Results for 'multiple realization'

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  1. Fish and Microchips: On Fish Pain and Multiple Realization.Matthias Michel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2411-2428.
    Opponents to consciousness in fish argue that fish do not feel pain because they do not have a neocortex, which is a necessary condition for feeling pain. A common counter-argument appeals to the multiple realizability of pain: while a neocortex might be necessary for feeling pain in humans, pain might be realized differently in fish. This paper argues, first, that it is impossible to find a criterion allowing us to demarcate between plausible and implausible cases of multiple (...) of pain without running into a circular argument. Second, opponents to consciousness in fish cannot be provided with reasons to believe in the multiple realizability of pain. I conclude that the debate on the existence of pain in fish is impossible to settle by relying on the multiple realization argument. (shrink)
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  2. Evaluating the Evidence for Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):457 - 472.
    Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly (...)
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  3.  92
    Has the Last Decade of Challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument Provided Aid and Comfort to Psychoneural Reductionists?John Bickle - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260.
    The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a "second wave" of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple (...) argument, one might think that this second wave of challenges provides important aid and comfort to reductionists. In this paper, however, I provide reasons for thinking it does not. This is not to the detriment of psychoneural reductionism because, as I also argue here, and unrecognized by the current non-reductive orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, one key argument among the first wave of criticisms of the multiple realization argument has never been adequately rejoined. (shrink)
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  4.  84
    Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
    One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that (...)
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  5.  81
    Multiple Realization, Levels and Mechanisms.Sergio Daniel Barberis - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):53-68.
    This paper focuses on the framework for the compositional relations of properties in the sciences, or "realization relations", offered by Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett (A&G) in a series of papers, and in particular on the analysis of "multiple realizations" they build upon it. I argue that A&G's analysis of multiple realization requires an account of levels and I try to show, then, that the A&G framework is not successful under any of the extant accounts of (...)
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  6.  31
    Multiple Realization and Compositional Variation.Kevin Morris - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in The Multiple Realization Book, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple (...)
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  7.  57
    Immense Multiple Realization.Anders Strand - 2007 - Metaphysica 8 (1):61-78.
    In his latest book Physicalism, or Something near Enough, Jaegwon Kim argues that his version of functional reductionism is the most promising way for saving mental causation. I argue, on the other hand, that there is an internal tension in his position: Functional reductionism does not save mental causation if Kim’s own supervenience argument is sound. My line of reasoning has the following steps: (1) I discuss the supervenience argument and I explain how it motivates Kim’s functional reductionism; (2) I (...)
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  8.  15
    The Counter-Revolution Over Multiple Realization[REVIEW]Ronald Endicott - 2017 - Metascience 26 (2):229-232.
    This is a largely expository review of Thomas Polger’s and Laurence Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (Oxford Press 2016).
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  9. Shocking Lessons From Electric Fish: The Theory and Practice of Multiple Realization.Brian L. Keeley - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):444-465.
    This paper explores the relationship between psychology and neurobiology in the context of cognitive science. Are the sciences that constitute cognitive science independent and theoretically autonomous, or is there a necessary interaction between them? I explore Fodor's Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) which starts with the fact of multiple realization and purports to derive the theoretical autonomy of special sciences (such as psychology) from structural sciences (such as neurobiology). After laying out the MRT, it is shown that, (...)
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  10. Review of The Multiple Realization Book. [REVIEW]Umut Baysan - forthcoming - Analysis:anx078.
    _The Multiple Realization Book_By PolgerThomas W. and ShapiroLawrence A.Oxford University Press, 2016. xiv + 258 pp. £71.14 cloth, £18.99 paper.
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  11.  73
    Multiple Realization and Expressive Power in Mathematics and Ethics.David Liggins - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press.
    According to a popular ‘explanationist’ argument for moral or mathematical realism the best explanation of some phenomena are moral or mathematical, and this implies the relevant form of realism. One popular way to resist the premiss of such arguments is to hold that any supposed explanation provided by moral or mathematical properties is in fact provided only by the non-moral or non-mathematical grounds of those properties. Many realists have responded to this objection by urging that the explanations provided by the (...)
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  12. Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 539--582.
  13.  70
    Identity, Variability, and Multiple Realization in the Special Sciences.Lawrence A. Shapiro & Thomas W. Polger - 2012 - In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 264.
    Issues of identity and reduction have monopolized much of the philosopher of mind’s time over the past several decades. Interestingly, while investigations of these topics have proceeded at a steady rate, the motivations for doing so have shifted. When the early identity theorists, e.g. U. T. Place ( 1956 ), Herbert Feigl ( 1958 ), and J. J. C. Smart ( 1959 , 1961 ), fi rst gave voice to the idea that mental events might be identical to brain processes, (...)
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  14.  20
    How to Theorize About Multiple Realization.David Barrett - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):674-690.
  15.  40
    The Multiple Realization Book.Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes are identifiable with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization, which serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed arguments that (...)
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  16.  94
    Multiple Realization, Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States.Oron Shagrir - 1998 - Synthese 114 (3):445-461.
    The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.
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  17. Realization and Multiple Realization, Chicken and Egg.Thomas W. Polger - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):862-877.
    A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in (...)
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  18. The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
    Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival (...)
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  19. How to Test for Multiple Realization.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):514-525.
    When conceived as an empirical claim, it is natural to wonder how one might test the hypothesis of multiple realization. I consider general issues of testability, show how they apply specifically to the hypothesis of multiple realization, and propose an auxiliary assumption that, I argue, must be conjoined to the hypothesis of multiple realization to ensure its testability. I argue further that Bechtel and Mundale go astray because they fail to appreciate the need for (...)
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  20.  22
    Multiple Realization in Systems Biology.Wei Fang - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Polger and Shapiro claim that unlike human-made artifacts cases of multiple realization in naturally occurring systems are uncommon. Drawing on cases from systems biology, I argue that multiple realization in naturally occurring systems is not as uncommon as Polger and Shapiro initially thought. The relevant cases, which I draw from systems biology, involve generalizable design principles called network motifs which recur in different organisms and species and perform specific functions. I show that network motifs with entirely (...)
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  21.  4
