Results for 'non-eliminative reductionism'

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  1. Non-Eliminative Reductionism: Not the Theory of Mind Some Responsibility Theorists Want, but the One They Need.Katrina L. Sifferd - 2018 - In Bebhinn Donnelly Lazarov (ed.), Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action: Concepts, Crimes, and Courts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 71-103.
    This chapter will argue that the criminal law is most compatible with a specific theory regarding the mind/body relationship: non-eliminative reductionism. Criminal responsibility rests upon mental causation: a defendant is found criminally responsible for an act where she possesses certain culpable mental states (mens rea under the law) that are causally related to criminal harm. If we assume the widely accepted position of ontological physicalism, which holds that only one sort of thing exists in the world – physical (...)
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  2. Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience?Dennis Nicholson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either (...)
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  3. Non-Eliminative Reductionism: Reconciling Qualia and Physicalism.Dennis Nicholson - manuscript
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either (...)
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  4.  41
    A Non-Reductionist Physiologism: Nietzsche on Body, Mind and Consciousness.Claudia Rosciglione - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (1):43-60.
    This paper addresses the following questions from the point of view of Nietzsche’s philosophy: What is the mind, and which kind of relationship does it hold to the body? Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to show that Nietzsche’s philosophy suggested a view of the mind that allows to outline an alternative stance to both mentalism and physicalism, as well as to both dualism and reductionism. It is argued that Nietzsche’s rehabilitation of the body as the specific seat (...)
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  5.  16
    Biochemical Reductionism In Biological Context.Niall Shanks - 1997 - Idealistic Studies 27 (1/2):11-22.
    Francis Crick once remarked, "...the ultimate aim of the modern movement in biology is in fact to explain all biology in terms of physics and chemistry" [1966:10]. Arguments to the contrary have been marshalled by many biologists and philosophers, notably Mayr [1986, 1988], and Rosenberg [1985]. Such arguments notwithstanding, reductionist hopes are still alive and well in both biological and philosophical circles. It seems reasonable to suppose that a first step in a reductionist programme would be the reduction or elimination (...)
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  6.  31
    Reductionism in Exile?: Herbert Feigl's Identity Theory and the Mind-Body Problem.Dieter Sturma - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 54 (1):71-87.
    Feigl approaches philosophy of mind in the monist perspective of Logical Empiricism but he does not treat the mind-body problem in an eliminative manner. Although he modified his positions and wavered between strict reductionism and explicit non-reductionism, he never abandoned his conviction that the mind-body problem is not a pseudoproblem. Especially in his 'double-knowledge-view' he concedes private mental states that physical theory cannot account for and develops an identity theory that integrates two epistemic features - the way (...)
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  7.  13
    Reductionism in Exile?: Herbert Feigl's Identity Theory and the Mind-Body Problem.Dieter Sturma - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 54 (1):71-87.
    Feigl approaches philosophy of mind in the monist perspective of Logical Empiricism but he does not treat the mind-body problem in an eliminative manner. Although he modified his positions and wavered between strict reductionism and explicit non-reductionism, he never abandoned his conviction that the mind-body problem is not a pseudoproblem. Especially in his 'double-knowledge-view' he concedes private mental states that physical theory cannot account for and develops an identity theory that integrates two epistemic features - the way (...)
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  8.  47
    `Non-Scientific Realism' About Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments.Barbara Hannan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31.
    Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.
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  9.  38
    On Non-Eliminative Structuralism. Unlabeled Graphs as a Case Study, Part A†.Hannes Leitgeb - 2020 - Philosophia Mathematica 28 (3):317-346.
    This is Part A of an article that defends non-eliminative structuralism about mathematics by means of a concrete case study: a theory of unlabeled graphs. Part A summarizes the general attractions of non-eliminative structuralism. Afterwards, it motivates an understanding of unlabeled graphs as structures sui generis and develops a corresponding axiomatic theory of unlabeled graphs. As the theory demonstrates, graph theory can be developed consistently without eliminating unlabeled graphs in favour of sets; and the usual structuralist criterion of (...)
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  10.  22
    On Non-Eliminative Structuralism. Unlabeled Graphs as a Case Study, Part B.Hannes Leitgeb - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica:nkaa009.
