Results for 'naive realism'

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  1. Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):529-578.
    Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in (...)
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  2. Rethinking Naive Realism.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):607-633.
    Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependent—their phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational properties of the subject. A good theory of perception must account for both these facts. But naive realism has been criticized for failing to accommodate internal-dependence. This paper evaluates and responds to this criticism. It first argues that a certain version (...)
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  3. VII—Naive Realism and Diaphaneity.Craig French - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):149-175.
    Naïve Realists think that the ordinary mind-independent objects that we perceive are constitutive of the character of experience. Some understand this in terms of the idea that experience is diaphanous: that the conscious character of a perceptual experience is entirely constituted by its objects. My main goal here is to argue that Naïve Realists should reject this, but I’ll also highlight some suggestions as to how Naïve Realism might be developed in a non-diaphanous direction.
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  4. Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past.Alex Moran - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):202-232.
    It seems possible to see a star that no longer exists. Yet it also seems right to say that what no longer exists cannot be seen. We therefore face a puzzle, the traditional answer to which involves abandoning naïve realism in favour of a sense datum view. In this article, however, I offer a novel exploration of the puzzle within a naïve realist framework. As will emerge, the best option for naïve realists is to embrace an eternalist view of (...)
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  5. Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
    Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.
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  6.  4
    A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour.Keith Allen - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    A Naive Realist Theory of Colour defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment, that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide-spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours don't really exist - or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is argued that a naive realist theory of (...)
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  7. Naïve Realism and Unconscious Perception: A Reply to Berger and Nanay.Alfonso Anaya & Sam Clarke - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):267-273.
    In a recent paper, Berger and Nanay consider, and reject, three ways of addressing the phenomenon of unconscious perception within a naïve realist framework. Since these three approaches seem to exhaust the options open to naïve realists, and since there is said to be excellent evidence that perception of the same fundamental kind can occur, both consciously and unconsciously, this is seen to present a problem for the view. We take this opportunity to show that all three approaches considered remain (...)
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  8. Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem.Alex Moran - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):368-382.
    This paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off problem’ for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt (...)
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  9. Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily.Craig French - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):393-413.
    Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that (...)
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  10. How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.Craig French & Anil Gomes - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):41-63.
    Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views cannot (...)
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  11. Naïve Realism and Illusion.Boyd Millar - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
    It is well-known that naïve realism has difficulty accommodating perceptual error. Recent discussion of the issue has focused on whether the naïve realist can accommodate hallucination by adopting disjunctivism. However, illusions are more difficult for the naïve realist to explain precisely because the disjunctivist solution is not available. I discuss what I take to be the two most plausible accounts of illusion available to the naïve realist. The first claims that illusions are cases in which you are prevented from (...)
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  12. Must Naive Realists Be Relationalists?Maarten Steenhagen - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):1002-1015.
    Relationalism maintains that perceptual experience involves, as part of its nature, a distinctive kind of conscious perceptual relation between a subject of experience and an object of experience. Together with the claim that perceptual experience is presentational, relationalism is widely believed to be a core aspect of the naive realist outlook on perception. This is a mistake. I argue that naive realism about perception can be upheld without a commitment to relationalism.
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  13. Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterizes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, (...)
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  14. Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.
    Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive (...)
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  15. Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).
    Naïve realism, often overlooked among philosophical theories of perception, has in recent years attracted a surge of interest. Broadly speaking, the central commitment of naïve realism is that mind-independent objects are essential to the fundamental analysis of perceptual experience. Since the claims of naïve realism concern the essential metaphysical structure of conscious perception, its truth or falsity is of central importance to a wide range of topics, including the explanation of semantic reference and representational content, the nature (...)
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  16. Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge (...)
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  17. Naïve Realism About Unconscious Perception.Paweł Zięba - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2045-2073.
    Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For (...)
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  18.  95
    Naive Realism and the Science of (Some) Illusions.Ian Phillips - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):353-380.
    Critics have long complained that naive realism cannot adequately account for perceptual illusion. This complaint has a tendency to ally itself with the aspersion that naive realism is hopelessly out of touch with vision science. Here I offer a partial reply to both complaint and aspersion. I do so by showing how careful reflection on a simple, empirically grounded model of illusion reveals heterodox ways of thinking about familiar illusions which are quite congenial to the (...) realist. (shrink)
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  19.  92
    Naive Realism About Operators.Martin Daumer, Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein & Nino Zanghì - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):379 - 397.
    A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a naive realism about operators. By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about measuring operators that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by measuring a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is (...)
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  20. Naïve Realism and the Problem of Causation.Michael Sollberger - 2008 - Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.
    In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions (...)
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  21. Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence.Matthew Kennedy - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109.
    I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs.
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  22.  47
    Naive Realism, Representationalism, and the Rationalizing Role of Visual Perception.Craig French - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):102-119.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 102-119, October 2020.
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  23.  71
    Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
    I argue that the possibility of non-perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience will lie in the nature of the objects that are so presented. I will defend a view according to which in (...)