    Multiple Realization and the Commensurability of Taxonomies.John Zerilli - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3337-3353.
    The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale’s :175–207, 1999) illuminating discussion of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses what seems to be an important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims alleging the multiple realization of psychological (...)
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  22. Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions.Carrie Figdor - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):419-456.
    Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one‐to‐one structure‐function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience‐based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised (...)
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  23.  13
    Multiple Realization in Systems Biology.Wesley Fang - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Polger and Shapiro (2016) claim that unlike human-made artifacts cases of multiple realization in naturally occurring systems are uncommon. Drawing on cases from systems biology, I argue that multiple realization in naturally occurring systems is not as uncommon as Polger and Shapiro initially thought. The relevant cases, which I draw from systems biology, involve generalizable design principles called network motifs which recur in different organisms and species and perform specific functions. I show that network motifs with (...)
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  24.  40
    Elimination, Not Reduction: Lessons From the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) and Multiple Realisation.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e22.
    The thesis of multiple realisation that Borsboom et al. are relying on should not be taken for granted. In dissolving the apparent multiple realisation, the reductionist research strategies in psychopathology research (the Research Domain Criteria [RDoC] framework, in particular) are bound to lead to eliminativism rather than reductionism. Therefore, Borsboom et al. seem to be aiming at a wrong target.
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  25. Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale.Ken Aizawa - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):493-510.
    One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper (...)
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  26. Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
    Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. Despite some recent advances, multiple realization remains a largely misunderstood thesis. Consider the dispute between Lawrence Shapiro and Carl Gillett over the application of Shapiro’s recipe for deciding when we have genuine cases of multiple realization. I argue that Gillett follows many philosophers in mistakenly supposing that multiple realization is absolute and transitive. Both of these are problematic. They are tempting only when we extract the question of multiple (...)
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  27.  85
    The Individualism-Holism Debate on Intertheoretic Reduction and the Argument From Multiple Realization.Julie Zahle - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):77-99.
    The argument from multiple realization is currently considered the argument against intertheoretic reduction. Both Little and Kincaid have applied the argument to the individualism-holism debate in support of the antireductionist holist position. The author shows that the tenability of the argument, as applied to the individualism-holism debate, hinges on the descriptive constraints imposed on the individualist position. On a plausible formulation of the individualist position, the argument does not establish that the intertheoretic reduction of social theories is highly (...)
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  28. Multiple Realization and Methodological Pluralism.Robert Richardson - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):473-492.
    Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a foundation of the “antireductionist consensus.” More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic grounds, as well as on more “metaphysical” grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for multiple realization. I take up the (...)
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  29. Autonomy and Multiple Realization.Robert C. Richardson - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):526-536.
    Multiple realization historically mandated the autonomy of psychology, and its principled irreducibility to neuroscience. Recently, multiple realization and its implications for the reducibility of psychology to neuroscience have been challenged. One challenge concerns the proper understanding of reduction. Another concerns whether multiple realization is as pervasive as is alleged. I focus on the latter question. I illustrate multiple realization with actual, rather than hypothetical, cases of multiple realization from within the (...)
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  30. Multiple Realization in Comparative Perspective.Mark B. Couch - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):505-519.
    Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that we know the kinds used in the arguments have been individuated properly. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing researchers think about the matter. I will consider several examples (...)
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  31.  15
    Multiple Realization and the Commensurability of Taxonomies.John Zerilli - 2016 - Synthese:1-17.
    The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale’s :175–207, 1999) illuminating discussion of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses what seems to be an important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims alleging the multiple realization of psychological (...)
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  32.  39
    The Case for Multiple Realization in Biology.Wei Fang - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (1-2):3.
    Polger and Shapiro argue that their official recipe, a criterion for judging when the phenomenon of multiple realization exists, renders MR less widespread than its proponents have assumed. I argue that, although Polger and Shapiro’s criterion is a useful contribution, they arrive at their conclusion too hastily. Contrary to Polger and Shapiro, I claim that the phenomenon of multiple realization in the biological world, judged by their criterion, is not as scarce as they suggest. To show (...)
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  33. A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):389-406.
    Two important thought-experiments are associated with the work of Hilary Putnam, one designed to establish multiple realizability for mental kinds, the other designed to establish essentialism for natural kinds. Comparing the thought-experiments with each other reveals that the scenarios in both are structurally analogous to each other, though his intuitions in both are greatly at variance, intuitions that have been simultaneously well received. The intuition in the former implies a thesis that prioritizes pre-scientific over scientific indicators for identifying mental (...)
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  34. Multiple Realization and Methodology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - unknown
    ABSRACT: An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast (...)
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  35. Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization?Michael Pauen - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):37-49.
    It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite (...)
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  36.  99
    Multiple Realization and Evidence.Sungsu Kim - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):739 - 749.
    The ?Dimensioned? view analyzes (multiple) realization in terms of compositional relation, and the ?Flat? view analyzes (multiple) realization in terms of causal-functional mechanism. The two different analyses of realization lead to the disagreement about whether realization is transitive. The two views, perhaps not surprisingly, have different consequences on testing for multiple realization, and prescribe different ?reconstructions? for the evidential significance of observation for multiple realization. I examine the differences between the (...)
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  37. Comments and Criticism on Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences.Alex Rosenberg - manuscript
    It is widely held that disciplines are autonomous when their taxonomies are “substrate neutral” and when the events, states and processes that realize their descriptive vocabulary are heterogeneous. This will be particularly true in the case of disciplines whose taxonomy consists largely in terms that individuate by function. Having concluded that the multiple realization of functional kinds is far less widespread than assumed or argued for, Shapiro cannot avail himself of the argument for the autonomy of the special (...)
     