    This is Part B of an article that defends non-eliminative structuralism about mathematics by means of a concrete case study: a theory of unlabeled graphs. Part A motivated an understanding of unlabeled graphs as structures sui generis and developed a corresponding axiomatic theory of unlabeled graphs. Part B turns to the philosophical interpretation and assessment of the theory: it points out how the theory avoids well-known problems concerning identity, objecthood, and reference that have been attributed to non-eliminative structuralism. (...)
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  11.  37
    Non-eliminative Structuralism, Fregean Abstraction, and Non-rigid Structures.John Wigglesworth - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (1):113-127.
    Linnebo and Pettigrew have recently developed a version of non-eliminative mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles. They recognize that this version of structuralism is vulnerable to the well-known problem of non-rigid structures. This paper offers a solution to the problem for this version of structuralism. The solution involves expanding the languages used to describe mathematical structures. We then argue that this solution is philosophically acceptable to those who endorse mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles.
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  12. One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary‐Object Eliminativism.Gabriele Contessa - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):199-221.
    Mereological nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects—i.e. objects with proper material parts. One of the main advantages of mereological nihilism is that it allows its supporters to avoid a number of notorious philosophical puzzles. However, it seems to offer this advantage only at the expense of certain widespread and deeply entrenched beliefs. In particular, it is usually assumed that mereological nihilism entails eliminativism about ordinary objects—i.e. the counterintuitive thesis that there are no such things as tables, (...)
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  13.  97
    A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism.Philip Goff - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54.
    How do we account for resemblance between concrete particular objects? What is it about reality which makes a sentence such as the following true? (1) x and y are both spherical Realists about properties claim that, at a fundamental level, this sentence is true because x and y both exemplify the property of sphericity. Michael Loux favours this account of resemblance. Nevertheless, Loux concedes that austere nominalism, which I understand to be the view that nothing exists over and above particular (...)
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  14.  9
    A Non‐Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism.Philip Goff - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43-54.
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  15. Supervenience and (Non-Modal) Reductionism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Time.J. M. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (4):793-810.
    It has recently been suggested that, for Leibniz, temporal facts globally supervene on causal facts, with the result that worlds differing with respect to their causal facts can be indiscernible with respect to their temporal facts. Such an interpretation is at variance with more traditional readings of Leibniz's causal theory of time, which hold that Leibniz reduces temporal facts to causal facts. In this article, I argue against the global supervenience construal of Leibniz's philosophy of time. On the view of (...)
     
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  16.  72
    One’s an Illusion: Organisms, Reference, and Non-Eliminative Nihilism.Joseph Long - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):459-475.
    Gabriele Contessa has recently introduced and defended a view he calls ‘non-eliminative nihilism’. Non-eliminative nihilism is the conjunction of mereological nihilism and non-eliminativism about ordinary objects. Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composite objects do not exist, where something is a composite object just in case it has proper parts. Eliminativism about ordinary objects denies that ordinary objects exist. Eliminativism thus implies, for example, that there are no galaxies, planets, stars, ships, tables, books, organisms, cells, molecules, or atoms. (...)
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  17.  88
    Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of Non-Eliminative, Ontic Structural Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2012 - The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science : Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality:187-206.
    The number of positions identified with structural realism in philosophical debates about scientific knowledge has grown significantly in the past decade, particularly with respect to the metaphysical or ‘ontic’ approach (OSR). In recent years, several advocates of OSR have proposed a novel understanding of it in order to side-step a serious challenge faced by its original formulation, eliminative OSR. I examine the conceptual basis of the new, noneliminative view, and conclude that it too faces a serious challenge, resulting in (...)
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  18.  46
    Nāgārjuna's “Middle Way”: A non-eliminative understanding of selflessness.Dan Arnold - 2010 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 253 (3):367-395.
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  19. Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism.Eleonore Stump - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):505-531.
    The major Western monotheisms, and Christianity in particular, are often supposed to be committed to a substance dualism of a Cartesian sort. Aquinas, however, has an account of the soul which is non-Cartesian in character. He takes the soul to be something essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless realized in material components. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas’s account is coherent and philosophically interesting; in my view, it suggests not only that Cartesian dualism isn’t essential to Christianity but also (...)
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  20. In Defense of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Timothy Perrine - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3227-3237.
