Proponents of human reproductive cloning do not dispute that cloning may lead to violations of clones' right to self-determination, or that these violations could cause psychological harms. But they proceed with their endorsement of human reproductive cloning by dismissing these psychological harms, mainly in two ways. The first tactic is to point out that to commit the genetic fallacy is indeed a mistake; the second is to invoke Parfit's non-identity problem. The argument of this paper (...) is that neither approach succeeds in removing our moral responsibility to consider and to prevent psychological harms to cloned individuals. In fact, the same commitment to personal liberty that generates the right to reproduce by means of cloning also creates the need to limit that right appropriately. Discussion of human reproductive cloning ought to involve a careful and balanced consideration of both the relevant aspects of personal liberty – the parents' right to reproductive freedom and the cloned child's right to self-determination. (shrink)

In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) is believed to be the next big breakthrough in reproductive medicine. The prima facie acceptance of this possible future technology is notable when compared to the general prohibition on human reproductive cloning. After all, if safety is the main reason for not allowing reproductive cloning, one might expect a similar conclusion for the reproductive application of IVG, since both technologies hold considerable and comparable risks. However, safety concerns may be overcome, (...) and are presumably not the sole reason why cloning is being condemned. We therefore assess the non‐safety arguments against reproductive cloning, yet most of these can also be held against IVG. The few arguments that cannot be used against IVG are defective. We conclude from this that it will be hard to defend a ban on reproductive cloning while accepting the reproductive use of IVG. (shrink)

This paper explores how current United States policies for funding nonreproductive cloning are justified and argues against that justification. I show that a common conceptual framework underlies the national prohibition on the use of public funds for cloning research, which I call the simple argument. This argument rests on two premises: that research harming human embryos is unethical and that embryos produced via fertilization are identical to those produced via cloning. In response to the simple argument, I (...) challenge the latter premise. I demonstrate there are important ontological differences between human embryos (produced via fertilization) and clone embryos (produced via cloning). After considering the implications my argument has for the morality of publicly funding cloning for potential therapeutic purposes and potential responses to my position, I conclude that such funding is not only ethically permissible, but also humane national policy. (shrink)

It is widely believed that reproductive human cloning is morally wrong and should be prohibited because it infringes on human uniqueness, individuality, freedom and personal identity. The philosophical and ethical discussion has, however, shown that it is far more difficult than might initially be supposed to sustain arguments against cloning on these and related grounds. More recently, a potentially viable argument, initially put forward by Hans Jonas, has regained new prominence. The argument holds that cloning is (...) wrong because it denies the clone an `open future', that is, the ability to freely shape her own personal identity, life plans, self-chosen goals, etc. After a critical exposition of the argument, I argue as follows: If one understands the Open Future Argument as an argument about the welfare of the cloned child, then it cannot show that cloning harms the child in a person-affecting sense of harming and benefiting. If, on the other hand, one understands the argument in a non-person-affecting sense, then some, but not all, reproductive cloning decisions can be shown to be wrong. The argument does not show, however, that cloning ought to be prohibited by law. While cloning, like other widely accepted reproductive decisions, will sometimes fail to minimize harm to `the child', such acts – to the extent that they do not constitute harm in a person-affecting sense – ought to be tolerated by proponents of the Open Future Argument. Attempts to prohibit reproductive choices on the basis that they are not optimal, will undermine the same set of values that the Open Future Argument seeks to uphold. (shrink)

In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men’s non-reproductive cells and sperm from women’s. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: ‘solo reproduction’. We will consider what might motivate people to reproduce (...) in this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation—and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes. (shrink)

Human cloning raises the most profound questions about human nature, our faith in ourselves, and our ability to make decisions that could significantly alter the character of humanity. In this exciting and accessible book, Gregory Pence offers a candid and sometimes humorous look at the arguments for and against human cloning. Originating a human being by cloning, Pence boldly argues, should not strike fear in our hearts but should be examined as a reasonable reproductive option for (...) couples. Pence considers how popular culture has influenced the way we think about cloning, and he presents a lucid and non-technical examination of the scientific research and relevant moral issues in the cloning debate. This book is a must-read for anyone who is concerned about the impact of technology on human life and for those with interests in medical ethics, sociology, and public policy. (shrink)

