Results for 'non-doxastic faith'

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  1.  19
    The Cognitive Aspect of Christian Faith and Non-Doxastic Propositional Attitudes.Dan-Johan Sebastian Eklund - 2018 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 60 (3):386-405.
    Summary In the recent discussion, several authors have argued for the claim that propositional faith need not be doxastic, but also can be “non-doxastic”. Notable proponents of this view are William Alston, Robert Audi, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and J. L. Schellenberg. In this paper, I focus on Christian faith and consider whether its cognitive aspect can be understood solely in terms of Alston’s and others’ non-doxastic accounts. I argue for a negative answer. In my view, the cognitive (...)
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  2.  63
    Testimony, Belief, and Non-Doxastic Faith: The Humean Argument for Religious Fictionalism.Christopher Jay - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (2):247-261.
  3.  93
    Are You There, God? It’s Me, the Theist: On the Viability and Virtue of Non-Doxastic Prayer.Amber Griffioen - forthcoming - In Oliver Crisp, James Arcadi & Jordan Wessling (eds.), Reaching for God: New Theological Essays on Prayer. Oxford, UK:
    In this article, I explore the possibility of what I call “non-doxastic theistic prayer”, namely prayer that proceeds without full belief in God – or in the kind of God who could be the recipient of such prayer. After developing a working definition of prayer, I proceed to discuss a few prominent forms of prayer and explore the ways in which such prayer might legitimately be performed non-doxastically. I conclude by examining the possibility that some forms of what I (...)
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  4. Faith, Belief and Fictionalism.Finlay Malcolm & Michael Scott - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):257-274.
    Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate has focussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in place of belief. This paper sets out and defends the doxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used in favour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt; (2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmatic (...). We argue that belief is required to maintain a distinction between genuine faith, pretend faith, and fictionalist faith. (shrink)
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  5. Can Fictionalists Have Faith?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):215-232.
    According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a ‘positive cognitive attitude’. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This paper shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact (...)
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  6.  82
    Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-Doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.
    In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs , Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. (...)
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  7.  92
    Faith as Doxastic Venture.John Bishop - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (4):471-487.
    A ‘doxastic venture’ model of faith – according to which having faith involves believing beyond what is rationally justifiable – can be defended only on condition that such venturesome believing is both possible and ethically acceptable. I show how a development of the position argued by William James in ‘The will to believe’ can succeed in meeting these conditions. A Jamesian defence of doxastic venture is, however, open to the objection that decision theory teaches us that there can (...)
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  8. Prolegomena to Any Future Non-Doxastic Religion.Andrew Chignell - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (2):195-207.
    A discussion of the relationship between religion and belief, in the context of an engagement with J.L. Schellenberg's recent "Prolegomena." I suggest that there may be an authentic way of being "religious" without having full-blown religious belief. -/- .
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  9. John Bishop's Leaps of Faith: Doxastic Ventures and the Logical Equivalence of Religious Faith and Agnosticism.James Beach - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (1):101-117.
    In recent essays John Bishop proposes a model of religious faith. This author notices that a so-called doxastic venture model of theistic faith is self-defeating for the following reason: a venture suggests a process with an outcome; by definition a venture into Christian faith denies itself an outcome in virtue of the transcendent character of its claims – for what is claimed cannot be settled. Taking instruction from logical positivism, I stress the nonsensical character of religious claims (...)
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  10.  97
    Ignorance Implicatures and Non-Doxastic Attitude Verbs.Kyle H. Blumberg - forthcoming - Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium.
    This paper is about conjunctions and disjunctions in the scope of non-doxastic atti- tude verbs. These constructions generate a certain type of ignorance implicature. I argue that the best way to account for these implicatures is by appealing to a notion of contex- tual redundancy (Schlenker, 2008; Fox, 2008; Mayr and Romoli, 2016). This pragmatic approach to ignorance implicatures is contrasted with a semantic account of disjunctions under `wonder' that appeals to exhausti cation (Roelofsen and Uegaki, 2016). I argue (...)
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  11. Descriptions and Non-Doxastic Attitude Ascriptions.Wojciech Rostworowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1311-1331.
    This paper addresses a certain objection to the quantificational theory of definite descriptions. According to this objection, the quantificational account cannot provide correct interpretations of definite descriptions embedded in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and therefore ought to be rejected. In brief, the objection says that the quantificational theory is committed to the view that a sentence of the form “The F is G” is equivalent to the claim that there is a unique F and it is G, while the (...)
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  12.  24
    The Proper Object of Non-Doxastic Religion: Why Traditional Religion Should Be Preferred Over Schellenberg's Simple Ultimism.Carl-Johan Palmqvist - 2018 - Religious Studies:1-16.
