Mitochondrial/nuclear transfer (M/NT) to avoid the transmission of serious mitochondrial disease raises complex and challenging ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI). In February 2015, the United Kingdom became the first country in the world to legalize M/NT, making the heated debate surrounding this technology even more relevant. This critical interpretive review identified 95 relevant papers discussing the ELSI of M/NT, including original research articles, government-commissioned reports, editorials, letters to editors and research news. The review presents and synthesizes the (...) arguments present in the literature in relation to the most commonly raised themes: terminology; identity, relationships and parenthood; potential harm; reproductive autonomy; available alternatives; consent; impact on specific interest groups; resources; “slippery slope”; creation, use and destruction of human embryos; and beneficence. The review concludes by identifying those ELSI that are specific to M/NT and by calling for follow-up longitudinal clinical and psychosocial research in order to equip future ELSI debate with empirical evidence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recent developments allow for the creation of human stem cells without the creation of human embryos, a process called alternate nuclear transfer (‘ANT’). Pursuing this method of stem cell research makes sense for pro‐lifers if arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo do not apply to ANT. However, the technology that makes ANT possible undermines the erstwhile technical barrier between human embryos and somatic cell DNA. These advances bring home the force of hypothetical arguments about the (...) potential of the DNA in somatic cells, showing that there is not a morally relevant difference between the potential of an embryo and the potential of the DNA in a somatic cell. Therefore, the supposed distinction between entities that are potential human life and entities that are human life does not give any support to arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo because those arguments extend value to too many entities. (shrink)

A remarkable event occurred at the December 3, 2004, meeting of the U. S. President’s Council on Bioethics. Council member William Hurlbut, a physician and Consulting Professor in the Program in Human Biology at Stanford University, formally unveiled a proposal that he claimed would solve the ethical problems surrounding the extraction of stem cells from human embryos. The proposal would involve the creation of genetically defective embryos that “never rise to the level of integrated organismal existence essential to be designated (...) human life with potential,” and therefore could be used as morally acceptable sources of stem cells for research and therapy. The aim of this essay is to show that Hurlbut’s proposal does not solve the ethical problems associated with human embryonic stem cell research. Two major reasons are presented. First, the proposal, which involves modification of a somatic cell nucleus, suffers from an ethical problem that is common to all types of human genetic engineering: since the procedure is not foolproof, there will be failures. In the case of the procedure Hurlbut proposes, some normal (albeit cloned) embryos will be produced. Second, the embryo engineered in the manner described is, at least in the early stages of its development, fully human despite its genetic defect. This essay also will show how a reasonable person might mistakenly view the proposal as legitimate if he or she makes the error of conflating genetic determinism with Aristotelian teleology. Finally, it will argue that ethical clarity can be achieved by seeing the embryo as a holistic entity possessing emergent properties that cannot simply be spelled out by genes. (shrink)

Harvesting human embryonic stem (hES) cells is a highly controversial field of research because it rests on the destruction of human embryos. Altering the procedure of nuclear transfer (NT) is suggested to generate hES cell lines without ethical obstacles by claiming that no embryo would be involved. While discussing the nature of an embryo and related central questions concerning their moral status and the respect they deserve, this paper argues that the entity created by somatic cell nuclear (...) transfer (SCNT) or altered nuclear transfer (ANT) is an embryo and has the same moral status as a natural embryo. Respect for the embryo is expressed by the ethical principles of proportionality, probability and subsidiarity. This paper argues that the human embryo should only be taken for research with high ranking goals, which are proven in animal experimentation and for which there are no alternatives. This makes ANT obsolete and shows that SCNT to produce hES cells is premature at the present time. (shrink)

Ford, Norman Once therapies using embryonic stem cells enter clinical practice, pressure will increase to find pluripotent stem cells for therapeutic purposes that are not derived from human embryos. This article explores several likely sources of such pluripotent cells.