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  24.  69
    Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap.Jonathan Morgan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1243-1253.
    Many arguments against naïve realism are arguments against its corollary: disjunctivism. But there is a simpler argument—due to Mehta —that targets naïve realism directly. In broad strokes, the argument is the following. There are certain experiences that are, allegedly, in no way phenomenally similar. Nevertheless, naïve realism predicts that they are phenomenally similar. Hence, naïve realism is false. Mehta and Ganson successfully defend this argument from an objection raised by French and Gomes :451–460, 2016). However, all (...)
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  25.  82
    Merleau-Ponty and Naïve Realism.Keith Allen - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper has two aims. The first is to use contemporary discussions of naïve realist theories of perception to offer an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. The second is to use consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception to outline a distinctive version of a naïve realist theory of perception. In a Merleau-Pontian spirit, these two aims are inter-dependent.
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  26. Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents.Matthew Nudds - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):334-346.
    Suppose that you are looking at a vase of flowers on the table in front of you. You can visually attend to the vase and to the flowers, noticing their different features: their colour, their shape and the way they are arranged. In attending to the vase, the flowers and their features, you are attending to mind-independent objects and features. Suppose, now, that you introspectively reflect on the visual experience you have when looking at the vase of flowers. In doing (...)
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  27.  77
    12 Naive Realism and Hallucinations.Matthew Nudds - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. pp. 271.
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  28. Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction.Anil Gomes - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  29. Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation.Heather Logue - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.
    In the first section of this paper, after briefly arguing for the assumption that experiential content is propositional, I’ll distinguish three interpretations of the claim that experience has content (the Mild, Medium, and Spicy Content Views). In the second section, I’ll flesh out Naïve Realism in greater detail, and I’ll reconstruct what I take to be the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. The third section will be devoted to evaluation of existing arguments for the Mild (...)
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  30. Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.
    Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The (...)
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  31. Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure.Keith Allen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  32. The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
  33. The Intuitive Case for Naïve Realism.Harold Langsam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):106-122.
    Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to (...)
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  34. Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error.M. D. Conduct - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to a relational view of experience and a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (...)
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  35. What Should the Naïve Realist Say About Total Hallucinations?Heather Logue - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.
  36.  75
    Naïve Realism: Folk Fallacies in the Design and Use of Visual Displays.Harvey S. Smallman & Maia B. Cook - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (3):579-608.
    Often implicit in visual display design and development is a gold standard of photorealism. By approximating direct perception, photorealism appeals to users and designers by being both attractive and apparently effortless. The vexing result from numerous performance evaluations, though, is that increasing realism often impairs performance. Smallman and St. John (2005) labeled misplaced faith in realistic information display Naïve Realism and theorized it resulted from a triplet of folk fallacies about perception. Here, we illustrate issues associated with the (...)
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  37. Naive Realism and Illusions of Refraction.B. M. Arthadeva - 1959 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):118-137.
  38.  20
    Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  39. Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion.Adam Pautz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
  40.  60
    What’s so Naïve About Naïve Realism?Carlo Raineri - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3637-3657.
    Naïve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features. The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception has devoted little attention to assessing one of the main motivations to endorse Naïve Realism–namely, that it is the only view which articulates our ‘intuitive’ conception of perception. In this paper, I first clarify in which sense Naïve Realism is supposed to be ‘naïve’. In this respect, I argue that (...)
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  41. Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism[REVIEW]John Campbell - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666 - 673.
  42.  23
    Naïve Realism and Illusions of Refraction.M. Arthadeva - 1959 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):118-137.
  43.  97
    Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light. Arthadeva - 1960 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21:467.
  44.  12
    Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds.Neil Mehta - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.
    Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is (...)
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  45. Naïve Realism: A Simple Approach.Justin Christy - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2167-2185.
    Naïve realism is often characterized, by its proponents and detractors alike, as the view that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience is for her to stand in a simple two-place acquaintance relation toward an object. However, two of the leading defenders of naïve realism, John Campbell and Bill Brewer, have thought it necessary to complicate this picture, claiming that a third relatum is needed to account for various possible differences between distinct visual experiences of the same (...)
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  46. Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.Heather Logue - 2010 - Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.
  47.  47
    Naive Realism and Illusions of Reflection.M. Arthadeva - 1957 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):155 – 169.
  48. Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.Ori Beck - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism - neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that (...)
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  49. Naive Realism and the Science of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    I begin by describing what I call simple naïve realism. Then I describe relevant empirical results. Next, I develop two new empirical arguments against simple naive realism. Then I briefly look at two new, more complex forms of naïve realism: one due to Keith Allen and the other due to Heather Logue and Ori Beck. I argue that they are not satisfactory retreats for naive realists. The right course is to reject naive realism (...)
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  50.  44
    A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour By Keith Allen. [REVIEW]Eliot Michaelson - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):580-583.
    A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour By AllenKeithOxford University Press, 2016. x + 204 pp.
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