Results for 'non-evidential justification'

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  1. Problems of Wright's Entitlement Theory.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill.
    I am concerned with Crispin Wright (2004, 2007, 2012 and 2014)’s entitlement theory, according to which (1) we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type, which Wright calls cornerstones, and (2) this non-evidential justification for cornerstones can secure evidential justification for believing many other propositions––those we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has (...)
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  2. Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2016 - In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-60.
    Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is (...)
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  3. Non‐Inferentialism About Justification – The Case of Aesthetic Judgements.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682.
    In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non‐inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower‐level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non‐inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited (...)
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  4. Doxastic Permissiveness and the Promise of Truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to adopt with (...)
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  5.  36
    Peters' Non-Instrumental Justification of Education View Revisited: Contesting the Philosophy of Outcomes-Based Education in South Africa.Yusef Waghid - 2003 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 22 (3/4):245-265.
    In this article I argue that Outcomes-basedEducation is conceptually trapped in aninstrumentally justifiable view of education. Icontend that the notion of Outcomes-basedEducation is incommensurable with anon-instrumental justification of educationview as explained by RS Peters (1998). Theprocess of specifying outcomes in educationaldiscourse lends itself to manipulation andcontrol and thereby makes the idea ofOutcomes-based Education educationallyimpoverished. In this article an argument ismade for education through rational reflectionand imagination which can complement anOutcomes-based Education system for the reasonthat it finds expression in a (...)
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  6.  77
    Truth Promoting Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.
    Sometimes a belief that p promotes having true beliefs, whether or not p is true. This gives reasons to believe that p, but most epistemologists would deny that it gives epistemic reasons, or that these reasons can epistemically justify the belief that p. Call these reasons to believe “truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.” This paper argues that three common views in epistemology, taken together, entail that reasons of this sort can epistemically justify beliefs. These three claims are: epistemic (...)
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  7.  40
    Non-Evidential Believing and Permissivism About Evidence: A Reply to Dan-Johan Eklund.Joshua Cockayne, David Efird, Daniel Molto, Richard Tamburro & Jack Warman - 2015 - Religious Studies (1):1-9.
    In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least to those (...)
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  8. Is There Non-Inferential Justification?James Pryor - unknown
    I want to talk about a certain epistemic quality that I call “justification,” and inquire whether that quality can ever be had “immediately” or “non-inferentially.” Before we get into substantive issues, we need first to agree about what epistemic quality it is we’ll be talking about, and then we need to clarify what it is to have that quality immediately or non-inferentially. When I say I call this epistemic quality “justification,” you’re liable to think, “Oh I know what (...)
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  9.  13
    The Discovery/Justification Context Dichotomy Within Formal and Computational Models of Scientific Theories: A Weakening of the Distinction Based on the Perspective of Non-Monotonic Logics.Jorge A. Morales & Mauricio Molina Delgado - 2016 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 26 (4):315-335.
    The present paper analyses the topic of scientific discovery and the problem of the existence of a logical framework involved in such endeavour. We inquire how several non-monotonic logic frameworks and other formalisms can account for such a task. In the same vein, we analyse some key aspects of the historical and theoretical debate surrounding scientific discovery, in particular, the context of discovery and context of justification context distinction. We present an argument concerning the weakening of the discovery/justification (...)
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  10.  12
    Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):206-224.
    Crispin Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addition to evidential warrant, we have a species of non-evidential warrant, namely, “entitlement”, which forms the basis of a particular view of the architecture of perceptual justification known as “epistemic conservatism”. It is widely known, however, that Wright's conservative view is beset by a number of problems. In this article, I shall argue that the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright's account is not the standard (...)
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  11.  8
    The Puzzle of Perceptual Justification: Conscious Experience, Higher-Order Beliefs, and Reliable Processes.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Switzerland: Springer.
    This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book’s discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our (...)
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  12. Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):295-313.
    It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a (...)
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  13.  13
    The Ethical Justification for the Use of Non-Human Primates in Research: The Weatherall Report Revisited.Gardar Arnason - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (5):328-331.
    The Weatherall report on the use of non-human primates in research was published in 2006. Its main conclusion was that there is a strong scientific case for the use of non-human primates in some cases, but the report stressed the importance of evaluating each case in the light of the availability of alternatives. In addition to arguing for the scientific necessity of using non-human primates in research, the report also provided an ethical justification. As could be expected, the report (...)
