Results for 'multiple realizability'

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  1. Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle.David Barrett - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.
    In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, (...)
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    Computation and Multiple Realizability.Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - In V. C. Mueller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 29-41.
    Multiple realizability (MR) is traditionally conceived of as the feature of computational systems, and has been used to argue for irreducibility of higher-level theories. I will show that there are several ways a computational system may be seen to display MR. These ways correspond to (at least) five ways one can conceive of the function of the physical computational system. However, they do not match common intuitions about MR. I show that MR is deeply interest-related, and for this (...)
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  3. The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability.Holger Lyre - 2009 - In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos. pp. 79.
    Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety (...)
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  4. Multiple Realizability.Ronald P. Endicott - 2005 - In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference.
    Multiple realizability has been at the heart of debates about whether the mind reduces to the brain, or whether the items of a special science reduce to the items of a physical science. I analyze the two central notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability: "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability." Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad conceptual traditions. The Mathematical Tradition equates realization with a form of mapping between objects. (...)
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  5. Multiple Realizability and the Semantic View of Theories.Colin Klein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):683-695.
    Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, (...)
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    Multiple Realizability and Novel Causal Powers.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Abstracta 6 (2):216-230.
    Framed within the dialectic of the causal exclusion argument (Kim 2005), this paper does two things. One, it clarifies some properties of multiple realizability based on its true origin (Turing 1950). And two, it challenges a form of argument Noordhof (1997), Clarke (1999), and Whittle (2007) employ to support the idea that the mental has causal powers not had by its physical realization base (Novel). The paper challenges Novel with ideas derived from multiple realizability, among others.
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  7. Multiple-Realizability, Explanation, and the Disjunctive Move.W. Jaworksi - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (3):298-308.
    The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay of anti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctions of physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave (...)
     
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  8.  90
    Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale.Sungsu Kim - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.
    Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of (...)
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  9.  11
    Multiple Realizability and Psychological Laws: Evaluating Kim's Challenge.D. Gene Witmer - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 59.
  10.  83
    Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind.William Ramsey - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):53-73.
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    Who's Afraid of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, and Connectionism.Justin Schwartz - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    Philosophers have argued that on the prevailing theory of mind, functionalism, the fact that mental states are multiply realizable or can be instantiated in a variety of different physical forms, at least in principle, shows that materialism or physical is probably false. A similar argument rejects the relevance to psychology of connectionism, which holds that mental states are embodied and and constituted by connectionist neural networks. These arguments, I argue, fall before reductios ad absurdam, proving too much -- they apply (...)
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  12.  70
    Multiple Realizability and Reduction: A Defense of the Disjunctive Move.Sven Walter - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (1):43-65.
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  13. The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.
    Reductionism is often understood to include two theses: (1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics; (2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics. These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's premises.
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  14. Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States.William Bechtel - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.
    The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in (...)
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  15.  27
    Multiple Realizability and Psychophysical Reduction.John Bickle - 1992 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58.
    The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available.
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  16.  84
    Multiple Realizability and Universality.RW Batterman - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):115-145.
    This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the (...)
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  17. Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity.Simone Gozzano - 2010 - In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa. Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 119-127.
    In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
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  18. Metaphysical Semantics Meets Multiple Realizability.Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):736-751.
    Metaphysical semantics is supposed to connect the nonfundamental to the fundamental in a distinctively “linguistic” way, explaining how nonfundamental truths can be grounded in fundamental facts , and so inducing a radically eliminative vision of the nonfundamental as mere talk. I wonder how the story goes when a single nonfundamental truth can be grounded in many different fundamental facts. For instance, the truth that Moore has hands can presumably be grounded in many different distributions of fields, arrangements of particles, vibrations (...)
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  19. Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
    b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful.
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  20. Multiple Realizability Revisited.Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel - manuscript
    The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in (...)
     