This essay aims to tell the story of the “altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming,” or ANT-OAR, proposal—from its conception by Professor William Hurlbut of the President’s Council on Bioethics—to its adoption and promotion by a group of conservative, mostly Catholic philosophers, theologians and scientists—to its eventual demise in Congress. It also will give some reflections on how ANT-OAR promotes a genetically deterministic view of the human organism and can lead down a slippery slope into a future in which (...) human cloning and human genetic engineering are more acceptable. For these reasons, it will be argued, ANT-OAR should be opposed by all who are against human genetic modification regardless of their political orientation. (shrink)

I argue that contraception is morally wrong but that periodic abstinence (or natural family planning) is not. Further, I argue that altered nuclear transfer—a proposed technique for creating human stem cells without destroying human embryos—is morally wrong for the same reason that contraception is. Contrary to what readers might expect, my argument assumes nothing about the morality of cloning or abortion and requires no premises about God or natural teleology. Instead, I argue that contraception and altered nuclear (...) transfer are morally wrong because they fail to treat humanity as an inviolable end. (shrink)

I argue that the contralife argument, which new natural law theorists have proposed as an argument against contraception, also would rule out altered nuclear transfer, which has been proposed as a way of procuring human stem cells without destroying human embryos.

Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) remains a controversial technique, one that has elicited a variety of regulatory responses throughout the world. On March 29, 2005, Canada's Assisted Human Reproduction Act came into force. This law prohibits a number of research activities, including SCNT. Given the pluralistic nature of Canadian society, the creation of this law stands as an interesting case study of the policy-making process and how and why a liberal democracy ends up making the relatively rare decision (...) to use a statutory prohibition, backed by severe penalties, to stop a particular scientific activity. In this article, we provide a comprehensive and systematic legal analysis of the legislative process and parliamentary debates associated with the passage of this law. (shrink)

We examine whether the current regulatory regime instituted in South Korea and the United States would have prevented Hwang’s potential transgressions in oocyte procurement for somatic cell nuclear transfer, we compare the general aspects and oversight framework of the Bioethics and Biosafety Act in South Korea and the US National Academies’ Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and apply the relevant provisions and recommendations to each transgression. We conclude that the Act would institute centralized oversight under governmental (...) auspices while the Guidelines recommend politically-independent, decentralized oversight bodies including a special review body for human embryonic stem cell research at an institutional level and that the Guidelines would have provided more vigorous protection for the women who had undergone oocyte procurement for Hwang’s research than the Act. We also suggest additional regulations to protect those who provide oocytes for research in South Korea. (shrink)

First put forth in June 2005, the altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming (ANT-OAR) proposal has been promoted as an ethically-acceptable alternative to the embryo-destructive methods now used to obtain embryonic stem cells. According to its proponents, the goal of ANT-OAR is to use the cloning process to create a pluripotent stem cell. This would be achieved through overexpression of the transcription factor Nanog (or a hypothetical substitute) both in the enucleated egg cell and in the somatic cell prior (...) to transfer of its nucleus. Although the ethical acceptability of ANT-OAR has been publicly debated, its scientific feasibility has not. This paper aims to help rectify this situation. It argues that ANT-OAR, as currently conceived, cannot realistically work. It presents evidence from the scientific literature showing that Nanog cannot single-handedly establish pluripotency in cells, but rather works together with a network of other transcription factors to maintain pluripotency. It argues that ANT-OAR is based on a flawed understanding of stem cell biology, and emphasizes that, in this debate about embryonic stem cells, scientists must strive to accurately and realistically assess the feasibility of the embryo research strategies they propose. (shrink)

