Results for 'norms of belief'

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  1. Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, (...)
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  2.  46
    Evidence of Factive Norms of Belief and Decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.
    According to factive accounts of the norm of belief and decision-making, you should not believe or base decisions on a falsehood. Even when the evidence misleadingly suggests that a false proposition is true, you should not believe it or base decisions on it. Critics claim that factive accounts are counterintuitive and badly mischaracterize our ordinary practice of evaluating beliefs and decisions. This paper reports four experiments that rigorously test the critic’s accusations and the viability of factive accounts. The results (...)
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  3. Transparency, Doxastic Norms, and the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32.
    Many philosophers have sought to account for doxastic and epistemic norms by supposing that belief ‘aims at truth.’ A central challenge for this approach is to articulate a version of the truth-aim that is at once weak enough to be compatible with the many truth-independent influences on belief formation, and strong enough to explain the relevant norms in the desired way. One phenomenon in particular has seemed to require a relatively strong construal of the truth-aim thesis, (...)
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  4.  47
    Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation.Jon Robson - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):750-763.
    Unusability pessimism has recently emerged as an appealing new option for pessimists about aesthetic testimony—those who deny the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. Unusability pessimists argue that we should reject the traditional pessimistic stance that knowledge of aesthetic matters is unavailable via testimony in favour of the view that while such knowledge is available to us, it is unusable. This unusability stems from the fact that accepting such testimony would violate an important non-epistemic norm of (...)
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  5. There Are No Norms of Belief.David Papineau - 2013 - In T. Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief.
    This paper argues that there is no distinctive species of normativity attaching to the adoption of beliefs.
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  6.  42
    Norms of Belief and Norms of Assertion in Aesthetics.Jon Robson - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Why is it that we cannot legitimately make certain aesthetic assertions – for instance that ‘Guernica is harrowing’ or that ‘The Rite of Spring is strangely beautiful’ – on the basis of testimony alone? In this paper I consider a species of argument intended to demonstrate that the best explanation for the impermissibility of such assertions is that a particular view of the norms of aesthetic belief – pessimism concerning aesthetic testimony – is correct. I begin by outlining (...)
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  7.  22
    Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.
    When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. (...)
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    Replies: On Norms of Belief and Knowledge.Pascal Engel - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1555-1564.
    These replies to commentators on my work focus on the nature of epistemic norms, on the nature of truth and on the nature and value of knowledge. A normative account of belief and knowledge is committed to substantial and objective epistemic norms. But not everyone agrees on their form. I try here to reply to some doubts raised by my critics.
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  9. Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
    For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is (...)
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  10. Paradox and the Norms of Belief.Antony Eagle - unknown
    Some philosophers have been attracted to the idea that the norm of belief is truth that is, a belief that p is correct i p is true. But this idea is problematic in view of some very common• place re ections on what one should believe about paradoxical sentences like the Truthteller. Interestingly, these re ections don't seem to trouble the rival knowledge norm for belief, and this may provide indirect support for that alternative norm.
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  11.  20
    No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.
    Recently it has been increasingly popular to argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. I present an argument against this view. The argument trades on the epistemic situation of the subject in the bad case. Notably, unlike with other superficially similar arguments against knowledge norms, knowledge normers preferred strategy of appealing to the distinction between permissibility and excusability cannot help them to rebut this argument.
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  12. Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. Maruš, I.ć & Berislav - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good chance that we won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe (...)
     
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  13.  10
    Norms and Aims of Belief.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 184.
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  14. The Norms of Assertion and the Aims of Belief.Sarah Wright - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.
  15. Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Berislav Maru%si'C. - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Berislav Maru%si'c explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.
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  16.  15
    Evidence and Agency Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Berislav Marusic - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Berislav Marusic explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.
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  17.  8
    Berislav Marušić, Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):687-695.
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    Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Christian Kietzmann - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
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    Marušić, Berislav. Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 256. $65.00. [REVIEW]Katia Vavova - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):687-695.
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  20.  33
    Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief.Casey Perin - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2):107-125.
  21. Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account.Neil Mehta - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):681-705.
    Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets (...)
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  22. Doxastic Norms and the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):59-74.
     
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  23.  8
    Book Review:Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms; Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice Jordan Howard Sobel; The Dynamics of Norms Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffery, Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW]Roy Gardner - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):553-.
  24. The Ethics of Belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The “ ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief formation, belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right to believe on the basis of sufficient (...)
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  25.  74
    Why Did Weyl Think That Dedekind's Norm of Belief in Mathematics is Perverse?Iulian D. Toader - 2016 - In Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 80,. pp. 445-451.
    This paper discusses an intriguing, though rather overlooked case of normative disagreement in the history of philosophy of mathematics: Weyl's criticism of Dedekind’s famous principle that "In science, what is provable ought not to be believed without proof." This criticism, as I see it, challenges not only a logicist norm of belief in mathematics, but also a realist view about whether there is a fact of the matter as to what norms of belief are correct.
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  26. Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant.Rachel McKinnon - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book is about the norms of the speech act of assertion. This is a topic of lively contemporary debate primarily carried out in epistemology and philosophy of language. Suppose that you ask me what time an upcoming meeting starts, and I say, “4 p.m.” I’ve just asserted that the meeting starts at 4 p.m. Whenever we make claims like this, we’re asserting. The central question here is whether we need to know what we say, and, relatedly, whether what (...)
     
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  27. Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely by (...)
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  28.  49
    Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695-2720.
    Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism generally claims that humans acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper introduces Negative Doxastic Voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: humans tend to acquire beliefs more or less automatically and unreflectively, but they tend to (...)
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  29.  11
    The Defence of Belief in Consent: Guidelines and Jury Instructions for Application of Criminal Code Section 265(4).Lucinda Vandervort - 2005 - Criminal Law Quarterly 50 (4):441-452.
    The availability of the defence of belief in consent under section 265(4) is a question of law, subject to review on appeal. The statutory provision is based on the common law rule that applies to all defences. Consideration of the defence when it is unavailable in law and failure to consider it when it is available are both incorrect. A judge is most likely to avoid error when ruling on availability of the defence if the ruling: (1) is grounded (...)
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  30. The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
    It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of (...)
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  31. Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally (...)
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  32. Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.
    In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable with other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim (...)
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  33.  64
    Norms of Assertion.Graham Oppy - 2007 - In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 5--226.
    This chapter discusses norms of assertion. I defend the view that the sole constitutive norm of assertion is that you should not assert what you do not believe. I also discuss the views of some--e.g. Grice, Williamson--who have defended the stronger view that the sole constitutive norm of assertion is that you should not assert what you do not know.
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  34. The Truth Norm of Belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.
    I argue that, if belief is subject to a norm of truth, then that norm is evaluative rather than prescriptive in character. No prescriptive norm of truth is both plausible as a norm that we are subject to, and also capable of explaining what the truth norm of belief is supposed to explain. Candidate prescriptive norms also have implausible consequences for the normative status of withholding belief. An evaluative norm fares better in all of these respects. (...)
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  35.  46
    Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
    Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such asBangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then (...)
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  36. The Practice of Assertion Under Conditions of Religious Ignorance.Aaron Rizzieri - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):27--39.
    The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non–dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of one’s own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the (...)
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  37. Three Challenges (and Three Replies) to the Ethics of Belief.Brian Huss - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):249-271.
    In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe (...)
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  38. The Normative Evaluation of Belief and The Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (10):588-612.
    It is a piece of philosophical commonsense that belief and knowledge are states. Some epistemologists reject this claim in hope of answering certain difficult questions about the normative evaluation of belief. I shall argue, however, that this move offends not only against philosophical commonsense but also against ordinary common sense, at least as far as this is manifested in the semantic content of the words we use to talk about belief and knowledge. I think it is relatively (...)
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    Logical Dynamics of Belief Change in the Community.Fenrong Liu, Jeremy Seligman & Patrick Girard - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2403-2431.
    In this paper we explore the relationship between norms of belief revision that may be adopted by members of a community and the resulting dynamic properties of the distribution of beliefs across that community. We show that at a qualitative level many aspects of social belief change can be obtained from a very simple model, which we call ‘threshold influence’. In particular, we focus on the question of what makes the beliefs of a community stable under various (...)
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  40.  52
    The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    John Gibbons presents a new account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms--truth and reasonableness, for example--but which one is the fundamental norm of belief? He explains both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable.
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  41. How to Be a Normativist About the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.
    According to the normativist, it is built into the nature of belief itself that beliefs are subject to a certain set of norms. I argue here that only a normativist account can explain certain non-normative facts about what it takes to have the capacity for belief. But this way of defending normativism places an explanatory burden on any normativist account that an account on which a truth norm is explanatorily fundamental simply cannot discharge. I develop an alternative (...)
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  42.  44
    Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic.Lawrence Pasternack - 2014 - Kant-Studien 105 (1):41-82.
    Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns (...)
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    Belief's Own Metaethics? A Case Against Epistemic Normativity.Charles Cote-Bouchard - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College London
    Epistemology is widely seen as a normative discipline like ethics. Just like moral facts, epistemic facts – i.e. facts about our beliefs’ epistemic justification, rationality, reasonableness, correctness, warrant, and the like – are standardly viewed as normative facts. Yet, whereas many philosophers have rejected the existence of moral facts, few have raised similar doubts about the existence of epistemic facts. In recent years however, several metaethicists and epistemologists have rejected this Janus-faced or dual stance towards the existence of moral and (...)
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  44.  27
    How Norms Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.
    Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide (...)
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  45. Belief Norms & Blindspots.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.
    I defend the thesis that beliefs are constitutively normative from two kinds of objection. After clarifying what a “blindspot” proposition is and the different types of blindspots there can be, I show that the existence of such propositions does not undermine the thesis that beliefs are essentially governed by a negative truth norm. I argue that the “normative variance” exhibited by this norm is not a defect. I also argue that if we accept a distinction between subjective and objective (...) there need be no worrying tension between doxastic norms of truth and doxastic norms of evidence. I show how a similar approach applies to the attitude of guessing. I then suggest that if we distinguish between practical and theoretical rationality, we will prefer a negative form of norm that does not positively oblige us to form beliefs. I finish by considering an alternative possible subjunctive form of norm that would also avoid problems with blindspots but suggest this has a non-intuitive consequence. (shrink)
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  46. Norms of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This paper argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt of testimony in conversational contexts. It then attempts to articulate these norms and determine their justification. More fully specified these norms prescribe that speakers tell the truth informatively, or be trustworthy, and that audiences presume that speakers do this, or trust. These norms of (...)
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  47.  26
    Testimonial Entitlement, Norms of Assertion and Privacy.Philip J. Nickel - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):207-217.
    According to assurance views of testimonial justification, in virtue of the act of testifying a speaker provides an assurance of the truth of what she asserts to the addressee. This assurance provides a special justificatory force and a distinctive normative status to the addressee. It is thought to explain certain asymmetries between addressees and other unintended hearers (bystanders and eavesdroppers), such as the phenomenon that the addressee has a right to blame the speaker for conveying a falsehood but unintended hearers (...)
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  48.  42
    Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief.Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
    A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes (...)
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  49.  7
    Norms of Credibility.Jennife Lackey - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):323-338.
    In this paper, I explore whether there is a need for a multiplicity of norms governing belief due to differences in the objects of those beliefs, particularly the difference between persons and nonpersons. I call the view according to which there is a single epistemic norm governing belief monism, and the view that there is more than one such norm pluralism. I consider three different kinds of objections to monism that stem specifically from considerations unique to assessing (...)
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  50.  3
    The Norms of the Mental.Pascal Engel - unknown
    This paper analyses Davidson's conception of the norms of rationality which govern, according to him, the interpretation of mind and action. While I accept Davidson's thesis that there are norms of the mental, I disagree with him on their scope. It is argued that there are much more specific norms for concepts, and that belief in partiuclar is governed by a norm of truth.
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