Background No two countries have adopted identical regulatory measures on cloning. Understanding the complexity of these regulatory variations is essential. It highlights the challenges associated with the regulation of a controversial and rapidly evolving area of science and sheds light on a regulatory framework that can accommodate this reality. Methods Using the most reliable information available, we have performed a survey of the regulatory position of thirty countries around the world regarding the creation and use of cloned embryos (see (...) Table 1). We have relied on original and translated legislation, as well as published sources and personal communications. We have examined the regulation of both reproductive cloning (RC) and non-reproductive cloning (NRC). Results While most of the countries studied have enacted national legislation, the absence of legislation in seven of these countries should not be equated with the absence of regulation. Senator Morin was not correct in stating that the majority of recent legislation bans both RC and NRC. Recent regulatory moves are united only with regard to the banning of RC. While NRC is not permitted in seventeen of the countries examined, it could be permitted in up to thirteen countries. Conclusions There is little consensus on the various approaches to cloning laws and policies, and the regulatory position in many countries remains uncertain. (shrink)

Philosophical problems with the concept of wronging someone in bringing the person into existence, especially the non-identity problem, have been much discussed in connection with forms of assisted reproduction that carry risks of harms either greater than or not otherwise present in natural reproduction. In this essay, I discuss the meaning of claims of wrongful life, distinguishing them from claims of wrongful disability. Attempts to conceptualize wrongful disability in terms of either the harmed existence of the offspring, or the possibility (...) of less harmful alternatives, are found unsatisfactory. A contractualist approach that provides an account of wronging that is independent of harming is considered. Finally, I present a new approach that necessitates an account of reasons for procreation that could justify harm to the offspring. These reasons are not the kind that require or prohibit actions of certain types, but reflect what the agent sees as intrinsically valuable in acting. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many people now believe that human reproductive cloning – once sufficiently safe and effective – should be permitted on the grounds that it will allow the otherwise infertile to have children that are biologically closely related to them. However, though it is widely believed that the possession of a close genetic link to our children is morally significant and valuable, we argue that such a view is erroneous. Moreover, the claim that the genetic link is valuable is (...) pernicious; it tends to give rise to highly undesirable consequences, and therefore should be combated rather than pandered to. The emphasis on the genetic is unwarranted and unfortunate; rather than giving us moral reason to support reproductive cloning in the case of infertility, the fact that cloning requests are likely to be motivated by the genetic argument gives us reason to oppose its availability. (shrink)

Fritz Allhoff has recently offered an extremely compelling challenge to the morality of human cloning. He argues that a biological phenomenon, that of telomere shortening, undermines the moral permissibility of human cloning. Telomere shortening is caused by cell replication, and appears to be one of the central reasons that cells and organisms age and die. Allhoff considers a thirty-year-old woman who wishes to create a genetic clone. He notes that the DNA from her cell that would be used (...) to create the clone would have shortened telomeres—as it would have gone through many generations of cell replication. As a result, the clone would begin its existence with shortened telomeres; the clone’s telomeres would be the same length as the woman’s telomeres at the time of cloning. The moral problem lies in the fact that because of shortened telomeres, the clone will senesce more rapidly as compared with noncloned organisms, and would have increased susceptibility to degenerative conditions and diseases. Allhoff then goes on to argue that earlier senescence and disease susceptibility constitute a moral ground for rejecting cloning because “the life of a clone would be worse than that of a non-clone”. This line of argument is rooted in Parfit’s The Same Number Quality Claim : “If in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived”. Applying Parfit’s Q principle to cases of cloning, it could be argued that parents ought to produce children that would be maximally well off, and since clones would be worse off than children produced “normally,” it follows that parents should avoid cloning. As Allhoff puts it, “obviously sexual reproduction would not transfer shortened telomeres to offspring so, all else being equal, sexual reproduction is better than cloning ”. For this sort of line to pack any moral punch, Q must be interpreted rather strongly. (shrink)