Despite the progress achieved over the last decade after the birth of the first cloned mammal, the efficiency of reproductive cloning remains invariably low. However, research aiming at the use of nuclear transfer for the production of patient‐tailored stem cells for cell/tissue therapy is progressing rapidly. Yet, reproductive cloning has many potential implications for animal breeding, transgenic research and the conservation of endangered species. In this article we suggest that the changes in the epi‐/genotype observed in cloned embryos (...) arise from unbalanced nuclear reprogramming between parental chromosomes. It is probable that the oocyte reprogramming machinery, devised for resident chromosomes, cannot target the paternal alleles of somatic cells. We, therefore, suggest that a reasonable approach to balance this asymmetry in nuclear reprogramming might involve the transient expression in donor cells of chromatin remodelling proteins, which are physiologically expressed during spermatogenesis, in order to induce a male‐specific chromatin organisation in the somatic cells before nuclear transfer. BioEssays 30:66–74, 2008. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The Chief Medical Officer of Health of the United Kingdom has recommended that the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act should be amended to allow cloning in humans for research purposes only. He also recommended that: “The transfer of an embryo created by cell nuclear replacement into the uterus of a woman (so called ‘reproductive cloning’) should remain a criminal offence” (recommendation 7, Ref. 1). This recommendation implies that nuclear replacement and cloning are the same. They are (...) not. Nuclear transfer constitutes reproductive cloning only when the individual created is genetically identical to the nuclear donor. In this paper, we describe a possible future use of nuclear transfer for the treatment of infertile individuals. The treatment yields an individual that receives approximately equal genetic contributions from each parent. We use this example to illustrate how semantic confusion might lead to plausibly moral and justifiable treatments being legally banned. In doing so, we hope to encourage a more accurate and informed use of language in science, law and politics, so that legislation is properly informed by science and achieves what it intends. BioEssays 23:359–364, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that there is no compelling therapeutic ‘need’ for human nuclear genome transfer to prevent mitochondrial diseases caused by mtDNA mutations. At most there is a strong interest in this technology on the part of some women and couples at risk of having children with mitochondrial disease, and perhaps also a ‘want’ on the part of some researchers who see the technology as a useful precedent – one that provides them with ‘a quiet way (...) station’ in which to refine the micromanipulations techniques essential for other human germline interventions and human cloning. In advance of this argument, I review basic information about mitochondrial disease and novel genetic strategies to prevent the transmission of mutated mitochondria. Next, I address common features of contemporary debates and discussions about so-called mitochondrial replacement. First, I contest the cliché that science-and-technology is fast outpacing ethics. Second, I dispute the accuracy of the term ‘mitochondrial replacement’. Third, I provide a sustained critique of the purported ‘need’ for genetically-related children. In closing, I call into question the mainly liberal defense of human nuclear genome transfer. I suggest an alternative frame of reference that pays particular attention to issues of social justice. I conclude that our limited resources should be carefully expended in pursuit of the common good, which does not include pandering to acquired desires. (shrink)

