Normative Ethical theory underwent a period of refinement in some areas and proliferation in others during the 20th century. Theories prominent in the 19th century, such as Utilitarianism, underwent refinement in light of criticisms; other approaches, such as normative intuitionism and virtue ethics, were developed in new directions, ones that reflected the sophistication of analytical techniques developed by philosophers in the 20th century, particularly in ordinary language philosophy. The middle of the 20th century was marked by an (...) interest in conceptual analysis and what could be revealed about our concepts in the analysis of ‘ordinary’ language appeals to those concepts. For example, Gilbert Ryle argued that the hope of clearing up our concepts via formalizing them was futile, and instead the task of philosophy was to clear up confusions present in the ordinary use of concepts, concepts employed by ordinary people as well as specialists in a given area. Normative ethicists in the very early part of the 20th century had not yet adopted a ‘scientizing’ attitude to philosophy. They believed, for example, that one could rely on intuition in formulating ethical theories.1 Theorists in the early part of the century were also optimistic about the prospects of systematizing normative ethics in a way that would be faithful to our common sense normative judgments. This began, largely, with a critical look at Utilitarianism. (shrink)

I became interested in normative ethics in my last term as a philosophy undergraduate at the University of Toronto. Influenced by a traditional conception of the discipline, I’d till then studied mostly history of philosophy, with a special interest in, of all things, Hegel. But seeing the value of a balanced philosophy program, I enrolled in an ethics seminar in the winter of 1975. I’d studied the ethics of Plato, Leibniz, Hegel, and others in my history (...) courses, but this was my first exposure to contemporary thought on the subject. The seminar had only one other student, and since he was fairly quiet I had something close to a one-on-one tutorial with the instructor, Wayne Sumner – another contributor to this volume. I was immensely taken both by Wayne’s teaching and by the seminar’s topic, which was utilitarianism. Our study of it included both theoretical questions such as act- vs. ruleutilitarianism and applied ones such as our obligations to future generations. I found all these questions intellectually engaging and also humanly important, given their connection to live ethical issues – in short, I was hooked. I was especially impressed by two non-utilitarian texts we read. One was the last chapter of G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, meant to illustrate a non- 1 utilitarian or ideal consequentialist theory. I was attracted by Moore’s general account of the good, which values states such as love and aesthetic appreciation alongside pleasure, and saw in his principle of organic unities a far clearer statement of ideas I had encountered in more pretentious form in Hegel. The second was Chapter 2 of W. D. Ross’s The Right and the Good, which defends a pluralist deontology against consequentialism. I thought Ross’s criticisms of consequentialism were right on the mark, and again clearly and precisely expressed. I had no idea these texts were largely passé in current discussions of the subject. At this time I was applying to graduate programs in philosophy, and given my new interest decided to specialize in ethics.. (shrink)

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This twelfth volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: vices and self-valuation, harmless wrongdoing, (...) solidarity in Kantian ethics, trust, forgiveness, and moral worth. (shrink)

The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative (...) ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights. (shrink)

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

OSNE is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

OSNE is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

OSNE is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

Professor Imwinkelried has boldly attempted to justify the admissibility of normative ethical expertise in the face of a legal evidentiary rule requiring a scientific basis for expert testimony. Because ethical testimony is inherently unscientific, Professor Imwinkelried prudently focuses his analysis on circumstances where evidentiary requirements are less strict; those involving the legislative rather than adjudicative function of courts and those in which substantive law overrides normally rigorous evidentiary requirements. While both proposals may have merit and are thoughtful and creative, (...) Professor Imwinkelried ultimately fails to provide sufficient doctrinal support or persuasive rationale for his arguments.Professor Imwinkelrieds argument for the admissibility of “expert” normative ethical testimony has two parts. The major proposition is that, when courts are engaged in legislative functions, they should be permitted to consider all sources of information. The assumption that apparently underlies this proposition is that nothing limits courts’ exercise of legislative powers. (shrink)