Some authors have argued that the human use of reproductive cloning and genetic engineering should be prohibited because these biotechnologies would undermine the autonomy of the resulting child. In this paper, two versions of this view are discussed. According to the first version, the autonomy of cloned and genetically engineered people would be undermined because knowledge of the method by which these people have been conceived would make them unable to assume full responsibility for their actions. According to (...) the second version, these biotechnologies would undermine autonomy by violating these people’s right to an open future. There is no evidence to show that people conceived through cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general be unable to assume responsibility for their actions; there is also no evidence for the claim that cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general rob the child of the possibility to choose from a sufficiently large array of life plans. (shrink)

It is from the mere announcement of the possibility of human cloning that moralists have formulated critical arguments against the permissibility of introducing this practice. A critical survey of these arguments, however, shows that they are not well founded, i.e. that frequently they are not such that they can be used as legitimate arguments in the debate about what is publicly permissible in a state, that they rely on mistaken premises, or that they are non coherent with permissions in (...) relation to other forms of human reproduction. Each argument in favor of the banning of human cloning is analyzed by at least one of these means: whether it is coherent with the fundamental principles of contemporary democracies , whether it relies on well-founded and widely accepted results of scientific researches, and whether it is coherent with the usual and widely shared moral attitudes related to other forms of human reproduction. The most important argument that is taken as a good foundation for the prohibition of human cloning is the moral duty not to harm future persons. The result of the rejection of traditional moral arguments against human cloning does not represent an overall justification of human cloning, it only shows that new, or more sophisticated, arguments must be found if human cloning is to be banned. (shrink)

The United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, introduced into Parliament on the 8th of November 2007 contains a number of controversial proposals inter alia expressly permitting the creation of inter-species embryos for research and destruction and increasing the scope for human cloning also for destructive research. It is supposed that there ought not to be a blanket ban on the creation of human clones, hybrids, cybrids and chimeras because these embryos are valuable for research purposes. The prohibition on (...) the gestation of non-permitted embryos and interspecies embryos is used to generate confidence that embryos with compromised origins would not be gestated and reared. The argument outlined here demonstrates how uncertain are any legal prohibitions on gestation. Accordingly, the practical import of the distinction between compromised embryos for research and the same for live birth is equally dubious. The legislation would not, on this analysis, supply effective controls over this reproductive technology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many people now believe that human reproductive cloning – once sufficiently safe and effective – should be permitted on the grounds that it will allow the otherwise infertile to have children that are biologically closely related to them. However, though it is widely believed that the possession of a close genetic link to our children is morally significant and valuable, we argue that such a view is erroneous. Moreover, the claim that the genetic link is valuable is (...) pernicious; it tends to give rise to highly undesirable consequences, and therefore should be combated rather than pandered to. The emphasis on the genetic is unwarranted and unfortunate; rather than giving us moral reason to support reproductive cloning in the case of infertility, the fact that cloning requests are likely to be motivated by the genetic argument gives us reason to oppose its availability. (shrink)

Human reproductive cloning aims to produce duplicates, i.e., people who are phenotypically and genetically identical to those already in existence. This might appear to actually threaten human dignity, because it calls into question our much-vaunted, precious uniqueness. This is precisely what this book sets out to explore: Whether, in what sense, and to what extent human reproductive cloning can threaten human uniqueness and dignity, particularly by either promoting or violating certain human rights or moral rights.

After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear transfer, also known as therapeutic cloning. The first embryo transfer for human reproductive cloning purposes was also attempted in 2006, albeit with negative results. These two events force us to think carefully about the possibility of human cloning which is now much closer to becoming a reality. In this paper we tackle this issue from two sides, first summarising what (...) scientists have achieved so far, then discussing some of the ethical arguments in favour and against human cloning which are debated in the context of policy making and public consultation. Therapeutic cloning as a means to improve and save lives has uncontroversial moral value. As to human reproductive cloning, we consider and assess some common objections and failing to see them as conclusive. We do recognise, though, that there will be problems at the level of policy and regulation that might either impair the implementation of human reproductive cloning or make its accessibility restricted in a way that could become difficult to justify on moral grounds. We suggest using the time still available before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully to create policies and institutions that can offer clear directives on its legitimate applications on the basis of solid arguments, coherent moral principles, and extensive public consultation. (shrink)