Giulia Cavaliere and César Palacios-González argue that lesbian couples should have access to human nuclear genome transfer so that both members of the couple can have a genetic link to the child they intend to parent. Their argument is grounded in an appeal to reproductive freedom. In this Response, I address a number of concerns with their argument. These concerns relate to nomenclature, treating like cases alike, genetic-relatedness and the limits of reproductive rights. On this last point, I (...) insist that we should not mistake ‘wants’ for ‘needs’ or ‘rights’. I maintain that there is no right to biological parenthood, there is no compelling need for human nuclear genome transfer to satisfy a so-called need for genetically-related children, and we ought not to pander to an acquired desire for genetic filiation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Direct Nuclear Reprogramming: Response to Condic, Lee, and GeorgeGerard Magill, Ph.D. and William B. NeavesWe read with great interest the response of Maureen Condic, Patrick Lee, and Robert George (2009) to our essay, “Ontological and Ethical Implications of Direct Nuclear Reprogramming” in the March 2009 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (Magill and Neaves 2009). Much of their response addressed issues that are not in (...) dispute: somatic cells are not zygotes, neurons and hepatocytes are different, growth-factor signals from the trophoblast influence development of the inner cell mass, membranes derived from the trophectoderm are critically required for embryonic survival, and stem cells cannot produce a fetus “on their own.”The crucial point of disagreement deals with the fact that iPS cells are not totipotent but zygotes are. Zygotes can generate their own placental structures while iPS cells must be given them through tetraploid complementation. Condic, Lee, and George consider totipotency to be crucial to natural potentiality. We present an alternative view in our essay (Magill and Neaves 2009, pp. 28–29). Placental structures make no lasting contribution to the postnatal organism, and the equivalency of iPS cells with the inner cell mass of the blastocyst is apparent from tetraploid complementation experiments.The respondents acknowledge the following:... somatic cells can be “converted” into zygotes by the process of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or direct reprogramming in combination with tetraploid complementation—just as sperm and egg cells can be “converted” into a zygote by the process of natural fertilization—....(Condic, Lee, and George 2009, p. 35)As the respondents recognize, different ways of manipulating cells can lead to embryogenesis: sperm and egg cells in the process of natural fertilization, the enucleated egg and an ordinary body cell in the process of somatic cell nuclear transfer, and reprogrammed skin cells and a tetraploid blastocyst in the case of induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells. In each case, different cells are manipulated—or “converted” in the respondents’ terminology—in a process that alters their biological fate within a supportive environment facilitating embryogenesis.The developmental potential that resides in the human genome does not unfold in isolation, not even in a zygote. In all cases, whether involving a zygote or an iPS cell, interaction with a supportive environment is required to express the developmental program residing in the genome. [End Page 201]This biological reality supports what we have described as “early cellular development along the continuum of natural potentiality that can result in the formation of a fetus” (Magill and Neaves 2009, p. 30), and it presents a significant challenge to the natural potentiality argument.Gerard MagillVernon F. Gallagher Chair for the Integration of Science, Theology, Philosophy, and Law, and Professor, Center for Healthcare Ethics Duquesne University Pittsburgh, PA.William B. NeavesPresident and CEO Stowers Institute for Medical Research and Professor of Basic Medical Science University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Medicine Kansas City, MOReferencesCondic, Maureen L.; Lee, Patrick; and George, Robert P. 2008. Ontological and Ethical Implications of Direct Nuclear Reprogramming: Response to Magill and Neaves. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19: 33–40. Google ScholarMagill, Gerard, and Neaves William B. 2009. Ontological and Ethical Implications of Direct Nuclear Reprogramming. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19: 23–32. Google ScholarCopyright © 2009 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

The technique of nuclear transplantation – popularly known as cloning – has been integrated into several different histories of twentieth century biology. Historians and science scholars have situated nuclear transplantation within narratives of scientific practice, biotechnology, bioethics, biomedicine, and changing views of life. However, nuclear transplantation has never been the focus of analysis. In this article, I examine the development of nuclear transplantation techniques, focusing on the people, motivations, and institutions associated with the first successful (...) class='Hi'>nuclear transfer in metazoans in 1952. The conflict between embryologists and geneticists over the mechanisms of differentiation motivated Robert Briggs to pursue nuclear transplantation experiments as a way to resolve the debate. Briggs worked at the Lankenau Hospital Research Institute, a research facility devoted to the study of cancer. The goal of understanding cancer would play a role in the development of the technique, and the story of nuclear transplantation sheds light on the role that biomedical contexts play in biological research in the second half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from (...) agreements or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the intending mother, and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from (...) agreements or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the “intending mother,” and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