OSNE is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

The history of the conceptualisation of social responsibility reveals three main themes: The profitability of SR, SR as stakeholder theory, and ethics as a force in SR. In this paper, I will argue that all three themes are philosophically unsound and rest on suspicious assumptions. First, there is little evidence that SR increases profits; second, stakeholder theory fails to give managers practical ethical decision-making skills; and, finally, ethics should not be viewed as a subset of social responsibility, but (...) as central to its conceptualisation. In fact, much of what is defined as corporate responsibility is innocuous; leaving managers ill equipped to solve specific moral dilemmas. Moreover, normative ethics is often lost in the conceptualisation of social responsibility. This paper calls for the rediscovery of ethics into business decision-making. (shrink)

OSNE is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

Bernard Rosen argues Mill's critics and supporters address one level or another, often without noting which one it is. The positions of important ethical theorists who have been influenced by, or who criticize Mill are presented."--BOOK JACKET.

The familiar argument from disagreement has been an important focal point of discussion in contemporary meta-ethics. Over the past decade, there has been an explosion of interdisciplinary work between philosophers and psychologists about moral psychology. Working within this trend, John Doris and Alexandra Plakias have made a tentative version of the argument from disagreement on empirical grounds. Doris and Plakias present empirical evidence in support of premise 4, that ethics is beset by fundamental disagreement. They examine Richard Brandt (...) on Hopi ethics and, especially, Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen on cultures of honor to make a prima facie version of this case. This raises important questions. Are Doris and Plakias correct that there is even a prima facie empirical basis for moral anti-realism? What sort of empirical contribution can be made to such debates in meta-ethics? I argue that we should have reservations about the prospects of empirical contributions to the argument from disagreement. Specifically, before empirical results from psychology can be used to offer conclusions about meta-ethical issues, more careful attention must be paid to normative ethics, and especially to normative theory. There are two parts to this position. First, there is good reason to think that the evidence we currently have about moral disagreement is irrelevant to the meta-ethical debate. Second, the relevant evidence is useless for meta-ethical purposes on its own. Instead, it must be combined with normative theorizing about value pluralism. (shrink)

The recent production of major treatises devoted to elaborating normative ethical theories and the eruption of lively debates concerning the merits of opposed normative systems have been greeted with applause. This reaction is an historical about-face, since for forty or fifty years “ethical” treatises had been attacking the pretensions of traditional moral philosophy, calling for its demise or at the least severely limiting its claims. These skeptical attacks had succeeded in seriously undermining the academic status of moral philosophy (...) and consequently moral philosophy was transformed into “metaethics,” a highly abstract and technical discipline considered much less necessary to the general education of students than what it replaced and with a diminished role in the curriculum. The recent resurgence of interest in normative ethics has generally been lauded as a sign that philosophy has rededicated itself to its proper and time-honored tasks. There is a widespread feeling that the overblown claims of twentieth century skepticism have been whittled down to innocuous proportions and thus that nothing stands in the way of proceeding to construct ethical theories. The study of normative ethical theory now enjoys such respectability and popularity that it is difficult to raise once more the uncomfortable ideas that the ideal of normative ethical theory is a false one, that vanquishing the spectre of noncognitivism is not sufficient for legitimizing it, and that the popular new justifications for the enterprise fail in mischievous ways. (shrink)

The article tries to inquire a third way in normative ethics between consequentialism or utilitarianism and deontology or Kantianism. To find such a third way in normative ethics, one has to analyze the elements of these classical theories and to look if they are justified. In this article it is argued that an adequate normative ethics has to contain the following five elements: (1) normative individualism, i. e., the view that in the last (...) instance moral norms and values can only be justified by reference to the individuals concerned, as its basis; (2) consideration of the individuals' concerns and interests—aims, desires, needs, strivings—insofar as they have a justificatory function; (3) a pluralism of references of these concerns and hence of moral norms and values to all possible elements of actions; (4) the necessity of a principle of aggregation and weighing with regard to these concerns; (5) finally, as a central principle of aggregation and weighing, the principle of relative reference to self and others, operating as a generalizing meta-principle that guides the application of concrete principles and decisions. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Human‐centered environmental ethics Beyond human‐centered environmental ethics Consequentialist environmental ethics Deontological environmental ethics Virtue‐based environmental ethics.