Although there is widespread opposition to reproductive cloning, some have argued that its use by infertile couples to have genetically related children would be ethically justifiable. Others have suggested that lesbian or gay couples might wish to use cloning to have genetically related children. Most of the main objections to human reproductive cloning are based on the child’s lack of unique nuclear DNA. In the future, it may be possible safely to create children using (...) class='Hi'>cloning combined with genetic modifications, so that they have unique nuclear DNA. The genetic modifications could be aimed at giving such children genetic characteristics of both members of the couple concerned. Thus, cloning combined with genetic modification could be appealing to infertile, lesbian, or gay couples who seek genetically related children who have genetic characteristics of both members. In such scenarios, the various objections to human reproductive cloning that are based on the lack of genetic uniqueness would no longer be applicable. The author argues that it would be ethically justifiable for such couples to create children in this manner, assuming these techniques could be used safely. (shrink)

The possibility of human reproductive cloning has led some bioethicists to suggest that potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status become untenable, as such arguments would be committed to making the implausible claim that any adult somatic cell is itself a potential person. In this article I defend potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status against such a reductio. Starling from the widely-held claim that the maintenance of numerical identity throughout successive changes places constraints on what a given entity can (...) plausibly be said to have the potential to become, I argue that the cell reprogramming that takes place in reproductive cloning is such that it produces a new individual, and so adult somatic cells cannot be potential persons. (shrink)

Human reproductive cloning provides the possibility of genetically related children for persons for whom present technologies are ineffective. I argue that the desire for genetically related children is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to engage in human reproductive cloning. I show this by arguing that the value underlying the desire for genetically related children implies a tension between the parent and the future child. This tension stems from an instance of a deprivation and violates a (...) general principle of reasons for deprivation. Alternative considerations, such as a right to procreative autonomy, do not appear helpful in making the case for human reproductive cloning merely on the basis of the desire for genetically related children. (shrink)

There is nothing like an overwhelming consensus of opinion to encourage a less than rigourous approach to analyzing complex ethical issues. Unfortunately, this is nowhere more apparent than in the discussion of human reproductive cloning contained in the federal House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ report on human cloning, released last August The report may well fulfil the first half of its project, namely the empirical task of adequately summarizing and categorizing the various (...) submissions made to the Committee. However, it is clearly inadequate as a discussion of the ethical and legal permissibility of human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

[Selected as EDITOR'S CHOICE] Background: Extant surveys of people’s attitudes toward human reproductive cloning focus on moral judgments alone, not emotional reactions or sentiments. This is especially important given that some (esp. Leon Kass) have argued against such cloning on the grounds that it engenders widespread negative emotions, like disgust, that provide a moral guide. Objective: To provide some data on emotional reactions to human cloning, with a focus on repugnance, given its prominence in the literature. (...) Methods: This brief mixed-method study measures the self-reported attitudes and emotions (positive or negative) toward cloning from a sample of participants in the United States. Results: Most participants condemned cloning as immoral and said it should be illegal. The most commonly reported positive sentiment was by far interest/curiosity. Negative emotions were much more varied, but anxiety was the most common. Only about a third of participants selected disgust or repugnance as something they felt and an even smaller portion had this emotion come to mind prior to seeing a list of options. Conclusions: Participants felt primarily interested and anxious about human reproductive cloning. They did not primarily feel disgust or repugnance. This provides initial empirical evidence that such a reaction is not appropriately widespread. (shrink)

In the traditions of narrative ethics and casuistry, stories have a well-established role. Specifically, illness narratives provide insight into patients’ perspectives and histories. However, because they tend to see fiction as an aesthetic endeavour, practitioners in these traditions often do not realize that fictional stories are valuable moral sources of their own. In this paper I employ two arguments to show the mutual relationship between bioethics and fiction, specifically, science fiction. First, both discourses use imagination to set a scene and (...) determine a perspective. Second, bioethics and science fiction share the family resemblance of expressing moral beliefs. I then consider how understanding bioethics and science fiction as interrelated discourses can be the basis of a methodology for inquiry into relational autonomy in the context of biotechnologies and medicine. As an example of this methodology, I analyse Fay Weldon’s novel The Cloning of Joanna May. (shrink)