During evolution, the genomes of eukaryotic cells have undergone major restructuring to meet the new regulatory challenges associated with compartmentalization of the genetic material in the nucleus and the organelles acquired by endosymbiosis (mitochondria and plastids). Restructuring involved the loss of dispensable or redundant genes and the massive translocation of genes from the ancestral organelles to the nucleus. Genomics and bioinformatic data suggest that the process of DNA transfer from organelles to the nucleus still continues, providing raw material for (...) evolutionary tinkering in the nuclear genome. Recent reconstruction of these events in the laboratory has provided a unique tool to observe genome evolution in real time and to study the molecular mechanisms by which plastid genes are converted into functional nuclear genes. Here, we summarize current knowledge about plastid‐to‐nuclear gene transfer in the context of genome evolution and discuss new insights gained from experiments that recapitulate endosymbiotic gene transfer in the laboratory. BioEssays 30:556–566, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Community detection is a major issue in network analysis. This paper combines a socio-historical approach with an experimental reconstruction of programs to investigate the early automation of clique detection algorithms, which remains one of the unsolved NP-complete problems today. The research led by the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin from the 1950s on non-numerical information and graph analysis is retraced to demonstrate the early contributions of social sciences and humanities. The limited recognition and reception of Gardin's innovative computer application to the humanities (...) are addressed through two factors, in addition to the effects of historiography and bibliographies on the recording, discoverability, and reuse of scientific productions: (1) funding policies, evidenced by the transfer of research effort on graph applications from temporary interdisciplinary spaces to disciplinary organizations related to the then-emerging field of computer science; and (2) the erratic careers of algorithms, in which efficiency, flaws, corrections, and authors’ status, were determining factors. (shrink)

This paper approaches the choice between the open and closed nuclear fuel cycles as a matter of intergenerational justice, by revealing the value conflicts in the production of nuclear energy. The closed fuel cycle improve sustainability in terms of the supply certainty of uranium and involves less long-term radiological risks and proliferation concerns. However, it compromises short-term public health and safety and security, due to the separation of plutonium. The trade-offs in nuclear energy are reducible to a (...) chief trade-off between the present and the future. To what extent should we take care of our produced nuclear waste and to what extent should we accept additional risks to the present generation, in order to diminish the exposure of future generation to those risks? The advocates of the open fuel cycle should explain why they are willing to transfer all the risks for a very long period of time (200,000 years) to future generations. In addition, supporters of the closed fuel cycle should underpin their acceptance of additional risks to the present generation and make the actual reduction of risk to the future plausible. (shrink)

The most common form of the CO2‐fixing enzyme rubisco is a form I enzyme, heretofore found universally in oxygenic phototrophs (cyanobacteria and plastids) and widely in proteobacteria. Two groups(1–4), however, now report that in dinoflagellate plastids the usual form I rubisco has been replaced by the distantly related form II enzyme, known previously only from anaerobic proteobacteria. This raises the important question of how such an oxygensensitive rubisco could function in an aerobic organism. Moreover, the dinoflagellate rubisco has unusual molecular (...) properties: it is encoded as a polyprotein, by nuclear (rather than plastid) genes, and these genes contain noncanonical spliceosomal introns. The nuclear location and alphaproteobacterial affinity of dinoflagellate rubisco genes hint at a possible mitochondrial origin and highlight the extraordinary richness of lateral gene transfers, both between and within organisms, that have occurred during rubisco evolution. (shrink)

The February 1997 announcement of the birth of Dolly, the sheep cloned from a mammary cell of an adult ewe, has drawn attention to the growing ability to select, alter, or otherwise manipulate the genome of offspring. Prior to Dolly, ethical discussion of genes in reproduction had focused on negative selection: carrier screening, prenatal diagnosis, and abortion or embryo discard. After Dolly, ethical debate will have to consider the direct or positive use of genetic selection or alteration technology.The principal use (...) of genetic selection techniques in human reproduction likely will be to treat or prevent disease in offspring. In the future, however, such techniques might also be used to enhance or even diminish expected characteristics of progeny. Techniques to accomplish these goals are likely to include: selection of the nuclear genome, as occurs in somatic cell cloning; chromosomal transplants; or direct insertion or deletion of specific genes. (shrink)

The February 1997 announcement of the birth of Dolly, the sheep cloned from a mammary cell of an adult ewe, has drawn attention to the growing ability to select, alter, or otherwise manipulate the genome of offspring. Prior to Dolly, ethical discussion of genes in reproduction had focused on negative selection: carrier screening, prenatal diagnosis, and abortion or embryo discard. After Dolly, ethical debate will have to consider the direct or positive use of genetic selection or alteration technology.The principal use (...) of genetic selection techniques in human reproduction likely will be to treat or prevent disease in offspring. In the future, however, such techniques might also be used to enhance or even diminish expected characteristics of progeny. Techniques to accomplish these goals are likely to include: selection of the nuclear genome, as occurs in somatic cell cloning; chromosomal transplants; or direct insertion or deletion of specific genes. (shrink)

The double membrane of the nuclear envelope is a formidable barrier separating the nucleus and cytoplasm of eukaryotic cells. However, movement of specific macromolecules across the nuclear envelope is critical for embryonic development, cell growth and differentiation. Transfer of molecules between the nucleus and cytoplasm occurs through the aqueous channel formed by the nuclear pore complex (NPC)Abbreviations: NPC, nuclear pore complex; GlcNac, N‐acetylglucosamine; WGA, wheat germ agglutinin. Although small molecules may simply diffuse across the NPC, (...) transport of large proteins and RNA requires specific transport signals and is energy dependent. A family of pore glycoproteins modified by O‐linked N‐acetylglucosamine moieties are essential for transport through the NPC. Recent evidence suggests that the regulation of nuclear transport may also involve the inteaction of RNA and nuclear proteins with specific binding proteins that recognize these transport signals. Are these nuclear pore glycoproteins and signal binding proteins the ‘gatekeepers’ that control access to the genetic material? Recent evidence obtained from a combination of biochemical and genetic approaches suggests – perhaps. (shrink)

As targeted proteins that move within the cell, the steroid receptors have become very useful probes for understanding the linked phenomena of protein folding and transport. From the study of steroid receptor‐associated proteins it has become clear over the past two years that these receptors are bound to a multiprotein complex containing at least two heat shock proteins, hsp90 and hsp56. Attachment of receptors to this complex in a cell‐free system appears to require the protein unfolding/folding activity of a third (...) heat shock protein, hsp70. Like the oncogenic tyrosine kinase pp60src, steroid receptors bind to this complex of chaperone proteins at the time of their translation. Binding of the receptor to the hsp90 component of the system occurs through the hormone binding domain and is under strict hormonal control. The hormone binding domain of the receptor acts as a transferable regulatory unit that confers both tight hormonal control and hsp90 binding onto chimaeric proteins. The model of folding and transport being developed for steroid receptors leads to some general suggestions regarding the folding and transport of targeted proteins in the cell. (shrink)

Germ-line therapy has long been regarded with great caution both by scientists and by ethicists. Even those who do not reject germ-line therapy in principle have tended to reject it in practice as carrying unacceptable risks in our current state of knowledge. For this reason, a recent paper by Rubenstein, Thomasma, Shon, and Zinaman is unusual in putting forward a serious proposal for the use of germ-line therapy in the foreseeable future.

A common feature of scientific and ethical debates is that clones are generally described and understood as “copies” or, more specifically defined, as “genetic copies.” The attempt of this paper is to question this widespread definition. It first argues that the terminology of “clone as copy” can only be understood as a metaphor, and therefore, a clone is not a “genetic copy” in a strict literal sense, but in a figurative one. Second, the copy metaphor has a normative component that (...) is problematic in the context of descriptive science and may support or indicate the ethically relevant phenomenon of objectification of animals. In order to support the argument against the common conception of a clone as a copy, the biotechnological principles of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning will be examined. On this basis, it will be shown that the metaphor is valid because of similarities between the phenotype, the genotype, or the nuclear DNA sequence of the clone and its progenitor by using three prominent levels of comparison. Focusing on the process of SCNT, it will be shown that cloning as copying or doubling has to be redefined for scientific purposes because it is neither necessary nor does it fit to the biotechnological principles of cloning. It is more accurate to understand SCNT cloning as a process of splitting rather than of doubling or copying. In the second part, a deconstructivist analysis based on Jacques Derrida’s description in Positions will reveal the normative potential of the original–copy dichotomy. I will be showing that it includes an asymmetrical power structure between the original and the copy and that this structure can be reversed or at least considered unstable. Therefore, arguments that build on that metaphor must be reconsidered. Moreover, the analysis reveals that applying a terminology to humans and animals that is commonly used for things becomes the language of objectification. Two selected examples, fungibility and violability, based on Martha Nussbaum’s notion of objectification will support the thesis of objectification, display its normative consequences, and put the clone as a copy metaphor in a broader range of ethically questionable research tendencies. (shrink)