Instructional technology, and the cognitivist and systems paradigms that underpin it, grew out of the military-industrial complex during the Cold War. Much as the Pentagon and this military complex defined the architecture of the Internet, they also essentially created, ex nihilo, the fields of instructional technology and instructional design. The results of the ongoing dominance or influence of the Pentagon in these specific disciplines have been traced in research that appeared during the final phases of the Cold War. But this (...) research has not been updated to reflect circumstances now most definitive of the post–Cold War world: the rapid development of Internet infrastructures and applications, and the aggressive expansion of US military spending and activity. Tracing the imprint left by the US military on instructional technology and design, this paper considers how this influence may now extend, like the Internet itself, into schools and the university. It will conclude by stressing that the end of the Cold War, along with more recent developments concerning the US military, presents a juncture offering both opportunity and challenge to the evolving field of educational technology or “e-learning.”. (shrink)

본 연구의 목적은 “(신경과학의 발견 사실에 대한) 신경윤리학의 도덕적 설명은 도덕적 정당화를 대체할 수 없다.”라는 주장을 검증함으로써 신경과학 시대의 규범윤리학의 고유한 가치와 역할을 논구하는 것이다. 본 연구는 이를 위해 신경과학과 신경윤리학이 규범윤리학에 제기하는 ‘뇌 결정론과 환원론, 그리고 자유의지의 문제’와 ‘도덕 판단에 대한 신경윤리학의 설명 문제’라는 도전적 과제를 규범윤리학의 관점에서 비판적으로 논구한다. (1) 인간의 판단과 행위의 물리적 원인과 도덕적 이유는 구분되는 것이기 때문에, 뇌의 신경 활동에 대한 신경과학의 기술적 설명이 인간의 판단과 행위의 도덕적 이유 내지 정당화 근거를 대체할 수는 없다. (2) (...) 신경윤리학은 신경과학의 연구 결과로부터 도덕적 당위 내지 도덕규범을 도출할 수는 없으며, 인간의 도덕 판단에 대한 신경윤리학의 설명이 도덕의 규범적 근거에 기반을 둔 도덕적 정당화를 대체할 수도 없다. 그러므로 우리는 신경과학 시대에도 도덕의 규범적 근거를 정초하고 도덕적으로 정당화될 수 있는 행위를 유발하는, 즉 도덕적 정당화 기능과 도덕적 행위 동기화 기능을 수행하는 규범윤리학의 고유한 가치와 역할을 인정해야 한다. 그리고 신경과학(신경윤리학)은 규범윤리학의 고유한 역할 수행에 간접적으로 기여할 바가 있기 때문에, 우리는 규범윤리학과 신경과학(신경윤리학)의 상호작용을 조심스럽게 추구하는 것도 요청된다. (shrink)

The article tries to inquire a third way in normative ethics between consequentialism or utilitarianism and deontology or Kantianism. To find such a third way in normative ethics, one has to analyze the elements of these classical theories and to look if they are justified. In this article it is argued that an adequate normative ethics has to contain the following five elements: (1) normative individualism, i. e., the view that in the last (...) instance moral norms and values can only be justified by reference to the individuals concerned, as its basis; (2) consideration of the individuals’ concerns and interests—aims, desires, needs, strivings—insofar as they have a justificatory function; (3) a pluralism of references of these concerns and hence of moral norms and values to all possible elements of actions; (4) the necessity of a principle of aggregation and weighing with regard to these concerns; (5) finally, as a central principle of aggregation and weighing, the principle of relative reference to self and others, operating as a generalizing meta-principle that guides the application of concrete principles and decisions. (shrink)