The Chief Medical Officer of Health of the United Kingdom has recommended that the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act should be amended to allow cloning in humans for research purposes only. He also recommended that: “The transfer of an embryo created by cell nuclear replacement into the uterus of a woman (so called ‘reproductive cloning’) should remain a criminal offence” (recommendation 7, Ref. 1). This recommendation implies that nuclear replacement and cloning are the same. They (...) are not. Nuclear transfer constitutes reproductive cloning only when the individual created is genetically identical to the nuclear donor. In this paper, we describe a possible future use of nuclear transfer for the treatment of infertile individuals. The treatment yields an individual that receives approximately equal genetic contributions from each parent. We use this example to illustrate how semantic confusion might lead to plausibly moral and justifiable treatments being legally banned. In doing so, we hope to encourage a more accurate and informed use of language in science, law and politics, so that legislation is properly informed by science and achieves what it intends. BioEssays 23:359–364, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Can philosophers come up with persuasive reasons to allow or to ban human reproductive cloning? Yes. Can philosophers agree, locally and temporarily, which practices related to cloning should be condoned and which should be rejected? Some of them can. Can philosophers produce universally convincing arguments for or against different kinds of human cloning? No. This paper analyses some of the main arguments presented by philosophers in the cloning debate, and some of the most important (...) objections against them. The clashes between the schools of thought suggest that philosophers cannot be trusted to provide the public authorities, or the general public, a unified, universally applicable view of the morality of human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

Human reproductive cloning has not yet resulted in any live births. There has been widespread condemnation of the practice in both the scientific world and the public sphere, and many countries explicitly outlaw the practice. Concerns about the procedure range from uncertainties about its physical safety to questions about the psychological well-being of clones. Yet, key aspects such as the philosophical implications of harm to future entities and a comparison with established reproductive technologies such as in vitro (...) fertilisation are often overlooked in discussions about HRC. Furthermore, there are people who are willing to use the technology. Several scientists have been outspoken in their intent to pursue HRC. The importance of concerns about the physical safety of children created by HRC and comparisons with concerns about the safety of IVF are discussed. A model to be used to determine when it is acceptable to use HRC and other new assisted reproductive technologies, balancing reproductive freedom and safety concerns, is proposed. Justifications underpinning potential applications of HRC are discussed, and it is determined that these are highly analogous to rationalisations used to justify IVF treatment. It is concluded that people wishing to conceive using HRC should have a prima facie negative right to do so. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Can philosophers come up with persuasive reasons to allow or to ban human reproductive cloning? Yes. Can philosophers agree, locally and temporarily, which practices related to cloning should be condoned and which should be rejected? Some of them can. Can philosophers produce universally convincing arguments for or against different kinds of human cloning? No. This paper analyses some of the main arguments presented by philosophers in the cloning debate, and some of the most important (...) objections against them. The clashes between the schools of thought suggest that philosophers cannot be trusted to provide the public authorities, or the general public, a unified, universally applicable view of the morality of human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

This paper reports on the meeting of the Sounding Board of the EU Reprogenetics Project that was held in Budapest, Hungary, 6–9 November 2005. The Reprogenetics Project runs from 2004 until 2007 and has a brief to study the ethical aspects of human reproductive cloning and germline gene therapy. Discussions during The Budapest Meeting are reported in depth in this paper as well as the initiatives to involve the participating groups and others in ongoing collaborations with the goal (...) of forming an integrated network of European resources in the fields of ethics of science. (shrink)

This paper reports on the meeting of the Sounding Board of the EU Reprogenetics Project that was held in Budapest, Hungary, 6–9 November 2005. The Reprogenetics Project runs from 2004 until 2007 and has a brief to study the ethical aspects of human reproductive cloning and germline gene therapy. Discussions during The Budapest Meeting are reported in depth in this paper as well as the initiatives to involve the participating groups and others in ongoing collaborations with the goal (...) of forming an integrated network of European resources in the fields of ethics of science. (shrink)