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  21. A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
    While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through _any_ differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple _specification_. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept (...)
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  22.  12
    A Physicalist Account of Multiple Realizability in the Special Sciences.Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker - manuscript
    Multiple realizability seems to be empirically justified and provides the conceptual basis for the autonomy of the special sciences. But it is mysterious. In this talk I propose a new reductionist approach to the special sciences that removes the mystery: I explain why the special sciences kinds appear to be multiply realized although they are identical with physical kinds and in what sense the special sciences kinds and laws are autonomous although they are physical laws. This approach is (...)
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  23.  54
    Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move.William Jaworski - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.
    The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to (...)
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  24.  36
    Reduction and Multiple Realizability.Robert Batterman - unknown
    This paper addresses the recent resurgence of Nagel style reduction in the philosophical literature. In particular, it considers the so-called multiple realizability objection to reductionism presented most forcefully by Sober in 1999. It is argued that this objection misses the point of multiple realizability and that there remain serious problems for reductionist methodologies in science.
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  25.  52
    Multiple Realizability, Constraints, and Identity.Mark Bauer - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):446-464.
    Shapiro has suggested that the empirical plausibility of the multiple realizability of human-like minds is dubious, because a contrary thesis, the Mental Constraint Thesis, enjoys positive empirical evidence. The Mental Constraint Thesis states that, given the actual physical laws, there is only one way to realize a human-like mind. I will suggest, however, that the Mental Constraint Thesis is not a contrary to the empirical multiple realizability thesis relevant to psychological reduction or autonomy and, as a (...)
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  26.  53
    Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist?Sven Walter - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):51-75.
    I will discuss two possible options how a defender of the type identity-theory with respect to mental properties can avoid the conclusion of Putnam's Multiple Realizability Argument. I begin by offering a rigorous formulation of Putnam's argument, which has been lacking so far in the literature (section 2). This rigorous formulation shows that there are basically two possible options for avoiding the argument's conclusion. Contrary to current mainstream, I reject the first option?Kim's 'local reductionism'?as untenable (section 3). I (...)
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  27.  9
    Is Multiple Realizability a Valid Argument Against Methodological Individualism?Branko MitroviĆ - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1):28-43.
    In recent decades, a number of authors have relied on the multiple realizability argument to reject methodological individualism. In this article, I argue that this strategy results in serious difficulties and makes it impossible to identify social entities and phenomena.
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  28.  58
    Multiple Realizability: Also a Difficulty for Functionalism.Mehdi Nasrin - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):25-34.
    Functionalism argues that since any mental state can be realized by different physical systems, it is therefore wrong to define or identify a mental state of an organism by the corresponding physical-chemical state of its body . In this paper, I argue that since a single mental state can also be realized in different functional patterns, multiple realizability creates the same problem for functionalism. This means that it is wrong to implicitly define a mental state by its causal (...)
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  29.  16
    Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability.Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):881-902.
    The Mind-Brain Identity Theory lived a short life as a respectable philosophical position in the late 1950s, until Hilary Putnam developed his famous argument on the multiple realizability of mental states. The argument was, and still is, taken as the definitive demonstration of the falsity of Identity Theory and the foundation on which contemporary functionalist computational cognitive science was to be grounded. In this paper, in the wake of some contemporary philosophers, we reopen the case for Identity Theory (...)
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  30. What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show.Robert Francescotti - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.
    It is widely held that psychological theories cannot be reduced to those of the natural sciences. Perhaps the most common reason for rejecting psycho-physical reduction is the belief that mental properties are multiply realizable--i.e., that events of different physical types might realize the same mental property. While the multiple realizability argument has had its share of criticism, its major flaw has been overlooked. I aim to show the real reason why the argument fails and why multiple (...) is compatible with even the strongest varieties of reduction. (shrink)
     
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  31.  23
    Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability.John Bickle - 1995 - Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.
    I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned.
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  32. The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals.Ellen Clarke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):413-435.
    Biological theory demands a clear organism concept, but at present biologists cannot agree on one. They know that counting particular units, and not counting others, allows them to generate explanatory and predictive descriptions of evolutionary processes. Yet they lack a unified theory telling them which units to count. In this paper, I offer a novel account of biological individuality, which reconciles conflicting definitions of ‘organism’ by interpreting them as describing alternative realisers of a common functional role, and then defines individual (...)
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  33. The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.
  34.  98
    Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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  35.  81
    Multiple Realizability.John Bickle - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  36.  42
    Multiple Realizability.John Heil - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):189-208.
  37. Multiple Realizability, Qualia, and Natural Kinds.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
    Are qualia natural kinds? In order to give this question slightly more focus, and to show why it might be an interesting question, let me begin by saying a little about what I take qualia to be, and what natural kinds. For the purposes of this paper, I shall be assuming a fairly full-blooded kind of phenomenal realism about qualia: qualia, thus, include the qualitative painfulness of pain (rather than merely the functional specification of pain states), the qualitative redness in (...)
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  38.  51
    Multiple Realizability, Projectibility, and the Reality of Mental Properties.Louise M. Antony - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):1-24.
  39.  33
    Reduction, Multiple Realizability, and Levels of Reality.Sven Walter & Markus Eronen - 2011 - In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum. pp. 138.
    The idea of reduction has appeared in different forms throughout the history of science and philosophy. Thales took water to be the fundamental principle of all things; Leucippus and Democritus argued that everything is composed of small, indivisible atoms; Galileo and Newton tried to explain all motion with a few basic laws; 17th century mechanism conceived of everything in terms of the motions and collisions of particles of matter; British Empiricism held that all knowledge is, at root, experiential knowledge; current (...)
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  40. Neural Plasticity and Multiple Realizability.Lawrence A. Shapiro - manuscript
     
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  41.  75
    Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism?John Bolender - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.
    Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not (...)
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  42.  29
    Multiple Realizability as Compatible with the Mental Constraint Thesis.Mark Bauer - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):119-127.
  43.  58
    Kim on Multiple Realizability and Causal Types.Ron McClamrock - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):248-252.
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    Multiple Realizability, Physical Constraints, and Possibilities.Heimir Geirsson - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):53-56.
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  45. The Metaphysics of Multiple Realizability: It's Like Apples and Oranges.Lawrence A. Shapiro - manuscript
     
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  46.  1
    Multiple Realizability, Physical Constraints, and Possibilities: A Response to Bauer.Heimir Geirsson - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):53-56.
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  47.  1
    Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism?John Bolender - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-142.
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  48. Multiple Realizability, Projectibility, and the Reality of Mental Properties.Louise M. Antony - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):1-24.
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  49. Natural Properties and the Special Sciences: Nonreductive Physicalism Without Levels of Reality or Multiple Realizability.C. Haug Matthew - 2011 - The Monist 94 (2):244-266.
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  50. Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move.Jaworski William - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 108 (3):298-308.
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