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  38.  29
    Multiple Realization and Multiple “Ways” of Realization: A Progress Report.Kenneth Aizawa - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68:3-9.
    One might have thought that if something has two or more distinct realizations, then that thing is multiply realized. Nevertheless, some philosophers have claimed that two or more distinct realizations do not amount to multiple realization, unless those distinct realizations amount to multiple “ways” of realizing the thing. Corey Maley, Gualtiero Piccinini, Thomas Polger, and Lawrence Shapiro are among these philosophers. Unfortunately, they do not explain why multiple realization requires multiple “ways” of realizing. More (...)
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  39.  19
    The Multiple Realization Book By Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro.Umut Baysan - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):177-180.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comWhen fish propel their bodies under water in order to travel from one place to another, are they doing the same kind of thing that we do when we swim? If swimming is to be identified with exactly the kind of thing that we do when we swim, we should seriously consider the following question: Do fish swim? Believe (...)
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  40. Multiple Realization and Methodology in the Neurological and Psychological Sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - manuscript
    The reigning picture of special sciences, what we will term the ‘received’ view, grew out of the work of writers, such as Jerry Fodor, William Wimsatt, and Philip Kitcher, who overturned the Positivist’s jaundiced view of these disciplines by looking at real cases from the biological sciences, linguistics, psychology, and economics, amongst other areas.1 Central to the received view is the ontological claim that the ‘multiple realization’ of properties is widespread in the special sciences which we may frame (...)
     
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  41.  38
    Natural Selection and Multiple Realisation: A Closer Look.Björn Brunnander - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):73 - 83.
    The target of this article is the claim that natural selection accounts for the multiple realisation of biological and psychological kinds. I argue that the explanation actually offered does not provide any insight about the phenomenon since it presupposes multiple realisation as an unexplained premise, and this is what does all the work. The purported explanation mistakenly invokes the ?indifference? of selection to structure as an additional explanatorily relevant factor. While such indifference can be explanatory in intentional contexts, (...)
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  42. Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence.Marc Slors & Sven Walter (eds.) - 2002 - Rodopi.
    Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Introduction. Marc SLORS: Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Michael PAUEN: Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Sven WALTER: Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Achim STEPHAN: Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Carl GILLETT: The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Wim DE MUIJNCK: Causation by Relational Properties. Albert NEWEN & Rimas ČUPLINSKAS: Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Bernd LUDWIG: Warum kommen „mentale Ursachen“ physikalischen (...)
     
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  43.  89
    Steering Away From Multiple Realization.Anco Peeters - 2019 - Adaptive Behavior:1-2.
    Mario Villalobos and Pablo Razeto-Barry argue that enactivists should understand living beings not as autopoietic systems, but as autopoietic bodies. In doing so, they surrender the principle of multiple realizability of the spatial location of living beings. By way of counterexample, I argue that more motivation is required before this principle is surrendered.
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  44. Kinds, Complexity, and Multiple Realization.Robert Boyd - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):67-98.
  45. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
  46. On Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences.Alex Rosenberg - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):365-373.
  47. Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
  48. On Physical Multiple Realization.Ronald P. Endicott - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):212-24.
     
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  49.  19
    Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
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  50. Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realization.Richard N. Boyd - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1):67-98.
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