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  14. Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity.Jessica Brown - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):339–348.
    Bergmann argues that we should accept epistemically circular reasoning since, he claims, it is a consequence of the plausible assumption that some justification is noninferential (Bergmann, M. "Epistemic Circularity, Malignant and Benign", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming). I show that epistemically circular reasoning does not follow merely from the assumption that some justification is noninferential, but only from that view combined with the assumption of basic justification or knowledge. Thus, we have reason to endorse epistemically circular reasoning (...)
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  15. Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential?Peter J. Graham - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84–95.
    Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such (...)
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  16. In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same (...)
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  17.  8
    The Problem of Identity and a Justification for a Non-Reflexive Quantum Mechanics.D. Krause - 2014 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (2):186-205.
    In this paper we try to justify our way of looking for an alternative approach to quantum mechanics, which is based on a non-classical logic. We consider two specific questions related to quantum theory, namely, entanglement and the indiscernibility of quanta. We characterize individuals, and then explain in what sense entanglement is a concept which can be applied to individuals in a restricted sense only. Then, we turn to indiscernibility and, after realizing that this concept is of a fundamental importance, (...)
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  18.  60
    The Problem of Identity and a Justification for Non-Reflexive Quantum Mechanics.D. Krause - unknown
    In this paper we try to justify our way of looking for an alternative approach to quantum mechanics, which is based on a non-classical logic. We consider two specific questions related to quantum theory, namely, entanglement and the indiscernibility of quanta. We characterize individuals, and then explain in what sense entanglement is a concept which can be applied to individuals in a restricted sense only. Then, we turn to indiscernibility and, after realizing that this concept is of a fundamental importance, (...)
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  19. Evidential Probability, Objective Bayesianism, Non-Monotonicity and System P.Jon Williamson - manuscript
    This paper is a comparison of how first-order Kyburgian Evidential Probability (EP), second-order EP, and objective Bayesian epistemology compare as to the KLM system-P rules for consequence relations and the monotonic / non-monotonic divide.
     
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  20.  5
    Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation Trial: A Philosophical Justification for Non‐Voluntary Enrollment.Daniel Tigard - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (4).
    In a current clinical trial for Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation, Dr. Samuel Tisherman of the University of Maryland aims to induce therapeutic hypothermia in order to ‘buy time’ for operating on victims of severe exsanguination. While recent publicity has framed this controversial procedure as ‘killing a patient to save his life’, the US Army and Acute Care Research appear to support the study on the grounds that such patients already face low chances of survival. Given that enrollment in the trial (...)
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  21.  4
    Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation Trial: A Philosophical Justification for Non‐Voluntary Enrollment.Daniel Tigard - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (5):344-352.
    In a current clinical trial for Emergency Preservation and Resuscitation, Dr. Samuel Tisherman of the University of Maryland aims to induce therapeutic hypothermia in order to ‘buy time’ for operating on victims of severe exsanguination. While recent publicity has framed this controversial procedure as ‘killing a patient to save his life’, the US Army and Acute Care Research appear to support the study on the grounds that such patients already face low chances of survival. Given that enrollment in the trial (...)
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  22.  41
    Is Non-Evidential Believing Possible? John Bishop on Passionally Caused Beliefs.Dan-Johan Eklund - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (3):309-320.
  23.  21
    Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity.J. Brown - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):339-348.
  24. Justification, Normalcy and Evidential Probability.Martin Smith - manuscript
    NOTE: This paper is a reworking of some aspects of an earlier paper – ‘What else justification could be’ and also an early draft of chapter 2 of Between Probability and Certainty. I'm leaving it online as it has a couple of citations and there is some material here which didn't make it into the book (and which I may yet try to explore elsewhere). -/- My concern in this paper is with a certain, pervasive picture of epistemic (...). On this picture, acquiring justification for believing something is essentially a matter of minimising one’s risk of error – so one is justified in believing something just in case it is sufficiently likely, given one’s evidence, to be true. This view is motivated by an admittedly natural thought: If we want to be fallibilists about justification then we shouldn’t demand that something be certain – that we completely eliminate error risk – before we can be justified in believing it. But if justification does not require the complete elimination of error risk, then what could it possibly require if not its minimisation? If justification does not require epistemic certainty then what could it possibly require if not epistemic likelihood? When all is said and done, I’m not sure that I can offer satisfactory answers to these questions – but I will attempt to trace out some possible answers here. The alternative picture that I’ll outline makes use of a notion of normalcy that I take to be irreducible to notions of statistical frequency or predominance. (shrink)
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  25. Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive (...)
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  26.  27
    Is the Non-Rivalrousness of Intellectual Objects a Problem for the Moral Justification of Economic Rights to Intellectual Property?Jukka Varelius - 2015 - Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (4):895-906.
    It is often argued that the fact that intellectual objects—objects like ideas, inventions, concepts, and melodies—can be used by several people simultaneously makes intellectual property rights impossible or particularly difficult to morally justify. In this article, I assess the line of criticism of intellectual ownership in connection with a central category of intellectual property rights, economic rights to intellectual property. I maintain that it is unconvincing.
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  27. Philosophical Controversies in the Evaluation of Medical Treatments : With a Focus on the Evidential Roles of Randomization and Mechanisms in Evidence-Based Medicine.Alexander Mebius - 2015 - Dissertation, KTH Royal Institute of Technology
    This thesis examines philosophical controversies surrounding the evaluation of medical treatments, with a focus on the evidential roles of randomised trials and mechanisms in Evidence-Based Medicine. Current 'best practice' usually involves excluding non-randomised trial evidence from systematic reviews in cases where randomised trials are available for inclusion in the reviews. The first paper challenges this practice and evaluates whether adding of evidence from non-randomised trials might improve the quality and precision of some systematic reviews. The second paper compares the alleged (...)
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  28.  50
    Experientially Defeasible a Priori Justification.Joshua Thurow - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):596–602.
    In his recent book Albert Casullo rejects the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. This claim is a crucial premise in a simple argument for the experiential defeasibility of a priori justification. I defend the premise against Casullo's objection, the main problem with which is that he does not take into account the evidential role of multiple corroborating sources of testimony. I conclude that the crucial premise is true (...)
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  29. ``Foundational Versus Non-Foundational Theories of Empirical Justification&Quot.James Cornman - 1978 - In Pappas & Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 229-252.
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  30. A Justification for Popper's Non-Justificationism.Chi-Ming Lam - 2007 - Diametros 12:1-24.
    Using the somewhat simple thesis that we can learn from our mistakes despite our fallibility as a basis, Karl Popper developed a non-justificationist epistemology in which knowledge grows through criticizing rather than justifying our theories. However, there is much controversy among philosophers over the validity and feasibility of his non-justificationism. In this paper, I first consider the problem of the bounds of reason which, arising from justificationism, disputes Popper’s non-justificationist epistemology. Then, after examining in turn three views of rationality that (...)
     
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  31.  14
    Mystical Experience and Non–Basically Justified Belief: MICHAEL P. LEVINE.Michael P. Levine - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (3):335-345.
    Two theses are central to foundationalism. First, the foundationalist claims that there is a class of propositions, a class of empirical contingent beliefs, that are ‘immediately justified’. Alternatively, one can describe these beliefs as ‘self–evident’, ‘non–inferentially justified’, or ‘self–warranted’, though these are not always regarded as entailing one another. The justification or epistemic warrant for these beliefs is not derived from other justified beliefs through inductive evidential support or deductive methods of inference. These ‘basic beliefs’ constitute the foundations of (...)
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  32.  13
    Max Black. Introduction. A Reprint of XVI 298. Philosophical Analysis, A Collection of Essays, Edited by Max Black, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, Pp. 1–13. - Alice Ambrose. The Problem of Linguistic Inadequacy. A Reprint of XVI 298. Philosophical Analysis, A Collection of Essays, Edited by Max Black, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, Pp. 14–35. - A. J. Ayer. Basic Propositions. A Reprint of XVI 299. Philosophical Analysis, A Collection of Essays, Edited by Max Black, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, Pp. 57–70. - Roderick M. Chisholm. The Theory of Appearing. A Reprint of XVI 299. Philosophical Analysis, A Collection of Essays, Edited by Max Black, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, Pp. 97–112. - Herbert Feigl. De Principiis Non Disputandum...? On the Meaning and the Limits of Justification. A Reprint of XVI 299. Philosophical Analysis, A Collection of Essays, Edited by Max Black, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, Pp. 113–147. -. [REVIEW]Ann M. Singleterry - 1997 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (4):675-676.