This paper examines the current Australian regulatory response to human reproductive cloning. The central consideration is the capacity of the current regulatory regime to effectively deter human cloning efforts. A legislative prohibition on human cloning must be both effective and clear enough to allow researchers to know what practices are acceptable.This paper asks whether the current Australian regime evinces these qualities and suggests that Australia should follow the example set in the UK by the enactment of (...) the Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001. (shrink)

Carson Strong's article “Cloning and Infertility” has initiated a conversation in this journal about the ethical and policy issues surrounding the question of who, if anyone, should be allowed access to human reproductive cloning technology, should somatic cell nuclear transfer ever become technically feasible and safe. Strong's position in that article is that infertile opposite sex couples for whom cloning is the last resort for having a genetically related child are the only people who should be (...) granted access to such technology, primarily because this need to have a genetically related child would give such couples respectable reasons for cloning themselves. Also, every child has a basic right to a “decent minimum opportunity for development.” Thus it would be morally wrong, other things being equal, to clone a person with cystic fibrosis or spina bifida but morally permissible to clone a nearsighted person, because nearsightedness is not sufficiently disabling to violate the child's birthright. With this caveat, he concludes that protecting reproductive freedom requires that physicians be allowed to provide cloning services only to that small subset of infertile opposite sex couples who would need it as a last resort, should human reproductive cloning ever become safe and feasible. (shrink)

ABSTRACT With the controversial ethical issues on the creation of human embryos through cloning for therapeutic research, which holds more promise for medical breakthroughs that the world could ever imagine and the acknowledgement by many scientists that this biotechnology may not lead in the near future to therapies; this country report discusses the approach Singapore takes on human stem cell research, interjected with the authors’ own arguments and suggestions especially on research compensation injuries, an often neglected important issue. International (...) comparative viewpoints taken by the major countries in the world are also included in the appendix. (shrink)

Concern for “reproductive liberty” suggests that decisions about embryos should normally be made by the persons who would be the genetic parents of the child that would be brought into existence if the embryo were brought to term. Therapeutic cloning would involve creating and destroying an embryo, which, if brought to term, would be the offspring of the genetic parents of the person undergoing therapy. I argue that central arguments in debates about parenthood and genetics therefore suggest that (...) therapeutic cloning would be prima facie unethical unless it occurred with the consent of the parents of the person being cloned. Alternatively, if therapeutic cloning is thought to be legitimate, this undermines the case for some uses of reproductive cloning by implying that the genetic relation it establishes between clones and DNA donors does not carry the same moral weight as it does in cases of normal reproduction. (shrink)