    Almost everyone agrees that many testimonial beliefs constitute knowledge. According to non-reductionists, some testimonial beliefs possess positive epistemic status independent of that conferred by perception, memory, and induction. Recently, Jennifer Lackey has provided a counterexample to a popular version of this view. Here I argue that her counterexample fails.
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  21. Information is Intrinsically Semantic but Alethically Neutral.Bruce Raymond Long - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3447-3467.
    In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic (...)
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  22.  4
    Cut Elimination Theorem for Non-Commutative Hypersequent Calculus.Andrzej Indrzejczak - 2017 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 46 (1/2).
    Hypersequent calculi can formalize various non-classical logics. In [9] we presented a non-commutative variant of HC for the weakest temporal logic of linear frames Kt4.3 and some its extensions for dense and serial flow of time. The system was proved to be cut-free HC formalization of respective temporal logics by means of Schütte/Hintikka-style semantical argument using models built from saturated hypersequents. In this paper we present a variant of this calculus for Kt4.3 with a constructive syntactical proof of cut elimination.
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  23. Non-Reductionism and Special Concern.Jens Johansson - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
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  24. The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Supervenience.Robert M. Francescotti - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-124.
    I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines (...)
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  25. A Compromise Between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism.Eray Özkural - 2007 - In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. pp. 285.
    This paper investigates the seeming incompatibility of reductionism and non-reductionism in the context of complexity sciences. I review algorithmic information theory for this purpose. I offer two physical metaphors to form a better understanding of algorithmic complexity, and I briefly discuss its advantages, shortcomings and applications. Then, I revisit the non-reductionist approaches in philosophy of mind which are often arguments from ignorance to counter physicalism. A new approach called mild non-reductionism is proposed which reconciliates the necessities of (...)
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  26. Non-Reductionist Naturalism: Nussbaum Between Aristotle and Hume.John M. Alexander - 2005 - Res Publica 11 (2):157-183.
    Martha Nussbaum proposes a universal list of human capabilities as the basis for fundamental political principles. She claims that the list, in an Aristotelian spirit, might be justified by an ongoing inquiry into valuable human functionings for the good life. Here I argue that the attractiveness of Nussbaum’s theory crucially depends on the philosophical possibility of a non-reductionist understanding of naturalism and on resolving the tensions between ethical and political aspects of the role of capabilities. Through a comparison of Nussbaum’s (...)
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  27.  42
    Finding a Place for Elimination in Inter-Level Reductionist Activities: Reply to Wimsatt.Pierre Poirier - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):477 - 483.
    According to Wimsatt, a proper treatment of reduction must distinguish between two types of reductionist activities scientists engage in. One of the benefits of better understanding the nature of reduction, he believes, is that it shows that eliminativism, that is, the elimination of concepts and theories from science, is a rather circumscribed and limited affair, especially in the case of inter-level reductionist activities. While I agree with Wimsatt that it is important to distinguish the two types of reductionisms, I show (...)
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  28. A Minimal Expression of Non–Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):706–723.
  29.  15
    Non-Effective Quantifier Elimination.Mihai Prunescu - 2001 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 47 (4):557-562.
    Genera connections between quantifier elimination and decidability for first order theories are studied and exemplified.
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  30.  12
    On Elimination of Quantifiers in Some Non-Classical Mathematical Theories.Guillermo Badia & Andrew Tedder - 2018 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 64 (3):140-154.
    Elimination of quantifiers is shown to fail dramatically for a group of well‐known mathematical theories (classically enjoying the property) against a wide range of relevant logical backgrounds. Furthermore, it is suggested that only by moving to more extensional underlying logics can we get the property back.
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  31. Non-Reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the Mind.Brian J. Garrett & John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):209.
  32. Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
    In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how (...)
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  33. The Non-Reductionist Dimension of Reductionism in Experimental Research From Molecular Models to Those Systemic in Cancer Research.Marta Bertolaso - 2012 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 104 (4):687-705.
     
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  34. Panpsychism.William E. Seager - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, (...)
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  35.  10
    On the Non-Confluence of Cut-Elimination.Matthias Baaz & Stefan Hetzl - 2011 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 76 (1):313 - 340.