본 고는 덕윤리의 상대주의 논쟁을 분석함으로써, 한 규범윤리학적 입장이 상대주의 비 판에서 완전무결하게 대응하는 것이 불가능에 가까움을 논증하고 대안을 제시하고자 시도 한다. 이에 서론에서는 왜 의무주의와 결과주의가 아닌 덕윤리의 상대주의 논쟁을 분석하 는지 밝힌 뒤, 2장에서는 상대주의·상대주의 비판·상대주의 논쟁을 명료하게 정의한다. 또한 3장과 4장에서는 각각 매킨타이어와 누스바움을 중심으로 한 상대주의 논쟁의 분석 을 통해 상대주의 비판의 논점을 명료화한다. 두 학자는 분석윤리적 상대주의를 거부하는 방식을 통해 기술적 상대주의를 수용하고 규범윤리적 상대주의를 극복하려 시도하나 실패 한다. 따라서 본 고는 5장과 6장에서 규범윤리학적 견해가 (...) 상대주의 비판에 대응하는 바 람직한 해명 방식으로 왕의 다원론적 상대주의적 대응을 탐구한다. 덕윤리학자인 왕은 상 대주의 비판의 과도함과 무용함을 고려할 때 상대주의자로 낙인찍히는 것은 두려워할 만 한 일이 아니라며 자신을 상대주의자고 선언한다. 만약 그의 견해를 수용한다면 특정 규범 윤리학적 입장을 상대주의라며 비판하는 것은 철 지난 비판이며, 이를 전면 부인하며 애쓸 필요도 없다. 대신 도덕적 애매성을 인정한 뒤 규범윤리학을 주장하는 자신의 규범윤리적 주장에 담긴 상대주의적인 지점을 솔직히 밝히고 그 이유를 정당화하는 것이 바람직한 대 응이다. 이 대응을 채택한다면 도리어 상대주의 비판을 가하는 상대에게 반문할 수 있다. 엄격한 상대주의적 요소를 규정한 비판자 본인은 그러한 요소가 하나도 담기지 않은 규범 윤리적 견해를 현대사회에 설득력 있게 제시할 수 있는가? (shrink)

A critical examination of the chapters on normative ethics in Peter Railton’s Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. It is argued that Railton’s theory of sophisticated consequentialism effectively handles issues of pollution and moral dilemma that Railton discusses, and that Railton’s more recent proposal of “valoric consequentialism,” if coupled with a non-act-utilitarian standard of rightness of the kind Railton discusses, is vulnerable to objections to which sophisticated consequentialism is immune.

This paper discusses a challenge to normative ethics motivated by experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers object to the perceived “armchair” or a priori nature of philosophy, claiming it should rather be empirical or naturalistic. The paper investigates the application of this claim to normative ethics. Dubbing the application of the experimental philosophers’ contention to normative ethics “the Armchair Claim,” I distinguish descriptive and normative versions of this challenge, and consider their merits as comments on (...) the method of normative ethics (descriptive versions), and as comments on how normative ethics should be done (normative versions). Characterizing normative ethics as essentially involving the use of the method of reflective equilibrium, I show how the versions of the Armchair Claim that I distinguish either misconstrue normative ethics, or are committed to metaethical views that are controversial. To bring home the latter point, I contrast two meta-ethical positions, and show how, on one such view, naturalism, the descriptive version could be correct, whereas on another, intuitionism, it would be false. The normative version, in turn, is consistent with naturalism, but begs the question against the intuitionist since she argues that normative ethics cannot be empirical. The upshot is that a conclusive assessment of the Armchair Claim will have to await the resolution of disputed issues in meta-ethics. However, normative ethicists can get on with their work since reflective equilibrium is unaffected by such debates. (shrink)