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  33.  10
    On Modelling Non-Probabilistic Uncertainty in the Likelihood Ratio Approach to Evidential Reasoning.Jeroen Keppens - 2014 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 22 (3):239-290.
  34. Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Evidential Updating.E. Kyburg, Henry - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 31:271--294.
  35.  3
    Unravelling Reasons for the Non-Establishment of Protected Areas: Justification Regimes and Principles of Worth in a Swiss National Park Project.Annina Helena Michel & Norman Backhaus - 2019 - Environmental Values 28 (2):171-190.
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    The Antemortem Use of Heparin in Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation: A Justification Based on the Paradigm of Altruism.David Steinberg - 2002 - Journal of Clinical Ethics 14 (1-2):18-25.
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  37.  32
    What Determines the Boundary of Civil Society? Hume, Smith and the Justification of European Exploitation of Non-Europeans.Elias L. Khalil - 2013 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 60 (134):26-49.
    Civil society consists of members obligated to respect each other’s rights and, hence, trade with each other as equals. What determines the boundary, rather than the nature, of civil society? For Adam Smith, the boundary consists of humanity itself because it is determined by identification: humans identify with other humans because of common humanness. While Smith’s theory can explain the emotions associated with justice (jubilance) and injustice (resentment), it provides a mushy ground for the boundary question: Why not extend the (...)
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  38.  5
    Hegel’s Justification of the Human Right to Non-Domination.Kenneth Westphal - 2017 - Filozofija I Društvo 28 (3):579-612.
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  39.  11
    Perceptual Justification and Non-Conceptual Perception.Frank Hofmann - unknown
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  40.  17
    La Justification du principe de non-contradiction.Thomas de Praetere - 1998 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (1):51-68.
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    The Elusiveness of a Non-Question-Begging Justification for Morality.William J. Talbott - 2014 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):191-204.
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  42.  5
    Supporting Controlled Non-Heart-Beating Donation - An Ethical Justification.David Price & Jo Samanta - 2013 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 22 (1):22-32.
  43. Direct Justification, Evidential Dependence, and Theistic Belief.Robert Audi - 1986 - In William Wainwright & Robert Audi (eds.), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Cornell University Press. pp. 139--166.
     
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  44. Performative Confirmation of First Principles (The Aristotelian Justification of the Principle of Non-Contradiction).M. Leclerc - 1998 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (1):69-85.
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  45. Non-Cognitivist Analysis of Moral Language: A Study of Meaning and Justification.Rajendra Prasad - 1957 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
     
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  46. Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Scepticism.Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Crispin Wright maintains that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this fact doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these (...)
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  47.  77
    Testimony, Evidence and Interpersonal Reasons.Nick Leonard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2333-2352.
    According to the Interpersonal View of Testimony, testimonial justification is non-evidential in nature. I begin by arguing that the IVT has the following problem: If the IVT is true, then young children and people with autism cannot participate in testimonial exchanges; but young children and people with autism can participate in testimonial exchanges; thus, the IVT should be rejected on the grounds that it has over-cognized what it takes to give and receive testimony. Afterwards, I consider what I (...)
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  48. Political Liberalism and Public Justification: The Deep View.Thomas M. Besch - manuscript
    The paper suggests the deep view of Rawls-type public justification as promising, non-ideal theory variant of an internal conception of political liberalism. To this end, I demonstrate how the deep view integrates a range of ideas, views and commitments at the core of political liberalism’s justification structure, including pro tanto justification, full justification, political values and their priority, justificatory neutrality, the role of reasonable comprehensive views, the nature public reasons, the wide view of public political culture, (...)
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  49. Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism.David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account (...)
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  50.  76
    Moore’s Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory.Brian Rosebury - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):361-376.
    The purely retributive moral justification of punishment has a gap at its centre. It fails to explain why the offender should not be protected from punishment by the intuitively powerful moral idea that afflicting another person (other than to avoid a greater harm) is always wrong. Attempts to close the gap have taken several different forms, and only one is discussed in this paper. This is the attempt to push aside the ‘protecting’ intuition, using some more powerful intuition specially (...)
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