Results for 'nonconceptualism'

61 found
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  1.  43
    Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 27-52.
    One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this article, I argue that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, I discuss in detail how and why my reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. I suggest ultimately that it is (...)
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  2.  48
    Kant as Both Conceptualist and Nonconceptualist.Golob Sacha - 2016 - Kantian Review 21:367-291.
    This article advances a new account of Kant’s views on conceptualism. On the one hand, I argue that Kant was a nonconceptualist. On the other hand, my approach accommodates many motivations underlying the conceptualist reading of his work: for example, it is fully compatible with the success of the Transcendental Deduction. I motivate my view by providing a new analysis of both Kant’s theory of perception and of the role of categorical synthesis: I look in particular at the categories of (...)
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  3. Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337.
    A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate (...)
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  4.  51
    Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction.Thomas Land - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (1):25-51.
    I give an argument against nonconceptualist readings of Kants claim that intuitions and concepts constitute two distinct kinds of representation than is assumed by proponents of nonconceptualist readings. I present such an interpretation and outline the alternative reading of the Deduction that results.
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  5.  2
    Relativizing the Opposition Between Content and State Nonconceptualism.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2).
    Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by constraints of content-attribution that pull in opposite directions, namely, the so-called cognitive significance requirement and what I would like to call here the same representing constraint. The solution to this apparent contradiction is the rejection of the real content view and the adherence to what I call here Content-pragmatism. In CPR, “proposition” is not as real as a mental state, but rather is a term of art that semanticists use, as a (...)
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  6. Kantian Nonconceptualism.Dennis Schulting (ed.) - 2016 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This is a collection of essential essays on the topical debate on Kantian nonconceptualism, written by researchers at the cutting edge of Kant scholarship, most of whom have themselves been centrally involved in the debate, including Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais who, in the mid- to late noughties, spearheaded the debate on nonconceptual content in Kant. All the essays in the volume are original work and have never before been published. In this collection, the contributors engage with each other, (...)
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  7.  1
    Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    This chapter contains the results of my discussion in the book. I first review the success of the respective arguments for nonconceptualism and defenses against conceptualist objections. Five of the six arguments presented in favor of nonconceptualism are successful, and three of them are strong enough to support the claim endorsed by Modest Nonconceptualism that every perceptual experience has at least some nonconceptual content. On the other hand, none of the conceptualist objections to nonconceptualism is fatal. (...)
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  8.  49
    Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. [REVIEW]Joe Cunningham - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):205-208.
    This review provides an overview of Eva Schmidt's impressively thorough and detailed book on the Conceptualist/Nonconceptualist debate in the philosophy of perception, and briefly sketches two objections to Schmidt. First, I suggest that a certain dilemma for the Conceptualist Schmidt raises in the context of her discussion of the fineness of grain argument is surmountable. Second, I question whether Schmidt's response to the epistemological motivation for Conceptualism is sound.
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  9.  31
    Nonconceptualism, Hume’s Problem, and the Deduction.Anil Gomes - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an answer to Hume’s problem (...)
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  10. State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism.Josefa Toribio - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):351-361.
    It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the (...)
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  11. Was Kant a Nonconceptualist?Hannah Ginsborg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77.
    I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular (...)
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  12. Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism.T. M. Crowther - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.
    Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. (...)
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  13.  15
    Modest Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - unknown
    The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. -/- An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, (...)
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  14.  23
    Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision.Josefa Toribio - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):621-642.
    (2014). Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 621-642. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.893386.
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  15.  15
    Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism.Thomas C. Crowther - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.
    Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. (...)
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  16.  76
    Perceptual Nonconceptualism: Disentangling the Debate Between Content and State Nonconceptualism.Laura Duhau - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):358-370.
    In this paper I argue, against recent claims by Bermúdez and Toribio , that within the debate about whether perceptual experiences are nonconceptual, ‘state nonconceptualism’ can be a coherent and plausible position. In particular, I explain that state nonconceptualism and content nonconceptualism, when understood in their most plausible and motivated form, presuppose different notions of content. I argue that state nonconceptualism can present a plausible way of unpacking the claim that perceptual experiences are nonconceptual once the (...)
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  17. Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Process of Perception.Emmanuel Akintona - 2012 - Philosophia 41 (1).
    Gareth Evans was first to express the idea that our perceptual experience is more detailed than what our concepts possess and this brings in the idea of nonconceptualism. The nonconceptualist claims that creatures without conceptual ability can be in a content-bearing state since they do not possess concept, memory or linguistic ability. Concepts are the constituents of those intentional contents that are the complete truth-evaluable contents of judgment and belief. This paper examines the possibility of nonconceptual content in human (...)
     
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  18. Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction.Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London: Palgrave.
    In this paper, I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content in the context of the main argument of the B-Deduction. Kantian conceptualists (Bowman 2011; Griffith 2012; Gomes 2014) have responded to the recent nonconceptualist offensive, with reference to A89ff./B122ff. (§13)—which, confusingly, the nonconceptualists also cite as evidence for their contrary reading—by arguing that the nonconceptualist view conflicts with the central goal of TD, namely, to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I contend that the conceptualist (...)
     
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  19. Coping with Nonconceptualism: On Merleau-Ponty and McDowell.J. C. Berendzen - 2009 - Philosophy Today 53 (2):162-173.
  20. A Psychofunctionalist Argument Against Nonconceptualism.Justin Tiehen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3919-3934.
    In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the “Two Visual Systems Hypothesis” notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner.
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  21.  25
    A Nonconceptualist Reading of the B-Deduction.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):425-442.
    In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...)
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  22.  8
    Review of Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content by Eva Schmidt. [REVIEW]Jacob Berger - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):600-606.
  23. What is Nonconceptualism in Kant's Philosophy?Roberto de Sá Pereira - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):233-254.
    The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...)
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  24.  36
    Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193.
    This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state?content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of ?state?content error error,? i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that (...)
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  25.  23
    Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):201-214.
    In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell. I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver’s conception (...)
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  26.  21
    Nonconceptual Content: A Reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision”.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):643-651.
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  27.  39
    Was Heidegger a Nonconceptualist?Peter Dennis - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):108-117.
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  28.  10
    Coping with Nonconceptualism? On Merleau-Ponty and McDowell.J. C. Berendzen - 2009 - Philosophy Today 53 (2):162-173.
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  29. Cognitive Abilities and the Conceptualist/Nonconceptualist Debate (Long Version).Ted Poston - manuscript
     
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  30.  80
    Introduction.Dennis Schulting - 2016 - In Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  31. Kantian Conceptualism.Thomas Land - 2011 - In Guenther Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology. De Gruyter. pp. 1--197.
    In the recent debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about perceptual content, Kant’s notion of intuition has been invoked on both sides. Conceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their position, arguing that Kantian intuitions have the same kind of content as conceptual thought. On the other hand, nonconceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their own position, contending that Kantian intuitions have a distinctly nonconceptual kind of content. In this paper, I argue first, that both sides are wrong about Kant, (...)
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  32. Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain.Michael Tye - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 504–30.
     