According to Arpaly and to Markovits, actions have moral worth iff they are done for the reasons that make them right. Can this view have implications for normative ethics? I argue that it has such implications, as you can start from truths about the moral worth of actions to truths about the reasons that make them right. What makes actions right is the question of normative ethics. I argue from the moral worth view to a pluralistic (...) view of ethics - not Kantianism or utilitarianism but an account according to which there are at least two important moral factors, one of which is wellbeing. Part of this argument involves objecting to Kant's view of the moral worth of actions performed out of altruism and not universalizability. I also specify various implications for the relationship between the true normative theory and common sense morality. (shrink)

One of the most controversial issues to emerge in recent studies of Fichte concerns the status of his normative ethics, i.e., his theory of what makes actions morally good or bad. Scholars are divided over Fichte’s view regarding the ‘final end’ of moral striving, since it appears this end can be either a specific goal permitting maximizing calculations (the consequentialist reading defended by Kosch 2015), or an indeterminate goal permitting only duty-based decisions (the deontological reading defended by Wood (...) 2016). While I think each interpretive position contains an element of truth, my aim in this paper is to defend a third alternative, according to which Fichte’s normative ethics presents us with a unique form of social perfectionism. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher presents an ambitious account of pragmatic naturalism that incorporates an explanatory story of the emergence and development of ethics, a metaethical perspective on progress, and a normative stance for moral theorizing. This article contends that Kitcher's normative stance is incompatible with the explanatory and metaethical components of his project. Instead, pragmatic naturalists should endorse a normative ethics that is experimental, grounded in practice, and acutely aware of cognitive and informational limitations. In particular, the (...) ethical project would benefit from endorsing empirical work on participatory democracy for the identification of mechanisms to guide us on deep moral conflicts. (shrink)

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

This is a paper about the methodology of normative ethics. I claim that much work in normative ethics can be interpreted as modelling, the form of inquiry familiar from science, involving idealised representations. I begin with the anti-theory debate in ethics, and note that the debate utilises the vocabulary of scientific theories without recognising the role models play in science. I characterise modelling, and show that work with these characteristics is common in ethics. This (...) establishes the plausibility of my interpretation. Taking methodological inspiration from modelling in science gives us new tools for managing idealisations, and a new perspective on pluralism. I demonstrate why this interpretation is a fruitful way of interpreting ethics, by looking at three case studies. First, I return to the anti-theory debate and argue that modelling opens up a new middle ground. Second, I argue that a modelling lens offers a new way of understanding impossibility theorems in population ethics, and their bearing on ethics as a whole. Finally, I show how viewing our work as modelling can be deployed in debates within ethics, using the debate over prioritarianism as an example. I close with further methodological suggestions for those who choose to see themselves as modellers. I discuss the role of counterexamples, our responses to moral disagreement, and the training of new ethicists. (shrink)

Several influential recent accounts of moral progress avoid engaging with normative ethical reflection to understand this idea. This allegedly ‘value-neutral’ methodology is based on the belief that we should not ground a theory of progress on abstract, ideal ethical views, and that defining a clear criterion for moral progress would be too epistemically arrogant and disrespectful of ethical pluralism. For these reasons, these accounts mostly provide ‘taxonomic’ views of moral progress, rather than justifying why certain changes should be deemed (...) morally progressive. I argue that it is problematic to address the topic in this way, and that engaging with normative ethics in moral progress theory does not necessarily entail adopting an “ideal” approach. I then defend an agency-based view of moral progress, showing that the value of gains in agency systematizes and justifies paradigmatically progressive historical shifts and extant normative criteria of moral progress. I conclude by replying to concerns of epistemic arrogance and arbitrariness that can be directed against it. (shrink)

The present article deals with Kierkegaard’s contributions to ethics by focusing on his relation to virtue ethics and deontology, his views of moral agency and the source of moral obligations. It is argued that Kierkegaard presents a critique of Kantian autonomy that favors moral realism and theological voluntarism and that he gives an account of human agency and selfhood in which morality is inescapable.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory.