to (...)
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  3. Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions.Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):715-734.
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, (...)
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  4. Motivational Internalism.Christian Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.
    Cases involving amoralists who no longer care about the institution of morality, together with cases of depression, listlessness, and exhaustion, have posed trouble in recent years for standard formulations of motivational internalism. In response, though, internalists have been willing to adopt narrower versions of the thesis which restrict it just to the motivational lives of those agents who are said to be in some way normal, practically rational, or virtuous. My goal in this paper is to offer (...)
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  5. Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate (...)
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  6.  72
    Review of G. Björnsson Et Al's (Eds.) Motivational Internalism[REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):658-661.
    This is a short review of collection of articles entitled Motivational Internalism, which was edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund.
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  7.  31
    Motivational Internalism[REVIEW]Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Motivational Internalism is a collection of thirteen new essays on exactly the topic you expect it to be, given the title. It also contains an introductory chapter, in which the editors attach an excellent overview of the current state of play to an intimidating bibliography. The essays in the volume are divided into three sections, each with its own, shorter, introduction by the editors. The first section concerns evidence for and against motivational internalism; the second concerns (...)
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  8.  67
    Motivational Internalism.Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptoins of moral motivation and moral judgment, it (...)
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  9. The Ideal Observer Theory and Motivational Internalism.Daniel Rönnedal - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):79-98.
    In this paper I show that one version of motivational internalism follows from the so-called ideal observer theory. Let us call the version of the ideal observer theory used in this essay (IOT). According to (IOT), it is necessarily the case that it ought to be that A if and only if every ideal observer wants it to be the case that A. We shall call the version of motivational internalism that follows from (IOT) (moral) conditional (...)
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  10.  79
    Defusing Counterexamples Against Motivational Internalism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Filosofija. Sociologija 27 (1):23-30.
    Externalists argue that motivation is external to moral judgments on the grounds that people can be unmoved by their moral judgments. I reply that people sometimes act indifferently to their moral considerations not because their moral judgments lack motivation but because their moral judgments are obstructed by rival desires. It appears that the moral motivation wanes while the moral judgments linger. In reality, however, the moral motivation is only made inconspicuous by the motivation of the opposing desires. A moral judgment (...)
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  11.  15
    How Not to Argue for Motivational Internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2011 - In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 64-87.
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  12.  39
    Motivational Internalism, Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Strandberg Caj, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björkland.Derek Baker - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):814-816.
  13. Motivational Judgement Internalism and The Problem of Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:601-621.
    Motivational judgement internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. There is, though, an important lack of clarity in the literature about the types of moral evaluation the theory is supposed to cover. It is rarely made clear whether the theory is intended to cover all moral judgements or whether the claim covers only a subset of such judgements. In this paper I will investigate which moral judgements internalists should hold their theory to apply (...)
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  14. Recent Work on Motivational Internalism.Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):124-137.
    Reviews work on moral judgment motivational internalism from the last two decades.
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  15.  64
    The Motivation Argument and Motivational Internalism.Daniel Eggers - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2445-2467.
    Much in contemporary metaethics revolves around the two positions known as ‘motivational internalism’ and the ‘Humean theory of motivation’. The importance of these positions is mostly due to their role in what is considered to be the most powerful argument for metaethical non-cognitivism: the so-called ‘motivation argument’. In my paper, I want to argue that widely accepted renditions of the MA, such as the rendition recently forwarded by Russ Shafer-Landau, are flawed in two senses. First, they fail to (...)
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  16. Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.
    I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the (...)
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  17.  13
    Weakness of Will and Motivational Internalism.Voin Milevski - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):44-57.
    The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. (...)
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  18. An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2):135-156.
    I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. I show that when we clarify (...)
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  19.  21
    Strong Motivational Internalism.Matej Sušnik - 2015 - International Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):165-177.
    Strong motivational internalists claim that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is necessary. It is widely accepted that strong motivational internalism is false because it cannot accommodate various phenomena from common experience. In order to make room for these phenomena, motivational internalists usually propose the weak formulation of their thesis. In the first part of the paper I differentiate between several versions of both strong and weak motivational internalism. In the second part I (...)