    We study cut-elimination in first-order classical logic. We construct a sequence of polynomial-length proofs having a non-elementary number of different cut-free normal forms. These normal forms are different in a strong sense: they not only represent different Herbrand-disjunctions but also differ in their propositional structure. This result illustrates that the constructive content of a proof in classical logic is not uniquely determined but rather depends on the chosen method for extracting it.
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  36. Reductionism and its Heuristics: Making Methodological Reductionism Honest.William C. Wimsatt - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):445-475.
    Methodological reductionists practice ‘wannabe reductionism’. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as “reductionist”. “Successional reduction” and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how (...)
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  37.  52
    Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-Reductionist Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):125-137.
    Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological perspective it has been argued that phenomenology cannot be naturalized. In this context it makes sense to consider that the notion of scientific reduction is linked to a (...)
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  38.  90
    Kripkenstein and Non-Reductionism About Meaning-Facts.Florian Demont - unknown
    In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...)
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  39.  73
    The Normativity Objection to Normative Reduction.Patrick Fleming - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):419-427.
    Non-naturalists claim that the nature of normativity precludes the possibility of normative naturalism. In particular, they think that normative reduction amounts to normative elimination. This is because it always leaves out the normative. In this paper, I examine the force that the normativity objection has against Humean reductionism. I argue that the normativity objection has no argumentative force against reductionism. When it is presented as a bare intuition, it begs the question against reduction. A more interesting reading of (...)
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  40.  27
    Free Agency: A Non-Reductionist Causal Account.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):113-132.
    Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled (...)
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  41. The Multiplicity of Experimental Protocols: A Challenge to Reductionist and Non-Reductionist Models of the Unity of Neuroscience.Jacqueline Sullivan - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):511-539.
    Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience and with them new understandings of the experimental practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models (...)
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  42.  23
    Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account.Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review.
    I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. (...)
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  43.  31
    The Necessity of a Non-Reductionist Science of Politics.James W. Skillen - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (1):95-106.
    The major tendency within the discipline of political science has been to try to achieve a science modeled on the natural sciences and mathematics, following the pattern of other social sciences. This tendency has led to many reductionistic efforts to explain political behavior in terms of one or more functions, such as power, linguistic, psychical, or the economic. The institutional community of government and citizens—the political community or state—is thus overlooked or reduced to one or more functions. In critique of (...)
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  44.  34
    Free Agency: A Non-Reductionist Causal Account.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):113-132.
    Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled (...)
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  45.  15
    Free Agency: A Non-Reductionist Causal Account.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):113-132.
    Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled (...)
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  46.  16
    Can Psychiatry Refurnish the Mind?Dominic Murphy - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):160-174.
    In this paper, I will argue that the NIMH’s new Research Domain of Criteria is a useful test of the philosophical hypothesis of eliminative materialism and demonstrates the superiority of a moderate eliminativism over integrationism, which is a rival philosophical framework for the cognitive sciences. I begin by going over the motivation for RDOC, which rests on the problems with the existing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders framework in psychiatry. Then, I introduce the main tenets of RDoC (...)
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  47.  16
    A Realistic and Non Reductionist Strategyb with Respect to Properties.Sandrine Darsel - 2008 - Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1):35-55.
    Is it possible and necessary to admit of non-physical properties? A minimal ontology accepts only the reality of physical properties. It is based on a restrictive existential criterion, namely the causal criterion. On the contrary, a fostering ontology insists that at least some non-physical properties are real, and therefore denies the validity of the causal criterion. The purpose of this investigation is to defend a moderate version of realism with regard to non-physical properties and to suggest a new existential criterion (...)
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  48. It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 160--89.
     
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  49. Vindicating Chance: One the Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate.Ramiro Caso - 2016 - Critica 48 (142):3-33.
    e presenta el debate entre reduccionismo y no reduccionismo respecto de la probabilidad objetiva y se identifican las cargas dialécticas adquiridas por cada posición: el problema de la motivación y el problema de la explicación. Se argumenta que, mientras que el problema de la motivación no presenta ningún desafío para los no reduccionistas, los reduccionistas no son capaces de responderlo exitosamente. Contrariamente a lo que se ha sugerido, ambos lados comparten el problema de la explicación. Se argumenta que los no (...)
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  50. Autonomy of Biology and Non-Reductionism in the Biophilosophy of Francisco J. Ayala.Diego Cano Espinosa - 2008 - Pensamiento 64 (240):267-287.
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