The momentum of advances in biology is evident in the history of patents on life forms. As we proceed forward with greater understanding and technological control of developmental biology there will be many new and challenging dilemmas related to patenting of human parts and partial trajectories of human development. These dilemmas are already evident in the current conflict over the moral status of the early human embryo. In this essay, recent evidence from embryological studies is considered and the unbroken continuity (...) of organismal development initiated at fertilization is asserted as clear and reasonable grounds for moral standing. Within this frame of analysis, it is proposed that through a technique of Altered Nuclear Transfer, non-organismal entities might be created from which embryonic stem cells could be morally procured. Criteria for patenting of such non-organismal entities are considered. (shrink)

ABSTRACT William Hurlbut, a Stanford University bioethicist and member of the President's Council on Bioethics, recently proposed a solution to the current impasse over human embryonic stem cell research in the United States. He suggested that researchers could use genetic engineering and somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning) to develop human ‘pseudo‐embryos’ that have no potential to develop fully into human persons. According to Hurlbut, even thinkers who typically ascribe high moral status to human embryos could approve of (...) destroying these ‘pseudo‐embryos’ for the sake of harvesting human embryonic stem cells. This essay argues, first, that an argument based on the ‘paradox of the heap’ (an argument that many ‘pro‐life’ thinkers employ in order to defend the notion that human embryos have high moral value from the moment of conception) challenges the ethical legitimacy of Hurlbut's proposal. Second, the paper argues that this conflict may illustrate a reductio ad absurdum for this ‘pro‐life’ argument itself rather than being a problem for Hurlbut's proposal. As a result, the paper challenges the ‘pro‐life’ strategy of arguing that one should respond to uncertainty about the moral status of developing embryos by being morally ‘cautious’ and granting all human embryos full moral status from the moment of conception. It appears that one is faced with a complex series of choices (about where to draw the moral line between entities that are human persons and entities that are not), and a strict moral ‘cautiousness’ about this series of choices may ultimately lead to absurdity. (shrink)

The mammalian egg employs a wide spectrum of epigenome modification machinery to reprogram the sperm nucleus shortly after fertilization. This event is required for transcriptional activation of the paternal/zygotic genome and progression through cleavage divisions. Reprogramming of paternal nuclei requires replacement of sperm protamines with canonical and non‐canonical histones, covalent modification of histone tails, and chemical modification of DNA (notably oxidative demethylation of methylated cytosines). In this essay we highlight the role maternal histone variants play during developmental reprogramming following fertilization. (...) We discuss how reduced maternal histone variant incorporation in somatic nuclear transfer experiments may explain the reduced viability of resulting embryos and how knowledge of repressive and activating maternal factors may be used to improve somatic cell reprogramming. (shrink)

I argue against the view that modern biology has undermined traditional moral rules, including the prohibition of abortion and restrictions on human embryonic stem cell research, by blurring the distinction between humans and other animals. I argue that this view depends on the false premise that an organism can be wronged only if the organism has conscious interests. I then defend a rule against harvesting stem cells in a way that kills an organism with a rational nature. Finally, I apply (...) this rule to proposals about altered nuclear transfer and animal-human chimeras. (shrink)