    Taking for granted the view that belief-less, ‘non-doxastic’, engagement with religion is possible, this article discusses the proper object of such religiosity. Its focus is the claim of J. L. Schellenberg that non-doxastic religion should be directed at ’simple ultimism’. I argue that ‘simple ultimism’ is too abstract to allow for alignment with religious reality. Traditional religion is a better choice since it commonly contains religious experience. As long as the veridicality of such experience remains an epistemic possibility, (...)
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  13.  3
    Schellenberg’s Ultimism as the Proper Object of Non-Doxastic Religion.Kirk Lougheed - forthcoming - Sophia:1-12.
    Carl-Johan Palmqvist recently examines a well-known form of non-doxastic religiosity called ultimism, which comes to us from J. L Schellenberg. He contends that traditional forms of religion are better candidates for non-doxastic religion for two reasons. First, their specificity makes them more likely to put one into contact with transcendental reality than ultimism. Second, religious experience can only be on traditional forms of religion, not on ultimism. I argue that Palmqvist’s rejection of ultimism is wrong. It’s false that (...)
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  14.  2
    Schellenberg’s Ultimism as the Proper Object of Non-Doxastic Religion.Kirk Lougheed - forthcoming - Sophia:1-12.
    Carl-Johan Palmqvist recently examines a well-known form of non-doxastic religiosity called ultimism, which comes to us from J. L Schellenberg. He contends that traditional forms of religion are better candidates for non-doxastic religion for two reasons. First, their specificity makes them more likely to put one into contact with transcendental reality than ultimism. Second, religious experience can only be on traditional forms of religion, not on ultimism. I argue that Palmqvist’s rejection of ultimism is wrong. It’s false that (...)
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  15. (Ad-)Ventures in Faith: A Critique of Bishop's Doxastic Venture Model.Amber L. Griffioen - 2015 - Religious Studies 51 (4):513-529.
    While some philosophical models reduce religious faith to either mere belief or affect, more recent accounts have begun to look at the volitional component of faith. In this spirit, John Bishop has defended the notion of faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. In this article, I consider Bishop's view in detail and attempt to show that his account proves on the one hand too permissive and on the other too restrictive. Thus, although the doxastic-venture model offers certain advantages (...)
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  16. Motivated Aversion: Non-Thetic Awareness in Bad Faith.Jonathan Webber - 2002 - Sartre Studies International 8 (1):45-57.
    Sartre's concept of ‘non-thetic awareness’ must be understood as equivalent to the concept of ‘nonconceptual content’ currently discussed in anglophone epistemology and philosophy of mind, since it could not otherwise play the role in the structure of ‘bad faith’, or self-deception, that Sartre ascribes to it. This understanding of the term makes sense of some otherwise puzzling features of Sartre's early philosophy, and has implications for understanding certain areas of his thought.
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  17.  36
    Leibniz and Luther on the Non-Cognitive Component of Faith.T. Allan Hillman - 2013 - Sophia 52 (2):219-234.
    Leibniz was a Lutheran. Yet, upon consideration of certain aspects of his philosophical theology, one might suspect that he was a Lutheran more in name than in intellectual practice. Clearly Leibniz was influenced by the Catholic tradition; this is beyond doubt. However, the extent to which Leibniz was influenced by his own Lutheran tradition—indeed, by Martin Luther himself—has yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this essay, the views of Luther and Leibniz on the non-cognitive component of faith are considered (...)
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  18.  35
    Gritty Faith.Jonathan Matheson - 2018 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):499-513.
    In this paper, I will connect some of the philosophical research on non-doxastic accounts of faith to some psychological research on grit. In doing so I hope to advance the debate on both the nature and value of faith by connecting some philosophical insights with some empirical grounding. In particular, I will use Duckworth’s research to show that seeing faith as grit both captures the philosophical motivations for non-doxastic accounts of faith and comes with (...)
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  19. On Non-Illusory Faith.Eliezer Goldman - 2019 - In Dov Schwartz & Avi Sagi (eds.), Faith: Jewish Perspectives. Academic Studies Press. pp. 123-136.
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  20. Can Faith Be a Doxastic Venture?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.
    In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that (...)
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  21.  15
    Conversations About Taste, Contextualism, and Non-Doxastic Attitudes.Marián Zouhar - 2018 - Tandf: Philosophical Papers 47 (3):429-460.
    Volume 47, Issue 3, November 2018, Page 429-460.
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  22.  63
    Explaining Our Own Beliefs: Non-Epistemic Believing and Doxastic Instability. [REVIEW]Ward E. Jones - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):217 - 249.