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  20. Motivational Internalism and the Authority of Morality.James Edwin Mahon - 2000 - Dissertation, Duke University
    If it is true that an agent who has a moral reason for acting has a reason for acting independently of whether or not she has a desire to so act , then it cannot also be true both that moral reasons are necessarily motivating and that an agent who is motivated to act is motivated in virtue of a desire to so act . This dissertation argues that the arguments given against Motivational Internalism about Moral Reasons are (...)
     
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  21. Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):285-318.
    While differing widely in other respects, both neo-Humean and neo-Kantian approaches to normativity embrace an internalist thesis linking reasons for acting to potential motivation. This thesis pushes in different directions depending on the underlying view of the powers of practical reason, but either way it sets the stage for an attack on realist attempts to ground reasons directly in facts about value. How can reasons that are not somehow grounded in motivational features of the agent nonetheless count as reasons (...)
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  22. Motivational Internalism and Externalism.G. F. Schueler - 2010 - In Timothy O. Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 293-300.
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  23.  56
    Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Acount.Mark Roojen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):233-241.
    Contemporary internalists typically idealize the conditions for motivation, claiming for example that motivation must be present in rational persons under certain conditions. Robert Johnson, in The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, convincingly argues that these versions of internalism overlook ways in which the conditions in the antecedent of the conditional expressing the analysis are incompatible with the claim under analysis. However, avoiding the fallacy decouples internalism from its use to explain and justify moral action. I use Johnson’s argument as the (...)
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  24.  41
    Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (4):417-36.
  25.  15
    Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Acount.Mark van Roojen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):233-241.
  26. Semantic Realism and the Argument From Motivational Internalism.Alexander Miller - unknown
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non-factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state (...)
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  27.  29
    Björnsson and Olinder on Motivational Internalism.Emma Wood - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):379-383.
  28. Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism, and Self-Deception in Kant's Ethics.Nelson Potter - 2002 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. Clarendon Press.
     
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  29.  1
    Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Acount.Mark Roojen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):233-241.
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  30. Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions and Motivational Internalism.Tommaso Bruni - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (3):19-23.
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  31. Motivational Internalism. Profile of a Kantian Viewpoint.H. F. Klemme - 2004 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 33 (3-4):179-205.
     
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  32.  82
    Aristotelian Motivational Externalism.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):419-442.
    Recent virtue theorists in psychology implicitly assume the truth of motivational internalism, and this assumption restricts the force and scope of the message that they venture to offer as scientists. I aim to contrive a way out of their impasse by arguing for a version of Aristotelian motivational externalism and suggesting why these psychologists should adopt it. There is a more general problem, however. Although motivational externalism has strong intuitive appeal, at least for moral realists and (...)
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  33.  11
    Internalism, Motivational.Mark Roojen - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  34.  35
    A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism.Thorsten Sander - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):391-408.
    According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument.
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  35.  27
    Emotion as the Categorical Basis for Moral Thought.Demian Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):533-553.
    I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.
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  36.  24
    The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic.Alex King - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This article puts pressure on moral motivational internalism and rejects normative motivational internalism by arguing that we should be aesthetic motivational externalists. Parallels between aesthetic and moral normativity give us new reason to doubt moral internalism. I address possible disanalogies, arguing that either they fail, or they succeed, but aren’t strong enough to underwrite a motivational difference between the domains. Furthermore, aesthetic externalism entails normative externalism, providing further presumptive evidence against moral internalism. (...)
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  37. Depression, Listlessness, and Moral Motivation.Michael Cholbi - 2011 - Ratio 24 (1):28-45.
    Motivational internalism (MI) holds that, necessarily, if an agent judges that she is morally obligated to ø, then, that agent is, to at least some minimal extent, motivated to ø. Opponents of MI sometimes invoke depression as a counterexample on the grounds that depressed individuals appear to sincerely affirm moral judgments but are ‘listless’ and unmotivated by such judgments. Such listlessness is a credible counterexample to MI, I argue, only if the actual clinical disorder of depression, rather than (...)