Hello readers! Hope everyone is fine especially in this season where we often are prone to attacks of cold or flu. The holiday season is at our threshold, and we wish everyone to be in the best of health and happiness.This issue of the BJB is very interesting with topics stretching from Non Communicable Diseases to the ethical issues related to the habitation of the planet Mars, and proves how forward looking are our readers and authors.Mohammad Rashedul Islam et al (...) discuss the application of the SARA method in a district in Bangladesh. The method is based on the principle of Service Availability and Readiness Assessment of WHO. The study in a district in Bangladesh found that about 62% of all the facilities were ready to provide general services like basic amenities with basic equipment, standard precautions for infection prevention, diagnostic capacity and essential medicines. However in case of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCD), only 40% of the health facilities had chronic respiratory disease and cardiovascular diseases diagnosis/management and only 32% had availability of diabetes diagnosis/management. Therefore, service availability and readiness of the health facilities to provide NCD related health services were not satisfactory. The authors emphasize that SARA which is a tool to monitor facilities to be ready for provision of services including NCD, should be used by all clinic managers.The very scientific and forward looking article titled “SCNT Method and the Application for Patent Eligibility on Cloned Animals” by Norman K. Swazo reviews US federal court decisions regarding applications for patent in the case of live-born animal clones. A decision issued from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit established an earlier decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board that live-born animals cloned by the somatic cell nuclear transfer method (SCNT) like cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats are not patentable, so a scientist using the method is not eligible for a patent claim on the animals. The author feels that this decision has ethical implications related to the moral status of cloned animals. The author argues whether the end product of a SCNT (somatic cell nuclear transfer) application is same as an invention or only a revelation of nature at the cellular level. The author quotes Article 11 of Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights UNDHGR “Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted.” He concludes that the judicial assessments in the USA deciding on the question of patenting of animal clones provide important barriers to human reproductive cloning research, safeguarding moral and legal commitment to human dignity. The article on Ethics in Public Health Research and Clinical Research by Muhammad Waseem Khanet al discusses on the need to continue to focus on ethical values in conducting any research. Tha authors stress the importance, either in public health research or clinical research, of the need to recognize an ethical standard that respects individual’s autonomy and community’s wellbeing. This can be achieved through collective collaboration for the protection of individual’s autonomy, dignity and wellbeing. Research ethics is a fundamental criterion to be complied with throughout a research study. The very interesting article on Planetary Protection for Mars: Time for Reconsideration by Svetoslav Alexandrov looks into the ethical questions beyond mother earth but which could be affected by people from our planet. In this manuscript the author discusses the ethics of the protection of hypothetical organisms on Mars in terms of planned manned space missions and subsequent colonization. The author discusses the possible problems related to a process called terraformation where the planet is converted to make it suitable for Earth life. He argues that terraformation will change the whole condition of the planet. The author quotes Carl Sagan, of The Planetary Society: “If there is life, then I believe we should do nothing to disturb that life. Mars then, belongs to the Martians, even if they are microbes”. I think we all agree with this brilliant recommendation.The article ‘We Still Need to Improve Our Research Writing Ethics’ by Sheikh Arslan Sehgal looks into the value of maintaining professional integrity of research work. Particularly with issues like plagiarism, ethics, authorship and data fabrication. He argues that the scientific community must obey the scientific ethical norms and rules. He feels that ethical problems must be resolved for the advancement of research in countries including Pakistan. The author recommends teaching students the international, institutional and professional standards regarding research and authorship issue. Thus from the beginning researchers will know the key components of ethics in conducting research and the end product will be research work of quality and acceptability.Dear Readers, we look forward to your articles, commentaries, observations on different issues which touch our lives and will help in broadening our knowledge and understanding of Bioethics. (shrink)

Concern for “reproductive liberty” suggests that decisions about embryos should normally be made by the persons who would be the genetic parents of the child that would be brought into existence if the embryo were brought to term. Therapeutic cloning would involve creating and destroying an embryo, which, if brought to term, would be the offspring of the genetic parents of the person undergoing therapy. I argue that central arguments in debates about parenthood and genetics therefore suggest that (...) therapeutic cloning would be prima facie unethical unless it occurred with the consent of the parents of the person being cloned. Alternatively, if therapeutic cloning is thought to be legitimate, this undermines the case for some uses of reproductive cloning by implying that the genetic relation it establishes between clones and DNA donors does not carry the same moral weight as it does in cases of normal reproduction. (shrink)

This article provides an analysis of the relationships between IVF and therapeutic cloning, as they played out in the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority consultation of 2006: Donating Eggs for Research: Safeguarding Donors. We develop an account of current developments in IVF and cloning which foregrounds the role of mediation in structuring the discursive context in which they are constituted. We foreground the imperative of choice and the promise of cures as key features of this context. We (...) also argue that the intercorporeal exchanges of IVF are materially restructured in relation to cloning research, despite their represented similitude in the consultation document. The discourse of choice in relation to reproductive technologies has become entrenched over the last twenty years. In relation to therapeutic cloning, it has been coupled with, and strengthened by, the discourse of cures. In examining relations between IVF and cloning with specific attention to both mediating imaginaries, and intercorporeal exchanges, we develop an analysis that displaces the rhetoric of choice and cures. This makes visible the limited subject positions available, and the limited possibilities for responding critically to the consultation. Identifying women as the gendered subjects of this consultation and placing intercorporeality at the centre of our analysis illuminates the interdependency of women undergoing IVF, cloning science and the governance of embryo research in the UK. (shrink)

In Canada, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act received royal assent on 29 March 2004. The approach proposed by the federal government responds to Canadians’ strong desire for an enforceable legislative framework in the field of reproduction technologies through criminal law. As a result of the widening gap between the rapid pace of technological change and governing legislation, a distinct need was perceived to create a regulatory framework to guide decisions regarding reproductive technologies.In this article the three main topics covered (...) in the new legislation are commented on: cloning, germline therapy, and purchase of gametes and embryos. Some important issues also covered in the new legislation, such as privacy and access to information, data protection, identity of donors, and inspection, will not be addressed. (shrink)