    It has often been claimed that ourbelieving some proposition is dependent uponour not being committed to a non-epistemicexplanation of why we believe that proposition.Very roughly, I cannot believe that p andalso accept a non-epistemic explanation of mybelieving that p. Those who have assertedsuch a claim have drawn from it a range ofimplications: doxastic involuntarism, theunacceptability of Humean naturalism, doxasticfreedom, restrictions upon the effectiveness ofpractical (Pascalian) arguments, as well asothers. If any of these implications are right,then we would do well to (...)
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  23.  59
    Doxastic Doubt, Fiducial Doubt, and Christian Faith. A Response to Gunter Zimmermann.Rik Peels - 2007 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 49 (2):183-198.
    In this paper I respond to Gunter Zimmermann's article on doubt and faith in God that was published in this journal last year, by offering some criticisms of his views and elaborating on certain issues that Zimmermann leaves nearly or entirely untouched. First, I argue that Zimmermann's analysis of doxastic doubt is incomplete. Next, I defend the thesis that whether some specific doxastic doubt is compatible with someone's faith depends in at least four regards on the person who (...)
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  24. Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):295-313.
    It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a number of theories that (...)
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  25. Toward a Continental Philosophy of Religion: Derrida, Responsibility, and Non-Dogmatic Faith.Matthew C. Halteman - 2002 - In Philip Goodchild (ed.), Rethinking Philosophy of Religion: Approaches from Continental Philosophy. Fordham University Press.
    From its inception in Kant's efforts to articulate a "religion within the limits of reason alone," the Continental tradition has maintained a strict division of labor between theological and philosophical reflection on religion. In what follows, I examine this continental legacy in the context of Jacques Derrida's recent work on the concept of responsibility. First I discuss three guiding themes (the limits of speculative analysis, the idea of nondogmatic religion, and the importance of the other) that characterize the continental tradition's (...)
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  26.  24
    Faith and Hope in Situations of Epistemic Uncertainty.Carl-Johan Palmqvist - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (3):319–335.
    When it comes to religion, lack of conclusive evidence leads many reflective thinkers to embrace agnosticism. However, pure agnosticism does not necessarily have to be the final word; there are other attitudes one might reasonably adopt in a situation of epistemic uncertainty. This article concentrates on J. L. Schellenberg's proposal that non-doxastic propositional faith is available even when belief is unwarranted. Schellenberg's view is rejected since his envisaged notion of faith conflicts with important epistemic aims. Instead, it (...)
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  27.  27
    Knowledge and Non-Traditional Factors. Prospects for Doxastic Accounts.Alexander Dinges - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    Knowledge ascriptions depend on so-called non-traditional factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once we are reminded of possible sources of error. A number of potential explanations of this data have been proposed in the literature. They include revisionary semantic explanations based on epistemic contextualism and revisionary metaphysical explanations based on anti-intellectualism. Classical invariantists reject such revisionary proposals and hence face the challenge to provide an alternative account. The most prominent (...)
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  28.  65
    On the Possibility of Doxastic Venture: A Reply to Buckareff.John Bishop - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):447-451.
    In response to Buckareff, I agree that it is indeed impossible intentionally and directly to acquire a belief one judges not to be supported by one's evidence. But Jamesian doxastic venture does not involve any such direct self-inducing of belief: it is rather a matter of an agent's taking to be true in practical reasoning what she already, through some ‘passional’, non-epistemic, cause, holds true beyond the support of her evidence. To deny that beliefs may sometimes have passional causes is, (...)
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  29.  66
    Propositional Faith as a Mode of Belief and a Gift of God.Richard Creel - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Research 19:243-256.
    Sorne people use “faith” to refer to an action, some to a passion, and sorne to a composite of the two. “Faith” is also sometimes used interchangeably with “belief.” This paper is an effort to identify and overcorne some of the problems caused by these facts. I pursue this end by distinguishing several meanings of “belief,” and by distinguishing actional faith, passional faith, and faithfulness from one another. I argue that much can be gained by restricting (...)
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  30.  48
    Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief.Andrew Dole - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (2):250-253.
    Preface ix Acknowledgements xi 1 Introduction: towards an acceptable fideism 1 The metaquestion: what is the issue about the ‘justifiability’ of religious belief? 4 Faith-beliefs 6 Overview of the argument 8 Glossary of special terms 18 2 The ‘justifiability’ of faith-beliefs: an ultimately moral issue 26 A standard view: the concern is for epistemic justifiability 26 The problem of doxastic control 28 The impossibility of believing at will 29 Indirect control over beliefs 30 ‘Holding true’ and ‘taking to (...)
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  31.  8
    Propositional Faith as a Mode of Belief and a Gift of God.Richard Creel - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Research 19:243-256.
    Sorne people use “faith” to refer to an action, some to a passion, and sorne to a composite of the two. “Faith” is also sometimes used interchangeably with “belief.” This paper is an effort to identify and overcorne some of the problems caused by these facts. I pursue this end by distinguishing several meanings of “belief,” and by distinguishing actional faith, passional faith, and faithfulness from one another. I argue that much can be gained by restricting (...)