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  33. Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition: On the Note to B160 in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.Christian Onof & Dennis Schulting - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):1-58.
    In his argument for the possibility of knowledge of spatial objects, in the Transcendental Deduction of the B-version of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a crucial distinction between space as “form of intuition” and space as “formal intuition.” The traditional interpretation regards the distinction between the two notions as reflecting a distinction between indeterminate space and determinations of space by the understanding, respectively. By contrast, a recent influential reading has argued that the two notions can be fused into (...)
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  34. Kant and Nonconceptual Content.Robert Hanna - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.
  35. Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...)
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  36. On An Older Dispute: Hegel, Pippin, and the Separability of Concept and Intuition in Kant.Dennis Schulting - 2016 - In Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 227–255.
    In this chapter, I am interested in how, following Hegel’s critique of Kant, recent Hegelians have interpreted Kant’s claims in the Transcendental Deduction (TD), in particular. Hegelians such as Robert Pippin think that in TD Kant effectively compromises or wavers on the strict separability between concepts and intuitions he stipulates at A51/B75. For if the argument of TD, in particular in its B-version, is that the categories are not only the necessary conditions under which I think objects, by virtue of (...)
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  37. Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception.Sacha Golob - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):505-528.
    This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views (...)
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  38.  17
    Expressiveness, Ineffability, and Nonconceptuality.John Spackman - 2012 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (3):303-314.
    In much of the discussion of expressive qualities in the 19th and 20th Centuries, music and artworks were viewed as capable of expressing emotions too fine-grained to be captured by language or concepts, and this ineffability and nonconceptuality was seen as a primary source of the value of music and the arts. In recent debates about expressive qualities, however, there has been a good deal of skepticism about both the ineffability claim and the claim about value. This essay argues for (...)
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  39.  11
    Arguments from Concept Possession.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I discuss arguments for the claim that a subject can both have an experience with a certain content and not be in possession of all the concepts needed to specify this content. If she does not possess all the relevant concepts, then she cannot exercise them. So, she can undergo such an experience without being required to exercise all the concepts needed to specify its content. The argument from memory experience goes back to Martin (Philos Rev 101:745763, (...)
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  40.  11
    Nonconceptual Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    I defend both conceptualists and nonconceptualists against an attack which has been leveled at them by critics such as Byrne (Perception and conceptual content In: Steup M, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, Malden, pp 231-250, 2005), Speaks (Philos Rev 114:359–398, 2005), and Crowther (Erkenntnis 65:5–276, 2006). They distinguish a ‘state’ reading and a ‘content’ reading of ‘(non)conceptual’ and argue that many arguments on either side support only the respective state views, not the respective content views. To prepare (...)
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  41.  26
    Perception and Conception: Shaping Human Minds. [REVIEW]Otávio Bueno - 2013 - Biosemiotics 6 (3):323-336.
    Perceptual experiences provide an important source of information about the world. It is clear that having the capacity of undergoing such experiences yields an evolutionary advantage. But why should humans have developed not only the ability of simply seeing, but also of seeing that something is thus and so? In this paper, I explore the significance of distinguishing perception from conception for the development of the kind of minds that creatures such as humans typically have. As will become clear, it (...)
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  42.  9
    Arguments from Phenomenology.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    I examine two arguments for nonconceptualism from the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. The idea is that only the assumption that experience content is nonconceptual does justice to the phenomenology of experience. In particular, if experience content is conceptual, we cannot account for its finely grained representational content. The problem is that visual color experience makes differences between shades of a color that are much more fine-grained than our conceptual repertoire allows. Further, conceptualism is incompatible with the situation-dependence of (...)
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  43.  9
    The Epistemological Objection.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I rebut three incarnations of the epistemological objection put forth by McDowell (Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994a) and Brewer (Perception and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999). According to them, only the assumption that perceptual experiences have conceptual content can account for the fact that perception plays a crucial role in justifying belief about the external world. I begin by providing some context to the objections, viz. by presenting the myth of the given that (...)
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  44.  7
    The Objection from Objectivity.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I turn to the claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective. I start out by presenting the objection from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994a). I then discuss the following replies: First, even if objective perceptual experience requires the perceiver to have an objective world-view, the (...)
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  45.  6
    The Argument from Contradictory Contents.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    The argument from contradictory contents presented here is based directly on observations about the content of experience. It claims that experience content, if conceptual, allows for contradictions within one and the same content. There are at least two examples of this, the waterfall illusion and the visual experiences of some grapheme-color synesthetes. However, due to a Fregean principle of content individuation, no conceptual contents are contradictory. So experience content is nonconceptual. I motivate a particular version of the argument and defend (...)
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  46.  5
    Introduction.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    This chapter provides an overview of the structure and purpose of the book. It introduces the philosophical context and motivations of the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism. The book is a defense of the nonconceptualist claim that experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. In particular, it defends what I call ‘Modest Nonconceptualism,’ which is briefly introduced in this chapter. On this view, all perceptual experiences are at least partly nonconceptual, i.e., involve the exercise of at least some (...)
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  47. Perception and Conceptual Content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that experiences have (...)
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  48.  82
    Getting Acquainted with Kant.Colin McLear - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 171-97.
    My question here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. However there is a sense in which this debate concerning the content of intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has to do with the terms in which the debate is set, and part to do with confusion over the connection between Kant’s own views and contemporary concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, I think much of the (...)
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  49. What is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual Content?José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):55–72.
    It is now 25 years since Gareth Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in The Varieties of Reference. This is a fitting time to take stock of what has become a complex and extended debate both within philosophy and at the interface between philosophy and psychology. Unfortunately, the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly ramified. Much of the contemporary discussion does not do full justice to the powerful theoretical tool originally proposed by Evans (...)
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  50.  87
    Kant on the Relation of Intuition to Cognition.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Recent debates in the interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy have focused on the nature of Kantian intuition and, in particular, on the question of whether intuitions depend for their existence on the existence of their objects. In this paper we show how opposing answers to this question determine different accounts of the nature of Kantian cognition and we suggest that progress can be made on determining the nature of intuition by considering the implications different views have for the nature of (...)
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