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  38.  11
    The Challenge of Amoralism.Voin Milevski - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):252-266.
    According to unconditional motivational internalism, there is an a priori constraint on an agent's forming a sincere moral judgement, namely that she is, at least to some minimal extent, motivated to act as it dictates. In order to undermine this internalist position, proponents of motivational externalism typically appeal to the possibility of the amoralist—i.e. an individual who makes sincere moral judgements, but who is completely unmoved to act accordingly. This strategy is known as the challenge of amoralism. (...)
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  39.  49
    Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation.Houston Smit - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate requiresidentifying (...)
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  40.  89
    Aesthetic Judgements and Motivation.Alfred Archer - 2017 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):1-22.
    Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for (...)
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  41. Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism.M. S. Bedke - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189-209.
    Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not (...)
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  42. Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath.Erick Ramirez - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):330-343.
    I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. Lastly, I argue (...)
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  43. En internalistisk teori om moraliska uppfattningar.Gunnar Björnsson - 2000 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 1.
    Responds to Ingmar Persson's criticism of my Moral Internalism: An Essay in Moral Psychology (SU 1998). In Swedish.
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  44. The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement.Stephen Finlay - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.
    Analyses of moral value judgements must meet a practicality requirement: moral speech acts characteristically express pro- or con-attitudes, indicate that speakers are motivated in certain ways, and exert influence on others' motivations. Nondescriptivists including Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard claim that no descriptivist analysis can satisfy this requirement. I argue first that while the practicality requirement is defeasible, it indeed demands a connection between value judgement and motivation that resembles a semantic or conceptual rather than merely contingent psychological link. I (...)
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  45. Expressivism and Motivation Internalism.R. Joyce - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):336-344.
    The task of this paper is to argue that expressivism [the thesis that moral judgements function to express desires, emotions, or pro/con attitudes] neither implies, nor is implied by, [motivational internalism].
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  46. Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism.Mark van Roojen - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):495–525.
  47. Cryptonormative Judgments.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):3-24.
    A cryptonormative judgment, roughly speaking, is a judgment that is presented by the agent who makes it as non-normative, but that is in fact normative. The idea of cryptonormativity is familiar from debates in social theory, social psychology, and continental political philosophy, but has to my knowledge never been treated in analytic metaethics, moral psychology or epistemology except in passing. In this paper, I argue, first, that cryptonormative judgments are pervasive: familiar cases from everyday life are most naturally diagnosed as (...)
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  48. Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism About Moral Judgements.Mark Van Roojen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):26-49.
    Motivational internalism about moral judgments is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgment is necessarily connected to motivation motivation. However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires. Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right. This has long been urged by David Brink. Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a (...)
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  49.  13
    Do Psychopaths Refute Internalism?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2014 - In Schramme Thomas (ed.), Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity. pp. 187-208.
    The chapter focuses on the philosophical debate between moral motivational internalism and externalism. The author analyzes and thereby challenges the conceptual problems underlying this quarrel in relation to the apparent empirical findings on psychopathy. Major obstacles in making progress in this debate are conceptual and methodological problems. First, there is not a clear-cut and undisputed definition of moral internalism. Second, empirical results about a lack of moral judgment are not forthcoming, since it is not certain how to (...)
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  50.  50
    A Metaethical Option for Theists.Kyle Swan - 2006 - In Journal of Religious Ethics. pp. 3-20.
    John Hare has proposed “prescriptive realism” in an attempt to stake out a middle-ground position in the twentieth century Anglo-American debates concerning metaethics between substantive moral realists and antirealist-expressivists. The account is supposed to preserve both the normativity and objectivity of moral judgments. Hare defends a version of divine command theory. The proposal succeeds in establishing the middle-ground position Hare intended. However, I argue that prescriptive realism can be strengthened in an interesting way.
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