The reproductive justice movement started by black women’s rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women’s reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term ‘reproductive justice’ in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what ‘justice’ entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of (...) reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non‐interference and an approach based on freedom as non‐domination. I then argue that the non‐domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non‐ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non‐domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice. (shrink)

BackgroundGenetics and genomics research (GGR) is increasingly being conducted around the world; yet, researchers and research oversight entities in many countries have struggled with ethical challenges. A range of ethics and regulatory issues need to be addressed through comprehensive policy frameworks that integrate with local environments. While important efforts have been made to enhance understanding and awareness of ethical dimensions of GGR in Africa, including through the H3Africa initiative, there remains a need for in-depth policy review, at a country-level, to (...) inform and stimulate local policy development and revision on the continent.MethodsTo identify and characterize existing ethics-related guidelines and laws applicable to GGR across much of Africa, we conducted a scoping review of English language policy documents identified through databases, repositories, and web searches. Thirty-six documents were included and coded using a framework that contained a range of themes across five analytical categories: (1) respect, (2) beneficence, (3) justice, (4) independent oversight, and (5) bans and prohibitions. Data analysis software (NVivo 12) was used to organize, code, and tabulate information according to document characteristics and topics. Illustrative examples of policy requirements were selected for inclusion.ResultsDocuments that met inclusion criteria spanned 20 years; published between 1996 and 2018, with the majority (58%) published after 2009. About two-thirds were denoted as “guidelines,” and slightly more than half were non-exclusive to GGR. Very few (six) country-level documents identified were specific to GGR. Requirements related to the principle of “respect” appeared most often across all documents, relative to other principles and processes. The most commonly stated ban was on reproductive cloning. Other prohibitions applied to germline editing, undue inducements in research, sample use for commercial purposes, employee mandatory DNA testing, fetal sex selection, stem cell use, eugenics, and research without public health benefits.ConclusionsEnforceable policies that are indispensable to the ethical conduct and review of GGR are either deficient or missing in many African countries. Existing international, GGR-specific ethics guidelines can be used to inform GGR policy development at a country-level, in conjunction with insight from country specific ethics committees and other local stakeholders. (shrink)

The number and the scale of transboundary public health concerns are increasing. Infectious and non-communicable diseases, international trade in tobacco, alcohol, and other dangerous products as well as the control of the safety of health services, pharmaceuticals, and food are merely a few examples of contemporary transnationalization of health concerns. The rapid development and diffusion of scientific and technological developments across national borders are creating new realms of international health concern, such as aspects of biomedical science, including human reproductive (...) cloning, germ-line therapy, and xenotransplantation, as well as environmental health problems, including climate change, biodiversity loss, and depletion of the ozone layer. Growth in international trade and travel, in combination with population growth, has served to increase the frequency and intensity of health concerns bypassing or spilling over sovereign boundaries.Although health has traditionally been seen an area of limited multilateral cooperation, there is growing awareness that contemporary globalization has led to the proliferation of cross border determinants of health status and is undermining the capacity of nation states to protect health through domestic action alone. (shrink)

The number and the scale of transboundary public health concerns are increasing. Infectious and non-communicable diseases, international trade in tobacco, alcohol, and other dangerous products as well as the control of the safety of health services, pharmaceuticals, and food are merely a few examples of contemporary transnationalization of health concerns. The rapid development and diffusion of scientific and technological developments across national borders are creating new realms of international health concern, such as aspects of biomedical science, including human reproductive (...) cloning, germ-line therapy, and xenotransplantation, as well as environmental health problems, including climate change, biodiversity loss, and depletion of the ozone layer. Growth in international trade and travel, in combination with population growth, has served to increase the frequency and intensity of health concerns bypassing or spilling over sovereign boundaries.Although health has traditionally been seen an area of limited multilateral cooperation, there is growing awareness that contemporary globalization has led to the proliferation of cross border determinants of health status and is undermining the capacity of nation states to protect health through domestic action alone. (shrink)