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  32.  8
    St. John Henry Newman, Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta, and Bl. John Duns Scotus on Knowledge, Assent, Faith, and Non-Evident Truths.Timothy B. Noone - 2020 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):73-89.
    While working on various medieval philosophers, I have noticed an affinity between their remarks on the reasonableness of accepting propositions that are not matters of proof and strict deduction and St. John Henry Newman’s remarks that we accept unconditionally and rightly everyday ordinary propositions without calibrating them to demonstrable arguments. In particular, Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta and Blessed John Duns Scotus both claim there is a sense in which assent to everyday propositions is tantamount to knowledge, even though there is (...)
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  33.  6
    Motivated Aversion: Non-Thetic Awareness in Bad Faith.Jonathan Webber - 2002 - Sartre Studies International 8:45-57.
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  34.  25
    Faith Among Faiths: Christian Theology and Non-Christian Religions (Review).Catherine Cornille - 2001 - Buddhist-Christian Studies 21 (1):130-132.
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  35.  13
    Faith And Experience IX The Rational, The Irrational, And the Non-Rational.Simon Tugwell O. P. & Michael E. Williams - 1979 - New Blackfriars 60 (713):425-440.
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  36.  1
    The Faith and Vision of Non-Religious Individuals: A Human-Oriented View—A Post-Modern Version of Atheism.Amos Avny - 2019 - Philosophy Study 9 (10).
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  37.  19
    Illusions of Faith: A Critique of Non-Credal Religion Carlos G. Prado Dubuque, Iowa and Toronto: Kendal-Hunt Publishing Company, 1980. Pp Xii, 93.Terence Penelhum - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (2):346-349.
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  38.  4
    Certainty of Oneself: On Fichte’s Conception of Faith as Non-Epistemic Consciousness.Christian Lotz - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):25-36.
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  39.  6
    A Faith Friendly to Non-Believers.W. Hryniewicz - 2000 - Dialogue and Universalism 10.
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  40. Carlos G. Prado, Illusions of Faith: A Critique of Non-Creedal Religion Reviewed By.Wayne Grennan - 1982 - Philosophy in Review 2 (6):289-291.
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  41. Faith Among Faiths: Christian Theology and the Non-Christian Religions.J. Fredericks - 2002 - Buddhist-Christian Studies 22:251-254.
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  42. THOMAS, E. E. -The Non-Rational Character of Faith[REVIEW]J. Laird - 1926 - Mind 35:394.
  43.  33
    Christian Lotz’s “Certainty of Oneself: On Fichte’s Conception of Faith as Non-Epistemic Self Consciousness”.Kristen Brown - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):159-162.
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  44.  93
    Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the (...)
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  45.  17
    Communicated Accountability by Faith-Based Charity Organisations.Sofia Yasmin, Roszaini Haniffa & Mohammad Hudaib - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 122 (1):1-21.
    The issue of communicated accountability is particularly important in Faith-Based Charity Organisations as the donated funds and use of those funds are often meant to fulfil religious obligations for the well-being of society. Integrating Stewart’s (1984) ladder of accountability with the Statement of Recommended Practice guidance for charities, this paper examines communicated accountability practices of Muslim and Christian Charity Organisations in England and Wales. Our content analysis results indicate communicated accountability to be generally limited, focusing on providing basic descriptive (...)
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  46. On the Morality of Having Faith That God Exists.Rob Lovering - 2012 - Sophia 51 (1):17-30.
    Many theists who identify themselves with the Abrahamic religions maintain that it is perfectly acceptable to have faith that God exists. In this paper, I argue that, when believing that God exists will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to forgo attempting to believe that God exists on the basis of sufficient evidence. Lest there be any confusion : I do not argue that it is always wrong to have faith that God exists, only that, under certain (...)
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  47. Involuntary Belief and the Command to Have Faith.Robert J. Hartman - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):181-192.
    Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns (...)
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  48. Feeling Good: Integrating the Psychology and Epistemology of Moral Intuition and Emotion.Hossein Dabbagh - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (5):1-30.
    Is the epistemology of moral intuitions compatible with admitting a role for emotion? I argue in this paper that moral intuitions and emotions can be partners without creating an epistemic threat. I start off by offering some empirical findings to weaken Singer’s (and Greene’s and Haidt’s) debunking argument against moral intuition, which treat emotions as a distorting factor. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake. Moral intuitions and (...)
     
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  49. The Practice of Assertion Under Conditions of Religious Ignorance.Aaron Rizzieri - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):27--39.
    The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non–dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of one’s own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian (...) tradition, but my reflections generalize. (shrink)
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  50. Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to (...)
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